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Abstract
Long distance trade routes, based on ivory, from the interior 
of East-Central Africa to Mozambique and Kilwa were forged by the 
Maravi and the Yao, respectively, during the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, and by about 1698 the Yao apparently 
dominated both these routes* After 1698, factors influencing the 
ivory trade at the coast caused the Yao to shift most of their 
trade from Kilwa to Mozambique, where Yao ivory soon constituted the 
basis of the island1 s trade* In the interior, the Yao traded with 
the Maravi and, through the Bisa, with the recently established 
Eastern Lunda state of the Mwata Kazembe. After 1750* Kilwa slowly 
began to revive as Zanzibar, under Omani hegemony, became an 
increasingly important coastal entrepot, while the trade of Moyambique 
was plagued by Makua belligerence and by Portuguese harassment of 
the Indian trading community there* By 1785* influenced in particular 
by the better price paid for ivory at Kilwa, most Yao had rechannelled 
their trade back to Kilwa*
Concurrently, the substance of trade in East-Central Africa was 
being altered, as slaves became an increasingly important commodity due 
to the rising demands of both the Arabs and French traders from the 
Mascarene Islands* By the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
although ivory still dominated the Yao trade to Kilwa, those Yao 
who continued to trade to Moyambique were already basing their trade 
on slaves* By the late 1830s slaves had also become dominant along 
the Kilwa route, which continued to command the bulk of Yao trade*
The Ngoni invasions and mid-century dispersal of the Yao, caused by 
Makua and Lomwe attacks from the east, transformed the Yao from 
traders into invaders, as they spilled into Malawi and Tanzania, and 
marked the beginning of Yao political hegemony over a wider area of 
East-Central Africa, while destroying the earlier pattern of trade*
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PREFACE
The history of East-Central Africa is a particularly fascinating 
subject, with ample possibilities for further investigation. I am 
grateful to both Dr. J. Richard Cray and Professor Roland Oliver for 
directing my attention towards this area of Africa, in which I have 
set my thesis, and in which I hope to undertake further historical 
studies. My thanks also go to the Research Fund of the University of 
London, whose generosity facilitated the undertaking of research in 
Lisbon during the summer of 1964*
In this study I have tried to modernize all Portuguese personal 
names, despite the fact that even today there is precious little
consistency in the spelling of these by individual Portuguese. When­
ever possible I have given Swahili names in the Kiswahili form, and 
Arabic names in a modified Arabic form, basing the latter on the 
spelling utilized in the Oxford History of East Africa. Regarding 
the orthography of African names, I have sought no more than internal 
consistency. Makua names are given in their most common contemporary 
Portuguese form. I have preferred *c* to * ch* in the case of the Cewa, 
and in all Ciyao sectional names and words; thus, ‘Macinga,* not 
‘Machinga* Yao. At the same time, I have used ‘Hangoche,* the place, 
to distinguish it from fMangoce,! the Yao section. Similarly, I have 
retained !Maravi! for the people, but employed ‘Malawi* for certain 
references, in the hope of avoiding confusion.
I wish to express my gratitude to the Directors and Staffs of the
various archives, in Portugal, France, and England, in which I have 
completed the research for my thesis. I am specially grateful to 
Professor C.R. Boxer and to the Marquesa of Cadaval for allowing me to 
see manuscripts in their private collections.
To Dr. J. Richard Gray I owe my sincerest thanks, not only for his 
keen scholarly counsel in the study of African history, but also for 
his friendship and encouragement.
Finally, only my wife, and perhaps not even she, knows how indebted 
I am to her.
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GLOSSARY
Alf£ndega royal custom-house 
Alvar^l a royal or vice-regal decree 
Arroba a weight of about 32 pounds 
Auto de visita writ of inspection 
Bando a proclamation
Bar, bares a weight which varied between about 510 to 650 pounds; 
composed of either 15 arrobas, or 20 farayolas
Carta patente official letter of installation
Compagnie des Indes the French East Indies Company
Cruzado a silver coin equal to 400 rlis
Despacho a writ, or clearance; dispatch
Devassa a judicial investigation
Estado da India State of India, the name applied to the Portuguese
possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope, of which 
Moyambique formed a part until 1752
Farayola a weight varying from 18 to 30 pounds; composed of 12 mainas
Junta do Com^rcio Board of Trade
Laka a single sail, single outrigger canoe used by the maritime
peoples of Madagascar
Machila a rough, durable cloth woven by Africans north and south of 
the Zambezi
Mayo bundle, packet
Maina a weight of about 1-g- to 2-g- pounds
Morador a Portuguese colonist, as opposed to non-Portuguese inhabitant
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Pangaio a generic term for several varieties of Arab and Swahili 
coasting vessels
Parecer an opinion, or recommendation
Pataca the Portuguese name for the Austrian Maria Theresa and 
Spanish dollars, equal in the eighteenth century first 
to 3* then to 4> and when marked, to 6 cruzados
Patamar, patamares an African, or mulatto, trading agent, usually
slave, who travelled in the hinterland on
behalf of his master at the coast
Piastre the French equivalent of pataca
Portaria an official decree, regulation, or diploma
Real, rlis the basic Portuguese monetary unit
Regimento a royal or vice-regal set of instructions
Requerimento a formal petition
Resid£ncia a judicial investigation conducted at the completion of
an official*s tenure of office to see if he had fulfilled, 
or contravened, his instructions
Santa Casa da Misericdrdia Holy House of Mercy, a charitable brotherhood
Senado da Camara Municipal Council
Termo da posse term of tenure
Tosfao, tostfles a coin of 100 r4is
Veldrio beads, usually Venetian
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CHAPTER ORE
The Development of Overland Trade Routes up to 1698
1. The trade of medieval Kilwa
East-Central Africa, as defined in the present study, is an area 
which has been largely ignored fcy historians of pre-colonial Africa. 
Forming a wedge, with its base lying along the East African coast, 
between Kilwa and the mouth of the Zambezi River, and its point 
reaching the Luapula River, at the court of the Mwata Kazembe, it 
includes southern Tanzania, northern Moyambique, Malawi, and northern 
Zambia. The entire area lies north of the Zambezi. Intersected by 
several international boundaries which date from the colonial period, 
there have subsequently been only limited attempts to study the area 
as an historical region, although it has for some time been recognized 
by ethnographers as constituting part of a larger Central African 
culture area. (1) There is also an historical unity to the region, 
based on inter-African commercial relations, which became particularly 
cohesive during the eighteenth century. This is the wider setting of 
this study. More specifically, it is the role played by the lao in 
these affairs which concerns us, so that the emphasis inevitably falls 
on the eastern half of the region.
A study of trade in this area during the eighteenth and first 
half of the nineteenth centuries cannot be attempted, however, without 
first examining the development of overland trade routes before that
(1) Bee H. Baumann & D. Westermann, Les Peuoles et les civilisations 
de 1 (Afrique (trans. L.Homburger), Paris, 1948, pp.146-70;
G.P. Murdock, Africa - Its Peoples and Their Culture History, 
hew fork, 1959, pp.290-506; A.I. Richards, wdome Types of 
Family Structure amongst the central Bantu,0 in A.K. Kadcliffe 
Brown & D. Forde (eas.), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. 
London, 1950, pp.207-51; M. Douglas, "Matriliny and Pawnship in 
Central Africa,” Africa, xxxiv, 4, 1964, pp.501-15.
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period. This is especially important in view of the writer*s 
interpretation of the pattern of trade after 1698, when the Omani 
Arabs finally succeeded in evicting the Portuguese from Mombasa 
and in limiting Portuguese footholds on the hast African coast to 
those south of Cape Delgado.
The first point 'which should be emphasized is that there are 
no firm bases for postdating the existence of any sort of trade 
route, or network, however rudimentary, extending inland from 
medieval Kilwa Kisiwani to the remote interior. For several 
centuries after its settlement in about the ninth or tenth century, 
Kilwa remained a small, rather insignificant town, with only limited 
trading connections. According to the revised chronology suggested 
by Neville Chittick, the immigration of Shirazi colonists (from the 
danadir coast?) in the second half of the twelfth century resulted 
in the growth of Kilwa to a town of great importance on the coast, 
equal to Kisimani Mafia, but overshadowed by Mogadishu. A century 
or more later, Kilwa had captured most of the gold trade of Sofala 
from Mogadishu and consequently replaced it as the principal trading 
state on the hast African coast. At about the same time, Kilwa also 
extended its political hegemony to include Mafia, perhaps Pemba and 
Zanzibar, and much of the immediate mainland coast. (1) But Kilwa*s 
commercial domination was based on its control of the sea route to 
Sofala and of that place itself, not on any trade it carried on with 
the peoples of its own hinterland. Certainly, there was an important 
trade route from the Rhodesian goldfields to Sofala, but there was 
none leading from that interior to Kilwa.
Roger Summers has visualized the existence of a medieval trade 
route along which gold was carried from Rhodesia to Kilwa, but there 
is virtually no evidence to support his argument. The appearance of
(1) N. Chittick, “The *Shirazi* Colonization of hast Africa,” JAH.
vi, 5, 1966, pp.276-94; cf. G.B.P. Freeman-Grenville, The 
Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika. London, 1962,
pp.74-y8, 201-2.
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Arab cane beads in one of the levels which he excavated in the 
Ziwa complex surely cannot be sufficient evidence for his conclusion 
that "Ziwa* s contacts are clearly with the north-east and point to 
Kilwa rather than Sofala, “ which was not only much nearer to Ziwa, 
but which he himself noted was also "the port of entry for imports 
connected with Rhodesian Ruins, including Inyanga." ^furthermore, 
the fact that bummers supports his hypothesis linking Ziwa and Kilwa 
with the erroneous dating of Kilwa1 s foundation to the seventh or 
eighth century only increases one*s doubts as to the veracity of 
this reconstruction* Gervase Mathew, with perhaps more justice, has 
found Summers1 hypothesis acceptable by attributing the development 
of overland connections between Ziwa and Kilwa to the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries* This period is not only one during which 
Kilwa1 s commercial dominance of the coast was at its height, but also 
one which bummers has given as an alternative, though personally less 
favoured, dating for Ziwa. Nevertheless, one still cannot accept 
the Ziwa-Kilwa hypothesis, for, contrary to Mathew*s assertion,
Summers has not "found traces of such a route. "(1)
There is yet another source which has caused some writers to 
infer the existence of a land route leading from Kilwa to the Sofalan 
gold fields: the Travels of Ibn Battuta, the greatest medieval
Islamic traveller, who visited Kilwa, Mombasa and Mogadishu, in Idol, 
in an early, abridged translation of ibn Battuta*s Travels* Sir H.A.R. 
Gibb speculated, on the basis of Ibn Battuta* s identification of the 
auriferous area in the hinterland of Sofala as Yufi, the same name by 
which the great traveller also designated a vaguely known country in 
West Africa, that there was a transcontinental trade between the 
Sofala hinterland and the Mali empire. This seems highly unlikely; 
Gibb, in his later, integral translation of the Travels* has noted in 
preference that Ibn Battuta was confused in making this identification*
(1) R. bummers, inyanga - Prehistoric Settlements in southern Rhodesia. 
Cambridge, 19b8, p.265; G. Mathew, "The itest African Coast until 
the Coming of the Portuguese," in H M .i. p.117.
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Mathew, however, in acknowledging Gibb* 3 earlier suggestion, has 
misinterpreted this to read that the hypothetical route from We3t 
Africa led not to bof'ala, but to Kilwa. A further inconsistency 
exists in Mathew1 s reasoning that there was a route inland behind 
Kilwa in the medieval period. While he has observed correctly 
that "No record or tradition suggests that Kilwa traders ever 
penetrated inland," he has noted in the same place that "The 
penetration ^Inland/ would still seem to have been from the coast 
to the interior. "(1) in view of such a total lack of evidence in 
support of this hypothesis, it is difficult to attach any 
reliability to these speculations.
Dr. G.5.P. Freeman-Grenville has also interpreted Ibn Battuta 
to argue for the existence of a route between the far interior and 
Kilwa in medieval times. He bases this on his own translation of 
the relevant passage in the Travels, which reads; "A merchant told 
me that Sofala is half a month1 s march from Kilwa. . ." Gibb, on 
the other hand, has translated the same passage in the following 
manner: "I was told by a merchant that the city of Sufala lies at
a distance of half a month*s journey from the city of Kulwa. . ."-(2) 
Not being an Arabist, the present writer cannot comment on the merits 
of either translation, out Gibb*s rendering of "journey", seems 
preferable to Freeman-Grenville*s more limiting choice of "march."
An overland march from Kilwa to Sofala could not possibly have been
(1) H.A.K. Gibb (trans.), The Travels of Ibn Battuta (abridged), London,
1929, pp.579,n.lb,582,n.35; ibid., The Travels of ibn Battuta. 
(complete ed.), Cambridge, 1962,ii,p.580 & n.61; HKA,i,pp.ll2, 
117; cf. Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, p.106. Some
scholars, e.g. Gibb, Travels (abridged),p.379,n.16, citing 
Cooley, & Travels (complete ed.), p.380,n.61, K.w. Bovill, The 
Golden Trade of the Moors, London, 1961,p.96, & J.S. Trimingham, 
A History of Islam in West Africa. London,1962,p.130, have 
suggested that the Xufi of West Africa were the Nupe, but the 
foremost authority on these people has doubted this 
identification: see b#F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium - The Kingdom
of Nune in Nigeria. London, 1961 reprint, p.404.
(2) Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast, I4y8-1840," in HBA.i. p.147; SD,
p.31; Gibb, Travels (complete ed.),ii,p.380; cf. Freeman- 
Grenville, Medieval History, pp.204-3.
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completed within a fortnight* s time, as they lie nearly eight 
hundred miles apart in a direct line of march, which would entail 
crossing some very hilly country. On the other hand, provided 
with a fair wind, the customary sea route from Kilwa to Sofala 
could easily have taken no more than a fortnight to complete. (1) 
in addition to these largely negative arguments refuting the 
existence of a medieval overland trade route extending behind Kilwa, 
there is one strong positive fiece of evidence which can be cited in 
the same cause: Ingombe Xlede, situated on a ridge lying just north
of the Zambezi River, in the Gwembe Valley. Excavations undertaken 
by J.H. Chaplin and Brian Fagan have revealed that this site was, 
during the middle, and later stages of its occupation from the late 
seventh to tenth centuries, a trading centre of some importance, 
with obvious connections with the coast. These were clearly 
maintained by means of contacts down the Zambezi, the principal 
highway to the interior of Central Africa and the one by which the 
Portuguese moved inland in the sixteenth century. In view of the 
antiquity of this route, which was well established long before
(1) I have been unable to locate any contemporary sources giving the 
normal sailing time between Bofala and Kilwa. In 1505 the 
S&o Rafael, which was taking the Viceroy D.Francisco de Almeida 
to India, sailed from 30 leagues south of Mozambique to Kilwa 
in four days* time, and from there it took five days to sail 
to Mombasa, a further distance of 60 leagues. The same source 
gives the distance between Kilwa and Sofala as 255 leagues; but 
one cannot mathematically work out the sailing time on this 
basis, for it took the bHo Rafael only two days to cover 60 
leagues on the voyage from south of Mozambique to Kilwa.
"Do (sic) viagem de Dora Francisco d*Almeyda primeyro viso rey 
de India... ," 22 May 1506, in J>octuaehtos sobre os Portugueses 
em Mozambique e na Africa Central. Lisboa, l962,i,ppv522-5, 
528-9. Gibb, Travels (complete ed.),ii,p.379,n.58, states 
that "The journey from Mogadishu /to Kilwa, some 850 miles 
south in a straight line/ towards-the end of the north-east 
monsoon in Feburaiy or early March might take from six to ten 
days." A.Villiers, The Indian Ocean. London, 1952,p.85, has 
sailed in an Arab vessel from Zanzibar to Muscat, more than 
2000 miles, in "a little over three weeks."
*«
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Kilwa gained control of the Sofala gold trade, it seems highly 
unlikely that a new, more arduous route would have been developed 
overland from Kilwa to the Zambezi. (1)
There are, then, neither archaeological nor documentary bases 
which would indicate that medieval Kilwa was in any sort of overland 
commercial contact with the peoples of the interior. On the 
contrary, Kilwa rose to a position of commercial pre-eminence on 
the East African coast by virtue of its control of the seaborn trade 
to Sofala. This monopoly was certainly challenged, and probably 
broken, by ihe expansion of the Nabhani kingdom of Pate in the 
beginning of the fifteenth century. Thereafter, the unexplained 
rise of Mombasa also contributed to a gradual decline in Kilwa* s 
commercial domination oi the coast. Internal dissensions also 
sapped Kilwa*s vitality, and by the end of the fifteenth century 
Sofala was able to assert its independence from the suzerainty of 
Kilwa. (2) Nevertheless, until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 
Indian Ocean, Kilwa, despite its decline, continued to trade for the 
gold of Sofala by the familiar sea route, while contacts with the
mainland behind Kilwa remained as tenuous as ever.
2. The arrival of the Portuguese
The intrusion of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean after
1498 signalled the beginning of a new era throughout the East.
One important effect which it had there was the redirection of the 
Indian Ocean spice trade as a result of Portuguese control of the
(1) B.M. Fagan, Southern Africa during the Iron Age. London, 1965,
pp.94-9j see idem., "Kadiocarbon dates for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (from c. 1000 B.C.) - III,** JAH. vi, 1, 1965, p.111.
(2) Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History, pp. 111-40; HEA.i.pp. 119-25.
198-9, 202$ Chittick, “The *5hirazi* Colonization of East 
Africa," p.295.
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seas and of certain strategic ports, (1) in iSast Africa,
Portuguese activities revolved around their desire to control the 
gold trade of bofala, Consequently, in 1605 they first 
established a factory and built a fort at Kilwa, which was 
forcibly subjugated to the Portuguese Crown, and then founded a 
factory at Sofala, where news of Kilwa1 s fate precluded the use 
of force. The Portuguese rigorously pursued a policy of squeezing 
the Muslims out of the gold trade; and Kilwa, already in decline, 
became moribund. The Portuguese soon realised that, controlling 
Sofala as they did, Kilwa was only an unnecessary expense on their 
meagre resources. Kilwa* s wealth had come from the duties its 
Sultans had levied on the trade of Sofala; deprived of these it 
was commercially impotent. Furthermore, Kilwa was a less 
convenient port of call for vessels sailing between Portugal and 
India than was Mozambique, where the Portuguese had established a 
settlement for this purpose in 1607. Thus, in 1612, the Portuguese 
withdrew their garrison from the fortress at Kilwa and left the 
island to its traditional rulers. (2)
Liberated from the commercial stranglehold with Portuguese 
occupation had enforced, Kilwa*s fortunes revived noticeably, as 
its merchants joined those from the other coastal towns in avoiding 
Portuguese control over the Rhodesian gold trade. This they did 
by not going to Sofala, where the Portuguese were masters, but
(1) See C.fi. boxer, “The Portuguese in the East, 1600-1800,“ in H.V.
Livermore (ed.), Portugal and brazil. Oxford, 1955, pp.Ib9-y6. 
The opposite point of view has also been expressed by several 
writers, but their conclusions would appear to be based on 
insufficient data: cf., e.g., A. ToussaLnt, History of the
Indian Ocean, (trs. J. Guichamaud), London, 1966,pp.112-14.
(2) A. Lobato, A Kxpans&o Portuguesa em Mozambique de 1496 a 1650.
Lisboa, 1964, i,pp.61-268, 262-6* ii,pp.16-61; K. Axelson, 
South-Hiast Africa. 1488-1660. London, i94G, pp.64-97; J. 
Btrandes, The Portuguese Period in bast Africa (trans. J.F. 
Wallwork), Nairobi, 1961, pp.68-81, 105-J16; cf. Boxer, 
“Mozambique island and the "carreira da India1*, “ Stvdia.8. 
1961, pp.96-162.
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rather to Angoche, or other points along the coast between 
Mo9ambique and the Zambezi delta* The Angoche coast quite 
probably had ancient ties with the Zambezi route to the interior, 
perhaps even serving as an embarkation point to Ingombe llede*
As early as 1506 the Portuguese had learned that a small amount of 
gold, no more than about b% of the amount winch they believed the 
Swahili traders annually carried away from Sofala before their 
establishment there, was exported by way of Angoche, probably by 
individuals seeking to avoid the restrictions imposed there 
previously by the Sultan of Kilwa* During the first half of the 
following decade, however, Angoche had become a much greater threat 
to the gold trade of Sofala, as increasingly large numbers of Muslim 
traders sought to avoid Portuguese supervision of the trade*
Traders from Kilwa sailed past Moijambique to Angoche, where their 
merchandise was transported to the Zambezi and landed some six 
leagues upstream at the town of a powerful African chief. Here they 
paid duties to this chief, who then supplied them with dug-outs for 
carrying their goods ftorther up the Zambezi* After making a portage 
around some rapids, lying at an unspecified distance up-river, they 
continued a further twenty leagues until they reached a mountain called 
Otanga, where a large settlement was situated. According to Antonio 
de baldanha, Captain of Sofala and Mozambique, it was there that "all 
the Kaffir and Moorish merchants of the land gather together and where 
they sell and set up their markets." Having seen the Portuguese 
withdraw from Kilwa, it seems not unlikely that the Muslim traders 
hoped, by undermining the gold trade to Sofala, to force the 
Portuguese to retire from Sofala, as well.(l)
(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period* p.lll; Lobato, hxpans&o. ii, pp.21-
5, 54-5, 117-23, 128-9, 154-5; iii,pp.22-4, 103-18; Axelson,
South-Kast Africa* pp.109, 121-6, 145; Diogo de Alca^va to 
Crown, Cochin, 20 November 1508, in Documentos sobre os 
Portugueses, i, pp.589-401, at 595; Antonio Carneiro, summary 
of letters from Antonio de baldanha to Crown, /IbllJ ibid.. 
1964, iii,pp.11-19, at 15; Gaspar Veloso to CrownJ /I5127, 
ibid.. iii, pp.181-9, at 187.
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Had there been any tradition of an overland route from Rhodesia 
to Kilwa in medieval times, surely this would have been revived after 
the Portuguese withdrawal from Kilwa in 1612? The recourse which 
the bwahili traders of the East African coast, including those from 
Kilwa, had to the Angoche-Zambezi route in order to subvert the 
effectiveness of the Portuguese control of bofala is yet another 
indication that there was no overland trade route connecting Kilwa 
with the Zambezi before the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast.
in the second and third decades of the sixteenth century it 
became apparent to the Portuguese that if this clandestine trade 
were to be terminated, they would have to establish themselves in 
the interior. (1) They therefore began the gradual occupation of the 
area which was to become known as the Hi vers of bena by ascending the 
Zambezi and establishing a fair on the right bank, at Sena, in 1651. 
Some time thereafter, another Portuguese fair was founded fttther 
upstream, on the same bank, at Tete; in 1644 a factory was set up at 
Quelimane to supervise the entrance of vessels at the several mouths 
of the Zambezi. by 1660 both bena and Tete had become important 
markets. Nine years later the ill-fated visionary, Dom bebastiao, 
King of Portugal, was persuaded to attempt to conquer the Rhodesian 
mines for the Portuguese Crown. But the massacre, in 1576, of some 
two hundred Portuguese troops which had been stationed at Chicoa, up 
the Zambezi beyond Tete, put an end to this unsuccessful episode. (2) 
During this half-century, when the Portuguese were seeking to 
master the commerce of the Rivers of bena, a change had apparently
(1) Lobato, Expans%o.ii. pp.44,55-6,62-5,81-4,95,145-5,151-2; iii,
215-17,256,246-4,517-18,525-7,556-8,569-71,576-6 ,585-7;
Axelson, bouth-Kast Africa, pp.149-50,164, 158-9.
(2) J.J. Teixeira botelho, Hist6ria Militar e PoljCtica dos Portugueses
em Moyambique da Descoberta a 1855. Lisboa, 1954, pp.95-4, 
146-7,162-70,175-207; J. Dully, Portuguese Africa. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1959, pp.55-8, 107-8; Lobato, "Para a Historia 
da Penetray&o Portuguese na Africa Central," in his Colon!za- 
yao benhorial da Zambezia e Outros Estudos. Lisboa, 1962, 
pp.77-80; ibid., EvoluySo Administrative e Economica de 
Moyambique. 1752-1765. Lisboa, 1967, pp.169-72; see J. de 
Alcfintara Guerreiw, "Inquerito em Moyambique no ano de 1676," 
btvdia, 6,1960, pp.7-18.
taken place in the trade of Kilwa. Following the Portuguese 
retirement from Kilwa in 1612, the only Portuguese point of 
occupation along the coast of East Africa, north of Cape Delgado, 
was at Malinai. There, a Captain of the Malinai coast, operating 
from an unfortified base, did his best to safeguard Portuguese 
interests, particularly commercial, on that coast. At first,
Kilwa clearly ignored any claim to authority by the Captain of 
Malinai over its trade. in addition to its merchants1 cultivation 
of the Angoche trade, Kilwa also furnished Moyambique with provisions. 
But relations with the Portuguese were not always cordials in 1619 
the crew of a shipwrecked Portuguese vessel were massacred qy 
bwahili in the vicinity of Kilwa. Towards the end of the following 
decade several French ships are known to have spent some time at 
Kilwa without suffering attack from the bwahili.(l) borne time after 
1660, however, it would appear that Kilw’a gradually began to re-orient 
its external trade to the north and that the Portuguese at Malindi 
began to play a more important role in this trade. Simultaneously, 
Kilwa seems to have begun to carry on a more substantial trade with 
its own hinterland than it had ever known previously. Both these 
developments would seem to have been caused by the Portuguese 
penetration inland up the Zambezi.
As the Portuguese gradually extended their influence in the 
Hi vers of Sena the contraband gold trade on which Angoche had 
flourished must have declined correspondingly. As the Rhodesian 
gold trade fell under closer Portuguese control, the traders of 
Kilwa, a town which itself produced nothing of commercial value, its 
sole function being that of an entrepSt, had to seek other items of 
trade if their town were to remain of any importance. The gold of 
Rhodesia had been the staple of Kilwa* s commercial life for nearly 
five centuries; now it was replaced by ivory coming from its own
(1) Lobato, Exoansao. ii, pp.76-9, 89-90, 162, 164, 181; iii, pp. 
285-7.
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hinterland. in 1611, it was reported to King Manuel of Portugal
"that only a little ivory comes from Kilwa and that much comes from
Sofala. "(1) It would appear from this statement that prior to the 
mid-sixteenth century even Kilwa1 s ivory, as well as its gold, 
trade was based on Sofala. With so little to go on, one cannot be 
dogmatic about the details of this change, but the description which 
the Jesuit priest Monclaro has left us of Kilwa* s trade in 1571 
leaves little doubt that such a change had indeed taken place:
These Moors have some commerce 
with the islands of Comor, and 
in the interior in ivory, which
they buy from the Kaffirs to sell
to the Portuguese who are always
on these parts, or to the factor
of the captain of the said 
^MalindiJ coast, whence there 
come also quantities of honey 
and wax. (2)
Monclaro makes only a vague passing reference to a trade in 
gold. His remarks also indicate that the Portuguese at Malindi 
had assumed a more important role in the trade of Kilwa during the 
previous decades. One should not assume, however, that the 
Portuguese had any manner of political control over Kilwa at this 
time, a mistake which a nineteenth century governor-general of 
Moyambique made in referring to Kilwa as "our lend after 1529. "(5).
(1) Cameiro, summary of letters from Afonso de Albuquerque to
Crown, /I51V, in Pocumentos sobre os Portuguese s. 1965,
ii, pp.6-9,FP2.
(2) Kelac&o da Viagem que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus
com Francisco Barreto na conquista de Monomotapa no anno de 
1569 feita pelo padre monclaro da mesma companhia. in RbEA,
iii, pp.167-255, at 164, trs.211; trs. also in bD, p.158.
This expedition reached Moyambique on 18 May 1670. Before 
attempting to conquer the lands of the Mwanamutapa, Barreto 
directed his attention to the coast north of Cape Delgado in 
1571. Monclaro does not indicate when he himself arrived at 
Kilwa, but makes it clear that he spent some four weeks there. 
Freeman-Grenville wrongly dates this side trip to 1569; bP, 
p.158, and HEA,i,pp.l56,140,l45,151; cf. btrandes, Portuguese 
Period, pp.156-7.
(5) b.k. Botelho, Kesumo para servir de introducyfeo a Memoria Estatis- 
tica sobre os dominios portuguezes na Africa Oriental. Lisboa, 
1854, p.17.
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To be sure, the Portuguese razed Mombasa in 1628-1629, but by 1641 
it was able to repulse another Portuguese attempt to repeat the 
same. Two decades later there is evidence that Kilwa was still 
very much independent of Portuguese control. (1) When Monclaro 
visited this coast, he noted that, while all the local rulers were 
"poor and without power," those of Kilwa apd Malindi were the 
principal ones. It is likely that he was slighting the importance 
of Mombasa, but the Sultan of Kilwa was still in possession of Mafia, 
where a factor of the Captain of Malindi was stationed. (2)
by the last quarter of the sixteenth century, then, Kilwa had 
already readjusted its commercial orientation from one which had 
previously been exclusively seaward, to one which now looked to 
its own hinterland for the majority of its raw trade goods, especially 
ivory. The initial impulse which instigated this reorientation 
seems to have come from the coast. It was probably the Swahili 
merchants of Kilwa who, effectively cut off by the Portuguese from 
the Rhodesian gola trade after 1650, sought to cultivate the 
previously insignificant ivory trade with the hinterland of their 
own town. But the development of well defined, in a directional 
sense, long distance trade routes between the coast ana the 
interior did not owe its genesis to this impulse. Rather, the 
impulse came from the interior, largely as a direct result of the 
extension of Maravi influence over the peoples lying between Lake 
Malawi and the East African coast.
5. The commercial influence of Maravi expansion
As a result of Portuguese preoccupation with the gold of 
Rhodesia, East-Central Africa was dealt with only in passing 'ey 
Portuguese writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth
(1) btrandes, Portuguese Period, pp.126-7, 162-5; Axelson, South-
East Africa, pp.164-8; B. Gomes de Brito, Historia Tragico- 
Maritima. Lisboa, 1904, ii,p.69.
(2) RSEA.iii. pp.164,169, trs. 211,216; SD, pp.169,145.
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centuries. (1) Nevertheless, there is sufficient documentation 
to enable one to discuss developments there during this period 
with a reasonable degree of confidence. According to tradition, 
the Maravi migrated to the region south and southwest of Lake 
Malawi from Luba country, in the Congo basin. This migration 
was not, however, the mass movement of an entire nation, but 
rather, as both R.A. Hamilton and M.G. Marwick have concluded, the 
arrival of chiefly invaders who imposed their rule over a long- 
established indigenous population. (2) No one will argue with 
F.H. Lane-Poole*s opinion that this migration took place prior to 
1500; it is more difficult, however, to determine the date of 
this arrival more precisely. (5) It is clear, from the discovery 
of copper crosses at Ingombe Ilede, that commercial ties between 
the Katanga and the Zambezi were of considerable antiquity, dating 
from towards the end of the first millennium.
It is possible that the Maravi invaders were part of a more 
general movement which included the arrival of the Karanga clans 
in Rhodesia, who formed the ruling hierarchy of the empire of the 
Mwanamutapa. From archaeological research at Zimbabwe, we know 
that the arrival of the Karanga ruling clans is to be assigned to 
Period III there, which has been radiocarbon aated to between about 
1080 and 1450. On the other hand, it is only in Period IV, 
beginning about 1450, that copper artifacts, suggesting Congo 
connections, make their appearance at Zimbabwe; these would appear 
to have been introduced with the arrival of the Rozwi, or Mbire, 
clans, whom Abraham believes entered Rhodesia at this time. It
(1) e.g. "It was gold that lured the Portuguese into the interior.
it was the absence of gold north of the Zambezi that rendered 
penetration in that direction unremunerative..." Axelson, 
"Portuguese settlement in the interior of south-east Africa 
in the seventeenth century," Congresso Internacional de 
Historia dos Descobrimentos, Actas. v, 2, Lisboa, 1961, p.5.
(2) R.A. Hamilton, "Oral Tradition: Central Africa," in Hamilton (ed.),
History and Archaeology in Africa. London, 1955, p.21; M.G. 
Marwick, "History and Tradition in Fast Central Africa through 
the Fyes of the Northern Rhodesian Ce$a," JAH. iv,5, 1965, p.578. 
(5) F.H. Lane-Poole, Native Tribes of the Eastern Province of Northern 
Rhodesia (Notes on their Migrations ana History), third ed., 
Lusaka, 1949, pp.21-2, 57. ~
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seems more likely that the Maravi invaders formed part of this 
later migration, with its clear ties with the Congo, than the earlier, 
Period 1X1, influx, which does not seem to have had these connections. 
As 1450 is certainly the latest date by which the Rozwi, or Mbire, 
had established their rule at Zimbabwe, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the Maravi invasion may have taken place during the course of 
the fourteenth century, perhaps beginning even as early as the later 
thirteenth century.(1)
Today, there are apparently no people living in this region who 
call themselves Maravi, or, in its correct Giflyanja form, Malawi, 
which apparently became archaic as they gradually evolved into more 
distinct component parts. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe 
that the name was not merely one, based on a geographic designation, 
which the Portuguese applied to the people living north of the Zambezi 
and west of the shire. (2) Not only is there evidence that a small 
group of Maravi who migrated to Mtawanya, in Tanzania, during the 
nineteenth century were still using that name in reference to them­
selves as late as about 1950, but, at the same date, in JDowa District 
of what was then British Nyasalend, A.G.O. Hodgson observed that even 
now among the Achewa and Anyanja there may be found old men who wxll 
say, 'we are Amaravi'." Thus, one cannot accept Price's opinion that 
"No people are known to have called themselves Maravi."(5)
(1) D.P. Abraham, "Ethno-history of the Empire of Mutapa. Problems
and Methods," in J.Vansina et al (eds.), The Historian in 
Tropical Africa. London 1964, pp.106-8; idem, "The Political 
Hole of Chaminuka and the Mhondoro Cult in bhona History," in 
Conference of the History of the Central African Peoples.
Lusaka, 1965, 14 pp.; B.M. Fagan, Southern Africa during the 
iron Age. London, 1965, pp.102-25, especially 124.
(2) bee AHu, CM 50, anon., "Descripgeo do Imperio de Manomogy, ou
Caronga da lem do Rio Zambeze," n.d., enclosed in Cristov&o de 
Azevedo de Vasconcelos to D.Diogo de Sousa, bena, 2 March 1794, 
summarized in Lobato, Bvolug&o. pp.56-60, at 57, and reprinted 
in idem, "A terra, a gente e a vida nos sertoes de Mogambique 
nos fins do seculo AVIII," in idem, Colonizag&o. pp.125-7, at 125. 
(5) TDB. ii, Mikindani: "Tribal History and Legends," pp.6,9 (212,216);
A.G.O. Hodgson, "Notes on the Achewa and Angoni of the Dowa Dis­
trict of the Nyasalana Protectorate," The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, lxiii, 
1955, p.127; T. Price, "More about the Maravi," African Studies, 
xi, 2, 1952, p.75.
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For most of the sixteenth century nothing at all is known of 
developments in the interior of East Central Africa. Monclaro makes 
no references to the Maravi (1), but his allusion to the boat traffic 
up the Shire and, in particular, to the ivory trade carried on by the 
Swahili around the southern end of what should probably be identified 
as Lake Malawi, indicates that the region was at peace in the early 
1570s.(2).
(1) The Mongazes against whom the Portuguese fought in 1572, as
recorded by Monclaro, lived south of the Zambezi. They do 
not appear to have been Maravi. See KbEA,iii,pp.188-97, 
trs.257-48. W.H.J. Kangeley, "The Portuguese," NJ.xvii.l. 
1984,p.bO, suggests that Mongazi was an Nyai chief. H.Salt,
A Voyage to Abyssinia. London, 1814, p.62, incorrectly 
believed them to be iao.
(2) KdKA. iii,pp.l77-8,trs.226; cf. Lobato, ExpansSo.iii. p.858,
where he speaks of Swahili trading "na costa do Diassa" in 
about 1525. It should be understood that these earlier 
traders were reaching Lake Malawi by way of the Zambezi and 
Shire Kivers, not cy any direct overland route west from the 
coast. Monclaro's evidence of inland trading behind Kilwa, 
however, means that one cannot rule out this possibility, 
although it seems unlikely at this date. See above, pp.
11*3 j below, pp.55-*7jfc0 • The conclusion drawn by
sir John Gray, from a passage in Diogo do Couto's Da Asia 
(Decada iv), that "it would appear safe to say that goods 
were reaching Kilwa from Angola in the middle of the sixteenth 
century."with the tacit implication that this was carried 
out along a completely overland route, must be accepted with 
reservations. Dos Santos refers to contacts between the 
peoples of the Khodesian hinterland and those of the Angolan 
interior, but without mention of the coastal traders ever 
having travelled that way. dir John's identification of 
Couto's "kingdom of Atonde" as Abutua, while plausible, in 
light of Dos Santos' note, seems unfounded on an etymological 
basis. Perhaps a preferable reading would be to identify 
Atonde as the important Zambezi market of Gtonga. Clearly, 
further documentation is required in order to solve this 
problem. dee J.M. Gray, "Commercial intercourse between 
Angola and Kilwa in the Sixteenth Century." TDK. 57, 1961, 
pp.175-4; J. dos dantos, Ethiopia Oriental. Evora, 1609, 
i,fl.55v-56; reproduced in KdKA. vii,pp.90-l, trs. 274; 
cf. dtvdia. 5,1959, p.197.
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Only a decade later, however, the whole of East-Central Africa, 
from Maravia to the coast, was thrown into an acute state of 
turmoil which seems to reflect the sudden expansion of Maravi 
influence from within the hounds of war a via proper to large areas 
lying to the east of Maravia, right up to the coast itself.
The disturbances caused at Mozambique by the powerful Makua 
chief Mauruza, and the ravages of the Zimba, might, by themselves, 
appear to have little to do with the spread of Maravi^ influence 
over the eastern half of Zast-Gentral Africa. In fact, there is 
evidence which strongly suggests that they were both intimately 
connected with that phenomenon. in lb8b the Portuguese garrison at 
Mozambique suffered an ignominious rout at the hands of Mauruja, whOb& 
successors plagued the Portuguese well into the nineteenth century. 
Mauru^a was lord of the Makua who inhabited the mainland opposite 
Mozambique island. He and his followers had only recently moved to 
that part of Macuana, however, ana had forcibly subjugated the Makua 
who had lived there previously. According to Fr. Jo&o dos Santos, 
O.P., whose monumental Ethiopia Oriental, published at Evora in 160y, 
contains a wealth of information on East and boutheast Africa at the 
end of the sixteenth century, Mauruza*s people were a fearsome lot 
of cannibals who scourged the country immediately behind the coast 
for several years without disturbing the Portuguese. but in lbdb, 
when Nuno Velho Pereira was Captain of Mozambique, (1) they began 
regularly to terrorise the Portuguese settlements on the coast itself. 
Pereira deciaea to punish Mauruza and mounted an expedition of nearly 
four hundred men, including forty Portuguese soldiers and mo r adore s. 
or colonists, to destroy his main village, which was situated some 
three or four leagues inland. Commanded fcy Antonio Pinto, the 
column marched to their destination by night and attacked Mauruza* s 
village at dawn. The raid was a complete success and the settlement 
was destroyed. The ease of the victory lulled the Portuguese into a
(1J dee Z. barmen to, Mum santareno no Orientes huno Velho Pereira - 
Notas biograficas,w C.I.H.D., Actas. v, 1, pp.2fc>b-7b.
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sense of false security; as they made their separate ways back to 
the coast, being carried in litters by their slaves, they were 
attacked by the enemy, who had fled from their village and concealed 
themselves in the bush. Almost the entire Portuguese force was 
annihilated, and only two or three Portuguese and a few slaves safely 
reached the coast some three days later. Mauruja remained 
unchastised, and his Makua continued to plunder the mainland at will 
for some time thereafter. Eventually, Mauruza realized that it was 
to his advantage that there be peace in his lands, and an agreement 
was struck with the Portuguese so that there might be trade with them. 
Nevertheless, Dos bantos makes it quite clear that there were many 
instances of violence by the Makua against the Portuguese in the 
succeeding years.(1)
At about the same time that Mauruza and his Makua were 
plundering the mainland opposite Mozambique, the infamous Zimba, who 
have gained much notoriety in the history of East Africa, were 
wreaking havoc from the Zambezi to Malindi. Dos Santos, to whom we 
owe most of our knowledge of the Zimba, says that they were a 
cannibalistic tribfc living to the north of the Zambezi, to the east 
and northeast of Tete. The earliest known reference to them dates
(1) J. dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.74-7; ibid.,
Lisboa, 1891,i,pp.258-64; K5EA.vii.pp.l25-7.trs.509-14.
Diogo do Couto gives an alternative version of these events 
in which neither the Makua nor Mauruza figures. Couto 
writes instead of Africans whom he calls Macabires and 
Ambios, whose leaders were Mambeca, Maarvea and Odeburi.
In his account, it is Odeburi whose village was attacked 
by the Portuguese. Couto's version, written in 1595, seems 
to be far less reliable than Dos Santos', whose ethnographic 
details and nomenclature are undeniably correct. Couto, 
writing in India, also interpolates much extraneous material 
into his account, while Dos Santos, who was at Mozambique 
from 15 August to 1 November 1586, scrupulously avoids such 
speculation. It is worth noting, however, that Couto 
assigns the beginning of this period of unrest in East-Central 
Africa to about 1570. Couto, Da Asia. D^cada x, Lisboa,
1788, Livro 6, cap.xiv, pp.98-105; Dos Santos, Ethiopia 
Oriental (1891),ii,pp.179,191. For the reaction in Portugal
to this massacre, see CEhu-MF, Lm 5-A, fl. 162-6, Crown to D. 
Duarte de Meneses, Lisboa, ZZ January 1587, summarized in 
BFUP. 2 (1955), p.266(No.lb), and published in APQ. iii, No. 
24, PP 15, p.84, where it is misdated to 21 January.
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from 1561, when they appeared in their proper location on the 
world map of Bartolomeu Velho,(1) Sometime in the 1580s, a 
minor but ambitious Zimba chieftain is said to have been anxious 
to make himself a name. Consequently, he and his followers 
abandoned their homeland and began warring on the peoples lying to 
their east. By killing and, allegedly, eating their way “through 
all the places and kingdomts of Kaffraria," this Zimoa band soon 
snowballed into a horde of some lb,000 individuals, relentlessly 
moving to the east. About 1588, having passed along the coast 
opposite the Kerimba Islands, the Zimba reached kilwa, which they 
besieged for several months in an effort to take it. But they 
failed in all their attempts to cross the strait separating the 
mainland from the island and town of Kilwa, until a Muslim who lived 
there showed them a ford on the condition that he and his family be 
spared. The Zimba crossed to Kilwa by night and, in the ensuing 
massacre, slaughtered and captured some 5,000 inhabitants of the 
island, while only a handful managed to flee. After reportedly 
devouring their victims, the Zimba, leaving Kilwa a ghost town, 
continued to march northwards along the coast until they arrived 
opposite the island of Mombasa.
At Mombasa, the Zimba were prevented from crossing to the 
island by two Turkish galleys which were guarding the Makupa ford.
The Turks, led by the dashing Mir Ali Bey, had set themselves up at 
Mombasa with a view to making it a permanent base from which to drive 
the Portuguese from Bast Africa. The Portuguese, having previously 
been caught off guard by the same Mir Ali Bey in 1585-1586, were 
advised of his plans this time, and in January 1589 a large fleet 
sailed from Goa for Bast Africa. This fleet arrived at Mombasa on 
5 March to find the Turks and the people of the town, who had always 
opposed the Portuguese, confronted by the Zimba. A few Portuguese
(1) W.G.L. Handles, “South Bast Africa and the jbinpires of Monomotapa 
as shown on selected printed maps of the 16th century,“ 
Stvdia. 2, 1958, p.159, and photographic reproduction of 
Velho's map.
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sorties weakened the Turkish defence, ana on 15 March the Zimba 
crossed over to Mombasa, and laid waste to the island. Having 
sated themselves at Mombasa, the Zimba pressed on to Malindi.
Here, however, the tables turned on them. The local townsmen, 
aided by a small Portuguese garrison, were able to keep the Zimba 
at bay for a while. Dos Bantos reports that Portuguese gunfire 
took a heavy toll of the enemy. But, eventually, superior 
numbers began to sway the battle, and the Zimba scaled the low 
ramparts. At this decisive moment, a force of three thousand 
Begeju tribesmen, a pastoral people of mixed Soraali-riyika blood, 
fell upon the Zimba from behind. The Zimba were all but 
annihilated, and the power of this branch of the tribe broken as a 
result. Only a hundred men and their once ambitious leader are 
said to have returned safely to their homeland north of the 
Zambezi.
While nothing more was heard from the Zimba to the north of 
the Kuvuma Hiver, they are known to have caused the Portuguese a 
great deal of trouble in the Rivers of Sena from 1590 to 1595. In 
1592 the Portuguese attempted to chastise the Zimba, who had been 
terrorising Africans friendly to the Portuguese opposite Bena, on the 
other side of the Zambezi. But two Portuguese columns from Bena and 
Tete were separately wiped out by the Zimba in the field, with the
(1) Dos Bantos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.65, 69-71v, (1891),
228-9,241-4,277-9, HBBA, vii, p.107,114-18, trs.295,299-504; 
for the Turkish raids along the Bast African coast and 
related events, see Btrandes, Portuguese Period, pp.145-65; 
Boxer, “The Portuguese on the Swahili Coast, 1595-1729" in 
Boxer & C.de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in 
Mombasa, 1595-1729, London, 1960, pp.11-86, at 19-25; for 
the Segeju, see the sources cited by Boxer, "Bwahili Coast," 
pp.24-5,n.5, and J.B. Kirkman in Btrandes, Portuguese Period, 
pp.549-50. Although the passage in which Dos Bantos 
discusses the Zimba is a bit vague in places, it should not 
have given rise to the various errors in both detail and 
interpretation which later writers have made in writing about 
the Zimba: e.g., Axel son, Portuguese in Bouth-East Africa.
1600-1700. Johannesburg, 1960, p.9, misdates the Zimba sacking 
of Kilwa to 1595; Freeman-Orenville, apparently relying on 
the picturesque but badly bowdlerized translation of Bamuel
Purchas (1625-1626), presents one with an inaccurate version of 
parts of Dos £>antosf account, HBA.i.p.158; see SB, pp.l4t>-9, for
_______ the relevant parts of Purchas* translation.
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Captains of both settlements counted among the dead. The next year,
D. Pedro de Sousa, Captain of Mozambique, led an expedition of two 
hundred Portuguese and fifteen hundred Africans against the Zimba.
For two months they unsuccessfully besieged the Zimba* s encampment, 
or settlement - Dos Santos makes no distinction - which was heavily 
fortified with wood and earth walls. Finally, Sousa determined to 
raise the siege and retire to bena. According to Dos Santos, his 
decision was based on false information which was fabricated by 
fainthearted residents of the Elvers who implied that Sena, being 
undefended, was being subjected to raids by a local African chieftain 
in their absence. The Zimba, thus relieved, assailed the abandoned 
Portuguese camp, killed a few stragglers, and appropriated the 
Portuguese artillery. Thus the Zimba remained undisputed masters 
of the north bank of the Zambezi, their arrogance undiminished.
As happened with Mauruza, however, relations were eventually 
normalised and a peace struck between the Zimba chief and the 
Portuguese.(1)
Pursuing the connection between these events and Maravi 
expansion, we see that in 1696 the King of Portugal, Felipe i 
(1591-1598), addressed a letter to the Viceroy of Inaia which 
included references to letters written to the Viceroy from Pedro de 
bousa. According to these letters to bousa, the Viceroy knew that 
he, bousa, ”was in the river of Cuama /Zambezi/ with nearly 80 
soldiers whom he had taken with him to expel forcibly from those 
lands a Negro who was disturbing trade there...” Three years later, 
Felipe II (1598-1621) sent the Viceroy instructions regarding the 
outfitting of both bena and Tete, which were still unfortified.
These were to be carried out by Nuno da Ounha de Ataide, bousa*s 
successor as Captain of Mozambique, who had urgently sought the 
Viceroy* s permission **to be able to go castigate Tondo, because 
after he defeated Dom Pedro de bousa he remained excessively insolent.”
(1) Dos bantos, hthionia Oriental (1609),i, fl.65-9,(1891), i, 
pp.252-40, KSflA. vii, pp.107-14, trs. 295-9.
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Furthermore, Da Ounha was reported to believe that by crushing 
Tondo the Portuguese would be able to obtain possession of the 
eagerly sought silver mines of Chicoa. (1)
it seems most probable that this Tondo should be identified 
with Kundo, whom the Jesuit, Manuel Barreto, described as being 
"the second person in the empire of Maravi" in 1667. In Barreto* s 
day, Kundo, or Lundu, in its proper form, was ruler of the "kingdom" 
of Bororo, which extended fifty leagues north along the coast from 
the Zambezi delta and fifty-two leagues up the Zambezi to the 
confluence of the bhire, which Barreto calls the Embebe, or 
Morambara, after the prominent Mount Murrubala, which lies just to 
the north of the Zambezi and east of' the bhire.(2) Barreto*s 
information makes it clear that Lundu*s sphere of influence 
extended from the bhire eastwards.
Traditions collected by Eduardo do Couto Lupi around Angoche 
at the turn of the present century record vividly the expansion of 
Lundu*s hegemony over the vast, ill-defined area of Bororo.
According to these traditions, a few centuries previously, the 
aboriginal Makua of the Angoche hinterland were invadea by people 
who either called themselves, or were called by the Makua, ma-rundu. 
which Lupi translates as "people of the Rundu." Their distinguishing 
characteristic was the violent warfare which they waged, "destroying 
everything, killing all, and even having cannibalistic habits.1* 
/Italics in original/ In their relentless drive eastwards from the 
southwest, the ma-rundu swept many people who lay in their path 
ahead of them in great disorder, as well as setting many others to 
flight on their flanks. The tradition adds that they continued their
(1) Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 28 January 1596, in APQ.iii.no.206. pp.
585-95, at 585; same to same, Lisboa, early 1599, although 
letter is misdated to 21 November 1598, in ibid. iii, no.565, 
pp.921-52, PP 18, p.927, and note on p.911.
(2) M. Barreto, "InformazSo do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama.
Goa, 11 December 1667, in KbEA. iii, pp.442,446,450,trs. 470, 
475, 480. Barreto served in the Rivers from 1665 to 1667:
D.P. Abraham, "Maramurca: An Exercise in the combined use of 
Portuguese Records and Oral Tradition," JAH.ii.2.1961. p.218, 
n.4.
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march, moving always to the northeast, until they reached Mossuril, 
on the mainland opposite Mozambique, where they killed "all the 
whites and Arabs, as they had done in Sena", and that "they were 
only checked and repelled at a fortified village /aringa/ where 
the a-cunha (whites) had pieces of artillery." ^Italics in original/ 
All this, Lupi assures the reader, is what he was told by "the 
people who commit to memory the history of the region." There were 
still more details to this tradition, but Lupi omits any reference 
to them, as he considered them unnecessary to his argument, which 
was the identification of the ma-rundu with the Zimba, as described 
by Dos bantos.(1)
Fully realizing the reservations with which one must inevitably 
approach traditions presented in this format,(2) there is clearly 
much to be said in favour of Lupi1 s conclusion. Dos Santos relates 
that when he was returning from Sofala to Mozambique in April 1595, 
a storm forced his vessel to take port in the mouth of the Quizungo 
River (which Lupi identifies as the Tejungo, at the southern limit 
of Angoche territory), whence she was unable to set sail again for 
52 days. While he and his companions were stranded there, they 
were unable to procure provisions from the mainland, not only 
because there was a great famine at the time but also because the 
Zimba were then in occupation of the country. The local Makua had 
fled from the mainland to a deserted island lying off the coast. (5) 
As for the attack on Mossuril, with its reference to similar 
destruction previously wrought at bena, correspondence for these 
may be found in Mauruza* s devastation of the Portuguese column in 
1585 and in the Zimba* s massacre of the bena and T'ete detachments,
(1) E.de C. Lupi, Angoche - Breve memoria sobre uma das capitanias-
mores do Districto de Mozambique. Lisboa, 1907, pp.lib,119-25, 
162-9.
(2) bee J. Vansina, Oral Tradition (trs. H.M. Wright), London, 1965. 
(5) Dos bantos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609), ii, fl.85, (1891), ii,
pp. 260-2, KbEA. vii, pp.181, trs. 568-9.
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near bena, in 1592.(1) Similarly, the defeat of the Zimba at 
Malindi may be reflected in the traditional account of how the 
mli-rundu were finally stopped. If the tradition is at all 
accurate in its details, the placement of the ma-rundu 
devastation of bena before the battle at Mossuril is not a matter 
which would invalidate the data. Mauruza and his Makua, whom 
Dos bantos definitely identifies as recent arrivals to the coast, 
may well have been one of those groups which Lupi says were driven 
from their homelands by the ma-rundu. The identification of the 
Zimba of this invasion with the mA-rundu would also seem to be a 
very reasonable conclusion. No other mass movement of people in 
the interior of northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania is known 
to have taken place between the arrival of the Portuguese and the 
crossing of the Zambezi by the Ngoni in 1855.
Lupi records a tradition which explains that -the way in which 
the true ma-rundu consolidated their authority after passing through 
the Angoche district was by installing ma-rundu individuals, or 
families, as chiefs over those people who had submitted to their 
rule. At the beginning of the present century, virtually every 
chief of any importance in the district of Angoche claimed ma-rundu 
descent, while there has not yet been reported any similar survival 
of a ruling tradition deriving from the Zimba within the entire 
area of the invasion. (2) Although there were certainly areas which 
were spared the effects of this great invasion, further field 
research along these lines around Angoche and among the other Makua 
living just behind the coast of northern Mozambique, particularly
(1) Cf. K.M. bordalo & L. de Lima, Ensaios sobre a Estatistica das
PossessSes Portuguezes no Ultramar. 2a berie, Livro IV, 
"Provincia de Mozambique," Lisboa, 1859, pp.15,108, hereafter 
cited as Bordalo, Estatistica.
(2) Lupi, Angoche. pp.l25-b.
opposite Mozambique Island, might possibly be rewarding.(1) As 
for the name "Zimba", it would appear that this appellation was a 
blanket terra given by outsiders, probably African as well as 
Portuguese, to any bellicose people in East-Central Africa at that 
particular period. (2) As such, it is not surprising that Dos 
bantos should have called the ma-runau invaders by that name.
The last, and perhaps most obvious, point to be made in 
connection with this invasion is that the ma-rundu. or "people of 
the ttundu," were surely warriors who owed their allegiance to Lundu.
The mli-rundu invasion should, therefore, be identified with the 
expansion of Lundu1 s hegemony over the "kingdom" of Bororo, as 
Barreto called it, in reality a large region throughout which many, 
if not most, chiefs owed their prestige to their connection with 
Lundu, who was thereby able to exercise at least a nominal hegemony 
over its people.
It must be remembered, however, that in 1667 Lundu was only "the 
second person in the empire of Maravi." Barreto explicitly states 
that the Bororo chiefs were subject to the Maravi, who were ruled by 
a powerful chief named Caronga, or Kalonga, in its proper form. (5) 
Reconstruction of the process by which Kalonga became the overlord 
of the Maravi "empire", which allegedly stretched from Maravi a up to 
Mombasa, is complicated both by the paucity oi references to Kalonga 
and ty the frequent references which one encounters in the first 
third of the seventeenth century to a chief of corresponding importance
(1) bee A. dos bantos Baptista, Monografia Etnografica sobre os
Macuas. Lisboa, 1951, pp.16-20, for reference to Makua 
traditions which refer to an invading group from south of 
Lake Malawi coining to the Montepuez River and the effect
this had on the local population.
(2) This name survives today in the form azimba. which is that of a
Maravi sub-group living in the north of bena, but no modern 
researcher has collected traditions among them in an effort to 
see what their exact connection is with the Zimba who 
terrorised East-Central Africa in the late sixteenth century, 
bee AiRita-Ferreira, "Os 'Azimba* (Monografia Etnografica)", 
Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Mocamtique. xxiv, 84-85 
(1954), pp.47-140,5-116. Rita-Ferreira did not carry out
this sort of investigation for his monograph, or, if he did, 
he has not yet published his results.
(5) KbEA. iii, pp.442,450, trs. 470, 480.
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named Muzura. Nevertheless, one can show that the extension of 
Maravi influence over a vast area of itest-Central Africa, including 
the conquests made by Lundu in Bororo, led to the development of 
well defined trade routes leading from the interior to the coast.
The earliest mention of Muzura was made by Padre Antonio Gomes,
S.J. Writing in 1648, he noted that when Diogo Simoes Madeira had 
gone to battle with troops from Tete in order to prevent the over­
throw of Mwanamutapa Gat si Rusere by dissident chiefs who were 
nominally subordinated to the Mwanamutapa, he was aided by 4,000 
Maravi warriors whom he had sought from Muzura. (1) This campaign 
took place in 1608.(2) Clearly, Muzura was already a major power 
in ISast-Central Africa before the end of the first decade of the 
seventeenth century. Within two decades, however, Muzura*s 
relations with the Portuguese had seriously deteriorated. In 1624 
it was reported that the trade of the Rivers was completely at a 
standstill as a result of the war he was waging against Sena and 
Tete. The situation in the Rivers was further complicated by the 
death, in the previous year, of the Mwanamutapa, which had led to 
fighting among his sons on the right bank of the Zambezi.
Apparently seeking to extend his rule, Muzura, aided by a chief 
named Chombe, who had caused the Portuguese much trouble ten years 
before, crossed over to the south bank of the Zambezi. According 
to the Jesuit Padre Miguel Rufz, Muzura captured a great deal of 
booty in this war, including gold and thousands of head of cattle, 
although he did not capture the lands of the Mwanamutapa.(5) By 
late 1650, an official with three years* experience in Mozambique
O  £L(1) "Viagem que fez o Padre Ant. Gomes, da Comp, de Jesus, ao
Imperio de de (sic) Manomotapa; e assistencia que fez nas 
ditas terras d. Alg'us annos,“ addressed to Padre JoHo 
Marachi, S.J., Varca-Saleete, 2 January 1648; notes by 
Aielson, Stvdia. 5, 1959, pp. 155-242, at 185-4.
(2) Axelson, Portuguese, p.52.
(5) AHu, CM 1, Diogo de Sousa de Meneses, M09., 1 April 1624;
Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu*, Goa, 55 II,fl.750-72v, 
Sebastian Barreto to Vitelleschi, Goa, 15 December 1624, pp.
40-2, 67. 1 am indebted to Dr. J. Richard Gray for allowing
me to utilise his notes. In 1572, Chombe was considered
"our great friendn by the Portuguese: RSEA. iii, p.189, trs.259.
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was recommending to the Crown that it was particularly important 
that the Portuguese seelc to befriend Muzura, "King of the Bororos." 
This opinion was apparently shared by others, for the Viceroy had 
earlier in the year sent a present to Muzura for the same purpose, 
because Muzura controlled the copper trade carried on by the 
Portuguese in the Rivers*(1) Furthermore, the evidence supplied 
by Padre Luis Mariano, b.J., shows that the Portuguese in the 
Rivers also were aware of the great abundance of ivory in the 
country to the north of the Zambezi, as well as of the cheap price 
for which it could be purchased from the Africans.(2)
But Muzura and his Maravi had another outlet for their trade 
with the Portuguese: Mozambique. In the early 16bGs, a serious
conflict erupted between the Castellan of Moyambique, Cristovao de 
Brito de Vasconcelos, and the moradores. over the trade carried on 
by the latter with the Maravi. This trade was conducted on the
mainland, opposite the island. Cloth, firearms, and gunpowder were
traded to the Maravi£ who returned overland with these to the Rivers. 
One morador, named Francisco Botelho, went so far as to sell his land 
and houses for a sum of about 2,200 or 2,5u0 cruzados, all of which
he then employed in buying cloth for trading with the Maravi.
Although it is not stated what the Maravi were trading to the
moradores. the principal item of trade was undoubtedly ivory. For
the record, the Castellan advised that this trade prejudiced the 
Crown's control over the trade of the Rivers. Another, unstated, 
reason for which Brito de Vasconcelos may have opposed this trade so 
strongly was that the external trade of the Rivers was, at that time,
(1) Biblioteca Racional de Madrid, Cod.2562, fl.289-92, "Copia da
inf'orma^o que deu Pero d f Allmeiaa Cabral dos Re j nos de 
Monomotapa, e Rios de Cuama por mandado de Bua Magestade em 
carta sua de 15 de flovembro de 1650," at 290v.; Axelson, 
Portuguese. p.72. Axelson (pp.75-4) summarizes Almeida Cabral's 
report, but omits any mention of the reference to Muzura, for 
which I am again grateful to Dr. Gray.
(2) P. Aloysius Mariana (sic) ad Praepositum provinciae goanae,
Moy., 1624, in C. Beccari, Rerum Aethiopicarum Bcriptores 
Occidentales inediti a Baeculo AVI ad AlA. Rome, xii, (1912), 
pp. 112-14; cf. ARbi, Goa 55 II, fl,769-72v.
the monopoly of the Captain of Moyambique: since the death of Nuno
Alvares Pereira, in June 1651, Brito de Vasconcelos had himself 
become interim Captain.(1) Whatever his motives, Brito de 
Vasconcelos issued orders that no one from Moyambique was allowed 
to trade with the Maravi, and that transgressors would suffer 
heavy penalties.(2)
The great question raised by the letter of Brito de Vasconcelos 
is what circumstances led to the development of a substantial over­
land trade by the Maravi between the Rivers and Moyambique. The 
answer is suggested in the royal letter confirming the measures taken 
by the Castellan to suppress this trade. According to this 
dispatch, Brito de Vasconcelos wrote to the Crown, in a letter which 
has not yet been unearthed, that the origin of this trade was to be 
found in "the proximity of the Maravi Kaffirs, who have conquered a 
great part of the mainland by Moyambique and up to Mombasa." The 
presence, in strength, of the Maravi at the coast was attested by 
their subsequent offer, as a reaction against the Castellan's prejudicial 
orders, to aid four Dutch vessels, which were then cruising along 
there, in besieging Moyambique. in an attempt to counter this 
sudden hostility by the Maravi, Brito de Vasconcelos tried to induce 
the local Makua, the "enemies of the Maravi," to take up arms 
against them. Although he went so far as to offer to builu the 
Makua a wooden fortress on the mainland, at Cabaceira, they refused 
to be drawn into conflict with the Maravi.(5) But this answer itself 
raises the obvious problem of resolving this account of Maravi 
conquest opposite Moyambique with what we already know about the 
Zimba/ma-rundu invasions of this area at the end of the previous century.
(1) Axelson, Portuguese, p.76; Bordalo, Bstatistica. p.115.
(2) AHU, CM 1, Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcelos, provisao.
Moy., 7 January 1652.
(5) GBRU-MF, LM 17, fl.158, fit LM 18, fl.55v., Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 
27 February 1655, briefly summarized in BFUP. 9, 1958, pp.265 
(No.79), 508(No.17), respectively; see also, same to same, 
Lisboa, 12 February 1656, in KBjlA. iv, pp.267-70, which 
summarizes the contents of the same letter from Brito de 
Vasconcelos.
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At first sight, there would appear to be no problem here at
all, for we know that Lundu was himself a Maravi chief• But the
Portuguese never identified him as such, regarding him only as the
King of the bororo, who were correctly regarded as belonging to a
distinct and different ethnic group.(1) Thus, within the context
of the documentation, the puzzle is a very real one. The key to
this problem is revealed in Antonio bo carrot monumental Livro do 
*
Estado da India Oriental, written in 1655, and revised by Pedro 
Barreto de Kezende about a year later.(2) According to Bocarro, who 
became keeper of the archives of Goa in 1651, the mainland opposite 
moyambique was ruled by Muzura, "who came from the hi vers of Cuama 
to conquer the Makua who lived there.n Muzura was master of the 
coast from bamacoco, some ten leagues to the north of Moyambique, 
to the bar of Mogincual, twelve leagues south of the island; to the 
south, he ruled up to ouelimane, as well as to bemana.(5) He was
(1) bee below, p. HS . The name "Bororo" was a term rather hap­
hazardly applied cy the Portuguese to all the Africans who 
lived north of the Zambezi and east of the bhire, as well as 
to this country. The people now inhabiting the lower Zambezi 
area, among whom are numbered a small group known as Lolo 
(i.e., bororo), are an ethnically mixed lot. bee Rita-Ferreira, 
Agrupamento e Caracterizay'&o Etnica dos Indigenes de Moyambique. 
Lisboa, 1958, pp.55-4, 70.
(2) There are a number of variant manuscript copies of this work in
existence. One, in the possession of the Biblioteca Publica 
de Evora, is reproduced in Arquivo Portugues Oriental (nova 
ediy&o), Bastor£, iv,2 (1), 1957, and iv, 2(2), 1958, pp.1-64, 
at iv, 2(1), pp.15-15; for Kezende*s copy, see BM, bloane Ms.
197, at fl.100 & v.; for an 18th century copy containing var­
iations on both, see BNL, FG, Cod. 29, "Relay&o das Plantas, &
Bescripsoes de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades, e Povoayoens que 
os Portuguezes tern no Estado da India Oriental,” at 11.7; this 
latter has been published, with an introduction and comments, by 
A. Botelho da Costa Vfcfga, Relayao.... Lisboa, 1956; see also, 
Boxer, "Antonio Bocarro and the 'Livro do Estado da India 
Oriental* - A bio-bibliographical note," Garcia de Orta, numero 
especial, 1956, pp.205-19.
(5) bamacoco, or bomoroco (ML, FG,Cod.29), would seem to be identifiable 
as modern Simuco (14°00' 1" b., 40 55* 4" E,), or the inlet of
that name; the modern town of Mogincual (15° 54* 0" b., 40° 24* 
x 9" E.) is situated on the northern bank of the Mogincual River, 
the bar of which extends northward from the southern bank; it 
has not been possible to identify bemana. Uicionario Corografico
da Provincia de Moyambique. Coimbra, ii, 1921, pp.64,125-4;
Atlas de Moyambique. Lourenyo Marques, 1962, fl.5,8.
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regarded by the Portuguese as being “extremely cunning and very 
powerful." Bocarro then states that
This King is at peace with the Portuguese, and 
he used to keep it better than today, before 
he was so powerful, because since he has defeated, 
with our help, a Kaffir King called Rondo, with 
whom he was fighting, he thinks of making war 
against us$ it is said that some Portuguese have 
been killed in his lands by his order, and he 
wrongs us at every occasion.
The victories which Muzura had gained over other chiefs had resulted 
in his not being satisfied with the name of "King," and he reportedly 
wished to be addressed as "Rmperor," as was the Mawanamutapa. His
might was enforced by an army of 10,000 to 12,000 men.
The only trade goods which Bocarro knew to have come from 
Muzura's country were ivory and machilas. a rough, extremely durable 
cloth woven by the Maravi and frequently traded, to the detriment of 
imported Indian fabrics, with the people to the south of the Zambezi. 
Neither gold nor silver were known to have come from his lands, but 
it was reportea that there were copper mines, although these had not 
yet been discovered by the Portuguese. Within the effective limits 
of his rule, Muzura was the only person who could trade, as a result 
of which this area had been abandoned by many people. Bocarro 
concludes his account oi Muzura's country by noting that both the 
soldiers and the moradores of Moqambique traded to it for ivory, 
machilas. and provisions, ana that this trade did not contravene 
the monopoly of the Captain of Moqambique.
This invaluable account from Bocarro, a man who had all the 
necessary sources at his immediate disposal ana who was especially 
interested in the history of Portuguese hast Africa, leaves little 
doubt as to the circumstances which led to the extension of Maravi 
influence over a vast area of Bast-Central Africa. Out of the 
turbulence of the late sixteenth century emerged two chiefs who 
dominated all others on the northern bank of the Zambezi River:
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Lundu, to the east of the Shire, and Muzura, to its west. There 
was a struggle for absolute supremacy between these two rulers, with 
the latter emerging on top. in the eyes of* the Portuguese, Mttzura*s 
victory over Lundu established the primacy of Maravi rule over 1 
the lands which had already been subjugated by Lundu, including those 
opposite Mozambique. This, they thought, was an accomplished fact 
by 1655, when Bocarro completed his Livro do Estado da India Oriental, 
although his testimony that Muzura* s relations with the Portuguese 
deteriorated after they helped him to defeat Lundu suggests that 
this event may have taken place between 1608, when Muzura sent 
4,000 warriors to take part in the Portuguese campaign against 
Mwanamutapa Gatsi Rusere, and 1624, \hen he was at war with his 
former allies. Above all, it seems incontestable, given the paucity 
of available source material, that the Portuguese conception of a 
Maravi "empire”, which was first expounded by Barreto in 1667, dates 
from this period.
There still remains the problem of identifying the ruler of this 
putative empire. In 1648, Gomes says he was called Muzura; in 1667, 
Barreto refers to him as Caronga. Neither writer ever calls him by 
another name; the personal name "Caronga” never occurs before 1667, 
nor that of "Muzura” after 1648, and between these two dates no known 
references are made to this ruler at all. One may attempt to resolve 
this enigma in either of two ways. The first relies heavily on one*s 
acceptance of Maravi tradition; the second is based on a combination 
of apparent logic and judicious speculation.
Following orthodox tradition, (1) the Maravi were led from Luba 
country to Malawi, an area located at the southwest of Lake Malawi,
(1) unfortunately, the principal sources of Cewa, Nyanja, and Mangfanja 
tradition have been published only in the vernacular. See, e.g. 
S.I. Nthara, Mbiri ya Acewa. Zomba, 1848, "of which an English 
translation is prepared and awaiting a publisher,” according to 
T.C. ioung, "Place-Names in Nyasaland," NJ, vi, 2, 1955, p.56; 
see also, idem, "The Malawi people in Central Africa,” African 
Studies, xi, 2, 1952, p.91; E. Mwale, Za Acewa. London, 1952;
E.W. Chafulumira, Mbiri ya Amang*an.ia. Lusaka, 1948.
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fcy a chief called Kalonga* Kalonga sent a junior matrilineal kinsman 
("younger brother") named Undi, to settle the Kapoche River head­
waters. Undi, in turn, was aided by his junior matrilineal kinsman, 
Cimwala, who thus attained status in the area second only to (Jndi.
In time, Undi was ruler of all the southern Cewa, with his immediate 
rule being to the east of the Kapoche, while Cimwala ruled to the 
west of that river. similarly, after sending Unai to the Kapoche, 
Kalonga divided the country lying north of Undi's area between the 
lake and the Luangwa River amorgst several chiefs whose exact 
relationships, in terms of priority, have become somewhat muddled as 
a result of more recent political disputes.(1) At what appears to 
be an earlier stage of the Maravi wanderings than Undi's separation 
from Kalorga, the antecessors of the modern Nyanja and Mang'anja left 
Malawi under the leadership of Kaphwiti and his junior matrilineal 
kinsman, Lundu, Kaphwiti established his headquarters at Malawi-wa- 
Kaphwiti, to the west of the bihire, on the Wamkurumadzi River, while 
Lundu1 s town was Mbeve-wa-Mitengo, farther to the south on the Shire, 
about fifteen miles below modern Chikwawa.(2)
(1) Marwick, "history and Tradition." pp.078-61; cf. J.G. Pike, "A 
Pre-Colonial History of Malawi," NJ. xviii,1,1965, pp.5k-4;
A.J. Mazula, "Historia dos Nianjas," Portugal em Ulrica, xix, 
196k, pp.l6k-b, although most of this article must be read 
with the greatest scepticism and much of it rejected out of hand, 
(k) Hang el ey, "Two Nyasaland Hain bhrmes: Makewana - The Mother of
all People," NJ, v,k,195£, pp.31-k; idem, "Mbona - the Rain 
Maker," NJ, vi,l,J.y55, p.8; Pike, "A Pre-Colonial History of 
Malawi," p.55. According to an eighteenth century Portuguese 
traaition, the first Kalonga was the eldest son of a Maravi 
chief who was married to a daughter of the Mwanamutapa: see
ACL, Azul M65 084, No. k, Dionfsio de Melo de Castro to Pedro 
de baldanha de Albuquerque, 20 January 1760, also in KHGKP. 
pp.lkl-40, at 109; see also ibid.,, p.lOk; Price, "More 
about the Maravi," p.77. An earlier reference to this
tradition may be read into the statement that Kalonga usurped 
his empire from iYiwanamutapa: A. de Concei9ao, "IraJtado dos
Rios de Cuama," Rios de Cuama, 1696, in CT. ii,1867, p.4k.
Gomes, "Viagem," pp.l99-£00, reports the story that the 
founder of the "empire" of bororo was once a captive of the 
Portuguese, who fled north of the Zambezi and, by his prowess 
as a hunter and warrior, eventually became a great chief.
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In 1616, Gaspar Bocarro, in the course of a remarkable overland 
journey from Tete to Kilwa, spent a fortnight at Marauy, Muzura*s 
capital. Marauy was located at about a week*s journey northeast 
from Tete and a day1 s distance or so from a great expanse of water 
from which the Shire flowed to the Zambezi. Kang el ey, who was not 
very familiar with the Portuguese sources, has argued for the 
identification of Muzura and Marauy with Kaphwiti and Malawi-wa- 
Kaphwiti. (1) Mang*anja and Nyanja tradition is rather vague on the 
early relationship between Kaphwitis and Lundu, as Lundu eventually 
usurped most of Kaphwitifs power, but it has been recorded most 
positively by Murray that Kaphwiti once was the most powerful Maravi 
chief in the bhire watershed. (2) If Rangeley* s identification is 
correct, the evidence provided by Gaspar and Antonio Bocarro proves 
that this was indeed true at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Continuing with the proposition that Muzura and Kaphwiti were 
the same chief, one wants to know, then, what were the circumstances 
which led to Muzura* s decline of power. Regrettably, the translated 
traditions are silent on this point, but a possible answer is 
suggested by the accounts of Mariano and Gomes. Mariano gives the 
names of two other important chiefs living beyond Muzura* s kingdom, 
in 1624, ruling the country along the shores of what is surely Lake 
Malawi. These were Massi and Ruvenga, the one being a fortnight*s 
march from Muzura* s Maravi, and the other being yet another fortnight* s 
march beyond that. It seems quite possible that Massi should be 
identified with either the important Cewa chief Mwase, whose 
bailiwick is now far to the northwest, around Lundazi in modem 
Zambia, or with the other, latterly more powerful, Cewa chief called 
Mwase, whose dominion centres on Kasungu, in modem Malawi, north of
(1) Rangeley, "Mbona," p.8; idem, "Bocarro*s Journey,11 NJ, vii,2,1964,
pp.16-21; idem, "The Portuguese," NJ, xvii, 1,1964, pp.67-8; 
cf. Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro from Tete to Kilwa 
in 1616", NJ. vii,2,1964, pp.8-10; Marwick, "History and 
Tradition." p.382.
(2) b.S. Murray, A Handbook of Nyasaland. London, 1952, p.80;
Rangeley, "Mbona," p.8; idem, "Bocarro*s Journey," p.16.
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the Bua River. Ruvenga, on the other hand, seems to have no 
easily identifiable modern survivor. According to Mariano, Mas si/ 
Mwase was a friend of the Portuguese, who were then at war with 
Muzura, but it was not possible to reach Massi/Mwase*s lands 
without passing through the aggressor1 s. (1) By the time that 
Gomes wrote, in 1648, Muzura* s relations were again cordial with 
the Portuguese, and those who did business with him were impressed 
by the fairness of his dealings. Gomes also records that Muzura 
was at war with "other Kingdoms" to the north-northwest, and that 
the principal reason of some of them for pursuing this war was that 
they had hitherto been denied the right to travel through his 
lands "to go to trade with us, and to seek cloths for clothing 
themselves. "(2) It is possible that Muzura*s power was broken in 
a struggle over the control of trade routes with Massi/Mwase. This 
would have left Lundu as the only great chief in the Bhire Valley.
Although Muzura*s decline enabled Lundu to extend his immediate 
dominion, it still left him, at least in Barreto *s eyes, ultimately 
subordinate to Kalonga, the original Maravi leader. It is, of 
course, possible that the Kalonga known to the Portuguese was not 
the same chief who led the Maravi migration from Luba country, for 
Kalonga is merely a title meaning "king." Thus, Massi/Mwase could
(1) beccari, Rerum Aethiopicarum. xii, 1912, pp.115-14. The
distances given py Mariano should not be taken literally, 
as Portuguese writers of the period were prone to expressing 
distances in terms of "a fortnight*s march" (quinze dias de 
caminho). If one is to make a choice between Mwase Lundazi 
and Mwase Kasungu, it must be based on what Cewa tradition 
reveals about the emergence of the Kasungu chiefdom. Cf. 
Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Bocarro," p.7.
(2) Gomes, "Viagem, " pp.200,205.
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have been Barreto*s Kalonga. (1)
Another reading of Gomes1 information suggests that it was 
Kalonga himself who took Muzura to task for rank insubordination 
in refusing to allow him, the paramount Maravi chief, to trade 
directly with the Portuguese, but the Portuguese and Maravi 
sources available by which one can test this hypothesis are few. 
bxcept for Mazula's isolated ana confusing references to Chief 
Msumba, the name adopted by Kalonga Cimbano and thereafter utilised 
by his successors, there do hot appear to be any published Maravi 
traditions in translation which refer to Kalonga after he had led 
the Maravi migration and had dispatched his junior kinsmen to 
settle the land.(2) Tradition states that Kalonga settled at 
Mankhamba, just south of the Lintipe River, the northern limit of 
the traditional location of Malawi as described by the Cewa, and 
close ty the lake, after sending off his lieutenants.(5) This
(1) Marwick, "History and Tradition." p.578, and ref. cited. Arguing
on the same basis that the Kalonga known to the Portuguese was 
Undi is not acceptable. Duly has found a tradition in the 
lower bhire valley which names Undi as having been the supreme 
Maravi leader, and both Lacerda (1798) and Garnitto (1851-1802) 
refer to Undi as the head of the entire Maravi nation. Karlier 
Portuguese sources indicate rather conclusively, however, that 
Undies dominion was more limited than these statements suggest 
and that Kalonga was indeed Undi*s paramount. A.W.Jti. Duly,
"The Lower bhire District," NJ, i,2,1948, p.17; F.J. de 
Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia da Africa. Lisboa, 1958, p.178;
A.C.P. Gamitto, 0 Muata Cazembe.... Lisboa, 1854, trs. I.
Gunnison as King Kazembe. 2 vols., Lisboa, I960; in the present 
study, all references are to this translation, which see, i, 
pp.68,92; ii, p.195; TT, MR, ma9o 604, Antonio Pinto de 
Miranda, "Memoria sobre a Costa da Africa," c. 1766,TfL44, 
reproduced in A.A. de Andrade, Rela^oes de Mozambique Setecen- 
tista, Lisboa, 1955, pp.225-512, at 281; AHU, CM 50, anon., 
"Descripsao de Imperio de Manomogy, ou Caronga, da lem ao Rio 
Zambeze;" cf. Pike, "A Pre-Colonial History of Malawi," p.55.
(2) Mazula, "Historia dos Nianjas," pp.237-8; see also ibid., gp.165-
6. Msumba*s, or Messumba's, settlement is located at 12 56* 8"
8 ., 54 47* 2" K., north of Metangula, Distrito do Niassa,
Provincia de Mo9ambique, almost halfway up the eastern side of 
Lake Malawi. See Atlas de Mozambique, fl.9; the Dicionario 
Corografico. i, 1919, p.86, notes only the Msumba opposite Likoma 
Island, near Cobu& (Kobwe); for refs.to late 19th century Msumba, 
see W.P. Johnson, My African Reminiscences. 1875-1895, London 
-j£p.l924/; A. Ambali, Thirty Years in Nyasaland, London, /c. 19257*
(5) Rangeley, "Two Nyasaland Rain bhrines - MaKewana," pp. 31-2.
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puts him well to the north-northwest of Muzura ana in between this 
chiefdom and the present locations of either of the two Mwases.
While one cannot identify Kalonga* s town from Portuguese sources, as 
Rangeley has done with Muzura* s, one Teodosio Garcia, who had lived 
in the Rivers of Sena for thirty-five years and had been Kalonga* s 
friend for many of these, last visited him in 1679. His march 
from Chieoa to Kalonga* s town took twenty days to complete. This 
seems long for the distance covered, but Garcxa was an old man; in 
fact, he died two days after his return to the Rivers. (1)
Certainly, Mankhamba could have been reached from Chicoa within this 
time. If the same may be said for Kasungu, or even Lundazi, Garcxa*s 
friendship with Kalonga assures us that if the great chief were either 
of the two Mwases, Garcia would clearly have called him by that name. 
Massi/Mwase may have been known to the Portuguese before Kalonga, but, 
once the latter became known, there is no evidence for believing that 
he was ever confused with Massi/Mwase thereafter. It seems 
preferable to propose that Muzura* s loss of power followed on his 
defiance of and conflict with Kalonga, the paramount chief of the 
Maravi. Thus, as Barreto observed for the first time in 1667, 
perhaps two or more centuries after the first Kalonga had led the 
Maravi to Malawi from Luba country, his descenaant was still the most 
important chief in Maravia, as he had, perhaps, always been. The 
belated appearance of Kalonga*s name in Portuguese records may be 
accounted for by the fact that while Lundu remained subordinate to 
his over-weening senior chief Muzura, the Portuguese were unaware of 
the existence of a supreme Maravi chief, whose more limited, 
personally administered, chiefdom lay beyond Muzura* s realm. (2)
(1) AHU, CM 2, Teodosio Garcia to Crown, Qaelimane, 20 June 1679;
AHU, Cod.212, fl.94-b, Conselho ultramarino, parecer. Lisboa,
20 July 1680; see Axelson, Portuguese, pp.153-4.
(2) in this respect it is worth noting Livingstone*s observation
(1861) that the Mukumadzi (Wamkurumadzi) River was the 
boundary between the Mang*anja and Maravi tribes. As we 
know, Muzura* s town was located on this stream. Livingstone 
Makes only one passing reference to this, by then, unimportant 
chief, whom he calls Kapuiti, without indicating the precise 
location of his village. See J.P.R. Wallis (ed.), The Zambezi 
Expedition of David Livingstone. 1858-1865. London,!,pp.189,188.
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Having reached this tentative reconstruction of the process 
whereby Kalonga reasserted his supremacy over Muzura, one must admit, 
in view of the nature of the sources and the lack of further 
documentation, the very real possibility that Muzura was the personal 
name not of Kaphwiti, but of a Kalonga. Indeed, the comparative 
imperial position which each occupied in contemporary Portuguese 
sources, as well as the traditional pre-eminence of Kalonga, 
immediately suggests this identification.
Dos Santos makes an interesting reference to lfa place called 
Chicarongo, which is ten leagues from Tete,” where the Portuguese 
defeated a Mumbo chief named Ouizura. This was before the great 
Zimba migration of the 1580s, during a most confused period in the 
area north of the Zambezi. Dos bantos may not have been well 
acquainted with these names and it is possible that Chicarongo was 
not a place, but a chief, Caronga, and that his name was not 
Vhizura, but Muzura. Furthermore, Dos bantos may have been 
mistaken in believing that the name ‘'Mumbo u was that of a people, 
whom he places among the Zimba. Hather, it may be that he had 
heard of a great Mambo, or chief, living among them, and that he 
misinterpreted this information, incorrectly making a separate 
people of the Zimba chief. Thus, one could suggest that the Mambo 
Kalonga, who was also known as, or whose personal name was, Muzura, 
was the great Zimba chief whom the Portuguese defeated before the 
late 1580s.(1)
That Maravi tradition aoes not appear to have recorded such a 
defeat is not at all surprising. Court traditions in African 
societies frequently omit all mention of defeats, as their purpose 
is primarily to establish the right to authority of the royal 
families of the society. A possible interpretation of the events 
leading up to the confrontation which, it is suggested, might have 
taken place between the Portuguese and the Maravi paramount chief,
(1) Dos bantos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609),i,fl.65, HbKA, vii, p.107, 
trs. H9Z; cf. ibid., vi, p.550, trs. 405-4; see above, 
pp.
Kalonga, is that the Portuguese move up the Zambezi not only 
effectively cut off the merchants of Kilwa from the Khodesian 
gold trade, but also deprived the Maravi chief of his lucrative 
copper and ivory trade with these same Swahili traders. If the 
Maravi invasion had taken place during the fourteenth century, 
it is very likely that their chiefs, in particular Kalonga, had a 
considerable economic stake in the Swahili trade in the Zambezi 
valley. The absence of gold to the north of the Zambezi did not 
cause the bwahili, unlike the Portuguese, to turn their backs on 
that region. Copper, both Katangan and Ehodesian, and ivoiy 
were highly valued ty them. In particular, we know that the 
abundance of ivory in Maravia had lured bwahili traders far up 
the bhire hiver by the first quarter of the sixteenth century.
The unwillingness of the Portuguese to trade in these goods, an 
attitude which persisted into the middle of the eighteenth century, 
might easily have led to a conflict between Kalonga and the 
Portuguese, as the former mainly sought to find a market for his 
ivory and copper.(1)
By the late 1580s, this tentatively proposed Maravi economic 
frustration, which quite possibly had created considerable political 
unrest in Maravia, may well have produced a violent migration such 
as that which Dos bantos ascribes to the Zimba. In this light, the 
extension of mli-rundu influence, which we have seen to be identical 
with the Zimba migration, would be the consequence of Lundu* s half- 
century search for a new market for the ivory and copper trade, 
especially the former, on which the wealth of the Maravi chiefs was 
based. Such a market existed at Motjambique, where the moradores 
were excluded from the gold trade by virtue of the monopoly of the 
Captain of Mozambique. Similarly, Muzura*s defeat of Lunau would 
be seen as the final step in the re-establishment of the 
traditional Maravi hierarchy, which was upset during the middle
a) bee above, p. Z • below, pp. tyo-Z.
- i>0 -
decades of the sixteenth century.
Despite Kangeley1s positive identification of Muzura with 
Kaphviti, the second of these two interpretations appears to be 
more plausible than the first. If Muzura/Kalonga was only ten 
leagues from Tete before the late 1580s, there is no reason why, 
in pursuance of his struggle to reassert his authority over Lundu, 
he should not have had his headquarters during the first decades of 
the seventeenth century somewhere west of the 5>hire, where Bocarro 
found Muzura in 1816. Nor, in view of his mobility, should it be 
surprising to find Muzura/Kalonga, his primacy once again 
acknowledged 'ey Lundu, back near Lake Malawi within a decade, where 
Mariano1s account seems to place him in 1624, where Garcia 
apparently visited his descendant in 1679, and where Maravi 
tradition confidently asserts he established his capital after 
dispatching the subordinate Maravi chiefs to their respective 
areas of influence.
Clearly, more basic research needs to be done into this very 
important subject. Detailed examination of both Portuguese sources 
and Maravi traditions, not to mention archaeological investigation 
of Iron Age sites in this area, are essential to a better 
appreciation of the politico-economic history of the Maravi empire.
We must now return to the key problem of how the growth of 
Maravi prestige over much of .bast-Central Africa affected the 
development of long distance trade routes in that area. As we have 
previously seen, intimate commercial ties were already established 
between the Maravi and the Portuguese of Mozambique cy about 1650. 
Considering the bitter hostilities Detween the Portuguese and 
Mauruya in the 1580s, and the consequent absence of trade relations 
between the two parties, it appears most likely that the overland 
route from waravia to Mozambique only became operative after the 
Maravi conquest of Bororo had been completed. Until then, the 
struggle between Muzura and Lundu undoubtedly prolonged the unstable
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conditions which had reigned in the area since the late sixteenth 
century. in such circumstances there could not have been much in 
the way of trade between Maravia and Mozambique. Stability, and 
conditions favourable to such long-distance trade, only dame with 
the victoxy of Muzura and the creation of what the Portuguese came 
to regard as the Maravi empire.
The conflict between brito ae Vasconcelos and the moradores of 
Mozambique was eventually decided in favor of the latter. After 
first upholding the Castellan's provisions against trade with the 
Maravi, the Crown ordered that a devassa, or judicial investigation, 
be taken to determine the facts of the case. Although the Viceroy 
agreed to arrange the inquiry, he strongly defended the right of the 
moradores to continue this trade, as it was their sole means of 
earning a living. He also argued that they were especially due 
this right in gratitude for the valuable assistance they had given 
to the Portuguese garrison in withstanding the three Dutch sieges 
of the fortress of bao SebastiSo, at Mozambique, earlier in the 
century. Considering the convictions of the Viceroy, it is not 
surprising that the Crown subsequently followed his recommendations 
and that nothing further is heard of the devassa.(1) By 1655, 
whatever mi sunder standings had arisen between the Maravi and the 
Portuguese of Mozambique, as a result of brito de Vasconcelos' 
prohibition, had been resolved, and amicable relations prevailed.
In that year it was reported that the Maravi had aided the Portuguese 
in a campaign against some local bwahili. This co-operation on the 
part of the Maravi reinforced the Crown's previously expressed 
recommendations in favor of their trade with the moradores of
(1) CnhU-MF, LM 17, fl.158, & LM 18, fl.55 & v., Crown to Viceroy, 
Lisboa, 27 February 1655, and reply, Goa, 19 October 1655, 
which is recorded on fl.55 of LM 18, opposite the letter from 
the Crownj Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 28 March 1655 & 12 
February 1656, in KbbA. pp.265-70; on the Dutch siege of 
Mozambique, see Axelson, Portuguese, pp.15-29, to which may 
be added A. Meyrelles do Souto (ed.), "Historya dos Cercos 
que os Olandexes puzerao a Fortaleza de Mozambique o Anno de 
607 e 608," btvdia. 12,1965, pp.465-548.
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Mozambique, which were duly repeated to the Viceroy in 1640.(1)
The only other reference to the influence of the Maravi 
along the coast which precedes Barretofs invaluable account 
affirms that this was still considerable in 1649, and that the 
Maravi were “greatly feared along this coast."(2) But it is 
only Barreto who furnishes any details on the nature of Maravi 
domination in this area and on the operation of trade between 
Mozambique and Maravi country. According to him, the Makua were 
ruled by a number of petty chiefs, “who all obey in the first place 
the great emperor of the entire nation of the Makua." This 
emperor must have been Mauruza, who was undeniably the most 
powerful Makua chief in the neighborhood of Mozambique, which was, 
effectively, the only part of Macuana known to the Portuguese.
Thus, his elevation to emperor by Barreto is quite understandable. 
Similarly, Bororo was carved up among numerous local rulers, who 
equally were the subjects of Lundu.(5) On the other hand, Barreto 
makes it perfectly clear that the Maravi were dominant throughout 
the entire region and suggests that this influence was the result 
of their force of arms. The Makua rendered the Maravi "such 
obedience as they are compelled to by violence," while the Bororo 
were "subjected by force to the Maravi." Sanculo, on the mainland 
just south of Mozambique, was "infested by the Maravi," while 
Quelimane had occasionally been attacked by the Bororo "under the
(1) BFuP, 14, 1960, pp.85-6 (Nd.20); CchU-MF, LM 21-A, fl.90,
Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 11 March 1640, summarized in BFUP 
15, 1959, pp.712-15 (No.47); see also, ChhU-MF, LM 21-B, 
fl.505-4 v, "Lista de 45 cartas de Bua Magestade, tocantes 
ao govemo, que vao respondidas por este mazo No.l," No. 41, 
for a passing reference to this trade, summarized in BFUP.
£0, 1962, pp.149-50 (No.69).
(2) This observation is taken from the account of Padre Ant6nio
Francisco Cardim, B.J., "Eelaz&o da Viagem do galeao b.
Lourenzo e sua perdiz&o nos baixos de Moxincale em Z de 
Betembre de 1649," Lisboa, 1651, in Gomes de Brito,
Historia Tragico-Maritima. x, 1905, pp.161-88, at 182.
(5) See above, pp. 3S-(o . For the fragmented political organization 
of these peoples, see, e.g., the summaries of Hita-Ferreira,
Ag run amen to. p. 71, and M. Tew (Douglas), Peoples of the Lake 
Nyasa Keg ion. London, 1950, p. 25.
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name of Maravi." The final proof of Maravi dominance in Bast- 
Central Africa is in Barreto's sharp observation: "The Maravi
are very warlike, and are feared among all the Kaffirs as the 
bororo and Makua are despised, so that as any Kaffir is offended 
at being called a Bororo or Makua, so it is a great honor to be a 
Maravi. • ."(1) it seems certain, then, that Barreto's much 
maligned Maravi empire did, in fact, exist. it was not, assuredly,
an empire-state, nor was it a confederation. There are no grounds
for believing that it ever was actually administered as any sort of 
a unified state, although tribute was undoubtedly extracted by the 
Maravi whenever possible. Rather, it was a vast area which, after 
having been duly impressed by Maravi military strength, was bound 
together by Maravi commercial dominance.(2)
Following the dispute between Brito de Vasconcelos and the 
moradores of Mozambique, the Crown had repeatedly issued orders 
which granted the right of the latter to trade with the Maravi,
(1) K5BA. iii, pp.456, 442-5, 450-1, trs. 465-4, 47U-1, 480.
(2) o. de Castro, "Os Lomuls no Larde," Boletim Geral das Colonias.
504, 1950, p.2o, and "Os Lomues do Larde - elementos para 
urn monografia hist6rico-ethnografica," Boletim da Socieaade 
de Estudos de Mozambique, xxii, 76, 1952, pp.41-4, makes 
intriguing references to the Marravi being one of the original 
groups inhabiting Larde, the modern name for the former district 
of Angoche, where Lupi gathered his traditions about the ma- 
rundu. See also, AHU, Cod. 1452, fl.52-4, Manuel da Silva 
Gonzalves to Jos£ Joaquim Rodrigues, Moz*, 7 april 1852, 
which recommends to Rodrigues, as the new Captain of Fem&o 
Veloso (14° 27' 5“ S., 4U 40' 9" S.), located midway between 
Mozambique and Simuco, the northern limit of Muzura*s 
dominion, according to Antonio Bocarro, that he should treat 
the Maravi chief called Meua, who lived not far from the 
Portuguese establishment there, with particular respect. 
Enclosure number 4 of thi3 letter, "Relazao dos Generos, que 
se reraetem, para o saguate de Kegulo Meua," shows that Meua 
was the only chief to whom Rodrigues was to send presents on 
his arrival at Fernao Veloso. Cf. H.jfi.G*Neill, "A Three 
Months' Journey in the Makua and Lomwe Countries," Proceedings 
of the Royal Geographical Society, iv,1882,p.200: "Though
separately and distinctly independent, there is a commonality 
of interests along the lines of the trade routes, binding most 
of these petty chiefdoras.•."
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"but the governors of Mozambique have prevented it under various 
pretexts, as they have other trade. • .and they usurp eveiything," 
Barreto lamented, "so that now only one or two moradores have any 
capital, whereas in past years the town contained many rich 
merchants. If His Majesty does not put a stop to this,
Mojambique will soon be deserted, and the Captain will be left 
alone with the keys of his fortress." Indeed, in the 1640s, it 
had been alleged that the governors sometimes seized the goods of 
the moradores forcibly, and that the greed of these officials was 
at the root of the state of destitution into which Mozambique and 
the Rivers of Sena had fallen. (1) In spite of these vexations, 
which, of course, were felt by the Maravi traders, as well as by 
the moradores. this trade continued to be pursued. Barreto 
claims that the reason for this was that
it is much easier for the traders who go 
from Mozambique to Maravi, and there meet 
those of fete, to bring their ivory to Tete 
than to carry it to Mozambique, but they 
avoid coming to Tete in order not to be 
subjected to the monopoly of the governor 
of Mozambique.
Although he does not explicitly say so, Barreto is here certainly 
referring to African, not Portuguese traders. He elsewhere 
emphasizes that the Portuguese of Mozambique oared not enter Macuana 
and adds later that "The merchants of Mozambique trade in this 
kingdom /of Maravia - sic ThealJ with the Makua, those of Quelimane 
with the Bororo, those of Sena with the Rundo, and those of Tete 
with the said Maravi and in his /Kalonga'sJ court."(2) This
(1) AHU,CM 2, anon., document, beginning, "iin prezenza do Conde da
Torre.." /Lisboa/ n.d., but from the 1640s. The document is 
based on the testimony of two experienced men from Mozambique 
and the Rivers, Carlos Lufs de Almeida, who had last served in 
Bast Africa as Captain of the Rivers of Cuama, and Manuel da 
Bilva Louzado. They had been summoned to give witness before 
the Count, who became a member of the Conselho do Bstado in 
1641, and died in 1651. Grande Bnciclopedia Portuguesa e 
Brasileira. Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro, n.d., xxxii, p.205.
(2) RBBA. iii,pp.457,447-3,451, trs.464-5,476-7,480; see Axelson,
Portuguese, p.151, for complaints made to the Crown in 1665 
against the Captain of Mozambique's violating the trading 
rights of the moradores.
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statement indicates that the local Portuguese merchants of each 
settlement traded directly only with those people in whose lands 
they were located. Interior trade, such as that between 
Moyambique and Maravia, was completely in the hands of the Africans.
it seems probable that ty carrying his ivory to a competitive 
market - the moradores of Mozambique - the African trader could 
secure a far more favorable price for it than if he had to dispose 
of it at Tete, where the monopoly of the Captain of Mozambique 
enabled him effectively to dictate the price of ivory, no doubt to 
his own advantage. In the eighteenth century, this pattern of 
trade continued, as various factors combined to depress the value 
of ivory, so far as the African trader was concerned, in the Rivers. 
Later in the same century, similar circumstances caused him to 
forsake Mozambique, to a large extent, and to carry his merchandise 
to Kilwa, where he was able to turn an even greater profit. To 
most contemporary Buropean eyes, he may have seemed rather simple 
for exchanging precious ivory, as well as other desirable goods, 
including slaves, for rather inexpensive cloth and beads; but the 
long distance African trader in Bast-Central Africa was a shrewd 
businessman, keenly aware of the market in which he was operating. 
Indeed, this was a fact which greatly impressed several of the more 
perspicacious Portuguese officials of the period. (1)
There is not nearly so much information concerning the overland 
trade route from Maravia to Kilwa in the seventeenth century as there 
is for that Mozambique. The first evidence that such a route had 
been established is the account of Gaspar Bocarro's historic journey 
of 1616. In fact, until the middle of the eighteenth century, this 
is the only Portuguese source which indicates the existence of a 
route to Kilwa, which goes equally unnoticed in the Livro do Bstado 
da India Oriental and the reports of Gomes and Barreto. Despite the 
exaggerated claims by contemporary Portuguese observers that the 
Maravi empire extended up to Mombasa and that it thus adjoined
(1) See below, pp. 13/-% 152-3, 20Z-
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Ethiopia, the Maravi exercised no military domination over the regions 
through which the route to Kilwa ran. On the other hand, Antonio 
Bocarro*s description of Gaspar Boearro*s march from Muzura1s town of 
Marauy to Kilwa clearly reveals that Muzura*s commercial influence 
extended along the entire route. Muzura dominated neither Manguro, 
which extended roughly from the Mandimba hills to the Kuvuma River, 
nor the country lying between the Ruvuma and the Kilwa coast, as he 
reportedly axa bororo and Macuana, but he was well respected throughout 
the entire area. The ease with which Boearro completed his march, 
during most of which he was guided by several of Muzura* s subjects, 
as well as the nature of the relations which existed between Muzura 
and the two principal chiefs in these regions, Chicoave and Manhanga, 
attest to this state of affairs. Chicoave is said to have been rta 
friend and almost a vassal of Muzura, because he stands in awe of 
him,” but the fact that Muzura "sent the Kaffir a present, that he 
might let Boearro pass and provide him with guides" surely reveals 
that Chicoave was not his vassal. Mugura also sent presents to 
Manhanga, who reciprocated with cloth obtained in trade from the 
coast, for the same purpose; so the assertion that "this Kaffir also 
obeys Muzura" would seem to be the product of a similar misinterpret­
ation of the situation. it is striking enough, however, that 
Muzura* s reputation and influence extended from his own country, 
southwest of Lake Malawi, to beyond the Ruvuma River. (1)
As we have seen, during the middle decades of the sixteenth 
century, the merchants of Kilwa gradually began to cultivate a trade 
in ivory with the people of the hinterland.(2) After the devastation 
wrought fcy the Zimba at Kilwa in 1588, it must have taken several 
years before more than a trifling trade of this sort could have been 
re-established. Besides the determination and vitality of the 
people of Kilwa who survived the Zimba massacre to revive their town,
(1) 51). pp.166—7.
(£) bee above, pp. 21-Hw
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the principal factor in the revival of this trade was the presence 
of the Portuguese at Kilwa. In 159<2, the Portuguese seat of power 
on the coast of East Africa north of Gape Delgado was transferred 
from Malindi to Mombasa, where, in the following year, construction 
began on the monumental Fort Jesus. in 1594, an alf&ndega. or royal 
custom-house, was established at Mombasa. It was intended to be 
the sole official port for the import and export of all merchandise 
within the nominal jurisdiction of the Portuguese in that part of 
the world. According to the vice-regal instructions to the new 
Captain of Mombasa in 1598, no Portuguese were to be allowed to 
settle in any coastal or island town outside of Mombasa, not even 
in Kilwa or Zanzibar, whose rulers were known "for the long-standing 
friendship which they have with the Kstado /da India/." or State of 
India, as the entire Portuguese establishment east of the Cape of 
Good Hope was known. Within several years, however, the Captain of 
Mombasa had his personal factor established at Kilwa, among other 
places along the coast, for, despite specific instructions not to 
monopolise all trade for themselves, this is precisely what the 
Captains usually strove to do. During the course of the century, 
however, the trading monopoly of the Captain of Mombasa seems to 
have become accepted by the Crown.(1)
As the Sultan of Kilwa exercised hardly any independent power 
(although he still maintained at least a nominal hegemony over 
Mafia Island), he soon fell under considerable Portuguese iniluence. 
In 1614, the sultan's support of the Portuguese led to his 
assassination by an anti-Portuguese vassal who then apparently 
seized power for his faction. The Portuguese took the Sultan's 
young son under their protection after the assassination, but it is
(1) Boxer, "Swahili Coast," pp.£5-9; C. Azevedo, "Fort Jesus," in 
Boxer & Azevedo, Fort Jesus, pp.89-117, especially 94-5; 
Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.164-75, £4l-k; 6NL, FG,
Cod.1987, fl.69-7£v., "Kegimento que Levou Kui so^res de 
mello capitao da fortz de Mombaca," n.d., but ascribable to 
no later than 1598, when Soares de Melo became Captain of 
Mombasa; Dos Santos, Ethiopia Uriental (1609), i, fl.llbv., 
(1891), i, pp.579-80; see Boxer & Azevedo, Fort Jesus. 
Appendix A, p.118.
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not known whether he was himself installed as Sultan after the 
Portuguese reaffirmed their supremacy in Kilwa. When Gaspar 
Boearro reached Kilwa in 1816 "the factor and other Portuguese" 
who received him there seem to have been in control of the place, 
by 1651, the oppressive behavior of successive Portuguese factors 
from Mombasa at Kilwa had created a state of near revolt among 
its inhabitants, and the Sultan was only appeased fcy the persuasion 
of a visiting Portuguese judge who conducted an investigation into 
the matter. It was perhaps the antagonising conduct of Portuguese 
factors at Kilwa which caused at least one Captain of Mombasa, 
Francisco de Seixas Cabreira, to exercise his monopoly of the ivoiy 
trade there through a Muslim personal agent, in his case, one 
Sharif Alaum, a native of Kilwa.(1)
Portuguese control over the Mombasa coast, as it was called, 
was never very secure. A major uprising at Mombasa in 1651 threw 
the Portuguese out of their one coastal stronghold, but it was 
re-taken in the following year. Throughout the century, however, 
Kilwa remained friendly and well within the commercial sphere of the 
Captain of Mombasa, even after Oman began to challenge Portuguese 
supremacy on the East African coast. The rise of Oman under the 
new lorubi dynasty, which came to power in 16 k4, and the decline of' 
Portuguese domination in the Indian Ocean, which was largely the 
result of Dutch expansion, combined to result in the Omani capture 
of Muscat from the Portuguese in 1650. By being quick to adapt 
European ship design, the Omanis were soon able to present the 
Portuguese with a formidable challenge in East Africa. Already in 
1652 Arab raiders from Oman seriously threatened the Portuguese hold 
on the coast, and Kilwa was raided by a fleet mounted by the pro-
(1) Dos bantos, Ethiopia Oriental (1609), i,fl.ll4v., (1891),i, p.584; 
CEBDfMF, LM 1 £, fl. 161-7v, D. Jeronimo de Azevedo to Crown, 
Paragem das Queimadas, 51 December 1614, summarized in BFUP 
4,1955,p.767 (no.109); ED. pp.168,185-4; Arquivo Portugu§s 
Oriental (n.e.),iv,Jd(l),pp.57-8; Axelson, Portuguese, p.85; 
btrandes, Portuguese Period. p.£&0. After 1651, there were 
probably no unofficial Portuguese residents at Kilwa: see
Boxer, "Swahili Coast," p.41.
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Arab ruler of Pemba. But Portuguese hegemony was shortly re­
established in general, with Kilwa remaining far more strongly 
within their fold than other towns. While the Omanis continued to 
test Portuguese strength along the coast, even attempting 
unsuccessfully to seize Mozambique in 1670, Kilwa remained largely 
untouched by these events until after the Omani capture of Mombasa 
in 1698.(1)
The only further information on Kilwa until 1698 which has so 
far come to light is found in the Journal of William Alley, an 
Englishman, who spent several months at Mombasa in 1667. Mombasa 
he described as "a place of noe great traffiq,Tl but what there was
clearly lay in the hands of the Captain, or Governor, of the coast.
Mombaza its selfe seldome sens anything con­
siderable, their onely trade consisting in 
their small boates, with wnich the Governor 
sends downe to Ouilo, Pembah, and Zanzebar, 
and oft times to Musem'beque. Their returnes
are gould, amber /ambergris/* elevants teeth,
and slaves, most of which commodity they pur­
chase at very inconsiderable rates, and for 
which the Governor maintains continually a 
factory at Ouilo att his own charge. (2)
while there must have been a certain amount of independent 
exporting done by the bVahili merchants of Kilwa, it seems likely 
that the most important buyer at Kilwa was the Captain of Mombasa. 
His prominence was established there at the very beginning of the 
seventeenth century, when Kilwa was at its weakest, and despite 
occasional set-backs it seems to have remained the most vital 
commercial force at Kilwa throughout that century.
(1) btrandes, Portuguese Period, pp.178-240. Axelson, Portuguese
pp.78-96,127-8,159-45,151-5,155-8; CEHU-MF, LM 22-B,fl. 
587-90v., at 588v., Francisco de Seixas Uabreira, mombasa,
50 August 1652, summarized in BFuP,21,1962, pp.446-8, but 
the reference to Kilwa is omitted; AHU, Cod.211,fl.o05-6, 
Conselho Ultramarino, consults. Lisboa, 9 October 1654; see 
Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion. 1415-1825 :
A Sudcint Survey. Johannesbuig, 1961, pp.45-55.
(2) SB, p.190.
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Kilwa1 s recovery after the invasion of the Zimba was not due 
to the fact that it was the beginning of a route to the interior(1); 
rather, it was because Kilwa was the terminus of a route from the 
interior. Before the expansion of Maravi commercial influence in 
bast-Central Africa, there is no evidence that Kilwa was attracting 
trade from as far inland as Maravia. Furthermore, the disruption 
to trade caused by the Zimba hordes was not limited to Kilwa 
itself, for when Gaspar Boearro left the village of Manhanga, 
situated three days1 march from the Ruvuma, in Tanzania, he 
"travelled seven days through a deserted country, because the land 
had been devastated by the Zimbas, who passed over it with an army, "(ki) 
Considering the evidence amiable on the trade of Kilwa in the first 
two centuries of Portuguese involvement in bast Africa, together with 
that concerning the development of interior traae to Mo§ambique in 
the same period, it would appear that a significant factor leading 
to the initiation of a unified trade route between the far interior 
of bast-Central Africa and Kilwa was the commercial influence of the 
Maravi.
4. The role of the lap
The principal compilation of lao tradition, Tohannah B.
Abdallah's Cikala ca Wayao. emphasizes the role of the lao in the 
inauguration of trading between the interior and Kilwa.(3) This 
is to be expected, especially as Abdallah was himself a Xao. Here 
there is no mention of maravi commercial influence, which from 
Portuguese sources alone would seem to be more important than any 
other. let from the earliest contemporary references to the lao,
(1) Cf. Mathew, "The Culture of the bast African Coast in the Seven­
teenth and bighteenth Centuries in the Light of Recent
Archaeological discoveries," Man. lvi, 1955, No. 61, p.65.
U) p.167.
(5) I.B. Abdallah, The laos (arranged, ed., and trans. M. Sanderson), 
Zomba, 1919. I have been unable to locate a published copy 
of this book and have used instead a duplicated typescript 
which was presented to the library of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, by H.L. duff before 
its publication.
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in the 1750s and 1740s, it is clear that the Yao were the most 
prominent long distance traders in East-Central Africa. Indeed, 
an important document from the 1760s suggests that they dominated 
the routes to both Ailwa and Mozambique by the end of the seven­
teenth century. (1) It seems unlikely that this can be explained 
away by arguing that the Portuguese made no distinction between lao 
and Maravi traders at Mozambique in the seventeenth century. Nor 
does this necessarily imply that the commercial influence of the 
Maravi was any less vital in forging these routes to the coast.
On the other hand, this state of affairs does indJLcate that the 
picture one gets from the sources which we have so far examined 
errs in suggesting that the Maravi were the only important traders 
between the interior and the coast.
The heart of Yao country lies in the northwest of Portuguese 
East Africa, bounded, approximately, by the Rivers Lucheringo, or 
Luchulingo, to the west, the Luambala to the south, the Lugenda to 
the east, and running off to the north towards the Ruvuma. Like 
most of East-Central Africa it is an area of light woodlands; it 
is a well-watered, fertile country. While the general elevation 
of the area is high, it is marked by a series of hills and 
occasional abruptly rising peaks.(2) according to Abdallah, the 
entire lao nation regards one of these hills, appropriately known 
as ‘lao1 hill, as its place of origin. Other sources confirm the 
central position which this hill, "the birthplace of all the Yaos," 
occupies in Yao mythology. (5) This sort of legend is not unique: 
among neighboring peoples it is equally prominent in the traditions 
of the Lomwe, who regard Namuli peaks with veneration, and the 
Maravi peoples, who look to the hill called Kaphilintiwa as their
(1) bee below, jpp* 74.
(2) N.B. Valdex Thomaz bos bantos, Q Desconhecido X^iassa. LisDoa,
1964, pp.27-52 & plates at 20-1.
(5) Abdallah, The lao s. p. 2; see H.S. Stannus, "The Wayao of Nyasa- 
land." Varia Africana III. Cambridge (Mass.), 1922, p.251; 
banderson, "Inyago - The Picture-Models of the lao Initiation 
Ceremonies," NJ, viii,2, 1956, pp.56-7; Valdez Thomaz dos 
bantos, Niassa. p.121.
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place of origin. (1) But if one should not accept this tradition 
literally, it seems proper to look upon this region as the area 
in which the Yao developed their sense of tribal unity. As such, 
the tradition, briefly noted by bousa Lobato, that the Yao 
"originated in (s%o oriundos de) a chain of hills running from 
Mtonya, near Lake Nyasa, to Uizulu, near the Ruvuma River," is 
closer to reality than the more orthodox tradition. (2)
Like the Maravi, however, there is another tradition which 
points to the Congo Basin as the ultimate home of the Yao.
According to Hetherwick, the Yao living in what is now the state 
of Malawi believed that man was created on "an island in the midst 
of a lake called Kapiritimya," beyond Lake Bangweulu, and that one 
could see the footprints of the first men and animals there, as 
the clay over which they passed had not yet hardened at the time 
of their creation. The similarity between this legend and the 
Maravi myth of creation at Kaphilintiwa is striking. It is quite 
possible that the Yao who settled in Malawi during the second half 
of the nineteenth century merely appropriated this legend for their 
own. The version recorded by Murray strongly suggests this 
explanation, as it nowhere varies from the Maravi tradition.(3) 
Still, this need not be the only explanation for the sharing of a 
legend of origin between two peoples whose cultures are as 
similar as are those of the Yao and the Maravi.(4)
(1) M.E. 0 •Neill, "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirwa and
Amaramba," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society, vi, 
1884, pp.642, 727; S.de Castro, Os Achirimas (Bnsaio Etno- 
gr&fico), Louren 50 Marques, 1941, p.9; Marwi ck, "Hi story 
and Tradition," p.578; cf. w.E.K “Ward, A History of Ghana. 
London, 1958, pp.60-1, for the Ashanti legend of origin from 
"a hole in the ground" at Asantemanso.
(2) A. bousa Lobato, "Monografia Etnografica Original sobre a Povo
Ajaua," Boletim da bociedade de Estuaos da Colonia de 
Mozambique, xlx, 65, 1949, pp.7-8.
(5) A. Hetherwick, "borne Animistic Beliefs among the Yaos of British 
Central Africa," The Journal of the Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland, xxxii, 1902, p.94; Murray, 
Handbook, pp.86-7; cf. B. Heckel, "The Culture and Education 
of the Yao Tribe," University of London Institute of Education, 
Studies and. Reports, iv, 1955,pp.7,14, which is derived from 
Hetherwick.
(4) bee M. Tew (Douglas), Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region, London, 
 1950. pp.2-22» 5 0 - 5 0 . _____ _________
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There is no evidence that there was ever a lao state, either 
centralized, or as loosely organized as that of the Maravi appears 
to have been. The traditional dispersal of the various Yao sections 
from central Yaoland cannot be likened to Kalonga*s dispatching of 
the great Maravi chiefs throughout Maravia. The reason for this 
dispersal, if it actually occurred, is not known, but Abdallah 
suggests internal dissension. This seems likely enough, considering 
the fragmentary nature of Yao political organization. Abdallah 
ciescribes the dispersal as being “very ancient1’, not to be confused 
with the great Yao migrations of the nineteenth century. The eleven 
sections which he distinguishes spread out in all directions from 
central Yaoland. The southern limit of the Yao was almost 
identical with the modem frontier between Malawi and Portuguese hast 
Africa, with the Mangoce Yao settled around Mangoce Hill (Fort 
Mangoche) and the Macinga Yao occupying the hills stretching away 
from Mandimba towards the source of the Lugenda River. The Mwera, 
or Cimbanga, Yao crossed the Kuvuma into modem Tanzania. In 
between were the Masaninga, Malambo, Mbemba, Makole, Mkula, Njese, 
and Cingoli Yao. To these may be added the Cisi Yao, whom Abdallah 
elsewhere describes as a “sect.1 The Masaninga, by virtue of their 
domination of central Yaoland, appear to have been the strongest of 
the Yao sections. There were no Yao groups to the east of the 
Lugenda. (1)
At a very early date, then, the Yao had occupied an extensive 
tract of territory extending from the southeast end of Lake Malawi 
to across the Kuvuma. It is most important to determine the 
antiquity of this distribution. Gaspar Boearro passed through 
this country in 1616. T.C. Young has stated flatly that “at such 
an early date no Yao tribe existed.MW T h i s  is nonsense. Neither
(1) Abdallah, The Yaos. pp.2-5,10; J.G. Mitchell, “The Yao of
Southern Nyasaland,M in K. Colson & M. Gluckman, ,Seven Tribes 
of British Central Africa. Manchester, 1961, pp.515-47; idem, 
The Yao Village. Manchester, 1956, passim: K.G.P. Lamburn,
“Borne Notes on the Yao," TNK. 29, 1950, p.75.
(2) Young, Notes on the History of the Turnbuka-Kamanga Peoples of
the Northern Province of Nyasaland. London, 1952, p.20.
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are the interpretations of Rangeley and Hamilton satisfactory.
Five days after Boearro left Muzura's town of Marauy, he reached 
"the limits of the land of the son /Caramboe/ of iviuzura." The 
territory of Manguro began here. Manguro, as we know, was subject 
to Chicoave, whose village was situated two full days* march into 
Manguro, just south of the Kuambara (Luambala) River. A week 
later Boearro arrived at the Rofuma (Ruvuma), beyond which Manhanga 
is said to have ruled. Manhanga1 s town was three days beyond the 
Ruvuma. Rangeley has painstakingly reconstructed this route 
through Manguro with the help of Yao informants who had travelled 
to Kilwa in trading caravans before the imposition of colonial rule 
put an end to this traffic. His findings match Boearro's 
description of the route possibly a little too perfectly. Without 
knowing Rangeley's method of interrogation, one cannot regard his 
identifications without a certain amount of scepticism, particularly 
as even he considers it prudent to add the qualifxcation, "if indeed 
my lao informants are correct." Rangeley's later notes on the Yao 
include a more specific attempt to identify the Manguro people, but 
his conclusions are wholly unacceptable. In fairness to Rangeley, 
it should be said that these notes were published posthumously and 
seem to predate his more balanced article on Boearrofs route, in 
which he correctly recognizes that the people to the east of the 
mang'anja were "formerly indiscriminately described by the Mang'anja 
as Hguru."(l)
Hamilton, although he cites an article by Price which clearly 
shows that Nguru, as used ty speakers, was probably a
blanket term for "easterners", nevertheless identifies Chicoave as 
"the chief of a group of the Makua-Lomwe peoples. "(2) According to 
Portugal Dur&o, the Lomwe living north of the Marata hills, to the 
southeast of Lake Chilwa, were known among themselves as Hguru at
(1) SB, pp.l66-Y; Rangeley, "Boearro's Journey," pp.22-5; idem,
"The Ayao," JjJ, xvi,1,1955, pp.8-9,lb.
(2) Hamilton, "The Route of Gaspar Boearro," pp.10-11; T. Price,
"The ftarae 'Anguru'," HJ, v, i, 1952, pp.25-5.
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the beginning of the present century; but there is no evidence 
whatsoever that these people ever lived around the Luambala. (1) 
it is far more advisable to admit that Bocarro!s Manguro folk 
cannot be identified with any specific modem people on the basis 
of that name alone. When used by the Maravi, the name "Nguru" 
was by definition one of imprecision.(2)
When all is said, however, it seems most likely that the 
distribution of the lao throughout the northwest of Portuguese 
hast Africa had been achieved by 1616.(5) Boearro's definition 
of the boundary between Muzura's lands and Manguro is virtually 
identical to the southern frontier of lao occupation as described 
by Abdallah. If this were so, Boearro probably entered Manguro in 
the country of the Macinga lao and Chicoave was probably a Macinga 
chief. Just as it is clear that Chicoave was not Muzura1 s vassal, 
it seems apparent that the chiefs beyond Chicoave were not subject 
to his authority. Boearro*s passage through Manguro was 
facilitated by gifts of cloth, beads and copper bracelets to the 
chief of each village at which he rested. Of these individuals, 
Cuitenga, two days from the Kuvuma, and Muangongo, whose village 
was on the south side of that river, merited greater presents than 
the others. By this measure, Chicoave was the most important chief 
whom Boearro encountered in manguro, but his greater prestige was 
quite probably due to his commanding the frontier area between 
Muzura's lands and Manguro, through which the trade route to Kilwa 
passed. In this position, his co-operation was of the utmost 
importance to Muzura.
(1) A.A. Portugal Dur&o, "Keconhecimento e Occupa^o dos Territorios
entre o Messangiro e os Picos Namuli,” Revista Portugueza 
Colonial e Maritime, iv, 2,1900-1901, pp.l54-b.
(2) bee J. Kebman, Dictionary of the Kiniassa Language (ed. L.Krapf),
bt. Chrischona, 1877, p.120: "M1nguru. n.gent.(pl.Wanguru),
a name given by the tribes W. of the JNiassa to those in the 
b. including both Wahiao /XaoJ and Wajomba /?/;" see also, 
W.P. Johnson, Nyasa the Great Water. London, 1922, p.106; 
see below, pp. Zb\-Z* Ch.
(b) Cf. Price, "lao Origins," BJ. xvii, 2, 1964, pp.11-16. Price's 
interpretation of early fao history seems unacceptable in the 
light of Portuguese documentation.
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On the same basis of Boearro and Abdallah, it would seem that 
the xviwera lao had not yet pushed across the Ruvuma into Tanzania, 
assuming that Manhanga*s subjects were none of them lao. This is 
entirely possible, as the wider distribution of the Yao probably 
took place over an extended period of time, rather than in one 
great movement. The Mwera may have crossed the Ruvuma much later 
than Abdallah indicates. (1) On the other hand, it is equally 
possible that the lao who crossed the Kuvuma were subject to a 
powerful ruler of another tribe. Similarly, it is not 
inconceivable that Manhanga was a lao himself, ruling over Yao, 
and other, subjects. (&) Although Manhanga's rule reportedly 
stretched to the coast, this would seem to be a misconception. 
Manhanga quite probably did rule from the Ruvuma to his town, 
three days hence; but it is very doubtful that l»is authority 
extended from there, through seven days of deserted country, to 
the villages of Chiponda, "brother of Manhanga." Instead,
Chiponda was probably an independent ruler whose ties with Manhanga 
were a direct result of their mutual stake in trading to the coast. 
Similarly, the chiefs of the small villages of Ponde and Morengue, 
separated from Chiponda*s by another long stretch 01 desert land, 
shared this common interest in trade, but certainly owed no 
obeisance to either Manhanga or Chiponda. Prom these small 
villages to Bucury, a Swahili settlement on the mainland, only a 
half-day's march from the coast opposite Kilwa, Boearro again 
passed through a great stretch of uninhabited country, (b) Thus, 
the impression which one can get at first reading of the account 
of nocarro's journey, that Manguro and southern Tanzania were each 
ruled by a great chief, is inaccurate. Antonio Boearro's imperial 
conception of these two rulers, like Barreto's of Mauru^a, was
(1) Bee Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior c.1500-
1640," in H&A.i.p.gQB; A. Bmith, "The Southern Section of 
the Interior, 1840-64," in ibid, p.256.
(;d) Cf. Gray, "A Journey by Land from Tete to Kilwa in 1616," INK, 
Jdb, 1948, pp.4b-6; Hamilton, "The Route if Gaspar Boearro,"
pp.ll-lJd; Rangeley, "Boearro's Journey," p.£b.
(5) 8D, pp.166-8.
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undoubtedly moulded both by his times and by his familiarity with 
Muzura (Kalonga, in Barreto*s case), who more nearly satisfied that 
role, 1'he route from the border of Maravia to Kilwa was marked, 
rather, by mutual courtesies among independent chiefs who were 
bound together by the supremely important motive of long-distance 
trade.
Further reason for believing that the lao were the principal 
traders from Maravia to Kilwa by the early seventeenth century 
comes from the strong traditional commercial ties between the lao 
and Kilwa, According to Abdallah, before the aays of trading to 
the coast, the lao primarily were agriculturists, although they 
used to hunt a great deal, as well. They manufactured barkcloth, 
and produced salt by burning grasses. Abdallah implies that they 
possessed knowledge of iron-working at the beginning of their 
traditional history, that it was not a skill imported from outside. 
Indeed, they were accomplished smiths and "the iron ore in lao 
country was easily worked." But his account of how the Cisi lao 
"started building forges, furnaces ana workshops," ana manufacturing 
iron tools, suggests that the Cisi may have been an immigrant group 
who introduced this vital skill to the lao. The Cisi were 
specifically blacksmiths, "and they dwelt in lao country, because 
had they not started forging the country would have been aevastatea 
with famine." Consequently, the Cisi were formerly "held in great 
esteem." This, too, supports the belief that they arrived in 
Yaoland later than the main boay of the tribe. Unfortunately, 
there is absolutely no archaeological evidence from which one can 
date the beginning of the iron Age in northern Mojambique. The 
Cisi gained great fame and wealth from their unique skill as iron­
workers and travelled throughout the country, selling their wares 
to all the lao sections, even to those across the Ruvuma. "There 
was no country which the Wachisi did not visit." Although the Cisi 
were once "greatly respected and greatly feared," they gradually lost
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their fame, reportedly as a result ox a decline in the quality of 
their products, which Abdallah ascribes to conceit.(1)
Not surprisingly, the Cisi are said to have been the first 
Yao to trade with the coast. Abdallah records:
it happened that there was a certain 
district up-country, on the way to the 
coast, where there were no hoes, and 
the Achisi did not go there to sell 
theirs;....these people took foodstuffs 
and went to sell them to the people who 
lived near the Coast, and there they 
bought a piece of white calico. When 
they got this they took it to buy a 
hoe at a village visited by the Achisi.
And they (the Achisi) carried word of 
it when trading to another village, 
in this manner the fame of this calico 
spread everywhere....(the news) spread 
throughout Yao-land, disseminated by 
those who had seen it; and its fame
extended also wherever the Yaos went....
That was when the Yaos first began to 
trade and to penetrate as far as the 
coast.
Eventually, occasional small groups of lao banded together to strike 
out for the coast themselves. Abdallah1s collection of traditional 
lore states that this trade was at first limited to hoes, tobacco, 
and skins. Carrying their produce across the Ruvuma, Yao 
adventurers travelled until they reached "the coast at Mchiwi Mchilwa 
(Kilwa), and so that has always been the part of the coast most 
favoured by us Yaos, as being known to us from ancient times, "(id)
There is evidence from the coast which also attests to ancient
ties between the Yao and Kilwa. Burton visited the island in 1857,
i at which time it3 inhabitants recounted their "garbled legendary
\ history" to him. On this occasion, Burton learned that "the island
(1) Abdallah, The Yaos. pp.4,10-11. For nineteenth century accounts 
of Yao iron-working, see i). Livingstone, Last Journals (ed. H. 
Waller), London, 1874,i,p.79; E. Bteere, The Free Village in 
Yao Lana. ’Zanzibar, "probably Lent 1876," p.10, which also 
refers to Yao salt works; UMGA M5B, Al (iv), ^Johnson/,_"Up_ 
the Lujienaa, " /IdQO/ ; anon., A Journey to Lake Nyasa. /l88o/,p.59. 
(;d) Abdallah, The Yaos, p.lid.
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was originally inhabited by the Wahiao savages, from whom the 
present race partly descends. • ." furthermore, burton identified 
a tribe living between the coastal lowlands and the continental 
plateau rising behind this belt as the Machinga, who were 
interspersed among the bwahili.(l) Today, the Machinga of the 
district of Kilwa are recognized as comprising a separate tribe. 
Moffet believes that "the Machinga are probably a lao offshoot," 
although evidence from the Tanganyika .District Books suggests that 
they may alternatively have been Makonde. (2) This is an enigma 
which cannot be resolved on the strength of the evidence presently 
at our disposal. Nevertheless, it seems very possible that these 
Machinga may be related in some way to the Macinga lao, whom we 
have seen were probably well placed to take an especially active 
part in trading to the coast.
The bwahili Ancient History of Kilwa Kisiwani also contains 
references to these people. After naming "the original people who 
built Kisiwani," the chronicle continues: "Then came Mrimba and his
people. This Mrimba was of the machinga tribe and he settled at 
Kisiwani. he became the headman of Kisiwani." It is stated that 
when the first bhirazi ruler came to Kilwa, he acquired a place in 
which to settle from Mrimba, in exchange for cloth and beads. This 
bultan then married Mrimba1s daughter, and Mrimba, accepting a laige 
present of cloth from his son-in-law, removed himself to the mainland. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to regain Kilwa from the bhirazi ruler, 
it is said that "Mrimba moved his home, and went to the mainland of 
the Kuvuma and dwelt there."(5) This section of the Ancient History
of Kilwa Kisiwani is probably a nineteenth century rendering of the 
passage in the sixteenth century Arabic Kilwa Chronicle which alleges
(1) K.F. Burton, Zanzibar; City. Island and Coast. Lonaon,187<:,ii,
pp.561, 557-8.
(&) J.P. Moffet (ed.), Handbook of Tanganyika, second edition, Bar 
es balaam, 1958, pp.&£5,id94,E06; TDb.il.Lindi: "Tribal
History and Legends," p.1(190); ibid., ii, Kilwa, pp.l4b-16 
(166-8); cf. A. Handbook of German bast Africa.1916. pp.5&-5.
(5) bb. pp.2£l-£.
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that Kilwa was ruled "cy an infidel from Muli, who is icing of it."(l)
Tne bwahili Ancient History of Kilwa Kivinje. a town which is located
on the mainland, just to the north of Kilwa Kisiwani, runs along
similar lines.(2) let another nineteenth century bwahili history,
although primarily concerned with Tumbatu island, off the northwest
«
coast of Zanzibar, claims that in A, II. 1204, "there arrived in that 
islet /Tumbatu/ a certain bultan lusuf bin Alawi," whose grandson, 
Ismail bin Abdulla, "became bultan of Kilwa and married the daughter 
of a neighbouring Xao chief, named Koranda."(5) This last 
chronicle, even more so than the two from Kilwa, clearly cannot be 
accepted at face value. But whatever the limitations of these * 
histories, taken together with Abdallah*s collection of traditions, 
Burton*s note, and the possible connection between the Machinga 
people of Kilwa and the Macinga lao, they do suggest that the ties 
between the lao and Kilwa are probably of considerable antiquity.
There is no doubt that the long distance traae of Bast-Central 
Africa was based on ivory. Before the middle of the sixteenth 
century, there was virtually no call for ivory from the interior 
at Kilwa. (4) The trade described by Monclaro does not appear to 
have been very considerable. While it is possible that the lao 
may have begun trading some ivory to the coast at this time, it is 
more likely that this trade only became important after the Zimba 
disaster, when Kilwa* s export trade was apparently dominated by the 
Portuguese Captain of Mombasa, whose buyers undoubtedly encouraged 
its development. without more detailed knowledge of the ivory 
trade at Kilwa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one 
cannot say any more than that. Certainly, Abdallah *s picture of 
extensive iao trading to the coast before ivory was in demand is 
badly out of proportion. There is much of the nineteenth century 
in his reconstruction of this earlier period. One also doubts that
(1) Freeman-Grenville, Medieval History* pp.77-8.
(it) bee below, p. Z0$-%
UJ J .M. Gray, History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 185b.
London, 1962, pp.16-17; W.H. Ingrams, Zanzibar: Its History
and its People, London, I960, pp. (W-S,
{4) Bee above, pp.£X-*{.
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lao customs were seriously influenced qy tne coast before the 
growth or the ivory trade, as he suggests. Above all, there 
was no sudden demand, immediately fulfilled in the next trading 
season, for ivory and slaves. (1) The transition of long-distance 
trading between iaoland and Kilwa wasa* gradual process; slowly 
growing from an incidental, sporadically pursued exchange of 
products which were of little consequence to the coastal merchants, 
to a thriving, well organized trade by the end of the seventeenth 
century.
Although even at the beginning of the twentieth century 
elephants were "fairly numerous" in Xao country, the fao seem to 
have acquired most of their ivory by trading for it, with their 
neighbors, rather than by hunting elephants themselves. Maravia 
still abounded in elephants in the second half of the last 
century. (2) Thus the joining of forces between the Maravi and 
the Xao in the ivory trade was probably gradually achieved.
Allowing for bias in the documentation, it now appears most likely 
that the role of the lao in initiating trade with Kilwa was the 
crucial factor in the evolution of that particular long-distance 
route.(b) The growth of Maravi influence coincided with the rise 
of a considerable, steady demand for ivory at Kilwa. Together, 
these factors combined to produce a rich trade in ivory between 
the far interior ana Kilwa.
The traditions recorded by Abdallah are silent on the subject 
of trading to Mozambique. They do, however, note that "the Walolo 
tLomwe and Makua) were neighbours and they /the lao/ used to trade 
with them too," as they aid with the maravi. But not much can be
(1) Abdallah, The Yaos. pp.lb-15.
(2) J. btevenson-Hamilton, "Hotes on a Journey through Portuguese
Bast Africa from ibo to Lake Hyasa," The Geographical 
Journal, xxxiv, 1909, p.521; L. McLeod, Travels in Bastem 
Africa. London, 18b0,i, pp.252-b; R. Codrington, "The 
Central Angoniland District of the British Central Africa
Protectorate," The Geographical Journal, xi, 1898, p.510.
(5) Cf. Mitchell, The Xao Village, p.22, for the wholly
insupportable view that Yao contacts with the coast began 
with the passage of Arab caravans through their territory.
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gained from these passing references, which, in any case, occur 
in a section of Abdallah where the telescoping of events is more 
noticeable,(1} Perhaps the role of lao traders along the route 
to Mocambique was more important during the seventeenth century 
than presently available sources indicate; at this stage one can 
do no more than note this possibility. Portuguese documentation 
does argue strongly for the priority of Maravi initiative in 
establishing this route to the coast. By the end of the 
seventeenth century, however, or by the 1740s at the very latest, 
the lao were recognized by the Portuguese as the principal traders 
to both Kilwa and Moyambique. whatever the explanation for this 
apparent substitution of lao, for Maravi, domination of that 
route, final conclusions must await a careful scrutiny of sixteenth 
and seventeenth century Portuguese documents in the archives of 
Portugal, Spain, and India, with the specific problems which have 
been raised in this chapter in mind. Greater knowledge of the 
historical traditions of the lao, Maravi, and Makua peoples are 
also essential to the resolution of these questions. Meanwhile, 
one can merely assert with confidence that by the end of the 
seventeenth century, two long-distance trade routes were well 
established in the eastern half of Mast-Central Africa. One led 
from Maravia to Kilwa, the other from Maravia to Mozambique.
During the next century and a half, a variety of factors operating 
on the coast affected the ivory market, so as to cause fluctuations 
in the direction in which the bulk of this trade flowed; others 
combined to increase the importance of the slave trade.
(1) Abdallah, Ihe laos. p.lb.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Rise of Trade at Mozambique, 1698-1749
1. The first lao shift
The most important alteration in the trade of Kast-Central 
Africa during the first half of the eighteenth century was the 
substitution of Moyambique for Kilwa as the primary market for 
ivory of the far interior. Regrettably, until the creation of an 
independently administered.province of Mozambique in 1752, there 
is a disappointing lack of documentation concerning this trade. 
Throughout most of this period, the traditional preoccupation of 
the Portuguese with the area south of the Zambezi was emphasized 
by the nature of the commercial organization of the colony. The 
Captains of Mozambique were deprived by the Crown of their 
trading monopoly in 1674; but after a quarter century of varying 
regimes, including ten years of free trading and several forms of 
control from Goa, the administration of the trade of the Rivers of 
Sena was delegated to a Junta do Cornercio of M o z a m b i q u e .  Xhe 
Junta had its seat at Goa, the capital of the hstado da India, of 
which Mozambique formed a part, while its affairs were handled in 
Africa ty a Superintendent, who was often the Captain of Mozambique. 
Meanwhile, the trade of Macuana remained the perquisite of the 
moradores of Mozambique and the mainland opposite the island. As 
a consequence of this arrangement, while there is an abundance of 
correspondence in the Portuguese archives concerning all aspects 
of the Junta do Comercio. until its dissolution in 1744, there are 
only incidental references to the trade of Macuana and to the Xao. 
ftor uo matters change until after 1752, when the Portuguese, after 
two hundred and fifty years on those shores, at last began to pay 
more attention to the trade coming from the interior of the
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continent to Mozambique. (1) Indeed, it is from a document of 
this period that we learn that there had been, in fact, a shift 
of trade from Kilwa to Mozambique.
In 1758 Inacio Gaetano Xavier, the energetic and well-informed 
Secretary of the recently formed Government of Mozambique, wrote 
that the lao ivory trade, which by then was the mainstay of the 
island* s economy, (2) ‘'formerly was divided, part to Mombasa, and 
part to this island, and since the former was lost, all goes to 
this Market." Later in the same account, Xavier repeated that 
"before our losing Mombasa the trade of it /laoland/ went to that 
port."(o) Xavier's sources for this extremely important movement 
of trade are not specified, but Costa Mendes states that he 
utilized the records of the convent of the Hospitalers of S&o Jotb 
de Deus in Mozambique. (4) As Secretary, Xavier undoubtedly; had 
access to a wealth of information, much of which may have been lost 
since then. Certainly, there is no reason to suppose that he 
fabricated these notes. In any case, Xavier's premise that there 
was a shift of Xao trade towards Mozambique in the first half of 
the eighteenth century is strikingly borne out by the fact that 
there was a reversal of this movement in the second half of that 
century. (5,) The problem at hand is to discover the factors 
which caused the shift to occur.
(1) Teixeira Botelho, Historia.4.PP.546-51. 406-7; Axelson,
Portuguese, pp.145-8,176-7,181-2,186-7; J. de Alcantara 
Guerreiro, puadros da Historia de Mozambique. Lourenzo 
Marques, 1954,ii, pp.248-9, 189-95.
(2J bee below, pp. 108-^.
(5) TT, MR, mazo 604, inacio Gaetano Xavier, "Huma Relazao do
Estado prezente de Mossambique, benna, bofala, Inhambane, 
e todo o continento de Africa Oriental, que b. Magestade 
Fedelissima domina nesta costa," m o z *, 26 December 1758, 
published in KHGKP. pp.175-215, at 185 & 198; another 
copy, RNL, FG God. 826, is published in Andrade, RelajjSes, 
pp.159-88, at 155 & 169.
(4) F. da Costa Mendes, Catalogo Chronplogico e Historico dos
Capitaes Generaes e Govemadores da Provincia de Mozambique 
desde 1752. . .ate 1849. Moz*> 1892, p.viii; bee Andrade, 
"Pundaz&o do Hospital Militar de S. Joao de Deus, em 
Mozambique," btvdia.i.1958, pp.77-89.
(5) bee below, pp.^sr-fei, iff- zc^.
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The fall of Mombasa from Portuguese into Omani Arab hands in 
December 1698 marked an important turning point in the history of 
Bast-Central Africa. After baif ibn Sultan, the reigning Imam of 
Oman, had taken possession of Mombasa, he continued south along 
the coast, gaining recognition of his sovereignty at both Zanzibar 
and Kilwa, although it seems that he met with some resistance at 
the latter, which may have been sacked by the Omani.(1)
Until the Omani seizure of' Kilwa, a large part, perhaps most, 
of the goods carried to Kilwa from the interior by the lao 
probably were purchased by the official factor, or private buyer, 
of the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa.(2) whatever the proportion 
may have been, there can be little doubt that with the Portuguese 
withdrawal from the coast north of Cape Delgado a considerable 
market was lost to those lao who were in the habit of trading to 
Kilwa. It does not, however, follow that immediately upon the 
loss of this market the lao shifted all their trade from Kilwa to 
Mozambique Island, as Aavier's statement might imply. The veiy 
organisation of lao trade seems to argue against such reasoning. 
While the internal trading network within laoland proper must have 
been extensive by the end of the seventeenth century, trade was 
never organized on either a nationwide or a sectional basis among 
the lao, as it was among the Kazembe Lunda and other African 
peoples with a more highly centralized political structure than 
that of the lao. Normally, trading expeditions to the coast were 
organized under the direction of a single important chief, the size 
of the caravan depending on the extent of the chief's authority. 
Smaller expeditions may well have been put together by the headmen 
of several lesser villages. Thus it is extremely unlikely that
(1) bee Boxer, "bwahili Coast,1 pp.57-74; Btrandes, Portuguese
Period, pp. 245-75; 0. Guillain, Documents sur l'histoire. 
la"geographie. et le commerce de l'Afrique Orientale. Paris, 
1856,i,p.522; Gray, nA History of Kilwa: Part II,” INK.52. 
ly62, p.27.
(2) bee above, pp. 5C-2.
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the trade of the lao to Kilwa could have been massively and 
suddenly rechanneled to Mozambique after the Omani capture of 
Mombasa in 16y8.
Nor was the change simply a matter of the commercially minded 
lao who had been trading to Kilwa turning their efforts to the 
Mozambique route solely because the Portuguese had abandoned Kilwa. 
This was obviously an important reason, but it does not tell the 
whole story. The commercial importance of Kilwa was based solely 
on its position as an entrepot for the trade of the hinterland. 
Without a steady demand from outside, there was bound to be a 
consonant abatement in the supply from within. The proper!ty of 
Kilwa, in common with all the commercially oriented towns of the 
coast, depended upon the free and vigorous operation of these two 
factors. After the Portuguese withdrawal south of Cape Delgado, 
it appears that Oman failed to fill successfully the economic role 
previously played by the Portuguese Captain of Mombasa.
In the first flush of triumph it seems that the Omani did 
trade with some success there. In November 1701 it was reported 
"that tney have profited from the factories which they have along 
the coast above /Mozambique/ up to Kilwa."(1) Four years later, 
Charles Lockyer, bound for Moka from Canton in the service of the 
british hast India Company aboard the btretham. encountered "a 
bhip of HUO Tuns, that the Arabs had formerly taken from the 
Portuguese, loaden with Slaves, ivory, &c. from Mombas." He added 
that by taking that town "they have secured a rich Trade in Slaves, 
Gold, and Ivory, to themselves."12) Hut in the same year the 
Portuguese in Goa reported rumors that the Omani Arabs were 
impinging upon the freedom of the traders of the coast. Five 
years later a native spy sent up the coast by the Portuguese from 
Mozambique revealed that there was an Omani garrison of fifty men
(1) P.b.b. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Kstado /da India?.
(1696-1760). HdstorS-Goa, 19b7,v, p.lido.
(£) C. Lockyer, An Account of Trade in India. London, 1711, pp.206-6.
established at Kilwa, but he also noted that the Arabs had 
continued to plunder the wealthy inhabitants of the coast and to 
disrupt the operation of its trade. Furthermore, in 170y only 
three trading dhows were reported to have come to the coast from 
Muscat.(1) The death in 1711 of Saif ibn Sultan plunged Oman 
into thirty years of civil strife which was only to be resolved 
by the replacement of the iorubi dynasty by that of the Busaidi 
family in 1741 and the election of Ahmad ibn Said al Busaidi as 
Imam in 1744. Throughout this period, Oman undoubtedly neglected 
its territories in hast Africa.
Yet despite the unstable political situation in Oman, the 
garrison at Kilwa seems to have continued to hold sway there, 
barly in 1719 the Count of briceira wrote a letter to the Sultan 
of Kilwa which took note of the harsh treatment the Sultan had 
received at the hands of the "Mombasa Arabs," information which 
had been brought to his attention by the Captain of Mozambique, 
Francisco de Melo e Sousa. The Count reminded the Sultan that 
the Portuguese had always treated him fairly, and recalled his and 
his predecessorsf fidelity to the Portuguese. The Count offered 
the bultan two portions of cloth as a token of continued amity, 
while declaring that the gift was not in proportion to the Sultan's 
person or to his own desire, but that it was thus limited in order 
to avoid giving cause for suspicion "to the Arab enemies."(2)
This letter, together with the cloth, was probably presented to the 
Sultan by the unnamed individual whom strandes tells us carried out 
two missions, obviously clandestinely, from Mozambique to the 
Sultan of Kilwa between 1719 and 1721. No record appears to exist 
of the Sultan's reply, if he made one, but at about the same time, 
perhaps taking advantage of the chaos created in Oman by the death 
of Sultan ibn Saif in 1718, Kilwa is reported to have regained its
(1) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.276-6.
(2) BM, kdd9 MSS 20, 906, 11.211, D. Luis de Meneees, Conae de
Kriceira, to King of Kilwa, Goa, 27 January 171y.
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independence by expelling the oppressive Omani garrison. Although 
the Captain claimed that this was achieved with aid from Mozambique, 
btrandes rightly points out that "this aid should not be construed 
as meaning armed force." indeed, it is far more likely that 
Portuguese assistance was merely in the form of encouragement to 
oust the Omani, such as was given to the bultan by the Count of 
briceira. u;
Kilwa, however, was still in need of an assured market which 
could revive its flagging economy and which would encourage the 
people of the interior to bring their goods to Kilwa. Tne 
Portuguese at Mozambique Island were in no position to fulfill this 
need. (2) Nor did the fleeting Portuguese reoccupation of Mombasa 
ana Pate in 1728-1729 change matters.^bj in the absence of further 
documentation, it seems probable that the merchants of Kilwa were, 
of necessity, reduced largely to carrying on an insignificant trade 
with the smaller towns dotting the coast between the Hufiji delta 
and Cape Delgado, and with the Kerimba and Comoro Islands, as well 
as with Mafia Island. It also seems reasonable to assume that 
the attraction of Kilwa for the lao and other people of the interior 
declined accordingly. There was little reason for these people to 
spend up to three months making the journey to Kilwa, when there 
was small hope of receiving the goods they sought.
The most probable explanation, then, for the important change 
in the direction of lao trade, which was so briefly described by 
Xavier, is that a combination of three factors caused most of the 
lao trading to Kilwa to transfer their trade to Mozambique Island. 
These factors were 1) the loss to Kilwa of the Portuguese market
(1J Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.<177-8
(&} dee, e.g., CT, ii, 18£7, p.bo; A. Hamilton, A Hew Account of 
the bast Indies, bdinburgh, 1727, i, pp.9-10.
(5) bee Boxer, “Swahili Coast," pp.75-64; Strandes, Portuguese 
Period, pp.275-98; for an interesting, but perhaps 
misinformed, reference to the murder of an Augustinian 
priest at Kilwa in 1729, see A. da bilva Kego, l)ocumentac}ao 
para a Historia das MissSes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente. 
Lisboa, 1955, xi, p.675.
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at Mombasa after 1698, k) the subsequent failure of Oman to provide 
Kilwa with a steady demand for its goods (and with a regular supply 
of cloth and beads with which to purchase those goods), and b) the 
active disruption of the pattern of trade at Kilwa by the Omani 
garrison established there during the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century.
Compared with the voluminous Portuguese documentation for the
Kivers of bena and relations with the Mwanamutapa, that pertaining
to the ivory trade of Macuana, and to the lao ivory trade, is very
scanty. Nevertheless, there are sufficient sources to enable one
not only to detect this shift of direction in lao trade, but also
to understand the factors which influenced it and to appreciate the
vital importance which the lao ivory trade soon assumed in the
economy of Mozambique. in January 1716 the Viceroy of the Mstado 
*
da India reported that the ivory trade of Macuana was a growing 
danger to that of the hi vers of Sena, as it drew off much of the 
ivory which the Junta do Com£rcio considered rightfully belonged 
to it. This remark alone seems to substantiate the impression 
of developing trade, owing to the lao shift from Kilwa, That 
Portuguese relations with the Makua were peaceful and that 
Portuguese attempts to inhibit the trading monopoly of the Indians 
were minimal, are important indications that conditions at Mozambique 
were conducive to such a movement of trade. Similarly, the casual 
references to lao traders at Mozambique in the 17bUa suggest that 
the iao shift had taken place a good many years previously.(1)
In reply to the vice-regal letter of 1716 which emphasised 
the increasingly important ivory trade from Macuana, the Crown 
mooted the possibility of suppressing the moradores1 right to trade 
freely with Macuana, but noted that this would be a difficult task.
On the other hand, although the operation of this trade also afforded 
easy protection for exporting ivory which was illegally transported 
from the ports within the Junta* s jurisdiction, the new Viceroy
(1) bee below, pp.>3^6.
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wrote in 1718 that he aid not believe that such a drastic measure 
was necessary. Not only was the ivory trade of Macuana the only 
source of income for the mo r ado res of Mozambique, it was also, he 
alleged, so limited that it did no harm to the Junta do Comercio. (1) 
iVo years later, the Junta was suspended and the new Captain, or 
Governor, of Moyambique was granted a monopoly of the trade which 
had been its to administer. In view of the seventeenth century 
conflicts between the moradores and the Captains of Mozambique 
over the ivory trade of Macuana, there were understandable fears 
that this freedom would be abrogated in the process. In fact, the 
newr Governor’s orders specifically protected the moradores1 trade 
with Macuana, which was similarly unaffected by the re-establishment 
of the Junta do Comercio in 1722.(2)
Kilwa*s prosperity was curtailed by Omani disturbances of the 
operation of trade there. At Mozambique, interference with the 
normal pattern of trade there depressed the ivory market during 
the 1720s. Trade was carried on seasonally at Mozambique, as it 
was at Kilwa. Mvery year ships arrived at Mozambique from India 
during the northeast monsoon (November to March), carrying Indian 
cloths, above all else; they returned to India laden with ivory 
and gold, for the most part, with the southwest monsoon (March to 
September). Although the trade of Macuana was granted to the 
moradores of Moyambique, it was actually monopolized by Banian, and, 
to a lesser extent, Muslim traders from India. It was they who 
financed every aspect of this trade. Owing to an appreciable lack 
of currency, the moradores who wanted to engage in trade with Macuana 
had to buy their cloth and beads, which was mostly of Venetian
(1) BNL, BG, Cod.4408, pp.66-9, Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 8 February
1717; ibia., pp.69-72, Viceroy to Crown, Goa, 15 January 1718.
(2) AMU, MI 18, Meneses to Junta do Comercio. Panelim, 2 & 5 January
1720; copies also in BNL, FG, Cod.4406, fl.99; library of 
Professor O.K. Boxer, Castello-Novo Codex, j^-65,fl.190-5;
MM, Add.MbS 20, 906,f1.58, published in MShA, pp.74-5. bee
also, AHU, MI 18, Junta to Viceroy, /Goa/, 9 November 1720.
1 am grateful to Professor Boxer for allowing me to see the 
Castello-Novo Codex.
- 81 -
manufacture, with certain types being of Indian provenance, from 
the Banians and Muslims who acted as agents, or independent 
associates, of their fellows in India. The Indian merchants had 
no assurance that an individual morador would succeed in his 
tradings often, he lost all his goods to plundering Makua, or to 
his African or mulatto agent in the hinterland. These agents, 
called joatamares, occasionally returned empty-hanaed from the 
interior, claiming to have been robbed, whereas they may actually 
have been trading on their own account with their master*s goods.
To protect themselves against these not infrequent losses, the 
Banian and Muslim merchants charged high rates of interest on the 
merchandise which they sold on credit to the moradores. many of 
whom were constantly deep in debt to their creditors. Furthermore, 
the Banians, though apparently not the Muslim Indians, were allowed 
to trade personally in Macuana.
Indian domination of the ivory trade of Mozambique and Macuana 
dated from the later seventeenth century and was stimulated by the 
granting of a monopoly of the trade between Diu and Mozambique to 
a company of Banians (mazanes) in 1686.(1) Although the Banians 
from Diu enjoyed the protection of the Jesuit College at Mozambique, 
neither they nor the Muslim Indians were accepted as equals by the 
moradores. As a rule, they were despised for their power and 
looked upon with much suspicion.(£) The Muslim Indian community 
of Mozambique was the first to suffer from this attitude. In 17^0, 
influenced by pressure exerted from Goa by the Holy Office of the 
Inquisition, the King ordered that Muslims should no longer be 
allowed to act as captains, pilots, and sailors on boats sent to 
Mozambique. Three years later he repeated this command, which was 
designed ,fto avoid the very considerable evils’1 which might otherwise 
afflict Mozambique. The King also instructed the Viceroy to remove
(1) bee viceregal alvarfi, Diu, £t March 1686, in AC,i,1917, pp.£81- 
6; cf. AHU, to 19, Jeronimo Jose Nogueira de Anorade, Moy.,
8 July 1785, for a slightly different copy.
(£) Cf. Boxer, Kace Halations in the Portuguese Colonial Bmpire. 
1415"-16£5. Oxford, 1965, pp.55-4.
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the wuslim Indian who was currently the paymaster at Moyambique, 
and to replace him with a Christian, "because oi the evil results 
of his residence in that fort, employing the profits which he 
obtains in the worship of his false prophet and for other 
lamentable and perverse purposes, moved thereunto by the error of 
his religion."(1)
In early January 1727, the Viceroy grantea a special license 
to several exceptional men of the Muslim community which allowed 
them to trade to the mainland of Macuana, a privilege which was 
apparently forbidden to them otherwise. Although the license was 
permanent, it carried the restriction that each time any of these 
men, or their relatives, wanted to exercise this concession, he 
was obliged to inform the local Commission of the Holy Office that 
he was so doing. An extremely interesting fact which emerges from 
this document is that the prohibition against the Muslim Indians 
was definitely not extended to Muslims who were natives of hast 
Africa, so that Swahili living within the jurisdiction of 
Moyambique were free to trade without restrictions of any sort.(2) 
Less than a week later, however, the Viceroy issued a further writ 
which expressly forbade "the Muslim inhabitants" of Moyambique, the 
subordinate mainland, and the Hi vers of Bena from owning slaves. 
This seriously hurt their trading, as slaves were needed for 
transporting the heavy goods in which they dealt and also were 
utilized as patamares. They were permitted to continue trading 
for slaves in the interior, but once they brought them to the coast 
they had to register them immediately with the Holy Office and then
(1) AhU, CM 17, Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, (?)2l April 1720; same to
same, Lisboa, 7 April 172b, in KBbA.v.pp.124-6. The removal 
of the paymaster, Basira Mocali, was never carried out; only 
he could afford the post. Bee AHU, Ml ID, Prov.Govt. to 
Crown, Goa, 17 .December 1724, enclosing Paulo da Costa to 
Prov.Govt., Moy., 10 August 1724; AhU, Mi b7, Junta do 
Comercio to Crown, Goa, 27 January 1751; enclosing same to 
Viceroy, ^Goa7, 2 December 17b0, and Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 
b April 172Sj see also, Andrade, Relayoes. p.100.
(2) AHU, CM 5 & Cod.1517, fl.251-5, provis£o. Jo&o de Balaanha da
Gama, Goa, 10 January 1727; see also, AHU, CM 5, Antonio 
Cardim Frois, Moy., 10 March 1727.
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to sell them within six months to Christians. Failing 
compliance with these regulations, the slaves were to be 
confiscated and the trader punished. It is not made clear here, 
as it was in the granting of the petition earlier in the week, if 
the bwahili were to be included in this restriction, but it does 
seem that it was the Muslim Indians who were the particular targets 
of the Inquisition. A year later the Muslims were prohibited from 
trading "any slave already baptized" and orders were given that 
they must not try to convert heathen slaves to Islam. (1)
At the end of 172D the Viceroy observed that as all the traders 
of Moyambique were Muslims and Gentiles (i.e., Banians), the 
commerce of that place had fallen off, owing to their great fear of 
the Holy Office. The Muslims had complained to him that the 
Governor of Moyambique had issued independent orders which further 
restricted their activities. These appear to be lost. In 1750, 
with the approval of the Holy Office, the Viceroy allowed that the 
Muslims might keep slaves whose parents and grandparents were 
Muslim, and that any heathen slaves they wished to retain must be 
converted to Christianity within six months.(2) The assertion of 
the Count of briceira, in 1750, that the ivory trade of Macuana was 
not at all considerable may reflect the efficacy of these restrictions* 
On the other hand, the decline in the ivory trade of Moyambique at 
that time may not have been so very great, for in 1755, citing the 
records of the local banta Casa da Misericordia. or Holy House of 
Mercy, the Governor-General of Moyambique emphatically disputed this 
allegation, (b) Harassment of the Banian and Muslim Indian merchants 
of Moyambique was a contributing factor to the redirection of lao
(1) Provisoes. Baldanha da Gama, Goa, 16 January 1727 and a January
1728, in APU, vi, 1876, pp.286-7, and KBbA, v, pp.l4b-b, lbb-8.
(2) Jo&o de Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, la December 1729, in
J.F.J. Biker, Collecy&o de Tratados. . .nas partes da Asia e
Africa Oriental. . .. Lisboa, 1885, x, pp.172-5; provisao. 
Saldanha da Gama, Goa, 14 January 1750, in APQ. vi, 1876, 
pp. 501-5, and HShA, v, pp.165-7.
(o) AHU, CM 5, Meneses to Crown, Lisboa, 4 November 1750, BP 17; TT,
MH, mayo 605, Francisco de Melo e Castro to Crown, Moy.,
20 November 1755, enclosed in same to same, Moy., 28 December 
175b. For the santa Casa aa Misericordia. see Boxer, "The 
Portuguese in the bast," pp.22b-4.
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trade back to Kilwa in the later eighteenth century; during the 
crucial years of Kilwa1s decadence the Indians were relatively free 
to pursue their business as they wished, as may be seen from a French 
trader1s account of Mozambique in 1755.(1)
An even more important factor which later disrupted the lao 
trade to Moyambique was the belligerence of the local Makua.(2)
During the first half of the eighteenth century Portuguese 
relations with the Makua were generally pacific, nor are there any 
reports of internecine fighting among the Makua. In both 1721 
and 1722 there were a few skirmishes with the makua, some of whom 
raided one of the small Portuguese settlements on the mainland 
opposite the island, but these were soon resolved in favor of the 
Portuguese. In 1727 Macuana was reported to be at peace.(5)
It may be suggested, then, that during the first three decades 
of the eighteenth century the combination of inhibiting influences 
at Kilwa and the absence of these at Moyambique combined to produce 
a shift of lao trade from the one to the other. While it is 
possible that this was only gradually realized, Portuguese sources 
concerning the ivory trade from Macuana during these years suggest 
that it was, in fact, achieved rather quickly. It seems probable 
that kavier's evidence should be interpreted in this way.(4) The
(1) bee A. Lougnon (ed.), Kecueil trimestriel de documents et tra-
vaux inedits pour servir £t l rhistoire aes Mascareignes fran­
chises. iv, Tananarive, 1959, pp.545, 549, 559; see below, 
pp. IOV 10, lit-?3.
(2) bee below, pp. H7-Z£> 133- 7/.
(5) AHU, Ml 25, requerimento. Bernardo de Tavora, n.d., but post- 
50 November 1725, enclosing supporting testimony of Alvaro 
Gaetano de melo e Castro, Moy., 15 November 1721; ibid., 
Conselho Ultramarino. "Nomeayao de pessoas p. o posto de 
Gapp. da beg. Gompanhia de Infantario, q na prezente 
monyao passa de bocorro a 0 Bstado da India," Lisboa, 27 
March 1726; AhU, CM 5, Frois to Grown, Moy., 11 August 1727. 
in 1758, the F'rench geographer J.B. Bourgpignon d'Anville 
described the Makua in terms which suggest the opposite, but 
his description is derived from Dos bantos (160% see bUL, 
Mb Kes. 1—C—159, fl.26.
(4) See above, p. 75!.
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first documentary reference to the iao adds further support to this 
interpretation. Describing the coast north of Moyambique in 1756, 
a bieur Vigoureux, Captain of La Legere. observed that the river 
(there are several streams) flowing into Femao Veloso Bay was "on 
the way of the lao (mongeaux) Negroes, who are those who come thence 
to trade at Moyambique."(1) This rather casual observation, by a 
man who was apparently making his first voyage to Moyambique, clearly 
seems to indicate that the iao shift had occurred well before the 
175Us.
There are other casual references to the lao in the late 175Us 
included in the investigation of the corrupt Governor of Moyambique, 
Nicolau Tolentmo de Almeida. These, too, strongly suggest that 
the iao had been trading regularly and in considerable volume to 
Moyambique for many years. Among many charges levied against him 
(most of which concerned his illegal dealings with french slavers 
from the Mascarene islands), it was alleged, and proved, that Almeida 
had obstructed the ivory trade carried on qy the inhabitants of the 
mainland with the iao, both by declaring tnat it should be the 
prerogative of several of his cronies, and by ordering soldiers from 
the fortress to act as his personal trading agents on the mainland 
when the iao came during tne summer months.(z) Almeida, for his 
part, sought to justify his reasons for allowing the Trench to trade 
for slaves at moyambique by arguing that since the iao had not 
brought their ivory to Mossunl, the only means by which the local 
traders coulu earn money with which to pay their Banian creditors 
was to condone this otherwise illegal situation.(5) Almeida1s
(1) Lougnon, Receuil trimestriel. iv, p.594. See below, pp. 141-4*1,
for a reconstruction of the route followed by the Iao to 
Moyambique.
(2) AHU, CM 5, ChHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.5, & BM, Add. MSS 20,890, fl.
58v., Crown to Marques de Louriyal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740;
AHU, CM 5, & CEHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.4-7, Antonio da Silva to
same, Sao Pedro, 22 & 26 December 1741.
(5) AHU, CM 5, Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida to Crown, n.d., but
probably 1741-1742; see below, pp.77-6.
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explanation was clearly an attempt to throw a cloak over his own 
rather greedy motives in promoting this trade, but even if his 
story about the iao not coming was not, in fact, true, the 
situation in which he cited it clearly indicates the importance 
of iao trade to the economy of Moyambique by the late 1750s.
2. The French at Moyambique
It is quite clear that the rise of extensive slave trading 
in Mast-Central Africa had its roots in the eighteenth century, 
before then, neither the Arabs, nor the Portuguese, had seriously 
pursued this trade; it was always incidental to the overwhelmingly 
basic product of ivory. (1) let the fame of the iao arises from 
their having been the greatest African slave traders in all of Mast 
Africa during the second half of the nineteenth century.(2) The 
slave trade therefore demands careful examination, both in terras 
of its operation at the coast and its influence on the Iao. This, 
in particular, requires close investigation, wherever possible, as 
the increased demand for slaves did not influence all Iao, either 
concurrently or uniformly. Indeed, the evolution of this important 
transformation in the commercial priorities of the Iao was a very 
gradual process. The first manifestation oi this change only 
appears in the last two decades of the eighteenth century; while 
clear indications that some Iao long distance traders were becoming 
more influenced by the coastal market for slaves, rather than ivory, 
do not appear until the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The earliest body of traders in Mast-Central Africa who were 
primarily interested in slaves, above all else, were the French 
merchants from the Mascarene Islands, lie de France (Mauritius) 
and bourbon (Reunion). Before the appointment of Bertrand 
Franyois Mahe de la bourdonnais as Governor-General of the 
Mascarene islands in 1 they were essentially a burden to the
(1) Cf. R. Coupland, Mast Africa and its Invaders, from the Marliest
Times to the Death of Bewid Baja in 1856. Oxford, 1958, pp.
51-5; HMA, i, pp.154-8.
(2) Bee, e.g., Livingstone, Last Journals, i, p.78; HMa . i, pp.208,
227; Oliver & J.D. Fage, A bhort History of Africa.
Harmondsworth, 1962, p.174.
struggling Compagnie des indes. the French Mast indies Company, 
which had charge of them. Bourbon was first colonized by a 
handful of French settlers from Madagascar in 1665, the same 
year in which Colbert reconstituted the Compagnie. The island 
was intended to serve as a provisioning station and place of 
respite for French ships plying the arduous route between F'rance 
and India, as Moyambique island and Cape Town already were for 
the Portuguese and Dutch, respectively.(1) Unlike these two, 
however, Bourbon was uniquely unsuited for its purpose, as its 
coast is totally devoid of natural harbors. A half century later 
the island and its European population of perhaps 800 individuals 
were still living "as though lost in an inaccessible region of 
the ocean," according to Baintoyant, who also compared the society 
to that of a primitive tribe, subsisting on their efforts as 
hunters and fishermen, there being no crops cultivated on the 
island.(2) By 1712 the Dutch totally abandoned their unsuccessful 
attempt to colonize Mauritius, which had begun in 1598, and three 
years later Guillaume Dufresne, a captain in the Royal French Navy, 
stopped there long enough to claim it for the French Crown and to 
rename it lie de F’rance, although it was not until 1721 that 
colonists from bourbon first settled it.
in 1715 six coffee plants were introduced to bourbon from Moka 
and in 1718 one of the plants reached fruition. In 1725 the 
Compagnie. which had again been reorganized in 1717, established a 
monopoly on the coffee trade, and the growth of plantations dates 
from this time. It was oovious to the Compagnie that for the trade 
to prove profitable it was necessary that the crop be cultivated 
extensively and that this, in turn, required a larger labor force 
than was then available on the island.(5) in 1717 there were only
U) Bee Boxer, "Moyambique island and the "carreira da India"," 
Btvdia. 8 (1961), pp.95-152.
(2) J. Baintoyant, La Colonisation franyaise sous l ,ancien regime.
Paris, 1929, i, p.591.
U) Bee Lougnon, L'lle bourbon pendant la Regence. Paris, 1956.
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1100 slaves on Bourbon, according to the estimate of the traveller 
Le Gen til de la Barjpinnais. (1) Although the French had abandoned 
Madagascar in 1674, almost all of these slaves were from there, as 
it was the most convenient source of supply. (2) For this reason, 
many slaves continued to come from Madagascar, but they were never 
wholly satisfactory as laborers for the French islanders. Grant, 
for one, wrote in 1749 that slaves, especially those from 
Madagascar, were "insolent and idle, and consequently of little 
reliance," and that the latter constituted the majority of the 
Maroons, runaway slaves who inhabited the forests in the interior 
of the islands.(6) bo while in 1724 an official envoy was sent 
to certain ports on the east coast of Madagascar to explore the 
possibilities of expanding the slave trade between them and the 
French islands, the first notices of the French trading for slaves 
along the Mozambique coast also appear in the same period. (4)
The initiation of the slave trade between the Mascarenes and 
Mozambique came about as a matter of chance. As a result of an 
assault by pirates and rough seas, in 1721 the Count of Friceira, 
returning to Lisbon from Goa, had to tahe port at baint-Denis, the 
capital of Bourbon, where he had a cordial reception. He learned 
there that French slavers at Madagascar were also threatened ty 
pirates. In exchange for a promise of transportation to Furope, 
hriceira agreed to write to the Governor of Mojambique and to 
request that he co-operate with the French with whom this arrangement 
had been made. Accordingly, two vessels sailed from Bourbon to 
Mozambique in 1721. Only one cargo of slaves was assembled, but 
this was the result of disagreements between the French officials 
in charge of the venture. in spite of doubts which arose in the
(1) Cjuoted in G.Azema, Histoire de l file Bourbon depuis 1645 .iusqu1
au 20 Uecembre 1848. Paris, 1862, p.144.
(2) For the french establishments on Madagascar in the seventeenth
century, see H.Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, deuxieme 
edition, Paris, 1961, pp.67-76.
(b) C. Grant, The History of Mauritius. London,1801, p.297; see 
also, Lougnon, Correspondence du Conseil Superigm* ae 
Bourbon et de la Compagnie des indes. (1724-1761), Paris, 
1964, pp.xxxv,liii,65; BM Ada.Mob 56,766, ±1.10.
(4) Desch&raps, Madagascar, p.79.
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next few years, the Compagnie was anxious to secure a fruitful 
commerce with Mozambique, which it believed could satisfactorily 
fulfill the islands' requirements for slaves.(1)
By virtue of the Portuguese royal alvaras. or decrees, of 
8 FeDruary 1711 and 5 October 1715, foreign trade was strictly 
forbidden in the dominions of Portuguese Africa. (2) hews of the 
french at Moyambique consequently produced great concern at Lisbon, 
where the commercial competition of another European power in East 
Africa was greatly feared. in 1726 the King of Portugal called 
upon the Viceroy to investigate charges he had received that 
foreign ships were being allowed to trade at Moyambique. A rumor, 
later proved to be false, that one Governor had even permitted a 
French engineer-pilot to stay at Moyambique, thereby enabling the 
French to assess the fortifications and to chart the habor there, 
led to his removal on royal orders. His successor, Ant6nio Cardim 
Fr6is, was instructed that he "must not allow any European nation 
whatever to hold traae or commerce with the hegroes of that coast."
The Grown added that Frois should especially not allow "any of the 
said nations to establish themselves in the land, employing every 
possible means to prevent them from doing so, for which it is very 
necessary that no offence should be given to the Kaffirs 
inhabiting the said shores."(5)
in fact, until 1755 there was apparently no trade between 
Moyambique and the Mascarenes, notwithstanding a continued need 
for slaves at Bourbon. (4) in July of that year the authorities 
of Bourbon dispatched the Vi erg e de Grace for Moyambique and 
Madagascar to trade for slaves. The instructions issued on this
(1) Lougnon, L'lle Bourbon, pp.174-9,511,526,559,542; also 79, n.5,
& 105-6; idem, Heceuil trimestriel. iv, pp.517-26; idem, 
Classement et inventaire du fonds de la Compagnie des Indes 
des Archives departmentalcgd^iaHeunion (berie C), iMerac, 1956, 
pp.24-5.
(2) K5EA. v, pp.195-7; AHU, Cm 60 & Cod.1507, pp.295-5.
(5) RHEA, v, pp.122-4, 151-5; AHU, Ml 29, Crown to Baldanha da Gama,
Lisboa, 28 August 1729, with reply, Goa, 11 October 1750, on 
opposite column.
(4) Bee Lougnon, Correspondence (1724-1751), pp.xxvi,xxxviii; ibid.,
(1752-1756), Paris, 1955, pp.xvii,xxi-ii. Portuguese officials 
were forbidden to trade priyately by virtue of a law dated 5 Bep^
terabgj 17^) |^a royal alvara dated 5l march 1721; for the alvara
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occasion reveal that the object of going to Moyambique was 
secondary to the business of slaving with the Sakalava, who inhabit 
northwest Madagascar. Indeed, it was only to be a commercial 
reconnaissance of the entire Portuguese coast, with Sofala as the 
most particular port of interest. But the Vierge de Grace 
reached Moyambique in August ana, as a result of the skillful 
dealings of Gabriel Bejean, commercial agent for the expedition, 
departed with a cargo of 568 slaves. The journal;kept by Bejean 
during this voyage vividly reveals the manner in which the French 
had to conduct their trade. Everything had to be done secretly; 
one could not trade openly. Virtually every important Portuguese 
official realized what was happening, however, as Bejean was careful 
to bribe everyone of any importance. In this category were 
included the Governor, the Chief Justice, the commander of the fort, 
the Factor, the former Chief Justice, the Jesuit Rector, the 
Dominican Superior, the hospitalers of Bao Jofio de Deus, and the 
local Vicar. Trade progressed slowly and with some difficulty as 
long as the Indian fleet was still in the harbor, but when they 
departed for Goa the French were quickly able to complete tneir 
cargo. if the French were to trade at Moyambique, the Portuguese 
there did not want this news to reach the Court.
Bejean was impressed with the number and quality of slaves 
available at Moyambique. There was clearly room for expansion 
here, as probably no more than 800 to 1000 slaves were annually 
shipped to India; thousands were needed at the Mascarenes.
Despite the many petty annoyances oi trading in this manner, Bejean 
was sanguine over the prospects of slave trading at Moyambique. 
Prices were reasonable, with the top price for a male slave being 
about 80 to 100 cruzados, each cruzado being worth 400 rfis. This 
was then equivalent to only 52 to 40 piastres, or patacas, as the 
F'rench and Portuguese respectively called the Austrian Maria Theresa 
and Spanish dollars which were then the most prevalent form of
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coinage in the western Indian Ocean, The total amount spent on 
presents to the Portuguese was less than 40u piastres, and, though 
a nuisance, the charge oi' 2 tostSes (half a cruzado) for the baptism 
of each slave exported was no great expense. Although hearly a 
third of the Mo9ambique slaves died en route to the Mascarenes, the 
sale of those who were safely disembarked gave the Compagnie a 
handsome profit.(1) The Vierge de Grace expedition was, however, 
exceptional. French trade at Mozambique was still a novel 
occurrence. Indeed, one cannot really dispute Grant* s statement 
that “as for commerce, there was no idea of it when M. de la 
Bourdonnais arrived in the islands.1 (2)
There can be no doubt that La Bourdonnais was one of the most 
influential personalities in the history of Jfiast*Central Africa in 
the eighteenth century. Born in 1699, at the age of eighteen he 
entered the service of the Compagnie des indes. and by 1724 he had 
achieved the rank of second Captain. About 1728 he began to seek 
his fortune as a private merchant in the Indies, amassing a 
considerable fortune within a few years. On a voyage to Arabia 
in 1729, he saved two foundering vessels sent by the Portuguese 
Viceroy of India to collect tribute from the Imam of the lemen.
La Bourdonnais conducted the two Portuguese officers to their 
destination and then, when it appeared that the Arabs were about 
to seize them, personally intervened and set matters right by 
negotiating with the Arabs. In gratitude for his unusual succour, 
the Portuguese Viceroy offered him a place as a naval captain in 
the service of the hstado da India and added the attractive 
inducements of the Cross of the Order of Christ and letters of 
nobility, with the title of “Agent of His Portuguese Majesty on the
(1) Lougnon, Keceuil trimestriel. iv, pp.527-70,585,589; idem.,
Correspondence. (1752-1758), pp.159-40,148-7,155,158.
(2) Grant, Mauritius. p.l9y.
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coast of Coromandel.11 (1) La Bourdonnais accepted the offer, 
entering the Portuguese service on £0 December 1729, but later 
confided that "what haa temptea me the most in the propositions 
of the Viceroy was the disclosure that he made to me of a project 
concerning Mombaze. "(2) Ihus it was the attraction of involvement 
in Bast Africa, and in particular in Mombasa (which the Portuguese 
had again lost to Oman in 1729J which motivated La bourdonnais to 
abandon the Compagnie des Indes. He served Portugal into 1752, 
but the proposed expedition to recapture Mombasa never materialized. 
When the authorities in Lisbon let it be known that they opposed 
the plan, he quit the Portuguese service. La Bourdonnais returned 
to France in 1755 and began to formulate ideas to improve the state 
of H e  de Prance and Bourbon.(5) tie was especially intrigued with 
the possibilities of the former, which was naturally equipped with 
two excellent harbors, a great advantage over Bourbon. That he 
was fully aware of Portugal*s weakness in the Indian Ocean is 
obvious, as was his great interest in Bast Africa. By 1754 his 
plans for developing the French islands had resulted in his 
appointment as Governor-General for both, thus marking the first 
time that the administration of both islands had been united under 
one head.
Although La Bourdonnais was to continue as Governor-General 
for twelve years, during the last seven of these his attention was 
preoccupied with the wider interests oi the French establishment in 
inuia, especially after the extension of the War of tne Austrian 
Succession to the Bast in 1744. Bssentially, the truly remarkable 
transformation wrought by La Bourdonnais in the two colonies took
(1)?,Crepin, Mahe de la Bourdonnais. Gouverneur-General des isles de
France et de Bourbon. 1899-1755. Paris, 1922, pp. 11-17;
J.F. Thomazi, Un Millionaire au service du Roi. La Bourdonnais.
Paris, lyo5, pp.87-9.
(2) AC.G.da Silva Correia, "Os Francezes na Coloniza^o Portuguesa da
India," Stvdia.4.1959.pp.55-6; B.F. Mahe de la Bourdonnais,
Memoires historiques. Paris, 1827,p.7. For some unknown
reason Silva Correia divides La Bourdonnais into two individuals. 
(5j Crepin, La Bourdonnais. pp.19-20.
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place in less than live years, from his arrival in 1755 to 1740.
Touching first at Bourbon, La Bourdonnais immediately moved 
on to lie de France and established his headquarters at the vast, 
safe harbor of Port Louis (then known as Saint-Louis), where he 
found only one substantial house and a few ramshackle huts. In 
the following years he introduced the cultivation of cotton and 
indigo, and resurrected that of sugar, which had been started on 
both islands by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, but which 
had subsequently not been pursued to any meaningful extent. To 
improve and increase the pasturage for cattle brought from 
Madagascar, he introduced the hardy Fescue-grass. Furthermore, 
he personally offered financial backing to individual colonists to 
cover up to fifty per cent of their operating expenses, including 
the procurement of an adequate supply of slaves. On Bourbon, 
where the colonists were more firmly entrenched and consequently 
more resistant to innovation, La Bourdonnais compelled them to 
extend the cultivation of cereals in oraer to increase the food 
supply of tne burgeoning population, both free and slave, of the 
two islands. The production of coffee, over which the 
inhabitants of Bourbon were so concerned, did not suffer as a 
result of his precept.
For a while, the slave population continued to subsist almost 
exclusively on maize, a crop which was highly vulnerable to 
depredations by the troublesome rats and grasshoppers, as well as 
vident storms, which plagued the islands. in addition, it did 
not seem to La Bourdonnais that the slaves were doing well on this 
diet. Recalling that he had observed slaves in Brazil flourishing 
on a staple diet of manioc, he ordered tubers to be brought to the 
colonies from b&o Tiago, one of the Gape Verde islands. He 
required each settler to plant 500 square feet of manioc for each 
slave he possessed. This innovation, which was a great success, 
enabled the twin colonies to support a much larger slave population 
than was previously possible. (1)
(1) ibid., pp.72-4.
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Turning from agriculture, La Bourdonnais established the 
first sugar factories and iron foundries on lie de France, where 
deposits of high grade ore were located. He reorganized the 
entire administration and judicial structure of the colonies, 
and greatly minimized the threat of raids by the Maroons. In 
1757 he inaugurated the ship building industry on lie de France 
with the completion of a brigantine, and by 1740 Port Louis was 
a small city of stone buildings, its harbor well defended by a 
new system of fortifications. At the same time the younger 
colony began to export cotton and indigo to the Persian Gulf, 
when La Bourdonnais returned temporarily to France in 1740, the 
effects of his signal activity had already extended to Moyambique.
La Bourdonnais*s instructions of 1754 granted him independent 
power to organize the trade of the islands. Ho douot there was 
already some enthusiasm at the islands for trading with Mo9ambique, 
in view of the recent success of the Vi erg e de Grace, but La 
Bourdonnais had more specific reasons for hoping that French slavers 
would be well received there. His appointment as Governor-General 
of the Mascarenes coincided with the imminent accession of Hicolau 
Xolentino de Almeida &s Governor of Mozambique. Almeiaa was one 
of the officers bound for the femen whom La Bourdonnais had so 
exceptionally assisted in 1729. As a result of this encounter, a 
friendship was strucx between the men and apparently strengthened 
during the period of the Frenchman’s Portuguese service.(1)
According to a letter from the king of Portugal, D. Joao V (17U6- 
17b0), before ALmeida went to moyambique, "he had arranged with the 
foreigner Labordine (sic). who was at Mauritius, that he should 
send ships to Moyambique to trade with him." indeed in July 1756, 
by which date Almeida was aue to have taken over his new office, La
(1) Lougnon, Correspondence. (1756-1741), Paris, 1955, pp.xxvii,
xxxii, idem, heceuil trimestrial.iv. p.57b; see AhU, Ml 57, 
synopsis of Almeida’s services in the Estaao da India. 16 
September 1712 to 7 December 1750, enclosed in parecer. 
Conselho Ultramarino. Lisboa, 17 March 1752.
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bourdonnais sent two vessels to Mozambique to trade for slaves. 
On their arrival there, however, they found that Almeida had not
year as Governor. Nevertheless, owing to the persuasions of the 
Jesuits, the french were allowed to trade there and they returned 
to lie de France with at least one hundred Mozambique slaves. (1)
Neeoless to say, matters were greatly facilitated with the 
eventual installation of Almeiaa as Governor in 1757, whose 
intentions were revealed Dy a present of' ten slaves to La 
Bourdonnais. (2) By the end of his three-year term of office the 
French were well established traders at Mozambique. Almeida 
apparently transgressed every instruction he had received in regard 
to trade. All his efforts were directed towards wooing French 
trade and enriching himself and his associates. He allowed the 
French to establish a factory at Mozambique in order to facilitate 
the conduct of their business and condoned the trading of firearms 
and munitions to the Africans, as this was the basic french stock 
in trade. He sold the french cowry shells, which came from the 
Kerimba islands and were valued as currency in Bengal, where the 
French traded extensively. in addition to these and many other 
related cnarges, Almeida did not tax the trade of the French.(5)
CBHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.5, & BM, AjM.MBb £0, 890, fl.bbv.-9,
Grown to Lourizal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740; Lougnon, 
Correspondence. (1732-1736), p.522, (1756-1741), pp.48-9;66; 
idem, Keceuil trimestriel. iv, pp.577-96, vii, Baint-Denis, 
1945, pp.270-id, 278-80.
(id) Between 1756 and 1759 several attempts were maae under the
direction of Dupleix, La Bourdonnais1s great rival, to 
trade directly between Bengal and Mozambique, but the 
Compagnie des indes forbade this commerce. Bee A. 
Martineau, Dupleix et jtfnde franyaise. 1722-1741. i, 
Paris, 1920, pp.52L-5,541-2,505,525,627.
(5) Lougnon, Corresponaence. (1752-1756), p.^, (1740-1746), Baint- 
Lenis & Paris, 1940, p.12; AF, Col.C 2, nBbat General des
20 March 1758; CBHU-MF, LM 111-A, f1.5-5, & BM, Add.MBB.20, 
890, 11.57-40, Crown to Lounyal, Lisboa, 28 April 1740; AHU, 
CM 5 & ChHU-MF, LM 111-A, fl.4-7, Antonio da Bilva to Viceroy, 
Bao Pedro, 22 & 26 December 1741.
arrived that year, and that Jose Barbosa Leal was in his fourth
7 7 Jr 7 7 7 Qp
Vivres Depenses a I 1 isle de France depuis le p. mars 1757 
' au 28 fev. 17o8. Bavoir l ’Arrivee et la Bortie des 
dans l'lsle...," certxiiea by La Bourdonnais, Port Louis,
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According to the estimate made by a clerk in the court of 
criminal justice at Goa, Almeida and certain other inhabitants 
of Moyambique sold between 1000 and 2000 slaves to French 
merchants. The clerk reckoned that the lose duties on the 
French trade amounted to 50,800 cruzados, although others 
figured them to be only 40,000 cruzados. (1) As La bourdonnais 
wrote in 1740 that during his first five years in office only 
2815 slaves, tfpartie Mozambique, partie Madagascar, “ had entered 
the islands, the Portuguese estimate seems quite reasonable.(2)
That La bourdonnais and the French were seriously interested 
in developing their trade with bast Africa is evident from the 
two requests made by the Compagnie des Indes. with the support of 
the French Court, that Portugal relinquish all or part of her 
territorial claims north of Cape Delgado. The first was made in 
1759; the second in 1744. Both were refused by D. Pedro V, for 
the Portuguese still had dreams of recapturing Mombasa. (5) Rumors 
arose in Lisbon that the French had captured Moyambique by surprise, 
but in 1740 these were discounted as being "unbelievable" by D. 
Pedro, whose faith was justified by a report from the Viceroy that 
these were false. (4) By now the Portuguese fully appreciated, and
(1) AHU, CM 5, Antonio de Melo Pereira, "A Justic Autora contra
Nicolau Tolentino de Almeida," Goa, 18 October 1745; ibid.
6 CSHU-MF, LM 111-A,fl.4, Silva to Viceroy, Sao Pedro, 22 
December 1741.
(2) La bourdonnais, M&aoire des lies de France et de bourbon (ed.
Lougnon & Toussaint), Paris, 1957, p.57. Not surprisingly,
Almeida returned to Goa as a prisoner. Although his guilt 
was apparent, his case dragged on for several years. In 
1744 he was released from detention, although much of his 
property had been sequestered by then. As his judgment was 
still pending a year later, it seems not unlikely that he 
escaped further punishment. CEHU^MF, LM 111-A,fl.10,
Viceroy to Crown, Goa, 26 December 1741; AHU, CM 5, "Autos 
de Livramento do Reo Nicolao Tolentino de A l m e i d a . " Goa,
7 January 1744; bM, Add.Mbb 20,890,fl.139-42, Crown to 
Marquds de Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 16 March 1745.
(5) Strandes, Portuguese Period, pp.500-4; Teixeira Botelho, n0 Sonho 
de Mombaya," A£, 26,1929, pp.77-80. La Bourdonnais thrice
proposed the establishment of a French station in East Africa 
during the period 1755-1740, and even suggested making 
Moyambique a E'rench colony, bee Lougnon, Receuil trimestriel. 
iv# pp.571-5; La Bourdonnais, Memo ire, pp. 78,201,n.149.
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frequently exaggerated, the threat posed fay the French to their 
control of the trade of the Mozambique coast; indeed, to their 
pitifully weak possessions on that coast, as well as to their 
meaningless claims north of Cape Delgado. Similar rumors, in 
particular hearsay relating to a French establishment north of 
the Huvuma, plagued the Portuguese for the next half century.
These fears did not prevent Almeida^ successor, D. Lourerujo 
de Noronha, from admitting the French to trade at Mozambique, 
although he himself was not unmoved by rumors of French machinations 
concerning East Africa. (1) Unlike Almeida, however, Noronha 
apparently sought to control and to extract some profit from 
this trade for the benefit of the Crown. (2) The only detailed 
record of the French slave trade at Mozambique during Noronha*a 
time is a curious report, dated 9 November 1741, which was written 
by G.L. Hominy, the head clerk in charge of trade aboard the Dutch 
vessel De Brack, which sailed from Cape Town to Madagascar in 
search of slaves in the same year. At Bombetoka Bay, on the 
northwest coast of Madagascar, where the ruler of the Sakalava 
kingdom of Boina had his residence near Maravosy, (5) the Dutch 
slaver encountered a French merchant named Saveille who was also 
there after slaves, as well as rice, meat, and cattle. Of this 
encounter Homray wrote:
(4)(p.96) CT, ii, 1867, p.156; ibid.,iv, 1869, p.79; BM, Add.MSS 
20, 890, fl.48v-50, Crown to Louri9a!, Lisboa, 2 May 1740; 
Lobato, Svolu£aq, p.90.
(1) CifiHiMtF, LM 115,fl.171-3, D. Lourenzo de Noronha to Viceroy,
Moz*? 14 August 1742.
(2) Castello-Novo Codex, ^81, fl.244, ^Orzanento da importancia
des direitos desta Alfandega., .Mar^o de 740 athe fim do outro 
Marzo de 742.. •,n noting the duties collected on the goods 
sold by a M. de Lane,' captain of a French ship, in 1740; 
Lougnon, Kecaeil trimestriel. viii, Saint-Denis, 1948-1949,
pp.10-11.
(5) Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p.101.
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The French Captain Saveille informed me 
that the island of Mozambique furnishes 
better slaves than the island of Madagas­
car and that it is from the former that 
the French take their good slaves. The 
price there is 40 Spanish Piastres per 
head, men and women alike, but it is 
necessary to act with much circumspection 
and with prudence, because the £outh~
Africans are great thieves and blood­
thirsty people. The Portuguese allow 
no one to trade there without the 
permission of the King. (1)
From this account it would seem that French ships which 
wished to trade for slaves at Mofambique were now required to 
purchase some sort of temporary license from Noronha for the 
right to this privilege. This was still, of course, a breach 
of the King’s law, but there is no reason not to believe that 
Noronha was simply trying to make the best of a situation which 
he felt would have continued surreptitiously, trregardless of 
the attitude he adopted. The "South-Afiicans*1 of whom Homray 
wrote were obviously the local Makua.
French trading at Mojambique continued to be carried on 
throughout the next few years. home officers on a homeward bound 
ship from India charged that in the first six months of his 
administration, Pedro do Rego Barreto da Gama e Castro "had 
admitted three French vessels to trade at that fortress. . .and 
that the same Governor had taken from ten to fourteen thousand 
patacas from the French in exchange for Kaffirs which he would 
give them in the following monsoon. "(2) This arrangement probably 
was a considerable stimulant to the island’s economy, which, as we 
have seen, operated on a system of credit from the merchants of 
Portuguese India. The introduction of a large amount of patacas
(1) A. Grand!dier, et al. Collection des Quvrages anciena concemant
Madagascar, vi, Paris, 1913, p.195.
(2) Crown to Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 20 February 1748, in RSfiA. v,
pp. 192-5. Theal's translation wrongly implies that fiego 
Barreto was governor for only six months.
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into Moyambique, even if some of them never left the governor’s 
pocket, must have had a beneficial effect on the local economy, 
despite the fact that the importation and use of foreign currency 
there was deplored by authorities in Goa and Lisbon as being 
prejudicial to the Royal Treasury.
It must be admitted, however, that factors other than greed 
influenced Almeida’s successors. According to the Marquis of 
Castello-Novo, who spent over six weeks at Moyambique on his way 
to Goa as Viceroy in 1744, earlier in that year an epidemic of 
smallpox had raged along the entire Moyambique coast, taking a 
great toll in African lives. One result of this epidemic was 
that the land was left fallow, so that Moyambique Island, whidh 
produced no food of its own, was faced with a serious famine.
The Viceroy observed that this lack of food
is the main reason why French from the 
Islands of Mauricia, and Mascarenhas 
/Eourbon7, haunt this port at times,
?or as they are nearer they know our 
negligence, and they watch closely for 
the opportunity of coming to tempt us 
with provisions, when they are needed 
most, especially as the Governor is more 
diligent in executing His Majesty's 
Orders, which prohibit trading with 
foreigners. His action raises cries 
from the People and the Soldiers, who, 
seeing provisions at hand and not being 
able to have recourse to them, do not 
bear up well when they suffer from hunger.
If the governor refused to admit the French ships, he was in danger 
of losing control over a disgruntled population; if he acceded to 
their demands, he would face punishment for breaching the terms of 
his instructions and the likelihood was that his motives would be 
given Ha sinister interpretation."(I)
(1) Castello-Novo to Antonio Guedes Pereira, Moy., 12 August 1744, 
in AC.iii. 1918, pp.233-40, at 255-4; see Lougnon,
Corresoondence. (1724-1751), pp.xxix,xlviii,ill,158; AC, 
iii, 1918, p.229.
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Rego Barreto was, in fact, later accused of admitting the 
French, during the course of his residencia. which was an enquiry 
held at the conclusion of an official's term of office to 
establish if he had fulfilled, or viiated, his obligations; but 
he was able to justify his actions* (1) Conditions were unusually 
serious in 1744, but the problem of food shortage was endemic to 
Hojambique Island, and this method of operation had been tried 
before by the French* Two years previously, a French ship had 
arrived there loaded with rice and wheat, and bearing letters for 
the Governor from La Bourdonnais which declared that the food was 
for the relief of the fortress. Noronha claimed that £e rejected 
this offer as being a blatant attempt to trade for slaves, replying 
that the Portuguese had no need for the food* (2) This incident 
and the Marquis of Castello-Novo1 s explanation of the pressures 
brought to bear on Rego Barreto by the local populace go a long 
way towards indicating why even conscientious governors sometimes 
allowed the French to trade at Mozambique Island*
Another frequently employed French pretext for entering the 
harbor there was to claim that one's vessel was low on water or 
firewood, while declaring that as a friendly nation the Governor 
had no reason to refuse them entrance* Once admitted, the 
laborious task of taking on tee necessary supply of water or wood 
(usually the former, as it was more practical to empty a ship's 
barrels of water than to dispose of one's supply of wood at sea) 
took quite some time to complete, since neither was available at 
the coast and had to be carried there from the immediate hinterland* 
In the meantime, the French would carry on a clandestine trade in 
gold, ivory, and slaves. (5)
(1) Bordalo, Estatistica. p.121*
(2) CFHU^MF, LM lib, fl.193-4, La Bourdonnais to Gov. of M05., Port
Louis, 17 & 29 April 1742; ibid*, fl. 195-6, petition of MM. 
Jouvanie and Sanguinet, Hoc., 16 June 1742; ibid., fl.171,
Noronha to Viceroy, M09., 14 August 1742, printed in Arquivo 
Portugu&s Oriental* n.e*, iv,2(2), Bastor£, 1958, p.256.
(5) AC, iii, 1918, p.254*
Within the context of French trade and ambitions along the 
East African coast at this time, there appears a very important 
reference to the I&o trade at Moyambique. In a lengthy letter 
to the Crown, Rego Barreto lamented the precarious state of the 
colony and warned of foreign threats to the Portuguese in East 
Africa* Both the french and English had designs for taking 
control of Mombasa, he claimed, and from there either one could 
easily command the Kerimba Islands and ultimately seize 
Moyambique Island itself. Even if the Portuguese maintained 
their position south of Cape Delgado, the establishment of another 
European Power at Mombasa would still be ruinous to Moyambique, for
all the Kaffirs of Macuaaa, and of the 
lao Provinces, which are nearer to it 
/Mombasa/ them to our lands, will cany 
the ivo^y and other goods there which 
they now bring to us at these shores; 
and if these traders are lacking the 
patrimonies of these inhabitants /of 
Mozambique/, who maintain themselves 
on the Trade, will be ended.(1)
Rego Barreto's testimony as to the importance of the lao and 
Makua ivory trade is the only one which survives from the i740s, 
but in consideration of the relative wealth of information one 
encounters in the second half of the century, all of which supports 
his statement, there is no reason to doubt its accuracy* Thus, by 
1745, at the veiy latest, the ivoiy trade carried on at Moyambique 
Island by the Makua and the Xao was considered to be the very 
foundation of its economic life* Furthermore, Rego Barreto's 
expressed fear of the crippling damage to this trade which would 
result from the revitalization of commercial activity along the 
coast north of Cape Delgado supports the belief that the bulk of 
Xao trade flowed to Kilwa before Portugal lost Mombasa in 1698.
His statement, including the alleged proximity of Xaoland to Kilwa, 
which supplied Mombasa, seems to show that the Portuguese knew that
(1) AHii, CM 5, Rego Barreto to Crown, Moy*, 10 November 1745*
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the growth of Xao trade to Moyambique Island was the result of 
unusual factors which had caused the Xao to abandon their 
principal route to the coast in favor of a previously less 
frequented one, and that the ability of the Moyambique route to 
maintain its present dominance depended largely on the continued 
depression of Kilwa*(1)
A year later, the threat of French competition vas greatly 
diminished* Portuguese and french sources indicate, both 
explicitly and tacitly, that there was no French slave trading 
at Moyambique from 1746 through 1749, although Ingrams cites, but 
does not dacument, an instance in 1747* (2) In response to the 
Crown's exhortation to take all measures necessary to prevent 
foreign trade at Moyambique and its subordinate ports, Governor 
Caetano Correia de Sfi reported that not a single foreign ship 
had entered Moyambique harbor since he had taken office in 1746, 
despite many futile attempts. His statement may be judged true 
by the total absence of references to such trading in the 
transcript of his resid&icia* (5)
The rise of french trading at Moyambique was paralleled by a 
similar movement at the Kerimba Islands. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century the Portuguese settlements at Vamizi, or Amiza 
as it was then known, and I bo Islands were threatened by Omani 
raiders pushing to the south of Cape Delgado. Indeed, several 
later accounts lay the blame for the pitiful decadence of the 
Kerimba Islands at the time of their writing to numerous Arab 
invasions, which clearly took place during the turbulent years at
(1) See below, pp. AA3-5*
(2) Lougnon, Correspondence* (1746-1750), Saint-Denis, 1949, p.
xxxvi; V.H* Ingrams, “Some points of contact between 
Mauritius and East Africa, * Transactions of the Royal
bocletv of Arts and Sciences of Mauritius. Series C, 1, 
1952, p.55.
(5) BM, Add. MSB 28,165,pp.772-5, Crown to Chancellor of the
Relayao of Goa, /Lisboa/, 21 Februaiy 1748; of. RSEA.v. 
pp. 195-7; AHU, CM 5, Caetano Correia de 3a. to Crown, Moy., 
12 August 1749; ibid*, Francisco Kaimundo de Morals 
Pereira, Juiz Sindicante. "Treslado da hezidencia de 
Caetano Correa de Saa Governador que foi desta Ilha e 
Fortaleza de Mozambique," Moy*, 15 March - 6 April 1752.
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the turn of the century* (1) Following these depredations, the 
islands were rather overbearingly dominated by a certain Fr. Jo£o 
de Meneses, 0*P* His activities became so obnoxious to the few 
remaining Portuguese inhabitants that they complained to the 
Viceroy, who was subsequently ordered by the King, in 1724, to 
effect the Friar's permanent removal from there*(2) The order 
was a dead letter; Meneses was left unimpeded in his efforts to 
create a private domain in the Kerimba Islands*
An ageing Meneses still held power there in the 1740s, by 
which time the islands were becoming a favorite haunt for French 
slavers who sought to avoid the relative restrictions imposed on 
their trading at Mozambique after Almeida left office. In March 
1742 Noronha resolved to send a small body of troops to the islands 
to prevent the French from trading there, as three ships had 
arrived in less than six months to take on cargoes of cowries for 
the French factory at Bengal, where these would be exchanged for 
the cloths that the French merchants would later trade for slaves* 
Meneses was at the center of this trade, and it was rumored that 
he had some sort of agreement with a Portuguese Augustinian friar 
who headed a secret association in Bengal which had been organised 
specifically for exploiting the trade of the Kerimba Islands and 
the Cape Delgado area* Noronha recommended that Meneses be 
ordered to leave the islands, and the Viceroy gave orders to this
(1) Pissurlencar, As sen to s. v, p.118; see, e.g., EHGEP. pp*256,
276,283-4; Andrade, Relacoes- pp.337-8,376; AC. i, 1917, 
pp. 122—5. Certain traditions assert that the Imam of 
Oman also wanted to besiege the fortress of BSe Bebastiao, 
at Mozambique, but that he abandoned the plan, owing to 
his followers' fears, probably dating from the Omani 
siege of Mozambique in 1670, that the Portuguese had laid 
mines around the fort as a means of defending it*
Guillain, Afriaue Qrientale* i, p.522; cf. Bordalo, 
Estatlstica* p.119; Btrandes, Portuguese Period* p.230; 
Axelson, Portuguese* pp.142-5*
(2) Crown to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 April 1724, in RSEA. v. pp.152-4.
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effect later in 1742, but to no avail, (1) The notorious Fr.
Joao de Meneses continued his personal domination of the Kerimba 
Islands until his death in 1749.(2)
unfortunately, virtually nothing is known of Kilwa and the 
coast of southern Tanzania during this period. As Kilwa had
suffered more recently at the hands of the Arabs than at those \
of the Portuguese, and as the sources of Kilwa1 s wealth had always 
been to the south, it is quite likely that Kilwa fell more within 
the commercial sphere of the Portuguese than that of the Arabs to 
the north. The Sultan of Kilwa was certainly more favorably 
disposed to the former than to the latter, who had so lately 
abused his position. According to Almeida, he negotiated at 
Moyambique with the son of the Sultan of Kilwa for the purpose 
of establishing wa new Trade” between the two islands. The 
establishment of an officially sanctioned and regularized trade 
between Kilwa and Moyambique was not accomplished, however, for 
the negotiations seem to have broken down. Almeida blamed "the 
inconstancy, and the little faith of these barbarians* for the 
failure to achieve this end; no doubt the representatives of 
Kilwa had a similar explanation to give to the Sultan. (5)
Nevertheless, that such negotiations did occur suggests that 
Kilwa* s orientation was still to the Portuguese south and not 
to the Arab north.
(1) CKHU-MF, LM 115, fl.175-8, "Regim. q ha de observer...o Cap.
mor das Ilhas de Cabo Delgado Jose Glz valverde.. . Moy.,
4 May 1742; ibid., fl.179-80, £0 Juiz das Ilhas de Cabo 
Delgado Joze de Souza...fara hua inquiriyao..comprising 
ten points regarding foreign trade at the islands, n.d.j 
ibid., fl.198-211, "Inquiriyao que tira o Juiz de Cabo 
Delgado Jozeph de S o u z a . 20 May to 20 July 1742; ibid., 
f 1.185, Val verde to Noronha, ^Queriraba7, 10 July 1742; ibid., 
fl.191, Sousa to same, Querimba, 20 July 1742; ibid., fl* 
167-70, Noronha to Viceroy, Moy., 14 August 1742; ibid., 
fl.165, Viceroy to Antonio Guedes Pereira, Goa, 2 October 
1742; the last two letters are published in Arquivo 
Portugu&s Oriental, n.e., iv, 2(2), pp.252-4,257-8. See 
also, Crown to Castello-Novo, Lisboa, 20 February 1748, in 
RSKA. v, pp.192-5; Castello-Novo Codex, /  88, fl.265-7.
(2) Lobato, Kvoluy&o. p.57.
(5) AHU, CM 5, Almeida to Crown, n.d., but probably c.1741-1742.
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In 1742, in accordance with orders from the Viceroy, a Swahili 
courier was sent from the Kerimba Islands to Kilwa. He bore a 
letter from the Governor to the Saltan "warning him of the French 
project" to seize Mombasa, and from there to dominate the entire 
northern coast, and making a play for his support ty reminding him 
that his people had a recent history of being oppressed by foreigners. 
If the Sultan made a reply, it is now lost. The only further piece 
of information to be gleaned from the letter is that it was written 
to the same Sultan who sent his son to Moyambique a few years 
previously. (1) For the most part, however, French ships did not 
trade to the north of Cape Delgado, although one or two must have 
strayed into that area in search of slaves. While serious French 
interest in this part of the coast began in the time of La 
Bourdonnais, corresponding commercial involvement did not commence 
until the 1770s.
If the Portuguese had reason to fear French designs on Mombasa, 
they had none where the British were concerned. Britain had no 
more desire to become involved in East Africa at this time than it 
did when Captain Owen declared his short-lived protectorate# in 
1824^2) The basis of the Portuguese apprehensions was the fact 
that the British enjoyed good relations with the Arabs who traded 
at Bombay and Surat, and were suspected of being generally 
sympathetic to all Arabs. Undoubtedly, there were Indian and 
Arab traders operating out of Surat who traded in East Africa, but 
even in the 1770s British merchant ships from Bombay and Surat only 
put in along this coast at Pate, in search of cowries. (5) Rego 
Barreto1 s second-hand information that the British frequented the
(1) CuHU-MF, LM 115, fl.185, Valverde to Noronha, ^yuerimba/, 20
June 1742; ibid., fl.170-1, Noronha to Viceroy, Moy., 14 
August 1742, also in Arquivo PortuguSs Oriental (n.e.),iv, 
2(2), p.255.
(2) Bee Gray, The British in Mombasa. 1824-1826. London, 1957,
especially pp.50-55, 145-56, for the circumstances of the
declaration and the British Government's refusal to 
sanction it.
(5) FKI, p.114.
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coast from Brava to Cape Delgado simply was not true. (1) A 
glaring exception to this general rule was the case of the 
unidentified Englishman known only by his Swahili name of Kugu- 
Gu. The anonymous, early nineteenth century Swahili history of 
Mombasa, preserved only in French and English translations of two 
separate Arabic translations of the original text, states that 
this man, who was a ship's captain, and apparently well known to 
certain dignitaries at Mombasa, played an extremely active role 
in the reassertion of Mazrui rule there in 1746. The rhglishman's 
motives were clearly commercial and he is reported to have promised 
to assemble further aid, if necessary, from Bombay. His own 
assistance - he bombarded Fort Jesus with a cannon landed from 
his ship - proved sufficient, however, and his name does not again 
appear in the text. (2) If there was, in fact, something of a 
small 'Mombasa party1 of British merchants at Bombay, their 
influence would seem to have been inconsequential. (5)
The troubles of the Mazrui had begun with the change in 
dynasties in Oman.(4) After his proclamation as Imam in 1744, 
Ahmad ibn Bald al Busaidi sent several ships to East Africa to 
receive the recognition of those towns which were nominally within 
the Omani domain. He was denounced as a usurper in Mombasa and 
this marked the beginning of a long, bitter struggle between the 
houses of the Mazrui and the Busaidi. Kilwa apparently recognized 
the suzerainty of the Imam, which probably amounted to the yearly 
dispatch of a single ship, or two, to Kilwa from Oman to trade for 
ivory and slaves. it is doubtful, in view of the Imam's enormous 
problems at home, that he was able to impose a governor on Kilwa
(1) AHU, CM 5, Rego Barreto to Crown, Moy., 10 November 1745.
(2) See SD. pp.215-19, at 217-18.
(5) See below, p. 1*2-.
(4) See above, p. 17.
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at so early a date, as Miles implies. (1) By 1770, there were 
both a governor and a large Arab trading community at Kilwa, but 
both of these may not have taken root at Kilwa until the 1750s. 
ty mid-century, Kilwa was experiencing a gradual revival in its 
trade to the north, but the attraction of Oman was weak, and 
Zanzibar was not yet the great entrepot it was to be later.
(1) S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London, 
1919, ii, p.£66; R.F. Burton, Zanzibar: City. Island, and 
Coast. London, 1872, ii, p.566; Guillain, Afrique Orientale.
i, pp.647,556.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Trade at Mid-Centuiy, 1749 - 1770
1. Obstacles to trading at Moyambio.ue
At mid-century the Xao trade in ivory to Moyambique was at its 
peak, and formed the backbone of the economy of both the island and 
its dependent settlements of Mossuril and the two Cabaceiras, on the 
mainland. A certain amount of trading was also carried on ty the 
people of this community with the Makua, but contemporary sources 
made a clear distinction between the importance of this business and 
that done with the lao. To name only a few, Francisco de Melo e 
Castro, Inacio Caetano Xavier and Luis Antonio de Figueiredo, who 
served as Chief Justice of Moyambique, all stressed that the latter 
was far more vital than the former. Xavier estimated that the Xao 
alone carried some 400 - to 500 bares of ivory to Moyambique each 
year, a figure which is supported by the similar appraisals of the 
other two, not to mention that made by the anonymous author of the 
valuable Memoriae da Costa d1 Africa Oriental. The official figures 
of the exportation of ivory from Moyambique to India, which imported 
virtually all the ivory embarked from that port, for the years 1759- 
1761, lend further credence to these judgments. (1) In fact, the
(1) TT, MR, mayo 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moy., 20 November 1755; 
TT,MR,mayo 604, Luis Antonio de Figueiredo, "Noticia do Cont­
inents de Mossambique, e abreviada Relacao do seo Comercio,M 
Lisboa, 1 December 1775, in EHGEP.pp.3SViA at 264-5; TT,MR, 
mayo 604, anon.,"Memories da Costa d'Africa Oriental e algumes 
reflexoes uteis para estabelecer melhor e fazer mais florente 
o seu comercio," Sena, 21 May 1762, in ibid.,pp.189-224,at 215, 
219-220; AHli, CM 9, "Extracto do todo o Marfim que foy extrahido 
deste Porto para o de Goa, e Norte no tempo dos Rendeiros 
actuaes desta Alfandega da Ilha e Fortz. ^e Moss.e,^tirado 
pellos livres dos despachos da mesma Alf. Antonio Franc­
isco Xavier,Moy., 15 Devember 1761. The total amount of ivory 
exported to India during these years was 1720 bares. 14 fara- 
colas and 7 mainas. The bar ^Arabic bahar), was equal to 16 
arrobas in the Rivers of Bena, and to 20 farayolas (Arabic 
farsala) at Moyambique. Various authorities indicate that the
bar could be equivalent to,.anywhere from about 518 to about 650 
TOInds. Bee Lobato, fivplucao.P.269; Teixeira Botelho, Historia.
______  1^0^509^n>2r AxelaonV Portuguese^ n . 2 Q 9 - __________________
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ivory which the Yao carried to Moyambique constituted approximately 
90/6 of that traded overland to Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, and 
about 66/6 to 65$ of all the ivory which entered the island itself, 
including that which came from the Rivers of Sena, Sofala, Inhambane, 
and the Kerimba Islands.
Nevertheless, the duties collected on this ivory, including 
those levied on the cloth and beads for which it was traded, were 
not sufficient to remedy all the financial ills of the Portuguese 
administration of that Conquest, and by 1752 the Crown realized 
that a drastic solution was required for improving the sorry state 
of its holdings there. As it seemed hopeless to expect a revival 
of Portuguese fortunes if Moyambique remained subordinate to the 
Vice-royalty of Goa, which was preoccupied with protecting its own 
solvency end territorial integrity, the King, D. Jose I (1750-1777), 
decreed on 19 April 1762 that in view of the "decadency of the 
Government of Mossambique. . . it will be more convenient to separate 
it from that of Goa for its restoration.1 The first Governor- 
General of the newly created independent administration was to be 
Melo e Castro, who had been serving as Governor of Moyambique since 
January 1750.(1) But while these decisions were being hopefully 
made at Lisbon, a more ominous change, which was of far greater 
significance to the internal trade of East-Central Africa, was taking 
place at Moyambique.
This vital turn of events was the deterioration of the peaceable, 
if not necessarily amicable, relations between the Makua and the 
Portuguese, which FrSis reported to have existed in 1727. Owing to 
a total lack of pertinent documentation, the specific reasons for this 
altered situation are impossible to ascertain. But the probable 
cause is to be found in the fact that Makua-Portuguese relations on 
the mainland opposite Moyambique were naturally antagonistic, with
(1) Lobato, Svoluyao. p.285, quotes the decree of 19 April 1752 in 
its entirely, and gives a masterly analysis of the events 
leading to the establishment of an independent administration 
of Moyambique on pp.272-507 of the same volume.
i
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peace existing only when the Portuguese had the upper hand over 
the Makua. Failing this, the Makua were able to pose a serious 
challenge to Portuguese security on the continent, as they had in 
1585.(1)
By 1749 the Portuguese had taken up arms against certain 
unruly Makua chieftains. (Z) The result was not, however, the 
restoration of peace. Portuguese relations with the Makua, 
especially with the important chief Murimuno, whose main village 
lay some eight to ten leagues inland from the coast, only 
deteriorated further. The disturbances caused by Murimuno, whom 
Xavier tagged "the most arrogant of them all,*1 were indeed serious. 
According to the Governor, Murimuno was "making an Asylum in his 
main village for all the Slaves who fled from the Inhabitants of 
this Island, and from the other side, robbing our Merchants, and 
making various exceptional disrespects to people from our Lands 
who go to his." Furthermore, wrote Brigadier David Marques 
Pereira, Murimuno "impeded the inhabitants of his Continent from 
carrying provisions, and ivory to this Fortress, and did the same 
to his neighbors, seising from them what they carried."(5) 
Unsettling as these local disorders were, however, the most 
critical result of Murimuno's hostility was the ruinous effect it 
had on the trade of the lao to Mozambique. In view of what is 
known about the volume of trade and trading habits of the Makua and 
the lao, this is surely the only possible interpretation for the 
observation that the Makua were also obstructing the "trading and 
commerce of their nation which comes from three or four months' 
away," and that "this trade with us consists of the quantity of 
more than a thousand negroes loaded with ivory, from which this
(1) See above, pp. 48-1.
(2) Teixeira Botelho, Historia. p.456.
(5) Andrade, Relates. p.152; Melo e Castro to Sebastiao JosS de 
Carvalho e Melo, M05., 28 December 1755, in AC, iv, 1919, 
p.55; AHU, CM 4, Pereira to Biogo de Menaonpa Corte Real, 
M09., 15 November 1755; cf. AHU,CM 4, Melo e Castro to 
Rei, Mo9., 27 November 1755.
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Fortress derives great profits. "(1)
In addition to the most important quantitative distinctions 
noted above, the trade of the Makua and lao with the people of 
Mozambique was marked by certain other differences which further 
attest to the validity of the interpretation that the anonymous 
writer was mistaken in implying that the traders from the far 
interior were of the same nation as the Makua who were disrupting 
the economy of the island. Ideally, the Makua, being closer to 
the Portuguese coastal settlements of Mossuril and the Cabaceiras, 
traded with them throughout the year. The lao, whose country was 
farther away, only came to the coast from the beginning of May and 
continued coming only until the end of October. Figueiredo'® 
remark that patamares were not necessary for trading with the Makua 
tends to confirm one's conclusion that the year-round Makua traders 
did not come from a great distance inland, and would seem to imply 
that these people lived close enough to the coast not to be 
apprehensive about bringing their trade goods directly to the 
Portuguese settlements. On the other hand, the observations made 
by Joto Baptista de Montaury, long a resident of Moyambique, that 
patamares were sent into the interior "to call together the bands 
(ranchos) of the Makua and lao, who do not come without the 
assurance that the patamares are waiting for them beforehand," 
substantiates one's suspicions that there were some Makua, as well 
as lao, traders who came from the far interior to trade to
(1) Anon., "Breve Noticia Da infelicidade que teve a nossa
Expediy&o de Monyambique primeira que fez Kl Hey N.Benor 
D. Jose I. aestruida pello Rey dos Macuas em que deram fim 
a maior parte della com a relayao dos que morrerao, e da 
cause que noveu esta guerra hindo na Nau Nossa Senhora da 
Piedade e o Corsario N. Senhora de Atalaya, que entrarao 
neste Porto, 8 de Maio de 1754 hindo de Eyo de Janeyro," 
n.d., but obviously composed in Lisbon, in AC. ii, 9, 1918,
p.106.
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Moyambique. (1) The trade of these Makua was, however, of slight 
consequence compared to that of the lao. Furthermore, added 
confirmation that the traders in question were the lao comes from 
Melo e Castro, who was the first of several writers to state 
plainly that the lao came to the coast of Moyambique from some two 
to four months' journey distant. (2) Thus it was not primarily the 
more localized insults perpetrated by Murimuno's Makua against the 
Portuguese which caused the latter to declare open war against that 
ruler, tut rather the ruin which he was causing to their vitally 
important trade with the lao, for as Xavier described the truly 
essential role played by the Makua in the operation of trade at 
Moyambique:
The dependency which we have of these 
Chieftains is of neighborliness, and 
trade of some ivory, slaves, provisions, 
and above all that of free passage to 
the Yao, who cannot come to the coast 
with their ivory, without passing 
through their /the Makua*s/ lands. (5)
The vessels which bore the King's instructions regarding the 
new composition of the administration of Moyambique arrived there on 
4 June 1755. Whatever Melo e Castro's pleasure at receiving these 
orders may have been, he must have been especially grateful that the
(1) £BjEP« p.264; Andrade, Relates, p.549. The climate of southern
Tanzania, northern Moyambique and southern Malawi is of the 
tropical monsoon type, in which almost all rainfall occurs 
during the months of November through April, with the remainder 
of the year being a sharply contrasting dry season.
Appropriately, the Yao divide the year into two seasons, cuku 
(wet) and cau (dry), with the former being devoted to 
agriculture and the latter being the time for visiting and 
socializing, and also trading. Seasonal variations in rain­
fall could, however, delay the arrival of the first Yao trader® 
until August, or even later. S.J.K. Baker, "The Bast African 
Environment," in HEA,i,p.l2; Valdez Thomaz dos Bantos,
0 Desconhecido Niassa. pp.89-91; Mitchell, The Yao Village, 
pp.10-12,18; AHU, Cod.1352, fl.12, D. Ana Soares de Serra to 
Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira grande, 26 April 1766.
(2) TT, MR,mayo 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moy., 20 November 1755.
(5) Andrade, Relates, pp.152-5; cf. Labato, Svoluyao. pp.110-11.
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military expedition which had been fitted out in Lisbon in the 
previous year "to repress the chiefs and to terrorize Kaffraria," 
was also on board these ships, fl) On either 10 or 14 September, 
Melo e Castro sent these troops into battle against Murimuno.
This force, numbering over one hundred regular soldiers, plus some 
600 to 1000 auxiliaries, most of whom were supplied by the allied 
Sheikhs of Sanculo and yuitangonha, reached Murimuno fs territory. 
Several deserted villages were burned to the ground without 
resistance being encountered. The Portuguese impetus then seems 
to have spent its force, and in the following hours any cohesion 
which remained was thoroughly dissipated by the folly of a certain 
Diogo Martins, who, for reasons of hi3 own, first charged the 
Sheikh of Sanculo with being a traitor, and then, in view of the 
Sheikh's retainers, shot him dead. The force from Sanculo 
immediately withdrew from the field, although that from Quitangonha 
stayed on, but the Portuguese position was no longer tenable. With 
a decision to retire the entire expedition, all discipline was lost 
and the retreat turned into a disorderly flight of individuals to 
the coast. Once this disarray became known to the Makua, who were 
hidden in the bush, they seized the opportunity without hesitation 
and inflicted heavy casualties on the fleeing Portuguese. The 
bitterly disappointed Melo e Castro reported home that "this action 
was one of the most tragic, and unhappy which has been seen in this 
Conquest," a sentiment which was heightened by the fact that at 
least half, and probably more, of the regular troops were lost in 
this rout.(2)
The need to chastise Murimuno was thereafter accentuated by 
the fact that the new Sheikh of Sanculo had stopped supplying 
Moyambique with cattle and provisions in retribution for the murder
(1) AHU, Cod.1510, p.10; AHU, CM 6, Saldanha de Alburquerque to
Sec. St., Moy., 26 December 1758, quoted in Andrade,
Relayoes. p.56.
(2) AC,ii, 9, 1918, pp.106-11; ibid.,iv, 1919, pp.54, 56-7;
AHU, CM 4, Pereira to Corte Real, Hoy., 15 November 1755;
Cf. above, pp.tt-^.
- 114 -
of his father* (1) At first Melo e Castro sought the services of 
the powerful Makua chief Micieyra, who was the nearest neighbor 
of the Portuguese* Micieyra agreed to attack Murimuno, but his 
continual procrastination of the campaign frustrated the Governor- 
General, who consequently turned for aid to the faithful and 
reliable Sheikh of Quitangonha. Without further hesitation, the 
Sheikh's forces penetrated Macuana up to the main village of 
Murimuno and routed his followers, killing and imprisoning many of 
them. Murimuno sought revenge for this affront and prepared to 
attack the Portuguese mainland, but the Sheikh of Quitangonha got 
wind of Murimuno's intentions and prepared an ambush for his army. 
The Makua fell into the trap and were caught in a crossfire, from 
which they fled into the interior. The Sheikh'3 men pursued them 
ruthlessly for three days and inflicted many losses on them, as 
well as taking others captive. By late 1754, Murimuno had removed 
his center of operations farther into the hinterland of Moyambique 
and was seeking an entente with the Portuguese. These informal 
overtures were snubbed by Melo e Castro, who wished Murimuno to 
send personal emissaries to negotiate with the Captain-Major of 
the Cabaceiras and Mainland, but it did not really matter. The 
mainland was at peace and there was again freedom of movement and 
trade between Macuana and the Portuguese settlements.(2)
Very shortly, however, Murimuno was again rampaging, to the 
detriment of the economy of Moyambique. From late September 1756 
until February 1758 the lao were unable to come to trade with the 
Portuguese as a result of a war with his Makua, who refused to let 
them pass through Macuana to the coast. "Consequently," Xavier 
recorded, "this land, and the Treasury of His Majesty, suffered 
irremedial damage in respect to the duties of the alfandegas. as 
well as to the velSrio of the ^Ttayal7 Monopoly which was not sold,
(1) AC, ii, 9, 1918, p.112.
(2) AHU, CM 4, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moc., 16 November 1754;
AHW, CM 5, same to same, Moy., 18 August 1755.
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because they /the lao/ consume more of it than do the rest#* (1)
The Royal Monopoly over the vital importation and sale of velorio. 
the basic trade beads, at Mozambique had been created by the Royal 
decree of 29 March 1755, which also abolished the supervision of 
the trade of Mozambique by Goa and entrusted it to the Government 
of Mozambique. (2) In most years, between 20,000 and 50,000 mazos. 
or packets, of velorio could be emended in Portuguese East Africa, 
mostly in trading with the lao. Official requisitions for 
shipments of Venetian velorio from Lisbon to Mozambique show that 
in 1758, 20,000 out of 52,000 mays3 (62.5?) were specifically to be 
of that sort f,vhich serves for the lao,” while in the following 
year, 16,000 out of 25,200 (65.5?) were similarly earmarked for the 
Xao market. In the period during which the Makua were warring 
with the Xao, which included the latter part of one trading season 
(1756) and the entirety of another (1757), only 9295 mazos of 
velorio were sold fcy the Royal Monopoly. Prom the cessation of 
these hostilities until October 1758, a total of 56,592 mazos were 
sold, most of which went for trading with the Xao, who had a two 
years* backlog of ivory which they brought to the coast in the 
course of that season. (5) These figures, together with those 
concerning the ivory trade, eloquently attest to the undisputed 
primacy in the economy of Mozambique which the trade of the Yao had 
attained by the middle of the eighteenth century. It was, simply, 
”the principal application.” and ”the unique commerce” by which the
(1) Andrade, Relaz^es. p.155; cf. Melo e Castro to Crown, Moz*>
8 August 1757, AC, iii, 16, 1918, p.166.
(2) AHtJ, CM 5, decreto real. Lisboa, 29 March 1755; Crown to Conde
de Alva, Lisboa, 4 April 1755, in RSEA. v, pp.220-2.
(5) AHU, CM 6, Pedrolfie Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moz*, 10 
December 1758, with enclosure, n0istinczao de Vellorio que 
vay de amostra, e a qualidade, que delle deve vir na moncaS 
de 1760,” Moc., 51 December 1758; another copy in TT, MR, 
mazo 605; AHU. Ooa. 1517, fl.8-9, anon., ”Copia da Rellaza# 
sobre qualid. de vellorio que deve vir para o Estanque 
Real de Moss.6,” Moz«> 18 August 1759; see C. Montez, 
“InventSrio do Fundo do Seculo XVIII,” Mozambique. 72, 1952, 
Document 24, p.159, for the effect these events had on the 
price of velorio at Mozambique.
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people of that island, Mossuril, 1fce Cabaceiras, and environs 
sustained themselves. (1)
During the 1760s Macuana continued to be a restless and 
potentially dangerous area, but there were no further dramatic 
clashes between the Makua and the Portuguese, or Yao, during this 
decade. A close watch was kept by the Portuguese on the movements 
of Murimuno and Mauruza, the great chief of the Uticulo district, 
and in 1761 some undefined warring took place in Macuana. Five 
years later things were more threatening to the Portuguese, but 
the Governor-General feared a campaign against the Makua lest it 
should suffer the same fate as that of 1765. By late October 1766, 
however, their raiding, of both the Portuguese and the Yao, finally 
provoked a reaction from the former, who carried out some rather 
Indeterminate operations against several Makua chieftains of Uticulo 
and Camtdra, to the southwest of Mozambique. These were probably 
made with the help of Quitangonha, but most of the Portuguese raiders, 
for that is what they were effectively, seem to have been friendly 
Makua. Information is scarce for these years, but this pattern of 
desultory Makua raiding, with an occasional Portuguese reprisal 
along similar lines, seems to have characterized the fluid state of 
Macuana right into the next decade. (2)
While the Makua had always been a dangerous adversary, there is 
no doubt that the acquisition of firearms by them vastly increased 
their striking power. Indeed, it may well be that the deterioration 
of Makua-Portuguese relations can be traced to this fact. The arms 
trade, which had always been discouraged by Portuguese administrations, 
had only begun to take on serious proportions with the increased tempo
(1) Andrade, Relacffes. p.141; AHU, Cod.1313, fl.47, Pereira to Crown,
Moz*> 10 1768. «
(2) AHU, CM 8, /Saldanha de Albuquerquejto P.eM. jug. ,  Moz.> 24
January 1760; AHU, OH d, carta""patente. Saldanha de Albuquerque, 
naming Inacio de Melo Alvim as Commandant of the Cabaceiras,
Hoz*> 5 March 1761; AHU, CM 12, Pereira do Lago to Crown,- Moz*> 
20 August 1766s ibid., Francisco Pereira Henriques to Pereira 
do Lago, Gabaceira, 25 October 1766. According to the last 
letter, the Makua chieftains involved in the 1766 skirmishes 
were Corripe Muno, nephew of Muzama Muno; Emttutte Muno, 
nephew of Maurussa Muno, and Helimue Muno, nephew of Muere Muno.
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of French trade in East Africa after 1755. Following the French 
lead, Brazilian traders became particularly ardent gun-runners in 
the second half of the century, as did individuals operating 
aboard the annual vessel which was sent from Portugal to trade at 
Mojambique. Of necessity this trade was carried on surreptitiously 
by the traders, who, much to the consternation of the Government, 
found their chief accomplices in the Portuguese inhabitants of the 
mainland. Despite the potentially dangerous consequences of this 
trade with the Makua, at whose hands these same mainland residents 
suffered in particular when the Makua turned their guns against the 
Portuguese, it continued unabated. In 1754 one man wrote that 
"thirty years ago none of the Makua knew the use of firearms, and 
they used only weapons of their own creation, which are arrows, or 
spears; it is not thus today.**(l) Following the upheavals caused 
by the Makua in the 1750s, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, who had 
taken over the government of the colony of 5 August 1758, issued a 
ban do. or proclamation, strictly prohibiting anyone from trading 
arms and ammunition to all the Africans of the continent. In 1760 
the King consequently ordered that the right to do business In 
firearms and gunpowder would henceforth be the sole monopoly of the 
Royal Treasury, and that these goods were to be sold only by 
individuals selected by the Governor-General. But despite these 
orders the trade continued to flourish, and the Makua, according to
(1) AHU, CM 4, Antonio de Brito Freire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 
1754, Hfe 92-5; cf. AHU, CM 6, Saldanha de Albuquerque to 
Crown, M09., 28 December 1758, also in AC.iv.l919.p.2l5.
For a typical example of Portuguese participation in this 
trade, concerning gun-running at the village of Motomonho, 
where the people of Mozambique bargained for provisions with 
the Makua of Chief Mavere, see AHU, CM 7, bando, Saldanha de 
Albuquerque, Moz** 14 January 1759; ibid., report of GregSrio 
Taumaturgo de Brito to Gov., with Mavere*s mark and Arabic 
signature of the interpreter, Motomonho, 16 January 1759; 
for more on Mavere, see ibid., Fr. Pedro dos Martires e Cunha 
to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Convento de SSo Domingo, 19 
January 1759; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.105-6, "Jtiegisto de Outra 
Qrdem sobre devassar do incendio succedido em Mutomonho,” 
Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moz** 9 September 1769.
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one who knew them well, refused to sell slaves to the Portuguese 
if they did not receive gunpowder in return. (1)
Similarly, the people of Mossuril and the Cabaceiras were 
responsible for other disorders which hampered the smooth operation 
of trade there. The competition for trading with the Yao and the 
Makua was so great that during the dry season there was a continual 
state of petty war waged between these individuals. One result 
of this vicious competition was that the Africans were able to get 
a much higher price for their goods, especially ivory, as each 
trader offered another length of cloth and a few more strings of 
beads for them. Thus the margin of profit for the Portuguese was 
considerably lowered in this trade. Furthermore, at least some of 
the Portuguese traders seem to have pursued a policy of setting the 
Makua and Yao traders against each other, as well as against the 
other Portuguese, each in the hope of making the greatest profit 
from the ensuing turmoil. Not surprisingly, these efforts only led 
to greater chaos, and Montaury believed that they were the cause of 
the havoc often wreaked on the Portuguese lands fcy the disgruntled 
African traders as they withdrew to the interior from the coast.
This treatment, while it may not have precipitated the deterioration 
of Makua-Portuguese relations, could only have aggravated the 
situation during the 1760s.(2)
Seeking to minimize the disturbances which occurred in the trade 
with the Makua, in 1760 Saldanha de Albuquerque prohibited the people 
of Mozambique from going themselves, or from sending their slaves, 
into the interior of Macuana to procure provisions, ordering that 
these should be bought only in the old bazaar. In the same vein,
(1) AHU, CM 6, bando. Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moz*, 5 September 1768;
AHU, Cod• 1517,fl.245 and Cod.1320, no.166, Tome Joaquim da 
Costa Corte Real to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 5 April 
1760; AHU, CM 8, Cod.l517,fl.247; and US 9, royal bando.
Ajuda, 5 April 1760, published at Mozambique on 1 August 1760; 
AHU, CM 12, Francisco Pereira Henriques to Pereira do Lago, 
Cabaceira, 25 October 1766.
(2) AHU, CM 4, Brito Freire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 1754, IP 50;
BGrHKP. pp.265-4; Andrade, RelazSes. pp.349-50.
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his successor as Governor-General forbade anyone from "sending 
Patamares to Macuana in search of the Xao.nll) A more striking 
attempt to obviate these disorders and to regulate the vital 
trade with the lao was Saldanha de Albuquerque1 s proposal to the 
Portuguese inhabitants of Mozambique that they form a company in 
order to achieve this end. He envisioned a company embracing both 
rich and poor alike, and left it to them to decide among themselves 
what fora of corporation should take. Not surprisingly, they were 
unable to give the Governor-General any sort of coherent reply and 
the great variety of the responses obliged him, against his will, 
to drop the project. (2) A possible reason for their failure to 
act on this proposal, which was sqfebviously intended for their 
own benefit, as well as for that of the State, was their inability 
to admit that these disorders were of their own making, and not 
due to the connivance of the Indian traders of Mozambique, whose 
continued domination of all aspects of trade there angered the 
Portuguese.
While the ivory of the Xao sustained the economy of Mozambique 
from one side, the trade of the Indians nourished it from the other. 
Without a regular supply of Indian cloth, the provisioning of which 
was still completely monopolized by these merchants, there would be 
little attraction for the Xao to trade at Mozambique. Furthermore, 
as we have already observed, virtually all the ivory of Mozambique 
was exported to India, and this aspect of the trade was also firmly 
in Indian hands. Consequently, as they had been throughout the 
previous half-century, the Banians and Muslim Indians of Mozambique 
were the most active and important body of traders there. During 
the administration of Melo e Castro they were spared the sort of
(1) AHU, Cod.1317, fl.216-7, bando. Saldanha de Albuquerque, Moq«>
1 May 1760; AHU, CM 11, bando. Jotfo Pereira da Silva Barba, 
Moq., 23 June 1764.
(2) AHU, CM 7, Cod.1317, fl.75-4. "Proposta aos Moradores, e
habitantes desta Praqa de Mossambique, Portuguezes, Naturaes 
de Goa, e Nacionaes desta Terra,” Saldanha de Albuquerque, 
Moq., 14 July 1769; ibid., fl.71, Saldanha de Albuquerque 
to Sec. St., Moq«> 16 August 1769.
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persecution which had deviled them in the 1720s and which had 
resumed in the 1740s, although Muslim Indians still needed 
licenses from the Holy Office in order to cross over to the 
mainland.(1) While in 1749 the Church threatened those 
Portuguese who sold Christian slaves to them with excommunication, 
and in 1750 the Marquis of Tavora forbade Muslims from owning any 
such slaves, this restriction was abrogated by the Crown in 1752.
For his own part, Melo e Castro was most interested in revitalizing 
the economy of Mozambique and must have realized that to 
persecute these traders could only have defeated his purpose.
Daring these years, however, a great deal of resentment was built 
up against them ay the Portuguese inhabitants of Mozambique, as well 
as by the Church, with which Melo e Castro bitterly clashed 
throughout his tenure of office. Following the suicide of his 
successor, Jo&o Manuel de Melo, only three weeks after taking office 
on 15 March 1758, the government was entrusted to David Marques 
Pereira, who was decidedly not one to protect the interests of the 
Banians and Muslim Indians.(2)
On 9 May 1758, the Brothers of the Santa Casa da Misericordia. 
acting together as the benado da C&nara. or municipal council, of 
MoZ«®bique, submitted a lengthy proposal to Pereira which violently 
attacked the position at Mozambique and on its mainland of the 
Indians, and which was completely embodied in a bando issued by the 
Governor-General only two days later. (5) This bando ordered that 
Banians who owned any property on Moqambique or the mainland, or who 
possessed any boats, had to sell these within three months or else 
have them sequestered by the State; that no Banian or Muslim Indian
(1) bee above, pp.8l-*f ; RSgA,v,pp. 190-2; AF0,vi,1876,pp.467-9.
(2) Andrade, Relacfles. pp.68,79,88-9,96,98; BNL, Pombalina 742, fl.
8-9, bando. Tavora, Moq., 4 August 1750; AHU, C54 6, Conde da 
Efea to Crown, Moq*> 16 August 1758; for more about the 
administration ox Melo e Castro, see Lobato, "A Ditadura do
Primeiro Govemador-Geral, em 1755," in his Colonizaqao. 
pp.159-61.
(5) AHU, CM 6 , Proposal of the benado da Camara to Pereira, Moq.,
9 May 1758; ibid., bando. Pereira, Moq., 11 May 1758.
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could henceforth go, or send anyone on his account, to Macuana or 
to Motomonho in order to get provisions; that anyone at all who 
traded guns or powder to the Makua would be treated as a traitor; 
that the necessity of acquiring from the Commissioner of the Holy 
Office a license for passing to the mainland was obligatory for the 
Banians, as well as for the Muslim Indians; and that outside of 
the twelve most important Banian merchants, each of whom was allowed 
to maintain two other Banians and four slaves as assistants, all the 
other Banians of Mozambique, who alone numbered some 200 individuals, 
as well as all the Muslim Indians would be sent back to their own 
country in the next monsoon.
One of the charges brought forward by the Brothers as 
justification for these harsh measures was that those Banians who 
had residences on the mainland sold their cloth to the Makua at half 
the prices they charged the Portuguese. It seems not at all unlikely 
that this was indeed the case. On the other hand, the claim that 
they and the Muslim Indians, together with some of the Portuguese 
mainlanders, were the principal traders of guns to the Makua, is 
contradictory to what is known about this trade. Thus its attempt 
to blame the Banians and Muslim Indians for the hindrance of the Xao 
ivory trade by the Makua was also unjustified. The other reasons 
cited in the recommendation of the Brothers similarly reveal that 
the true aim of that proposal was not to improve the state of the 
Conquest, but rather to ameliorate that of its Portuguese subjects 
at the expense of the Indians. This is not to imply that all the 
Portuguese of Mozambique and the mainland were so motivated, nor 
that all the Banians and Muslim Indians were as faithful subjects 
of the Portuguese Crown as they inevitably claimed to be, but only 
that both the successful commercial endeavors and several religions 
of the latter prejudiced a great many of the moradores against them.
Despite the completeness of this frontal attack on the Indians, 
both the Brothers and the Governor-General were not so blinded to 
the facts of life that they did not provide for what they believed 
would be enough prosperous Banian merchants "to make the trade of 
this land run." But the bando was clearly unacceptable to the
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Indian community, and Pereira was shortly petitioned for its 
reversal* Pereira, who seems to have been little more than the 
tool of the brothers in this affair, refused to rescind the order 
on their advice, and they only levelled more charges against the 
Indians in response to their petition* Two further pleas were 
made separately by the Muslims, but the situation remained 
unchanged until the arrival at Mozambique on 14 July of Manuel 
de Saldanha de Albuquerque, Count of iSga, who was en route to Goa 
as the new Viceroy.(1) Within a week the Banians had presented 
him with a lengthy representation in which they pleaded their side 
of the argument, a lead soon followed by the Muslims* Granted the 
fact that theirs is hardly an unprejudiced report, the case 
presented by the Banians gives a much truer picture of events than 
that put forth by the Brothers of the Santa Casa da Misericordia*
The Banians argued cogently that their trading constituted the main 
support of the economy and thus of the Royal Treasury. They also 
exposed such blatant falsehoods as the attempt to blame the 
hostility of the bheikh of Sanculo towards Mozambique on them, 
rather than on the folly of Diogo Martins* Furthermore, they 
contended that the bando contradicted the King's decree of 2y March 
1756, which freed the trade of Mozambique and of all its 
subordinate ports and lands "to all the inhabitants of Goa, and 
of the other parts and lands of Asia, subject to my Royal Dominion." 
Basing his decision on this last factor and citing an otherwise 
unknown bando from Pereira, dated 8 April 1758, which specifically 
reversed the King's orders as expressed in a jtoyal alvara of 29 
July 1757, the Viceroy issued an alvara on 25 July 1758 which
(1) AHU, CM 8 , petition presented by forty Gentiles and fourteen 
Muslims to Pereira, 22 May 1758; ibid., Benado de
Ctbnara to same, Moz«> 4 June 1758; ibid., representation 
of Muslims to same, Moz«, 7 June 1758; ibid., same to same, 
n.d. (the last two documents are enclosed in ibid*, 
representation of Muslim traders to Conde da BJga, Moz*,
25 July 1758); ibid., Conde da Ifea to Crown, Moz** 18 
August 1768.
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nullified the effect of both of Pereira's odious proclamations 
and re-established the Crown's wiil.(l)
In view of the great confusion that had reigned at Mozambique 
during Pereira's brief spell as Governor-General, the Viceroy deemed 
that it was in the best interests of the Crown to replace him in 
that post with a more responsible individual* The fact that he 
installed his brother, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, as Governor- 
General, could only have further frustrated both the local Portuguese 
and the clergy* (2) During the next two years the Church, led by 
the Episcopal Administrator, Fr. Jo&o de Nossa Senhora, hammered 
away at the position of the Indians at Mozambique, but with scarcely 
any success* Saldanha de Albuquerque upheld the rights of the 
Indians to seek provisions on the mainland, prohibited the Chief 
Justice from making inventories of the possessions of deceased 
Indians, and declared his belief that "up to now it has not seemed 
convenient to me to prohibit the Trade, which the Muslims and Gentiles 
have with the Kaffirs of the Interior," because of its importance to 
the economy of the island. Considering the terms of the Secretary 
of State’s advice in 1752, that they be allowed to maintain Christian 
slaves until the King should determine otherwise, which he had not, 
the only concession which the Governor-General felt justified in 
granting to the demands of the Church was that the slaves regularly
(1) Ibid., b  representation of "Baneanes, Guzerates, e Bangazaes,
Mercadores todos," to Efea, Moz*, 20 July 1758; ibid., 
representation of Muslim traders to same, Moz** 25 July 1758; 
ibid., alvara* Ega* Moz*, 25 July 1758; AHU, CM 5, decreto 
real* Lisboa, 29 March 1755; cf. BM, Add* MBS. 28, 163, 
fl.466-7, alvara* Rei, Lisboa, 10 June 1755, also in RSEA* v, 
pp. 226-30; TT, MR, mayo 605, "Copia de AlvarS. porq se faz 
publica a ordem de S. Mag. , pella cjual manda, que os Portos 
de Senna, Sofalla, e Inhambane sejao Livres para todos os 
seus Vassalos, mor.ea de Goa, e das mats partes, e terras de 
Azia, sugeitas ao iseu Real Dominio," 29 July 1757*
(2) AHU, CM 6, Eg a to Crown, Moz«, 18 August 1758; ibid., Pereira
to Costa Corte Real, Moz** 10 August 1758.
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had to be taken by their masters to the Bee, for instruction in 
Christianity. (1) Furthermore, that the attitude of Saldanha de 
Albuquerque in these matters was approved by the Crown is seen 
from its reaction to the original proposal of 9 May 1768 to expulse 
the Indians from Mozambique. It registered surprise at such a 
request, noted that they had always resided and traded there 
without harm, and emphasized that the entire problem had to be 
judged fairly. (2)
Saldanha de Albuquerque was succeeded as Governor-General 
early in 1765 by JoSo Pereira da Silva Barba, who brought with him 
the first carta org&nica. or instructions of organization, which 
had ever been issued for that colony since its separation from Goa 
in 1752. For the present study, the most important provision in 
these instructions was that which abolished the Royal Monopoly of 
velorio. thereby freeing the trade of Mozambique from the hold of 
any official monopolies. (5) Silva Barba also brought something
(1) Ibid., representation of Fr. Joito de Nossa Senhora, Moq., 8 August
1758; AHU,CM 7, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moz*, 2 January 
1759, enclosing representation of "Banianes, Mouros e mais 
gentios habitantes desta Praza," to Gov., 1768; AHU, Cod.1520, 
n. 174, Costa Corte Real to same, Ajuda, 5 April 1760, enclosing 
latter1 s reply to same, Moz»> 9 August 1760; AHU, Cod.1517, 
11.146-8, same to Episcopal Administrator, Moz«, 10 September 
1759; ibid., fl.148-51, further correspondence and orders, dated 
5,10, & 11 September 1759, all relating to licensing Muslims to 
cross over from Mozambique to the mainland to trade; ibid., fl. 
310-15, same to Crown, Moz** 5 August 1760; ibid., fl.247-8, 
same to Costa Corte Real, Mo9., 14 August 1760, enclosing, fl. 
248-51, his bando of 10 August 1760 concerning the instruction of 
Christian slaves, the Episcopal Administrator's letter to him of 
24 July 1760, "bobre a extirpaza# da Seita dos Mouros," and 
related documents; cf. Andrade, Relazoes. pp.67-102, for a 
decidedly pro-Church account of the preceeding and related events.
(2) AHU, Cod.1525, fl.56, fTancisco Xavier de Mendonza Furtado to Gov.,
Ajuda, 27 May 1761; cf. AHU, Cod.1552, fl.121-6.
(5) AHU, Cod.1322, fl.40, "Autto da Posse," bilva Barba, 6 January 1765; 
AHU, CM 9, Crown, to Calisto Rangel Pereira de Sa, Ajuda, 7 May 
1761; cf. AHU, Cod.1522, fl.75-96; Teixeira Botelho, Hist$ria.
A* pp.560-6, for a summary of the carta organica; AHU, Cod.1527, 
fl.22, Crown to Gov., Lisboa, 24 March 1765, being orders 
concerning the abolition of the Royal Monopoly of velorio.
Calisto Rangel had been nominated to succeed Saldanha de 
Albuquerque, but died en route to Mozambique.
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less than an open mind to his job, for only three days after issuing 
a bando reaffirming freedom of trade for all the King*s vassals and 
stressing equal justice for all the people of the Conquest, including 
Muslims, Gentiles, and Africans, he promptly issued another, on 
51 January 1765, in which he completely reversed his position* 
laabodylng several of the 1758 proposals made by the Brothers of the 
Santa Casa da Misericordia* it stipulated that no Gentiles, Banians, 
or Muslim Indians could go, or send their goods, to the mainland or 
to the other ports of the coast, "selling them, however, on this 
Island to the Portuguese inhabitants of these Captaincies*"
Similarly, he ordered that those Muslims who were not residents 
should be sent back to India, and restricted the right of the 
Indians to be served by their own slaves, ordering these to be sold 
within three months*(1) The bando also required that anyone wishing 
to trade to the subordinate ports of the colony had to receive a 
passport from the Governor-General, and Silva Barba apparently 
relented by granting these to the Banians*
Presumably, the Indians who were established on the island must 
have decided that it was useless to protest these orders and that, 
so long as they were able to receive passports, they would not 
contend them, for no petitions are known to have been made to this 
effect* The only other legislation which affected this community 
during the remainder of Silva Barba*s administration was a bando 
which reflected the continuation of a firm official attitude towards 
it* This proclamation was primarily aimed at forbidding those 
merchants who came to Mozambique aboard the annual vessels from India 
from trading on the mainland with the Xao, as they sold them their 
cloth at cost value and thus ruined the trade there of the Portuguese, 
to whom they sold the same cloth at an "exorbitant price." ktfthe 
same time, however, it was also ruled that for the same reasons "the 
Gentile traders of this City* • • cannot personally, or through another,
(1) AHU, Cod.1524, fl.67-8, bando. Silva Barba, Mo<}*, 28 January 1765; 
ibid., fl.69-70, and AHU, CM 6, bando of the same, Mo^*,
51 January 1765*
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trade with the same Yao, as a result of this trade remaining solely 
reserved for the Vassals of His Majesty established in these 
Dominions, being, however, obliged to obtain my License in order to 
be able to do so, which will be conceded to theia. "(1) "While this 
restriction ran counter to the several Hoyal decrees and alvaras 
declaring the trade of Mozambique, its ports and lands, to be free 
to all Portuguese vassals, among whom the Indian merchants of 
Mozambique must be counted, they did not feel that their security 
was menaced, as long as they were freely able to obtain these 
passports. Sjhra Barba's measures, then, would seem to have 
temporarily sated the anti-Indian pressure of the Church and the 
moradores without seriously impairing the operation of trade at 
Mozambique.
From 1749 to 1765, when the smooth operation of trade at 
Mozambique was being threatened by forces outside Portuguese 
jurisdiction (the Makua) and by some within it (the trading 
practices of the Portuguese on the mainland and their persecution 
of' the Indians), the actual, as well as the official, policy of the 
administration was to prohibit the French from trading there. In 
contrast to the late 1750s and early 1740s, virtually no French 
trading was undertaken at Mozambique in the late 1740s and 
throughout the following decade. The specific application to the 
Conquest of the general law forbidding foreign trade within the 
dominion of Portuguese Africa, expressed in an alvarft dated 10 April 
1756, was a result of French activity in the Kerimba Islands alone. (2) 
The effective stoppage of French trading at Mozambique in these years 
did not, however, weaken its economic structure, nor lessen its 
attraction for the Yao, for this reason: the importance of the
French commercial involvement in hast Africa was that, unlike every 
other body of traders who had sought, or was still seeking, to do
(1) Ibid., fl.287-8, bando of same, Moz*, 7 March 1765.
(2) AHU, Coa.1507, p.291, royal alvara. Lisboa, 10 April 1766;
see above, p. 9 and below, pp. l£o-2.
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business there, they were not primarily after ivory, which had 
dominated its trade since the beginning of the Christian era.
What the French sought were slaves.
Consequently, after the brief upswing in the slave trade at 
Mozambique during, and immediately after, Almeida's encouragement 
of it, this business returned to its previous lethargic pace.
According to official figures, from 1755 to 1760 fewer than 5000 
slaves entered Mozambique from the various parts of the Conquest, 
including Inhambane, bofala, the Rivers of Sena, and the Kerimba 
Islands, as well as the opposing mainland. (1) While it is most 
likely that some slaves were sporadically traded to the French by 
the Makua and by Portuguese contrabanaers, at bays ana inlets in 
the immediate vicinity of the capital, there is no reason for 
thinking that these amounted to more than a small number of 
individuals. Therefore, it is clear that very few slaves were 
brought overland to Mozambique in these years. In any case, most 
of these were undoubtedly the more readily obtainable Makua. The 
few Yao slaves who were taken on the long journey to the coast by 
their fellow tribesmen were described by Melo e Castro as being Hof 
such delicate endurance, through their being subject to diseases 
while they are otherwise getting adjusted to the climate, that of 
those who are brought, ordinarily half survive, and often fewer. "(2)
For the ivory conscious Yao traders, slaves were as yet no more 
than an incidental item of trade and not of sufficient importance 
to influence the direction of their routes to the coast.
The French did not, however, cease trying to cultivate a market 
for slaves at Mozambique. In 1752 Dupleix, then Governor-General of
(1) AHU, CM 6 , "Fixtracto do Rendimt.°da Alfandega de Mossamtdq., do
tpo de 5 Annos, hum mez,e 10 dias,comezadas a 10 de Julho d'1755, 
e acabados a 20 d'Agosto de 1758...," rendeiros Antonio 
Baltasar Pires, Caetano ilvaro Tavares, and Jofio Estanislao 
Martins; AHU. CM 8, "Extracto do rendimento da Alfandega desta 
I l h a . A n t o n i o  Francisco Xavier, enclosed in Saldanha de 
Albuquerque to Crown, Moz*> 18 August 1760.
(2) AHU, CM 4, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moz*, 27 December 1755; also
enclosed in AHU, CM 5, parecer. Conselho Ultramarino. Lisboa,
26 March 1756; cf. ibid., Melo e Castro to Corte Real, Moz*»
29 November 1756.
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the Coapagnie des Inaes. proposed a treaty of alliance with the 
Portuguese in India, article nine of which read: "The trade of
Kaffirs at Mozambique will be permitted to the French Nation, by 
means of a tax per head which will be agreed upon amicably, and 
this number of Blacks will be able to be fixed at two thousand 
every year." The immediate Portuguese reply was, however, 
equivocating, and nothing ever seems to have come of this 
proposal.(1) According to official documents, in fact, no French 
vessels entered the harbor of Moz^nbique during Melo e Castro's 
administration and only three came there between 1758 and 1765. 
Although this apparent absence of French merchantmen at Mozambique 
during this period seems not to have been quite so total under 
iialdanha de Albuquerque and Silva Barba, there is no doubt that the 
renewed growth of their influence there stemmed directly from the 
encouragement they received from Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, 
who became Governor-General in August 1765. As this development 
coincided with a considerable expansion of trading activity at the 
French islands themselves, beginning after the cessation of 
hostilities with Great Britain in 1765 and continuing with the 
assumption of their administration by the Minist^re de la Marine 
in 1767 and the abolition of the commercial monopoly of the 
Compagnie des Indes in 1769, comparison with the brief period of 
French commercial influence at Mozambique during the collaboration 
of La Bourdonnais and Almeida is inevitable; for like his notorious 
predecessor, Pereira do Lago soon aligned himself with the interests 
of the French slavers.
A year after he took office, Pereira do Lago apprised the King 
of his commitment to "the total prohibition of entry to this Port by
(1) T’T, MR, mazo 602, "Copie du Pro jet que M. Dupleix a envoy£ par 
le Baron de Vicloire. Projet d'une Alliance perpetuelle
entre la Nation francoise, et la nation Portugaise dans la 
presqu'Isle de L'Inde, "enclosed in Dupleix to Viceroy, 
Pondichery, 11 February 1752; ibid., reply, Goa, 24 May 
1752; see above, p.^5j*n.^
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French and English ships except in cases of urgent necessity." By 
condemning the fact that the French had been providing the Makua 
with weapons for at least the past four years, he also suggested 
that Saldanha de Albuquerque and Silva Barba had not always enforced 
the King's laws forbidding foreign trade there.(1) This implication 
does not lack support, notably Antonio Pinto de Miranda's lamentation 
that these two men had indeed occasionally allowed it to happen, 
under the false impression that it was in the King's interest. On 
the other hand, the same writer made it clear that their mistakes 
were minor in comparison with the sins of Pereira do Lago on the 
same score. Montaury charged that French slavers only began to 
come continuously to Moyambique after the arrival of Pereira do 
Lago, while at the same time Figueiredo, for whom the Governor- 
General had a marked antipathy, wrote that the French were the most 
frequent traders there.(2) Moreover, Montaury also asserted that 
Pereira do Lago allowed the French to go to the mainland and trade 
directly with the Makua and Xao, and that these consequently 
received a regular supply of firearms and gunpowder. (5)
(1) AHU, Cod.1521, fl.215-25, Pereira do Lago to bee. St., Moc., 20
July 1766; AHU, CM 12, same to same, Moy., 15 August 1766.
In fact, the only times English vessels ever touched at 
Mozambique were those when they were unable to reach their 
usual fueling station on the way to India, at Grand Comoro 
Island. In none of these cases is any trading known to have 
taken place and they usually amounted to no more than a two- 
day layover at Mozambique. bee AHU, CM t>, Melo e Castro to 
Crown, Moy., 6 August 1756; AHU, Cod.1517, fl.65, Saldanha 
de Albuquerque to Sec. St., Moy., 25 July 1759; AHU, Cod.1521, 
fl.52-5, "RelayaS das Embarcayoens q 1 entrarao nesta Praya de 
Mossambique no monyao de Marco de 1761. the o mez de Julho do 
ms. anno;" AHU, CM 9, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moy., 
16 August 1761; AHU, Cod.1521, fl.202-5, Pereira do Lago to 
Sec. St., Moy., 20 August 1766.
(2) Ibid., fl.179, same to same, Moy., 20 August 1766.
(5) Andrade, Helay^es. pp.240,274; see ibid., p.460, for what little 
is known or Miranda, who briefly served as Secretary of Mozam­
bique and thereafter resided at Sena; ibid., pp.550-1; EHGEP. 
p.554; cf. AHU, CM 12, Henrique Jose de Menaanha Benevides 
Cime, "NarrayaS do Estado em que se acha a Fazenda Real no 
goverao de Mossambique," Moy., post-August 1766; TT, MR, mayo 
605, anon., "Breves reflexoens, sobre o Commercio de Azia, e 
Africa, principalmente aos Bominios Portuguezes," n.d., but 
clearly referring to Pereira do Lago.
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Needless to say, Pereira do Lago never informed the King of 
his understanding with the French, the operation of which will be 
described in the next chapter, although he shrewdly reported 
whenever, in a situation of "urgent necessity, M he was obliged to 
allow a French vessel to enter the port and was forced to trade 
with it. This happened in both 1766 and 1767, when a shortage 
of certain necessary supplies was caused ty the failure of the 
annual ship from Damao, in both years, and that from Diu, in the 
latter only, to arrive at Moyambique. In each year Pereira do 
Lago wrote of his trading with a French vessel for specifically 
needed items and paying for these with slaves and cowries. He 
even reported how, in 1767, he refused an offer to co-operate in 
this trade, with a cut of the profits, which was proposed in 
letters to him carried from the Governor-General of the French 
Islands, even though circumstances necessitated his obtaining 
supplies from the ship.(l)
Two other French vessels entered Moyambique road in 1767, but 
nothing is known of their activities there, except that Pereira do 
Lago complained that one of these embarked with seven Africans who 
had been abducted while out fishing. In the next year, he reported 
some trouble with a French slaver trading illegally at Fernao Veloso 
Bay and claimed that a vessel captained by a M. Clonard, who was 
later to gain some notoriety at Zanzibar, was illegally trading on 
the mainland at night. Whatever Pereira do Lago's complaints about 
the conduct of these French traders may have been, however, the fact 
remains that he had allowed them to drop anchor in the harbor of 
Moyambique and that he gave the King no explanation for their
(1) AHU, CM 12, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 20 August 1766 and 
18 August 1767; both also in AHU, Cod.1521, fl.202-5, 247-9, 
including related documents to the first French ship; ibid., 
fl.178, same to bee. St., Moy., 18 August 1766; ibid., fl. 
255-4, same to Conde de Oeiras, Moy., 20 August 1767; AHU,
CM 12, same to Crown, Moy., 21 August 1767; AHU, Cod. 1555, 
n. 564, Mendonya Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 1 April 
1769; cf. AHU, Cod.1510^ fl.58-9, Melo e Castro to Conselho 
da Fazenda do Estado da india. Moy., 12 August 1754, reporting 
the failure of both the vessels from Diu and Damao to appear 
at Moyambique that year.
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presence there. Furthermore, according to a Frenchman who was 
clearly well versed in the intricacies of trade at lie de France, 
a M. Panon, whom Pereira do Lago identified as being the super caigo 
of Clonard1s vessel, disposed of some 5000 to 6000 piastres, in 
trade goods at Mozambique. In order to have done this amount of 
dealing there one suspects that at least a certain amount of 
compliance from the Governor-General must have been necessary. (1)
It would also seem that the King*s approval of Pereira do Lago*s 
policy towards foreign vessels, that is, to only admit them in 
case of extreme necessity, probably persuaded the Governor-General 
to continue to sanction this trade, (id) By his actions, then, 
Pereira do Lago facilitated the beginning of a new period of direct 
French commercial influence at Mozambique.
In addition to encouraging the f rench to trade at Mozambique, 
Pereira do Lago nurtured the slave trade from there to the French 
islands in Portuguese and Brazilian vessels, the inspiration for 
which he was indebted to Saldanha de Albuquerque. In 1760 a French 
slaver had wrecked at the foot of Goa Island, within the harbor 
itself, and, avoiding the temptation to allow it to trade, iialdanha 
de Albuquerque ordered a full investigation to be taken. In the 
necessary arrangements for returning the crew and its salvaged cargo 
to ile de France, however, it was decided to let the owner of the 
only Portuguese ship available for this task carry as many slaves as 
he could with him, for trading at that island. All authorities 
agreed that while it was clearly illegal for foreigners to trade for 
slaves in the Portuguese dominions, it was nowhere stated that
(1) AHU, Cod. 1552, fl.7-10, Pereira do Lago to Bec.Bt., Moz*> & 16
August 1768; ibid., fl.12-5, Francisco Pereira Henriques to 
Pereira do Lago, Cabaceira grande, 26 June 1768, and Mussinga 
muave, 2b June 1768; BM, Ada.MBd. 18, 140, fl.21-2, Dumas to 
M. Glemet, Ile de France, 51 October 1768. Clonard, whom 
Pereira do Lago wrongly thought to have been Dutch, captained 
the (?)Labunt: for his problems at Zanzibar, see M I . pp.15,
16, 82-5, 87, 141-2, 173.
(2) AHU, Cod.1555, n.° 554, Mendonza Furtado to Pereira do Lago,
Ajuda, 28 March 1763.
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Portuguese subjects could not trade from them to foreign lands. (1)
This possibility appears not to have immediately inspired a new 
trade with the French Islands, although there is evidence that a 
similar voyage may have been undertaken in 1765. V/hen Pereira do 
Lago arrived in Moyambique, he found a Portuguese vessel already in 
the process of being fitted out with a cargo of slaves for trading 
to Ile de France, the license for which had cost its captain £>000 
cruzados. Following the advice of the Chief Justice, who reaffirmed 
that there were no Portuguese laws preventing this trade, the new 
Governor-General upheld the legality of the license. In the 
following year he sought the Crown*s opinion on this trade, 
recommending it both for the fact that it was a most profitable 
business and that it was to be preferred to the virtually unstoppable 
contraband trade carried on by French vessels in the Kerimba Islands. (2)
(1) AHU, Cod.1517, fl.185-94, "Sobre a perda de Havio Frances no dentro
da Fortaleza,” Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec.St., Moy., 15 
August 1760, followed by seven documents relating to same subjeSt, 
dated between 5 January - 8 August 1760; AHU, Cod.1521, fl.77-9, 
same to same, Moy., 18 August 1762, and "Copea do Termo" relating 
to the examination of another French vessel with which Saldanha 
de Albuquerque refused to trade, bearing the names of the several 
examiners, Moy., 10 April 1762. The name of the first ship was 
Sao Lucas Evangelista, captained by a H*(?) Trearel jo vital.
That of the second is unknown, but its captain was a M. Dery.
For a completely unjustified attack on Saldanha de Albuquerque, 
including the implication that he shirked his duty with regard 
to the first French vessel, made by one of the disgruntled 
Brothers of the Santa Casa de Misericordia. see TT, MK, mayo 605, 
Jose Gomes Henriques to. Crown, Moy., 20 August 1760; for more 
on Henriques, see TT, ME, mayo 604, "Rellacam dos moradores 
Portuguezes que assisteE era Mossambique, e nos destrictos,"
July 1757, where he is listed under Cabaceira Grande; also in 
BGHEP. p.160.
(2) AHU, CM 10, "Rezumo da Receita da Alfandega desde 1? de Janeiro,
the fim de Dezembre de 1765," and similar, undated fragment, 
but probably from the same year. AHU, Cod.1521, fl. 191-2,
Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moy., 20 August 1766; see AHU, Cod. 
1524, fl.550-1, passport issued qy same to Francisco Bertrand, 
captain of the corvette flossa Senhora da Conceiy&o. e Perola.
Moy., 16 October 1765; AHU, Cod.1529, fl.69-70, passport issued 
by same to Francisco dos £>antos e Silva, captain of the ship 
Nossa Senhora do Rosario. Santo Antonio, e Almas. Moy., 6 
September 1766.
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Although the King discouraged Eds licensing Portuguese vessels for 
this trade, except as a last resort if he was unable to prevent 
their pursuing it, Pereira do Lago continued to foster this policy* 
Besides sending local vessels to Ile de France and to Bourbon, he 
apparently encouraged Brazilian traders from Bahia and Bio de 
Janeiro to ship slaves there from Mo9ambique. Figueiredo wrote 
that they established trading houses there, from which they 
despatched these slaves to the islands, as well as ivoiy, gold, 
and cowries to India* Certainly some slaves were also taken from 
Mozambique to Brazil, but according to Melo e Castro they had a bad 
reputation there and the Crown’s tentative sponsorship of this trade 
in 1755 seems to have produced few results. (1) Nevertheless, as 
did his French policy, the attitude of Pereira do Lago towards this 
directly related trade in Portuguese and Brazilian vessels to the 
French islands marked the beginning of serious slave trading at 
Mozambique*
During the 1760s the iao continued to dominate the internal 
trade of Mozambique. (2) Spared anything more than desultory raids 
of the Makua during the first five years of his administration, 
Pereira de Lago was nevertheless faced with the substantial problem 
of trying to organize this trade more efficiently. Taking up the 
lead of Baldanha de Albuquerque in 1759, several of the more
(1) AHU, Cod.1355, n.° 550, Mendonza Furtado to Pereira do Lago, Ajuda,
29 March 1768; Andrade, Relates, p.551; EHGEP. p.254; AHU,
CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moz»> 19 August 1755; AHU, CM 4, 
same to same, Moz*, 27 December 1753, enclosing "Carregazao dos 
Escravos... p. serem vendidos no Bio de Janeiro.." Gaetano da 
Silva e Savdra, 1 January 1754; ibid., same to same, 29 
November 1753, enclosing chart of slaves shipped, Melo e Castro,
Moz*, 24 October 1735. A total of 495 slaves were sent to 
Brazil on this occasion aboard two ships. See also, E.G. Lopes,
A Escravatura (subsidios para a sua historia). Lisboa, 1944, P&136.
(2) AHU, CM 12,e£Mapa dado.. .pello^Jjiz, e Ver. da Camr.a, dos Mor. ,
e habit. Nesta mesma Cap. , e terras firmas...," Moz*>
50 May 1766, enclosed in Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moz«> 20 
August 1766. According to this chart, of the 181 Portuguese 
inhabitants of the island and its mainland, 52 had listed as 
their "Modo da Vida" (way of life), exclusively or in part,
"Neg. de Mejao" (trade with the Xao). As a point of interest, 
of these 181 individuals, 71 were listed as "Naturaes de 
Portugal," 74 as "Naturaes da India," and 56 as "Naturaes da Terra."
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prosperous moradores proposed on 4 March 1766 the establishment of 
a company for trading with the Yao and the Makua. Unlike the plan 
for that company, however, this one was not intended to include both 
rich and poor among its members, but only the former, the "experienced 
inhabitants of credit." They charged that the others, whom they 
dismissed as "vagrants," had caused great disorders by sending their 
patamarea into the interior to trade with poor quality beads and 
cloth on which no duties had been paid. This trading, they alleged, 
had cut the legitimate traders, themselves, out of the profits from 
this trade and was generally causing the ruin of the entire Conquest.
In support of the company, Pereira do Lago not only stressed the ill 
effect of these irregular trading practices, bhich included fighting 
with each other and the Yao in the struggle to procure ivory, but 
also charged that these same inhabitants were seriously depriving 
the hoyal Treasury of its rightful duties in the slave trade. Nhereas 
duties were only paid on several hundred slaves per year, he claimed 
that almost 2000 Africans annually were spirited away, usually at 
night, without being taxed, through their not being embarked from 
Mozambique Island. Furthermore, Pereira do Lago condemned the 
banians for having corrupted the Africans so thoroughly that they 
had become exceedingly artful in their negotiations, which also had 
resulted in declining profits. Having consulted the principal 
civil, ecclesiastical, and military officers of the Conquest, on 
11 March Pereira do Lago confirmed the incorporation of the new 
Companhia dos Mujaos. e Macuas. which was to exercise a total 
monopoly over the trade in ivory, slaves, and rhinocerous horn with 
the Makua and the Yao. All that was permitted to the poorer 
Portuguese, who were not members of the company, was the right to
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trade with these Africans for provisions.(1)
Pereira do Lago beseeched the K.ing*s approval for the 
establishment of the company for a period of six years, as 
originally proposed to him, bat the project immediately 
encountered vehement opposition from several quarters. The 
Viceroy at Goa objected that this monopoly caused great damage 
to the welfare of Diu and DamSfo, as did the traders from those 
places, who were at the mercy of the company which had become 
their principal buyer of cloth. Whether their voices were 
heard or not, the company clearly lacked the support of most of 
the common moradores of Mozambique. Figueiredo, who was then at 
Court in Lisbon, asserted that the monopoly of the company would 
only reduce further tiitir already miserable population, and 
attacked Pereira do Lago’s conception of the public interest by 
accusing him of consorting with French traders there to the 
detriment of the Hoyal Treasury. These arguments against the 
company, as well as the fact that its monopoly contravened his 
orders granting full freedom of trade in East Africa to all his 
subjects, caused D. Jose to quash the company and to reopen the 
trade of Mozambique to the traders of Portuguese India. (2) While 
he pleaded against this decision, Pereira do Lago fulfilled the 
order and abolished the company in 1768.(5)
(1) AHU, CM 12 & Cod. 1525, f1.20-51, petition presented fcy "os homens
de negocio, moradores nesta Capital, e Terra firma," to Pereira 
do Lago, Moc., 4 March 1766; followed by testimonies from 
various officials, confirmation of the company, 11 March 1766, 
and terms of office for its administrators, 5 May 1766; AHU,
CM 12 & 55, Cod.1521, fl.168-9, Cod.1525, fl.149-51, Pereira do 
Lago to Mendonga Furtado, M09., 15 August 1766; AHU, Cod.1522, 
pp. 185-8, same to Conselho Ultramarino. Mo9., 15 August 1766;
AHU, CM 12, same to Crown, M09., 24 August 1766; see also AHU, 
Cod.1521 fls. 200-1 & Cod.1525, fl.48-9, "os Deputados da Comp.a 
do Mujaos" to Pereira do Lago, M09., 24 May 1766 & his reply, 
M09., SO May 1766.
(2) AHU, Cod.1521,fl.242-5, Pereira do Lago to Sec.St., Moy., 20 August
1767; Andrade, Relayoes. p.550; AHU, CM 12, Benevides Cirne, 
"Narrayao...," M09., post-August 1766; AHU, CM 15, Pereira do 
Lago to Crown, Mo9., 25 November 1775, enclosing Figueiredo, 
"Narrazao dos descaminhos da Fazenda Heal," Ajuda, 21 March 1768, 
with Pereira do Lagofs answers to the charges therein, M09., 20
November 1775; AHU, Cod.1555, n.° 557, Mendonya FUrtado to
(5) ^^§^U&a45^l,Mfereirae^o Lago to Sec.St., M09.,
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The only permanent contribution which Pereira do Lago made in 
these years to the stabilisation of trading practices on the mainland 
was the establishment of two public fairs, one in the district of 
Mossuril and the other in that of Sancuk^ for the purchasing of 
provisions. These fairs probably formed the basis of what was to 
become known in the 1780s as the feira dos Mu japs, or fao fair, and 
represented a step forward in the struggle to induce the Xao, not 
to mention the Makua, to bring their goods to the very shores 
opposite the capital itself. Their establishment certainly did not, 
however, cause people to abandon the practise of sending patamares 
after the Makua and the lao, but may have helped to reduce the 
frequency of resorting to this practice.(1)
During the brief reign of the Companhia dos Muiaos. e Macuas. 
it is obvious that the Indians fared no better than those Portuguese 
who were excluded from trading with the Xao and Makua by its monopoly. 
Surprisingly, they were not much bothered by Pereira do Lago, who 
was extremely hostile to them. The instructions which he left for 
the successor he -expected to replace him in 1768 contain several 
bitter attacks on the Banians, the Mazanes of Diu, and the "Jews, 
and foreign nations” of Surat, on whose concerted opposition he 
blamed the failure of the company. Xet the Indians of Mozambique 
suffered no further limitations to their freedom of trade than those 
already imposed by Silva Barba. When they unsuccessfully sought to 
have the King free them from the necessity of seeking licenses for 
trading on the mainland and at the subordinate ports, however,
Pereira do Lago protested strongly. He added that they were presently 
tolerated at Mozambique only so that the duties of the hoyal Treasury 
should not suffer. (2) As had happened before, then, by virtue of
(1) AHU, Cod.1329, fl.236-7, bando. Pereira do Lago, Moz*> 15 January 1768.
(2) AHU, Cod.1555, n. 3 556 & 595, Conselho Ultramarino to Gov., Lisboa,
51 January 1769 & 18 April 1771; AHU, Cod.1525, fl.163-91, and 
BNL, IG, Caixa 12, Doc. 25, Pereira do Lago, instructions to 
his successor, Moz*, 20 August 1768; a bowdlerized verions of 
these instructions, omitting the references cited in the text, 
is in Andrade, Kelagoes. pp.517-58; AHU, Cod.1522, pp.251-3, 
two letters of same to Crown, Moz*, both 14 August 1769.
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their being the only reliable body of energetic traders at 
Mozambique, aact therefore the principal financers of its 
administration, the Indians were able to pursue their business 
there in relative security.
2. Trade in the interior
We have so far examined the trade of Moyambique largely from 
only one vantage, that of the island itself. We have seen how the 
trade of the Yao, especially that in ivory, dominated the economy 
of Moyambique; and how the disturbances of the Makua, in particular, 
but also of the Portuguese mainlanders, obstructed the smooth 
operation of this trade. We have also noted the various harassments 
of the Indians, who on their side were as vital to the success of the 
ivory trade at Moyambique as were the Yao. Finally, we have pointed 
out that the slow pace of the slave trade there was due to the 
absence of the French from that port, and that the beginning of its 
gradual revival came only with their reappearance there after 1765. 
Before turning to analyse the course of trade in the Kerimba Islands 
and along the Kilwa coast, then, it is necessary that we examine in 
some detail the operation of trade in the interior of Mast-Central 
Africa.
The ivory which the Makua brought to both Moyambique and Ibo 
most probably came from their own country, as in the nineteenth 
century they had a reputation for being great elephant hunters and 
they were never spoken of as being long distance traders. (1) In 
fact, perhaps because the amount of ivory they carried to the coast 
was relatively small, the Portuguese failed to leave a single word
(1) Traditionally, the Makua had secret societies for hunting elephant. 
Most of their hunting was undoubtedly done with traditional 
weapons, but by the 1760s the M a k u a  around Moyambique hunted 
elephant with firearms. E.de Froberville, "Notes sur les 
moeurs, coutumes et traditions des amakoua, sur le commerce 
et la traite des esdaves dan l fAfrique Orientale," Bulletin 
de la Society de Geogranhie. 5e Serie, viii, 1847, pp.511-29, 
at 522; Andrade, helayoes. p.244.
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on this subject. The slave trade carried on by the Makua was 
undoubtedly supplied exclusively from among their own people, and 
these probably were already domestic slaves, or individuals 
captured in a raid, or perhaps in a larger conflict between rival 
chieftains. The Ibo market was probably supplied with these two 
commodities fcy Makonde traders, as well, although there are few 
notices of these people until later in the eighteenth century.
While the Yao certainly procured some ivory within their own 
territory, they were, conversely, primarily ivory traders, rather 
than elephant hunters; thus their sources generally lay outside 
their own lands. A considerable amount of trading must have been 
done with the people of the upper Shire River valley, but the Shire 
was not the limit of xao penetration of the interior. In 1755 
Melo e Castro observed that "the Kaffirs whom they call Tao" 
carried ivory to the mainland opposite Moyambique from the
Lands of the Marave, Bive, Sarong a, 
and of various other potentates in those 
hinterlands bordering the Lands of our 
Jurisdiction of the Rivers of Bena of the 
other ^I.e., nor them/ side of the Zambezi, 
where our traders would acquire it if 
their goods did not cost so very much, 
which causes those Kaffirs to come to the 
mainland of Mossuril, opposite this 
Fortress, where they find them ^ h e  cloths? 
cheaper by one hundred per cent, and of * 
better quality than are introduced to them 
there, in those territories, by our traders.(1)
Cloths were cheaper at Mossuril than in the Rivers for two 
principal reasons: the cost of transporting them from Moyambique
to Cjuelimane, and then up the Zambezi, was very high and the risk 
of loss great; and the prices of cloths going for sale to any of 
the subordinate ports were regularly raised by 50% over the current 
rate at Moyambique. Furthermore, the monopoly which until 1755 
was exercised fcy Goa over the sale of the principal items of trade
(1) TT, MR, mayo 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moy., 20 November 1755.
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was limited to the external trade of the Rivers, Sofala, and 
Inhambane. North of the Zambezi both internal and external trade 
were free of its control, so that while the prosperity of those 
areas subject to its supervision steadily declined, the overland 
ivory trade to Moyambique flourished, and the competition for this 
trade must have resulted in the Africans being able to secure a 
continuously better price for their ivory at Mossuril. Not only 
was the price of cloth in the Rivers exorbitant, but that of ivory 
was considerably less there than it was at Mossuril.(1) After 1755 
the inauguration of a system of free trade in the Rivers, except for 
velorio. might have enabled the merchants of Sena, Tete and Zumbo 
to recapture at least part of the Maravi ivory market from the Yao, 
but the simultaneous imposition of a crippling 41% tariff on all 
cloth going there from the capital only aggravated the situation 
further. This tax was extendecL.to velorio after the abolishment 
of the Royal Monopoly, but Macuana remained, as before, a tax free 
area. By trading wxth the Yao, rather than with the local 
Portuguese, the Maravi could obtain a much more favorable exchange 
value for their ivory. In view of these circumstances, then, one 
is not at all surprised to find the petitioners for the formation 
of the Companhia dos Mujaos. e Macuas complaining that the Yao were 
carrying the duty free cloths of Moyambique hundreds of leagues 
inland and selling them to chiefs, win order to introduce them into 
our Fair of Zumbo."(2)
In the earlier seventeenth century, it was the Maravi themselves 
who apparently had dominated the route from their territory to 
Moyambique, but this priority had been lost to the Yao. While the 
depth of Maravi commercial penetration into the heart of the continent
(1) Andrade, Relayoes. p.218; Lobato, Evolucao. pp.270-1.
(2) Andrade, Relayoes. pp.179-81, for Aavier's opinion on 41% tax
as applied to cloths; AHU, Cod.1521, fl.72-5, Mendonca 
Furtado to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 25 May 1761; and 
reply, Moy., 19 August 1762; AHU, CM 10, Silva Barba to 
Menaonya Furtado, Moy., 15 August 1765; see above, >p.S*f,
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during the seventeenth century is not known, it is most likely 
that by the 1760s the Yao were already trading, at least 
indirectly, with the Bisa, from across the Luangwa River, and 
probably even with the eastern Lunda state ruled by the Mwata 
Kazembe in the Luapula River valley. This was certainly true 
by the end of the eighteenth century, and the several references 
to cross-continental joumies by African traders, which dot the 
memoirs of the French slaver Morice, suggest that such connections 
were well established by the mict-177Gs.(l)
The principal hunting ground of the Maravi was known as the 
Malambo and was located around the middle and lower reaches of the 
Luangwa. As early as 1725, the Portuguese knew that the "great 
lands of Uringi" bordered on Maravia, but it was only in the second 
half of the eighteenth century that the potential of these lands 
became known to them. Forty years later, the author of the 
Memoriae da Costa d 1Africa Oriental recorded that "the great 
hinterland of Orange ^is? situated forty days* journey to the 
Northwest of Zumbo," although another unidentified writer stated 
in 1768 that it wa3 only a fortnights march from the same fair to 
Orange. (2) Of the trade of the Orange/Uringi area, which must 
certainly be identified with the trans-Luangwa country, the earlier 
of these two commentators explained that
neither Canarins. nor negro traders 
go to this hinterland, but those of 
that country come to Zumbo every year 
to trade in exchange for ivory, and 
copper, which they carry already cast 
in large bars, and of which there is 
a great abunaancy.(5)
These traders should probably be identified as Bisa, for whom the
Luangwa formed a common boundary with the Maravi. One can infer
(1) See "below, pp. 3.0S-L •
(2) T. Price, "More about the Maravi," p.78; CT. iv, p.61;
Andrade, Relates, pp.204, 402.
(5) Ibid., p.204. See also, CEHU-MF, LM 105-A, fl.15-16, Frois to 
Viceroy, Goa, 28 December 1754, where Fr6is refers to "the 
Provinces of the Oranjes, and Anvuas," beyond Zumbo; cf. 
Barreto on the Amvuas, RSEA. iii, pp.451-2, trs. 481.
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from Bisa traditions that there was a migration of chiefly invaders 
from the Congo into their country at around the turn of the 
eighteenth century• The political organization imposed ty these 
invaders probably enabled the Bisa to trade more efficiently than 
ever before. The fact that they traded copper ingots to zumbo 
points to a source of trade in the Katanga. This end of their 
trading undoubtedly was transacted at the court of Mwata Kazambe II, 
who had established his rule over the Luapula valley about 1740, 
and to whom the bisa owed tribute. This line of trade probably 
was stabilized and considerably augmented after the accession of 
Kazembe III, c. 1760.(1)
How the iao began to trade with the bisa, and therety with the 
Kazembe Lunda, may be deduced from the following information 
concerning the traders from Orange, which also comes from the 
author of the 1762 Memoriae:
The greater part of the ivory which goes 
to Sena comes from this hinterland; and 
because gold does not come from it, the 
/Portuguese/ traders never exert them­
selves for~these two commodities /Ivory 
and copper/...as a result of whicE the 
negroes have on many occasions gone back 
carrying the goods which they had brought, 
through there not being anybody who would 
buy these from them. (2)
If the Portuguese traders of the Rivers of Sena were not interested 
in this ivory, the iao certainly were, as were the merchants of 
Mozambique. The wealth of the Luangwa hunting ground must have 
been known to the lao through dealing with the Maravi. Once this 
connection was made, the route from Kazembe1 s court to the bast
(1) F.M. Thomas, Historical Rotes on the Bisa Tribe. Northern Rhodesia.
Lusaka, 1958, pp.1-50, 5b, but especially 21-5; I. Cunnison,
The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester, 1959, 
pp.59-41, 151-5; see also idem. (tr. & ed.), Central Bantu 
Historical Texts II : Historical Traditions of the bastern 
Lunda, Lusaka, 1962, pp. 1-68, especially from 54.
(2) Andrade, Relates, p.204.
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African coast became fully operational. Bisa, Maravi, and Iao 
traded along this route, and each group probably dominated the 
carriage of goods within its own territory. It would also 
seem that some bisa and Iao, more so than the Maravi, traded over 
the entire length of this route for themselves, and that small 
parties of individuals probably succeeded in travelling beyond 
the Luapula to the coast of Angola, as suggested by Morice's 
memoirs. Thus, by about 1760, an important and regular trade, 
based upon ivory and following a well established route to the 
sea, was flourishing between the eastern Lunda state of the 
Mwata Kazembe, in the Luapula valley, and the coast of bast Africa.
This trade debouched at two main points on that coast,
Mozambique and Kilwa. For the moment, we are only interested in 
reconstructing the route taken by the iao, who commanded the eastern 
half of the trade, to Moyambique, and shall leave the Kilwa route 
until later. As we have seen, in the eighteenth century, the 
southern limits of laoland probably were the Mandimba hills, near 
the modem boundary between Malawi and Portuguese bast Africa, 
and running from the northern end of Lake Uhilwa, or Shirwa, 
towards the toe of Lake Malawi.(1) The Iao probably crossed 
into Maravi country directly over these hills, around the bottom 
of Lake Malawi, and thence across the Shire, or else were ferried 
across the great lake at any of several points where the lake 
narrows at its southern end, such as the important nineteenth 
centuiy settlement at Ng'ombe. At the coastal end of the route, 
the Iao seem to have approached Mossuril from the northwest, through 
uticulo, for it was the disturbances of the Makua chiefs in this 
district, and along a northwesterly line of march from Mossuril, which 
had prevented the Iao from reaching the coast in the 1750s. In 
between these ends of the route, nothing definite can be said, but 
it seems most likely that the Iao would have avoided the hilly 
countiy of the Lomwe, which lay athwart a direct route from the
(1) See above, pp.
-|M3-
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southern end of Lake Malawi to Mozambique. besides, the Lomwe 
were very hostile to outsiders and their country was difficult 
to traverse even in the late nineteenth century. That a route 
avoiding the Lomwe was, in fact, followed between these two 
points by about 1860 is proved by the thirty-three day itinerary 
given to Dr. Heinrich Barth by an Arab named Sherif Mohammed ben 
Ahmedu, who had travelled it himself. According to his account, 
from Mozambique one travelled northwest, through the flat country 
behind the coast; crossed the Lurio, or Luli, River into Me to, 
reaching the town of Mwalia, the chief of Me to, on the fifteenth 
day out. (1), continued west through Meto until one reached the 
Lugenaa River, which marked the beginning of Iao territory; 
generally followed this river to the environs of Lake Chilwa; 
and finally travelled along the Mandimba hills until one reached 
Lake Malawi at the market town of Mwala, three days to the south 
of Ng'ombe, from where one could cross the lake.(2)
(1) In 1881, the Reverend Chauncy Maples of the u.M.C.A. visited
Mwalia, the capital of Meto, "with the name of the 
sultanship, 'Mkaya'. " He located this town at approximately 
15°26' b. & 57°58' just slightly to the east of the 
modern post of Nungo, in the District of Niassa, Portuguese 
Mast Africa. C. Maples, "Makua Land, between the Rivers 
Rovuma and Luli," Proceedings of the Royal Geographical 
Society, iv, 1882, pp.79-90, at 84.
(2) Abdallah, laos. pp.5,16; H.E. O'Neill, "A Three Months'
Journey in the Makua and Lomwe Countries," pp.195-215, at 
205; idem., "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes Shirva and 
Amaramba," ibid., vi, 1884, pp.652-66, 715-41, at 644,750-2, 
759-40; H. Barth, "Routes from Kano to Nyffe, and from 
Mozambique to Lake Nyassi. Extracted from Letters from Dr. 
Barth to Dr. Beke, dated Kano, March 4th, & Luka, July 25th, 
1861," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, xxiv, 1864, 
pp.286-8. Barth met Mohammed ben Ahmedu, a native of Moka, 
at Ida, in what is now Nigeria. This man had travelled 
the length of the itest African coast, from Ras Hafun to 
Sofala, and offered to guide Barth across the continent for 
500 dollars, to be paid at Zanzibar* There is no mention 
of this meeting in Barth's Travels.
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in view of what we know about the trade of the Iao to 
Mozambique, including the extent and route of this trade in the 
interior, it seems worthwhile here to acknowledge the articles 
written by W.H.J. Rang el ey which bear on this subject, as his 
opinions would seem to contradict what has been detailed above, 
and to dismiss them. Mis interpretation of early Iao history 
is purely speculative and completely erroneous. In particular, 
Rangeley's reconstruction of Iao trade routes must be denied, since 
we know that the Iao did indeed trade to Moyambique, probably by 
skirting the country of the Lomwe, or Nguru, whom he claimed 
prevented the Iao from taking this route. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence to support his proposition that the Iao traded around 
the northern end of Lake Malawi to the Kazembe Lunda, and the 
facts at our disposal disprove his claim that the southern route 
was not opened until the middle of the nineteenth centuiy.(l)
There was, in fact, at least one more northerly water crossing 
of Lake Malawi which was used in the eighteenth century, as well as 
those previously suggested, but it was not so important a route 
to the Luapula as that which we have examined. (2)
5. The commercial revival of the Kjlwa coast
As emphasized in the previous chapter, the substitution of 
Mozambique for Kilwa as the favored coastal entrepot of the Iao, 
and therefore of the trade of East-Central Africa, had been caused 
by several factors which effectively reduced the commercial activity 
of Kilwa to a virtual standstill. The peak years of Iao trading at 
Moyambique appear to have come during the middle decades of the 
eighteenth century, but the seeds of the decline of that place, in 
comparison to Kilwa, were already being sown during the 1750s, in 
the disturbances which we have examined above. Indeed, Figueiredo,
(1) Rangeley, "The Ayao", NJ. xvi, 1966, pp.7-27; idem, "The Arabs,"
NJ. xvi, 1965, pp.11-25, at 22.
(2) See below, pp.
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Montaury, and others specifically mentioned the decline of the Yao 
ivory trade at Mozambique, despite its continued preeminence there, 
and prescribed various remedies for its rejuvenation. In addition 
to the unstable conditions of trade at Moyambique itself, however, 
its dominance of the Iao trade was being threatened 'ey the gradual 
commercial renaissance of Kilwa, which was inspired by the increase 
of Arab trading activity north of Cape Delgado, after the 
stabilization of political affairs in Oman under the new Busaidi 
dynasty. Ever since the days of Rego Barreto, the Portuguese had 
been well aware of the threat posed to Moyambique by the revival of 
trading along that coaBt.(l) Information on this subject was 
difficult for the Portuguese to obtain, and that which they received 
was often no more than baseless rumor, especially where it concerned 
European threats to Moyambique. But the increased pace of Arab 
and Swahili commercial activity along that coast was a fact which 
was vividly felt by the Portuguese in the Kerimba Islands.
Portugal's hegemony over these islands and the opposing coast 
was tenuous, at best, and her sovereignty there was made a mockery 
of by virtually all the inhabitants of those parts. The islands 
were totally defenseless, with only a handful of soldiers stationed 
at Ibo, and without any fortifications whatever. Had any other 
power wished to command them, it could have done so at will. It 
is not surprising, then, that the Portuguese were sensitive to 
foreign threats, real or imagined, to their position in the islands. 
I4elo e Castro wanted to build a fortress at Ibo to protect its 
harbor, which was the best suited for admitting large vessels, but 
there were not sufficient funds available for the task until 1760,
Bix years later a small company of soldiers was sent there to man 
it* (2) To compound matters, even the commercial ties between
(1) Bee above, pp. IOI-JL, 105^7.
(2) TT, MB, mayo 605, Melo e Castro to Crown, Moy., 20 November 1755;
iii,16, 1918, p.161, same to same, Moy., 10 August 1756; 
Teixeira Botelho, Historia. pp.427,454,458. A great many 
of the Portuguese inhabitants of the Kerimba Islands appear 
to have been mulattoes.
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Mozambique and the islands had dwindled to a minimum, despite 
the fact that no taxes were levied on the cloths which were sent 
there from the capital until after 1765. The head tax on slaves 
imported from the islands to Mozambique, where they were favored 
above all others, as well as those on other products of the area, 
were often evaded by the islanders, who disembarked their cargoes 
at Quitangonha, or Savasava, to the north of the capital. To 
prevent these frauds, it was ordered in 1762 that inhabitants of 
the islands who wished to trade at Mozambique were obliged to 
procure a license from the local Commandant, at Ibo. This bando 
must not have been effective, however, as the same order was 
repeated five years later.(1) Another futile attempt to control 
the activities of the Portuguese in the north was Silva Barba1s 
order that all of these who lived along the coast, and scattered 
in the interior, had to remove themselves to either Ibo or 
Querimba Island, where the Commandant could supervise them more 
effectively.(2)
Nor did the death of Fr. Jotio de Meneses put an end to the 
illegal trading practices of missionaries in the islands, for 
scandals erupted in 1756 and 1767 over the misconduct of particular 
individuals. (5) But the principal Portuguese culprits were those
(1) AHU, CM 9, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Mo5., 28 November
1762; AHU, Cod.1524,fl.21-2, bando of same, Moj., 5 May 1762; 
ibid., fl.26-7, registration of this bando by head clerk, Jo&o 
de Meneses, Ibo, 25 May 1762; AHU, Cod.1525, fl.44-5, & Cod. 
1529, fl.172, bando. Pereira do Lago, M05., 12 May 1767;
Andrade, helay>es. p.214.
(2) AHU, Cod.1524, fl.252, bando. Silva Barba, M05., 26 May 1764.
Today, what was formerly known as Ibo Island is called
Queramba Island, of which the city of 5ao Jo&o de Ibo is the
capital. ¥hat is now designated as Ibo Island is a tiny
islet lying to the east and in the shadow of Queramba Island.
Ouerimba Island today bears the same name as it did in the
eighteenth century.
(5) AHU, Cm 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, Mo^., 18 August 1756, also in
AC,iii,16,1918,pp.164-5; AHU, Cod.l525,f1.57-8, Pereira do Lago
to Gov. of the Episcopal Administration,Mo5., 18 March 1768.
In 1756 the scandal involved Fr.Pedro dos Martires e Cunha,
Vicar of Vamizi Island and later Commissioner of the Holy Office
at Mozambique, and Fr. Jose de Banta Teresa, who served in the
same parish, both of whom appear Jo have been Dominicans. In 
1767 the transgressor was Fr. Joss de Banto Inacio, an
Augustinian. Bee Andrade, Hela^oes, p.101.
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who inhabited the island of Vamizi and its mainland. The security 
of this island was particularly important to the administration, as 
it physically commanded the coast below Cape Delgado and was the 
most northerly outpost of Portuguese habitation in East Africa. 
Vamizi was, however, some distance from Ibo, and its residents 
obeyed only their own Instincts, trading with whom they pleased 
and generally leading lawless lives. In 1765, it was reported 
from Ibo that the Portuguese of Vamizi, all of whom had acquired 
their land there by virtue of royal grants, had not paid the Crown 
its due tithe for the past three years. In the following year, 
some of these people, together with local Africans and some Swahili 
from Tungi, looted the vessel from Dam&o, which was abandoned on 
the coast opposite Rongui Island, hear Funji, Auxilliary troops 
led by the Sergeant-Major of Vamizi, a post created in 1762, sought 
the looters at Funji, where a heated battle occurred with the 
combined forces of one BimSo Leite and an allied Makonde chieftain, 
who were routed. Soon afterwards, an appeal was made 'ey some of 
the Vamizi rebels to the Bui tan of Kilwa, under whose protection 
they wished to render the island. but the Sultan, being on good 
terras with the Portuguese authorities and warned of the treachery 
of these people, apparently refused the request. Thus defeated, 
the Portuguese of the Vamizi district patched up their immediate 
differences with the Commander of the Kerimba Islands, Gaetano 
Alberto Judice, and returned loosely to the official fold.(1)
Although the main internal threat to Portuguese hegemony over 
the Kerimba Islands came from the Portuguese residents of that
(1) AHU, CM 11, Gaetano Alberto Judice to Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 15 
December 1765; AHU, CM 12, same to same, Ibo, 20 April 1766; 
ibid., Jo&o Baptists to Judice, Bringano, 5 May 1766; ibid., 
Judice to Pereira do Lago, Bringano, 26 June 1766; ibid., 
Baptists to Judice, Bringano, 28 June 1766; ibid., Judice to 
Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 1 September 1766; ibid., same to same, 
Ibo, 27 October 1766; ibid., Fr.Domingos de Deus to (?) Judice, 
Vamizi, 8 April 1766; AHU, Cod.1524,f1.55, provisao naming 
Joao Baptists to be Bergeant-Major of Vamizi Island, Saldanha 
de Albuquerque, Mo9., 7 December 1762; see above, p. 130] 
cf. Teixeira Botelho, Hi storia.^pp. 577-80. The modem name 
of the promontory opposite Kongui Island is Cape Afungi,
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district, the area was not free from harassment by the Africans 
thereabout* In the late 1750s and early 1760s, there were 
sporadic conflicts with the Makua on the mainland opposite 
Querimba Island. By 176b, however, Judice was reporting ,fthe 
great thefts'* which the chiefs of Macuana were committing 
against people from the islands who traded for ivory in the 
hinterland. These were so serious that he was, according to his 
own rather exaggerated account, obliged to put 6000 men in the 
field to control the situation. While the effect of this 
measure is not known, relations with the Makua appear to have 
remained strained, for at the end of the decade the appointment 
of Joao Baptista as Commandant of the Mainland of Cape Delgado was 
recommended by his experience in dealing with the Makua, and thus 
by the hope that he would be able to improve trade there. (1) In 
the vicinity of Vamizi Island and Tungi, there was a great deal of 
trouble with the Makonde in the 1760s, who regularly attacked the 
island and terrorised the mainland. About 1765, in reprisal for 
recent outrages, Portuguese forces from Vamizi successfully attacked 
the settlement of Pangani, burning it and capturing two chieftains, 
but nothing seems to have been settled by this action.(2) Without 
considering any external threats to their dominance of the Kerimba 
Islands, it is clear that the Portuguese Crown was hard pressed to 
maintain even the vaguest semblance of order in this part of the 
Conquest*
Such potential threats did, of course, exist, although they 
never materialized. The ease with which foreign traders managed 
to do business there made it unnecessary for their governments to
(1) AHU, CM 6, Joao da Costa to ?Gov. of M09., Querimba, 5 May 1758;
AHU, CM 9, Vitorio Vasconcelos da Silva to Jo&o de Morais, 
Querimba, 14 April 1761, mentioning a chieftain named 
Mutubulla; AHU, CM 11, Judice to Pereira do Lago, I bo, 15 
December 1765; AHU, Cod.1551, fl.181-2, carta patents, naming 
Joao Baptista as Commandant, Pereira do Lago, M09., 17 April 
1769.
(2) AHU, CM 11, Baptista to ?Judice, Vamizi, 19 October 1764; AHU,
Cod.1524,fl.500-1, carta patente naming Joao da Bilva Ferreira 
as Sergeant-Major of the Auxilliary Troops of Cape Delgado, 
Bilva Barba, Mo<}., 29 April 1765; AHU, (M 12, Baptista to 
Judice, ?Vamizi, ? April 1766.
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seek to avict the Portuguese from the islands. The French were 
the most active European traders in that area, although a few 
British vessels are known to have visited it, perhaps to trade 
for cowries. (1) It is, unfortunately, very difficult to get more 
than a general picture of the slave trade carried on by the French 
in the Kerimba Islands, as all foreign trade was illegal and 
inevitably transacted with the local Portuguese inhabitants and 
officials, none of whom were likely to report their collaboration 
to Mozambique. Brito Freire wrote in 1754 that the ease with 
which the people of the islands could trade profitably with the 
French was the main reason for the decline in the traditional 
trade between there and Mozambique, which was both risky and less 
profitable. Indeed, owing to Melo e Castro fs refusal to admit 
foreigners to trade at the capital, French vessels were quite 
active in the islands during the 1750s. On the French side, it 
is known that at least two ships Le Glorieux and La Mutine were 
trading for slaves and cowries at the Kerimba Islands. (2)
Occasional notices of foreign ships trading for slaves and cowries 
there filtered down to Mozambique, while the royal alvara of 1756, 
reaffirming the total prohibition of this trade, was issued in 
response to a letter from the Viceroy of Portuguese India, which 
complained of French vessels entering the ports of Portuguese East 
Africa. The same alvara also noted the receipt of a requerimento. 
or formal petition, from the inhabitants of Matemo Island, 
immediately north of Ibo, which contained their protests against 
the excesses of the Commander of the islands in trading with the
(1) A. Daliymple, Plan of Querimboo and the Adjacent Islands. From a
Portuguese MS. supposed by Capt. Bento de AJmedoe. 1 November 
1779, including a note explaining how to identify the islands 
of Querimba and Ibo by a Mr. Alexander Bibbald, Hwho was on 
this coast about 1755;M AHU, CM 11, Baptista to ?Judice, 
Vamizi^ 19 October 1764.
(2) AF, Col.C 7, pp.5,4,12,15, De Lozier Bouvet to Syndics and
Directors of the Compagnie des Indes. 51 August and 51 
December 1755.
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French. (1) For the following years, even less is known, although 
both Figueiredo and Montaury wrote that the French were the most 
active traders in the islands. The vehement counter-charges which 
Judice and a Lieutenant Miranda hurled at each other for trading 
with the French was one of the rare moments when the authorities 
at Mozambique were given a brief glimpse of the extent of the 
islanders* compliance in this trade.(2) The scarcity of 
information on this trade daring this period makes it impossible 
to do more than hazard a guess as to the number of slaves annually 
exported by the French from the Kerimba Islands, but in view of 
later figures, an average of 1000 per year seems realistic, perhaps 
with a gradual increase in the late 1760s.(5)
While the Portuguese at Mozambique were certainly worried fcy 
the continued presence of French traders in the Kerimba Islands, 
they were particularly concerned at the prospect of any European 
power seizing Mombasa and, by resuscitating the commerce along that 
coast, causing the lao to re-route their trade from Mozambique to 
the north. At the end of 1758, influenced by the warnings of Inacio 
Gaetano Xavier, Saldanha de Albuquerque repeated Rego Barreto*s 
mistake by cautioning the Crown against English intentions to occupy 
Mombasa. Xavier seems to have picked up this rumor in Bombay, but 
it was groundless. Nevertheless, his counsel made Saldanha de 
Albuquerque a suspicious man, and the Governor-General opposed the 
building of a fort at Ibo through fear that it, too, would fall to 
foreigners. Like Rego Barreto, in both instances the gravest 
consequence he could imagine resulting from such a development was 
that the lao would gravitate to these places, at the expense of
(1) AHU, CM 4, Brito F'reire to Crown, Lisboa, 8 November 1754, IP 90;
AHU, Cod.1510, fl.4-5, Melo e Castro to Manuel de Sousa e
Brito, Moz*, 22 July 1755; AHU, Cod.1507, p.291, royal alvara.
Lisboa, 10 April 1756.
(2) EBGEP. pp.255-6; Andrade, Relac^es, p.555; AHU, CM 11, Judice
to ?Silva Barba, Ibo, 17 July 1765; also, AHU, CM 9, Jose
Rodrigo Barros to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 12 October 1762. 
(5) See below, p.
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Mozambique, "through the propensity which Foreigners have for 
trade." The shipment of beads to Mozambique which were 
unsuitable for trading with the Xao, in 1759, again provoked his 
warning that if such mistakes continued, the Xao would surely go 
to Mombasa for this purpose. (1) In his own way, then, Saldanha 
de Albuquerque had recognized the two elements which were 
steadily to attract the trade of the Xao back to the coast of 
East Africa, north of Cape Delgado, at the expense of Mozambique: 
the revival of commercial activity along that coast, and the 
continuing problems which disturbed the smooth operation of trade 
at Mozambique. Although the Portuguese underestimated the second 
factor, they were right in emphasizing the first. The Kilwa 
coast was the traditional and favored outlet for the trade of most 
of the Xao, and the increase of their trade to Mozambique was 
dictated by its decline. A revival of its fortunes could only 
attract much of this trade back to the north.
This revival began to take place after about 1750. Its 
engineers were certainly not the English, nor were they the French.
The French were primarily in search of slaves, which were still of 
slight concern to the Xao, and of cowries, the export trade of which 
was obviously of no concern to the Xao. Indeed, the considerable 
trade which the French transacted in the Kerimba Islands had not 
caused the Xao to re-channel their trade either to Kissanga, on the 
mainland opposite Ibo, or to Tungi, for there was no demand for 
their ivory at these places. The revival was due to the increased 
vigor of Omani Arab trading involvement north of Cape Delgado, which 
brought with it a renewed demand for ivory.
(1) Andrade, Relajoes, pp.155,591-2; AHU, Cod.1515, fl.75-4,
Baldanha de Albuquerque toCrtsii, Moz*> 27 December 1758, also 
in Andrade, Rgla^oes, pp.571-2; AHU, CM 6, same to same, MoZ*> 
50 December 1758, also in AC. iv, 1919, pp.76-9; AHU, CM 7, 
same to same, Moz., 1 January 1759; AHU, Cod.1317, fl.8, same 
to Costa Corte Real, Moz«> 4 August 1759; AHU, CM 8, same to 
Crown, M09., 18 August 1760; also, AHU, Cod.1517, f1.257-8, 
Costa Corte Real to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 5 April 
1760.
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Zanzibar was the principal Omani stronghold in East Africa after 
Ahmad ibn Said al Busaidi was elected to the throne of Oman, about 
1744, and it had both an Omani garrison and governor, named 
Abdallah ibn Jaad al Busaidi. An attempt by them was made to take 
Mombasa, but it failed, so that Mombasa remained independent after 
1746. Conversely, in 1755 the Mazrui ruler of Mombasa 
unsuccessfully attempted to conquer Zanzibar. In 1754, however, 
it was reported that there was no governor on the island and that 
relations with Mombasa were badly strained.
Despite this situation, Zanzibar’s commercial strength seems 
to have been considerable, for the same report of 1754 asserts 
that the greatest number of Arabs in East Africa were found on 
that island. There were nearly 400 of these, and all of them 
were merchants. (1) Much of their trading was undoubtedly done 
at Kilwa, which had, as seen previously, agreed to Omani suzerainty 
under the new dynasty in the 1740s, although a governor may not 
have been installed there until later. In 1758 the Imam of Oman 
dispatched seven ships to fight against Mombasa and Pate.
According to the Sultan of Kilwa, this expedition was caused by 
the deliverance of Mombasa by its governor to the King of Pate.
The Sultan gave the name of this governor as Abdal Bunujadi, (2) whom 
it seems proper to identify as Abdallah ibn Jaad al Busaidi. His 
reappearance as governor of Mombasa suggests that his absence from
(1) Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.87-9, 112; HEA. pp.158-9; AHU,
CM 5, Melo e Castro to Crown, M09., 27 November 1754, 
enclosing news of Mombasa, Pate, Zanzibar, and Muscat, 
gathered by sailors of the yacht Santa Ana e Sem Francisco 
de Paula, who had gone to ibo to build a fort there,
Querimba, 1 November 1754.
(2) AHU, CM 7 & Cod.1317, fl.72-5, King of Kilwa to Gov. of M09.,
n.d. This letter was received at Mo9ambique on either 20 
or 24 April 1759. Bee AHU, Gin 7, Baldanha de Albuquerque 
to King of Kilwa, M09., 27 April 1759; copy in AHU, Cod.
1517, fl.73; ibid., fl.62-5, same to Bee.St., M09., 24 July 
1759; cf. Guillain, Afrique Orientals, i, p.555, where he 
states that the Imam was too preoccupied with domestic affairs 
to intervene in those of East Africa. Guillain does, 
however, correctly emphasize Oman’s commercial exploitation of 
Zanzibar and Kilwa, stating that the Imam sent 5 or 4 ships 
there yearly to trade.
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Zanzibar in 1754 was the result of a successful Omani seizure of 
Mombasa, after the withdrawal of the Mazrui forces from Zanzibar 
in 1755. It would also appear that, having deposed the Mazrui 
ruler, Masud ibn Nasr, and installed himself as governor, he 
decided to forsake allegiance to his kinsman, the Imam, and to 
make a name for himself. His deal with the King of Pate must 
have been the result of these ambitions. Neither the outcome of
the Omani expedition of 1758, nor the fate of Abdallah ibn Jaad is 
known, but Masud ibn Nasr regained power for the Mazrui and ruled 
Mombasa until his death.(1) Nevertheless, it would appear that 
the expedition strengthened Omani control of Zanzibar and 
consequently stimulated Omani trade along the Kilwa coast, for it 
is in the early 1760s that the influence of this trade began to be 
intensely felt in the Kerimba Islands.
In the years following the Omani ouster of the Portuguese from 
Mombasa, Zanzibar had gradually replaced that town as the principal 
entrepfit for the trade of the entire coast. The presence of 400 
Arab traders there in 1754 attests to the commercial importance of 
Zanzibar by that date, whatever the difficulties of Omani rule there 
may have been. As at Mozambique and the Kerimba Islands, the trade 
goods carried to Zanzibar were Indian. According to the French 
adventurer Mo rice, writing in 1776, the trade from Zanzibar to the 
coast followed this pattern:
When the ships from India arrive in 
December, January or February, all the 
Moors from Kilwa, Mafia, Mombasa, Pate, &c., 
go to Zanzibar to buy cargoes and distribute 
them subsequently in their districts in 
exchange for ivory tusks, provisions and 
slaves, &c. In March and April all the 
Moors and Arabs come to the Kingdom of 
Kilwa to trade there for slaves, for Kilwa 
is the assembly point for all the slaves 
who come from the mainland.(2)
(1) SD. p.218; see Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.502,
(2) FKI. p.82.
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By -toe mid-1750s, then, Kilwa was a place of considerable 
commercial activity by the beginning of the dry season, when all 
these traders were gathered there to bargain for the ivory and 
slaves with which the Africans of the interior began to arrive in 
June. Of the smaller coastal towns to the south of Kilwa, the 
most important was Mongalo, later known as Mgau Mwania, which lay 
between Lindi and Mikindani, in the same bay as modern Budi.(l)
A limited trade in provisions and cattle had been carried on 
throughout the first half of the eighteenth century between the 
Kilwa coast and the Portuguese settlements south of Cape Delgado.
The Portuguese Government specifically did not, however, allow 
the Bwahili to trade doth and beads in their territory, strictly 
limiting this cabotage to comestibles. This is clear from 
official agreements with the Bui tan of Kilwa, in 1760, and with 
the King (Mwenyi Mkuu) of Zanzibar, in 1768, which permitted 
certified vessels of these rulers to enter Mozambique for trading 
within this limitation. (2) The threat of Swahili traders from 
north of Cape Delgado seeking to introduce these prohibited goods 
into Portuguese territory was first noticed only in 1754, when 
several small boats from Mombasa and Pate, which had come to trade 
at Mongalo, passed south to the Kerimba Islands in search of slaves.(3) 
There is no information for the immediately following years, but 
after 1762 there is a solid body of evidence which reveals the 
increasing activity of Arab and Swahili traders both along the Kilwa 
coast and south of Cape Delgado.
(1) See Burton, Zanzibar, ii, p.867.
(V) AHU, Cod.1517,f 1.215, Saldanha de Albuquerque to King of Kilwa,
Mo5., 12 May 1760; Afiu, Cod.1529, f1.225, alvara. Pereira do
Lago, M05., 11 January 1768. Despite the friendship of the
Mwenyi Mkuu, a Portuguese merchantman from Bengal had been
robbed by the Swahili at Zanzibar in 1767. The captain of 
this vessel was Bento de Almeida, to whom Daliymple credited 
his map of the Kerimba Islands. AHU, CM 13, Pereira do Lago 
to Crown, M09., 20 August 1768; see above, p.lSf, n.|.
(5) AHU, Cod.1510, fl.55-4, Melo e Castro to Bousa e Brito, M09.,
19 May 1754.
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In July 1762 the Commandant of the Kerimba Islands reported 
that there were seven Arab ships trading there. Together they had 
more than 50,000 cruzados worth of cloth in exchange for which he 
feared that they would carry off all the ivory in the district, to 
the detriment of the Koyal Treasury. He had also received 
information that there were 4000 Arabs in Mombasa, where a three- 
masted ship was being constructed by them, and suggested that the 
Arabs might be considering an attack on the islands, such as those 
which had occurred in the seventeenth centuiy, in order to command 
their trade more easily. As usual in these cases, the Commandant, 
who had arrived at Ibo only a month before, seems to have greatly 
exaggerated this last threat, but the tenuousness of the Portuguese 
hold on the islands caused them to react violently to such rumors. 
Saldanha de Albuquerque immediately issued a bando prohibiting Arab 
vessels from entering the islands, but it is obvious that the 
Portuguese did not possess the means to enforce it. The Governor- 
General sent a detachment of twenty-two soldiers, with two pieces of 
artillery, to be stationed at Vamizi Island for this purpose, but 
contrary winds forced it ashore before reaching Vamizi, and it was 
set upon by the Makonde.(l)
Silva Barba followed his predecessor's lead and sought to have 
all the Swahili resident in the Kerimba Islands and on the mainland 
recalled to Mozambique, but this was little more than wishful 
thinking. Further exhortations to the Commandant and the Vicar of 
the islands, as well as to the Commandant of Vamizi, were consequently 
made to stop the Swahili from beyond Cape Delgado trading there, but
(1) AHU, CM 10, Jose Rodrigo Barros to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 
24 July 1762; AHU, Cod.1524, fl.27-8, bando. Saldanha de 
Albuquerque, Moz*> 16 August 1762; AHU, Cod.1321, fl.52-5, 
same to Sec.St., Moz., 27 August 1762; AHU, CM 10, Conselho 
Ultramarino to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Lisboa, 25 June 1763, 
enclosing Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moz*> 25 November 
1762; AHU, Cod.1524, fl.300-1, carta patente of £»ilva 
Ferreira, Silva Barba, Moz«* 29 April 1765.
- 158 -
with little success. (1) The difficulty of preventing this trade 
was greatly compounded by the imposition of a kQjs% duty on all 
goods sent to the islands from Mozambique. Rather than buy cloth 
from the capital, the Portuguese islanders preferred to buy it 
illegally, and cheeper, from the Arabs and Swahili.
Further pressure from the north was felt when in 1766 the 
Arabs succeeded in establishing their rule over Mongalo by seizing 
it "almost violently” from its Makonde chief, Moanha, and placing 
a governor there. In June, Judide warned that "the Arabs will 
come with cloth to distribute them in Mongalo, as well as throughout 
these Islands, especially in the district of Vamizi, because of the 
certainty they have that cloth no longer comes from Mozambique due 
to the great duties which it pays in that alf&ndega.w Two months 
later he reported that, so far as he coula learn from his 
"trustworthy spies," the Arabs only intended to trade at Mongalo, 
and not to utilize it as a base from which to launch an attack on 
the Portuguese. But he confirmed his previous fears by noting 
that the Arabs "have spread, and continue to send, to Macuana cloth, 
which has already reached our territory, end which causes 
considerable damage to His Majesty's vassals through their not being 
able to procure any ivory, since the Arabs sell their cloth at a 
lower price."(2) In 1769 the new Commandant of the Kerimba Islands 
tried to enforce several drastic measures designed to control the
(1) AHU, Cod.1528, fl.322, bando. Bilva Barba, Moy., ?9 May 1765; AHU,
CM 11, Judice to same, Ibo, 17 July 1765; ibid., same to 
Pereira do Lago, Ibo, 11 October & 15 December 1765; AHU,
Cod.1528, fl,521-59, various letters from Moyambique to 
■ Portuguese officials in the Kerimba Islands, 26 April 1765 
to 21 April 1769.
(2) AHU, CM 12, Judice to Pereira do Lago, Bringano, 26 June 1766, &
ibo, 1 September 1766. The Swahili History of Sudi states that 
it was the capital of Mwanya (i.e. Moanha) and that the first 
Bultan of Sudi was a Shirazi called Mwenyi Mwanya. The 
Makonde are only spoken of as being up-country folk, distinct 
from the coastal inhabitants of Sudi, but this is not surprising 
from a late nineteenth century Swahili document. The history 
itself is largely garbled, but it does contain some interesting 
place names (Kisanga and. Sawasawa) which suggest a possible 
connection with the coast of Portuguese East Africa. ED. pp. 
250-2. Bee below, pp. Z&h3#
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trade of the Swahili in these islands, whom he asserted were 
depriving the Portuguese of their ivory trade, God of the souls 
of Africans who were being enslaved by Muslims, and the King of 
his taxes. (1) These efforts seem to have been no more successful 
than those of his predecessors.
Undoubtedly frightened ty the growing strength of Oman to 
the north, and encouraged ty reports of unrest with their 
domination along that coast, not to mention the arrival at 
Moyambique in 1765 of a pro-Portuguese pretender to the leadership 
of Mombasa, the Portuguese launched a farcical and abortive 
expedition to regain supremacy there. The Sultan of Kilwa, who 
had encouraged the Portuguese and whose military aid they had hoped 
to enlist in this cause, apparently had little need for their 
support, for about 1770, according to the account of Morice, Kilwa 
reasserted its independence from Oman. At the beginning of that 
year, when the Omani Arabs, including the governor, made their 
customary exodus for Zanzibar in order to procure trade goods,
the Kilwa people took advantage of this 
absence to signify to them that they 
would not return to their island and 
that they no longer wished for a 
governor —  in a word, that if they 
represented themselves under any name 
other than traders they would be given 
no quarter.(2)
Caught off their guard and faced with the united opposition of the 
coast from Mafia to Cape Delgado, the Omani were unable to do 
anything except to comply with this demand. Quite clearly, Oman's 
position in East Africa, outside of Zanzibar, was considerably 
weaker than it had been a decade previously.
Kilwa's action did not, however, in any way adversely affect 
the steady progress of trade along that coast. The Omani were
(1) AHUy CM 13, Jo&o Ferreira da Cruz to Pereira do Lago, Ibo,
8 July 1769.
(2) Btrandes, Portuguese Period, pp.502-4; AHU, Cod.1528, fl.
530-1, Pereira do Lago to Judice, Moc., 26 January 1766; 
pp. 151-2.
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still established at Zanzibar and freely able to trade at Kilwa. 
Mongalo, which probably ousted its governor at the same time, 
similarly suffered no commercial decline. The revival which 
the Portuguese at Moyambique had feared for so many years was 
taking place. That it was beginning to have the effect on the 
trade of the Xao to Mojambique which Rego Barreto, Xavier, and 
Saldanha de Albuquerque had predicted it would, is indicated by 
Pereira do Lago's appraisal of the situation along the coast 
north of Cape Delgado, written just after the return to the 
capital of the unsuccessful Mombasa expedition, and based upon 
news which it had gathered there. That coast, he wrote,
has many valuable goods, but above 
all a greater quantity of ivory than 
is brought to this Capital by the Xao 
and the Makua, all running to that 
Coast, as the goods which the Arabs 
and Foreign Nations introduce there 
are one hundred per cent cheaper....(1)
Pereira do Lago was exaggerating the part played ty European traders 
north of Cape Delgado, but he was correct in suggesting that the 
ivory trade of the Xao, and to a lesser extent that of the Makua, was 
slowly being turned north to a more favorable market. (2) After 
nearly three-quarters of a century, the position of Mojambique as the 
principal coastal outlet for the trade of the Xao, which was 
increasingly that of all of East-Central Africa, was being whittled
(1) AHU, CM 14, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 21 January 1770; cf.
AHU, Cod.1552, fl.48-51, 53-4, same to Bee.St., Moy., 20 
January 1770; AHU, CM 14, same to Crown, Moy., 20 January 1770, 
enclosing Judice to Pereira do Lago, Moy., 15 January 1770.
(2) From about 1742 to 1777 occasional Dutch vessels from the Cape of
Good Hope called at Zanzibar seeking slaves. Before 1770, an 
English vessel -called the Bonadventure Grab made three voyages 
to Mingoyo, in Lindi Bay, in search of cowries. On different 
occasions it traded near Kilwa, lay for two months off Mafia, 
and anchored off Tumbatu. In 1776 Morice wrote that the 
inglish only came to Pate, in small ships, to trade for 
cowries. Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.89-90; idem., "The 
French at Kilwa, 1776-1784," TNR. 44, 1956, pp.54-5; FKI. 
p.114.
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away. The dominance of the Mozambique route, which had been 
achieved by the decline of trade to the north of Cape Delgado, 
was being undermined both by its reinvigoration there and by the 
various difficulties affecting the smooth operation of trade at 
Mozambique. Both of these situations were to continue during 
the next fifteen years, and the result was to be no different.
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CHAPTER TOUK 
The Resurgence of "the Kilwa Route, 1770-1765
1, Pereira do Lago and Mo rice
The fifteen years following Kilwa*s reassertion of independence 
from Oman —  the last years during which the affairs of that island- 
state were to be ruled by its traditional authorities —  were marked 
not only by a steady shift of lao trade back to Kilwa, but also by a 
noticeable increase in the volume of the slave trade in East-Central 
Africa. Kilwa was already, as Morice tells us, the center for the 
Omani slave trade in East Africa and slavers from the Kilwa coast 
are known to have operated in the Kerimba Islands. But there is no 
evidence for determining the volume of the Arab slave trade and no 
indication of a sudden increase in the Omani demand for slaves at 
this' time. It seems advisable, therefore, to postulate a constant, 
gradually increasing, slave trade from the Kilwa coast to Zanzibar, 
from where slaves were exported to Western India and the Persian Gulf. 
About 1770 the volume of this trade was perhaps 2000 souls annually. (1) 
To the south of Cape Delgado, the Portuguese themselves still exported 
only several hundred slaves a year from the overland trade to Ibo and 
Moyambique. The Brazilian slave trade at Moyambique, although it 
was prohibited by an alvara of 12 December 1772, apparently continued 
to be perpetrated by a few individuals, but it was not to increase 
until the last decade of the eighteenth century.(2) The increased 
demand for slaves from this part of Africa must be attributed to the
(1) This figure is based on Morice*s description of this trade.
Although he nowhere indicates its volume, it is clear that, 
by the standards of the French trade to H e  de France, he 
considered it to be important. FKI. passim; cf'., HEA. p.155.
(2) See below, pp. o.
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rapid expansion of trade at the French islands of lie de France 
and Bourbon.
The factors causing this surge of prosperity and commercial
activity at the twin colonies have been briefly noted in the
previous pages. (1) The end of the Seven fears' Viar in 1765 and 
the transfer of responsibility for the islands from the Comnagnie 
des lndes to the Crown both injected them with new vitality.
The greatest boost to trade, however, came in 1769 with the 
abolition of the monopoly of the Compagnie and the substitution 
of free trade. Moyambique was the first place to feel the 
effect of these measures, as it was the particular desire of the 
French government to cultivate the slave trade between there and 
the islands. In the late 1760s it was increasingly difficult for 
French traders to procure slaves in Madagascar, and 11*6005 officials 
at lie de France recommended that the slack should be taken up by 
encouraging the trade to Moyambique. Their correspondence shows 
that some of these officials were unaware of the trade already 
carried on there by French interlopers, but it also reveals a change 
in Pereira do Lago's attitude towards this trade which seems to have
occurred about 177U. During the first five years of his
administration, Pereira do Lago had avoided openly sanctioning the 
illegal slave trade with the French, although he had allowed it to 
take place under the guise of "urgent necessity.11 Two tenders from 
tne french to throw this trade open to all vessels from lie de France 
and Bourbon had met with little success in the late 1760s. But the 
shortage of slaves in lie de France led them to persist in their
(1) Bee above, p. .
- 164 -
efforts and 'ey 1775 their perseverance was being rewarded. (1) 
Pereira do Lago's reasons for making this decision are not 
known. Costa Mendes states that his appointment as Governor- 
General was political exile from Portugal and that his frequent 
requests to be repatriated were all unsuccessful. (£) It seems
likely, in these circumstances, that once Pereira do Lago resigned
himself to his fate, he decided to profit by it. Thereafter, he
never looked back. In 1775 the Governor of lie de France wrote:
Last year seven or eight French ships 
have done quite a considerable trade in 
blacks at Mozambique and Kerimba. A H  
give much, praise to the Governor-General, 
from whom 1 have received a veiy upright 
letter in which he asks me, however, not 
to send so many ships at one time, and 
never in the months of March and April,
because then ships arrive in his port
from Europe.(5)
(1) See above, pp.(3o- / ; AF,C 18, Pierre goivre to Minister of Navy, 
H e  de France, 50 November 1767; AF,C £0, Lumas to same, lie 
de France, £7 February & £4 November 1768, latter enclosing 
diary of M. de Clonard, commander of the frigate L 1 Ambulant, 
which made the unsuccessful voyage in 1768 and returned with 
only eight slaves; 4ibid., Dumas to Poivre, lie de France, £4 
October 1768; AF,C ££, Poivre to Minister of Navy, lie de 
France, 15 January & 16 June 1768; latter enclosing a report 
on voyage of L 1 Ambulant to Moyambique; BM,Add.Mss. 18,140, 
fl.£J-£, Dumas to Glemet, lie de France, 51 October 1768;
AF,C £4, Desroches and Poivre Jo Minister of Navy, lie de 
France, 1 September 176 y; AF,C £5, Poivre to same, H e  de 
trance, £ September 176 y. I am indebted to Dr. G£.P. Freeman- 
Grenville for allowing me to utilize his draft paper, ''Some 
Eighteenth-Century Documents concerning Eastern Africa in the 
Archives de France." prior to its publication in the Bulletin 
of the Institute of African Studies of the University oi Ghana.
It should be noted, however, that Dr. Freeman-Grenville misdates 
a great many of these documents. Dumas, Desroches and Temey 
were successively governors of the French islands (1767-1776); 
Poivre ana MaiHart du Mesle were the first two intendants of 
H e  de trance; Glemet was sent by Dumas on an unsuccessful- 
mission to Madagascar in 1767; see Deschamps, Histoire de 
Madagascar, p.80.
(£) F. da Costa Mendes, Catalogo Chronologico e Historico dos Capit&es 
Generaes e Govemaaores aa Provincia de Moyambique. Moyambique, 
18y£, p.17.
(5) FKi. p.££l.
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Pereira do Lago only once gave the Crown any indication that he was 
allowing these vessels to trade at Mozambique and then covered up 
his activities with the sort of excuse he had utilized in the 1760s.
By 1777, however, word had reached Lisbon that the French were “doing 
a great business" in slaves and cloth at Moyambique. Pereira do 
Lago was ordered to stamp out this trade. The next year, he reported 
the execution of this order, but added that in view of the shortage of 
provisions and of other necessities at Moyambique, he was obliged to 
trade with whomever could supply these needs. As he advised Lisbon, 
“Necessity has no law." He further justified his permissive attitude 
ty arguing that he was the only Governor-General to let the French 
trade there and to make them pay duties. Finally he asserted that 
the reports which the King had received of numerous French vessels 
entering Moyambique to trade were false.(1)
The magnitude of Pereira do Lago's complicity in this trade only 
became known to the metropolitan authorities after his death in early 
June 1779. As part of his devassa. which was conducted by the Chief 
Justice Liogo Guerreiro de Aboim, an official account was compiled to 
determine how many French ships had entered Moyambique during his 
thirteen-year administration and how many slaves had been exported 
by them. According to this document, Pereira do Lago had granted 
licenses to thirty-two French and two Portuguese vessels for 
transporting slaves to the french islands; these ships had embarked 
a total of 9158 slaves for that destination.(2) All of these 
licenses presumably were granted af ter Pereira do Lago decided upon 
his new policy towards this trade, about 1770. Thus, this figure 
represents a yearly average of more than 10UU slaves exported from
(1) AHU, Cod.1552, fl.129, Pereira ao Lago to dec.St., Moy., £0 August
1775; AHU, Cod.1555, n.° 415, Martinho de Melo e Castro to
Pereira do Lago, Ajuda, 15 April 1777; AHU, CM 15 & Cod.1552, 
fl.256-7, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 15 August 1778; cf. 
AHU, CM 15, same to same, Moy., 20 August 1778.
(2) AHU, CM 16, Diogo Guerreiro de Aboim to Clerk of the alfandega.
Moyl, 25 August 1779; ibid., certid&o. Joaquim Jorge, Moy.,
24 August 1779.
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Mozambique to lie de France and bourbon* The estimates made by 
two independent observers, one anonymous, the other Jose Joaquim de 
Segreira Magalhaes Lanyous, confirm this figure: the first being
1000 annually, a bit conservative, and the second being 1500 to 
2U00.(1) In view of the fact that certainly some French slavers 
must have traded at Mocambiaue without Pereira do Lago's license, 
such as those which came at times of ”uigent necessity,” the lower 
figure given by Lan^ous, 1500, may be nearest to the truth*
These two documents, together with further information related 
to Pereira do Lago’s devassa* give us a vivid picture of the operation 
of the French slave trade at Mozambique during the 1770s* According 
to the findings of the devassa* the captain of each French ship had 
to pay Pereira do Lago 1050 patacas (4200 cruzados) in order to obtain 
his license to trade there. Furthermore, the Governor-General charged 
them 4 patacas (16 cruzados) for each slave they exported from 
Mozambique* Neither Lanzous nor the other writer remarked on these 
licenses, but both knew of the head tax of 4 patacas. In addition, 
both commented that the French paid the Governor-General a gift, 
proportionate to the size of each cargo, which seems to have averaged 
about 250 patacas (1000 cruzados) per ship. TUrthermore, Pereira do 
Lago collected an unspecified sum in rents, which he charged the 
French for utilizing the houses which he had ordered built for this 
purpose. All of this money went directly into his own pocket; the 
Royal Treasury received none of it. True to his word, however,
Pereira do Lago also charged the French a capitation tax of 2 patacas 
(6 cruzados) in the name of the Grown. In addition to these various 
expenses, the French also had to pay the local traders for the slaves 
whom they bought. These purchases were made in Indian cloth, on 
which Pereira do Lago graciously charged them no taxes. Slaves whom
(1) AHU, CM 15, anon*, H0s Francezes extr&em...,” n.d., but clearly 
post-1770; TT, MR, ma^o 602, Jose Joaquim de Segreira Mag­
alhaes Lanzous, "Memorias sobre Mossambique11, Goa, 5 August 
1779, enclosure in same to Visconde da Vila Nova de Cerveira,
Goa, 12 January 1780. Lanzous was Chancelor da Reino at Goa; 
he touched at Mozambique on his way to India in 1778.
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the Portuguese, or Indians, acquired for the equivalent of 20 
to 50 cruzados, or perhaps more, were sold to the French for 
anywhere from about 60 to 100 cruzados. (1) Thus the average 
total cost of obtaining a slave at Mozambique for the French was 
about 120 cruzados each. let despite these considerable expenses 
and the prospect of about a 20% death rate on the return voyage, 
which usually took at least forty days to navigate, the French 
slavers could still turn a sizeable gross profit on this trade, as 
slaves sold at the French islands for 80, 100, or even 150 patacas 
each, just as they had in the 1750s. Nevertheless, the French 
slavers naturally sought greater profits in this trade, and after 
the death of Pereira do Lago they complained of the unjust taxes 
he used to charge them, especially his personal head tax of 16 
cruzados per slave.(2)
During the 1770s, the French also continued to trade in force 
at the Kerimba Islands. Although there are scarcely any records 
of their activities there, the observations of one Joao Vito, 
captain and pilot of the Portuguese corvette Santa Ana, preserve 
many details of the operation of this trade.(5) According to Vito,
(1) iiiiU, Oi 16, Aboim to ?Sec.St., Mo^., 24 August 1779, for the
relevant information from Pereira do Lago's devassa. Besides 
swindling the Crown, Pereira do Lago also extorted the people 
of Mozambique by taking advantage of a bando passed by Silva 
Barba which determined that the pataca, which was worth 4 cruzados, 
would be worth 6 cruzados when it bore an official mark stamped on 
its face by the government. The natural opposition of the 
people to this inflationary measure was aggravated by Pereira do 
Lago, who controlled practically all the patacas which entered 
the island and perverted this provision for his own aggrandize­
ment. AHU, Cod.1524,f 1.269-70, bando. Silva Barba, Moz*> 29 
December 1764; ibid., fl.517-18, bando. Pereira ao Lago, ivio9• > 
/fWroie, £u August 1765;/4 M &  pp.551,490-5; AHU,'CM 16, Aboim to Crown, 
Reta^ ocgi Moy., 24 August 1779; see Lobato, "dm torno do Problema das 
Moedas Carimbadas de Mozambique" and "Porque se Marcavam as 
Moedas de Mozambique," in his Colonizazao. pp.211-25.
(2) FKI. pp.64,84,167; AHU, CM 15, anon., "0s Franceses extraem...,"
n.ci.; AHU, CM 16, Aboim to Crown, Moz*> 24 August 1779;
Lougnon, Corresponaence, (1740-1746), p.248.
(5) ACL, Vermelho Mb 275, "Noticias que da Jo^o Vitto das Ilhas de Cabo
Delgado," n.d., also in MHMP, pp.269-72; this is an incomplete
copy of the original manuscript, which has not been located.
Sailing from Goa to Mocamoique, the Santa Ana was forced by contrary 
winds to take.port at ibo on 14,April 1778/'but Vito does not 
indicate the length of his confinement there.
- 168 -
the French traded there nin almost every month of the year," and 
when he arrived at Ibo there were two French vessels in the harbor, 
waiting to take on cargoes of 400 and 250 slaves, respectively.
Most of these were purchased with firearms, gunpowder, (1) and cloth, 
with about a third of both cargoes being paid for in patacas. The 
price of each slave at Ibo was established at 100 cruzados. After 
careful scrutinization of this business, Vito calculated that the 
French introduced at least 100,000 cruzados in goods into Ibo every 
year. It would appear, then, that some 1500 slaves were annually 
embarked at Ibo for lie de France and Bourbon, a figure which is 
supported by the same anonymous source who was so well informed on 
the Trench slave trade at Mozambique. his estimate of 1600 slaves 
annually was made, however, for the French trade throughout the 
Kerimba Islands.(2); but if the French did seek slaves elsewhere 
along the Cape Delgado coast, Vito was unaware of these activities. 
On the other hand, he was fully aware of the complicity of the 
Portuguese officials at Ibo in turning the Frencn trade to their own 
profit. While Vito is silent on the price paid by the French for 
this co-operation, later accounts indicate that it was not much less 
than they paid Pereira do Lago at Mozambique. This is not really 
surprising, however, as Pereira do Lago spawned this attitude by 
auctioning off the office of Commandant at Ibo and by requiring the 
successful bidder to make him an annual payment of 5000 to 4000 
cruzados. The Commandant, or Captain-General, naturally sought to 
make his office pay and usually received a gift of 1000 to 2000 
cruzados, depending on the size of the vessel, from French slavers. 
He also charged them 5 patacas (12 cruzados) for each slave whom
(1) FKI. p.189.
(2) AHU, CM 15, anon., "0s Franceses extraem.. "  n.d.
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they exported from I d o (1 ), thus making each slave as costly there 
as at Mozambique.
At Ibo, however, trading with the French was something more 
of a community project than it was at the capital, deals often 
being made over drinks in public taverns(2), and Vito gives a 
splendid description of its operation. A French captain would 
declare the nature of his cargo, especially the amount of patacas, 
to the Commandant of Ibo, who would take most of the money for his 
own payment for supplying slaves. The Frenchman would then rent 
a hut (gara) in which he could reside and at which he could hold 
the slaves he received.
The same Governor /sic/ usually distributes 
the goods: so much~for the Vicar, so much 
for th9 Curate (both of whom are natives of 
Goa), so much for the Commandant of the 
Troops, so much for the District Judge: so 
much for his cronies, etc. Each one of 
these is obliged to supply a number of 
slaves proportionate to the value of the 
goods which he receives.
Each trader would then send his patamares into Macuana to barter for 
slaves and this business would last two or three months. Monsieur 
Boudoim /? Boudoigne/, one of the French slavers whom Vito met at ibo, 
had been there for four months making up a cargo of slaves.(5)
Both the wearisome and expensive business of trading illegally 
at Mozambique and Ibo, as well as the continuing demand for more and
(1) AHU, CM 18, Raimundo Luis de Lima to Crown, Goa, 24 January 1781,
enclosing RicardgaJose de Lima, ’’Relacam dos descaminhos,
Gravames da Faz. Real, e Ruinas do Comercio no Govemo de 
Monsarabique,” n.d., articles 20-1. The author, brother of 
Raimundo, was Procurador da Coroa. or special Crown agent, at 
Mozambique, whose diligence received the attention of the 
Governor, Fr. Jose de Vasconcelos de Almeida, Pereira do Lago’s 
successor, and earned him seven months’ imprisonment. This 
document was a part of Vasconcelos’s residencia. but the 
present citations clearly incriminate Pereira do Lago, as well. 
Cf.AHU, Cod.1472,fl.10, Crown to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Lisboa,
6 March 1782, for the orders to release Ricardo da Lima from prison.
(2) AHU, CM 18, Ricardo da Lima, "Relacam dos descaminhos...," article 25.
(b) ifflGEP. pp.270-1 and note.
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more slaves on the French islands eventually caused a few 
adventurous French slavers to seek other sources, beyond the 
control of the Portuguese. Not surprisingly, they turned to 
Zanzibar, the steadily growing entrepftt for all coastal trade 
north of Cape Delgado. By far the most ambitious of these 
merchants was the celebrated Jean-Vincent Morice, who purchased 
700 slaves at ZanziDar in 177b, 500 of* whom were safely disembarked 
at lie de France. In the following year Mo rice returned to 
Zanzibar, where he bought 92b slaves, 860 of whom survived the 
passage to H e  de France. At Zanzibar, however, Mo rice encountered 
the old Mojambique slaver, Monsieur de Clonara, whose “little warM 
with the local authorities undoubtedly strained their relations with 
the French in general. in view of ilfcClonard's clumsiness, Morice, 
still seeking more slaves, sailed to Kilwa, already the principle 
source of slaves for the Zanzibar market. At Kilwa, Morice 
purchased another 700 slaves and made a contract with the bultan to 
provide him with a steady supply of slaves. Returning to H e  de 
France before b March 1776, Morice began to formulate and to press 
his ultimately unsuccessful plan for a French factory and colony at 
Kilwa; but on lb September he was back at Kilwa, where another of 
his vessels had preceded him.(1)
On the following day, Morice concluded a one hundred year 
treaty with the sultan of Kilwa which granted the Frenchman primary 
rights in the European slave trade at Kilwa. Morice contracted to 
purchase 1000 slaves annually, and could take as many more as he 
desired before other Europeans would be allowed to trade there.
By the terms of the treaty, a standard price of 20 piastres (60 
cruzados) per slave was established, and Morice agreed to pay a tax
(1) FK1. pp.12-16, 64, 74, 82, 87. Morice was not the first French­
man to trade on the Kilwa coast. In 17b4 Joseph Crassons de 
Medeuil took on a cargo of slaves and provisions at Bongo 
bongo Island, between Kilwa and Mafia. As early as 1771, 
the French were attempting to arrange a treaty of protection 
with the Sultan of Kilwa. SD, p.195; AF,Col.C 29, Brayer au 
Barre to Minister of the Navy, n.d., but c.1771
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of 2 piastres (8 cruzados) to the Buitan for each slave. Furthermore, 
the Arabic version of the treaty stipulated that “there shall be no 
extra tax upon him /MoriceJ.1* Finally, Morice was granted the right 
to establish cannon in and to raise the French flag over the palace 
known as Husuni Kubwa. (1)
In June 1777 Morice was still, by his own account, "the only 
European who has secured a trade in slaves on the coast of Zanzibar.11 
But he had already made three voyages there himself and, with an 
interest in several vessels, had purchased 2725 slaves at Zanzibar 
and Kilwa. Shortly thereafter, in order to secure his own position 
and, ultimately, that of the French at Kilwa, while he awaited a 
decision from France on the fate of his proposal, Morice "set up a 
company with which we have engaged two ships which, until the court 
replies, will ply to and fro with cargoes of blacks for the colony."
A year later, the fame of this operation had reached Mozambique, 
where Pereira do Lago wrote that a French company had "now 
established a Factory in Kilwa. "(2) Finally, on 7 February 1779, 
the Minister of the Navy wrote from Versailles that, "For the present 
it is enough for us to limit ourselves to friendship with the King of 
Kilwa," thereby ending Morice*s elaborate plans for the French at 
Kilwa. Although It is not .known when Morice received the news, he 
evidently continued to control the French slave trade at Kilwa.
Sometime previous to 5 September 177y, when he sailed for Africa, 
he contracted to sell 600 slaves, at 52 piastres each, to the 
Government of lie de France. Following this, however, Morice*s 
activities are unknown, except that he later shipwrecked near Zanzibar 
and retired with a fair amount of money to Kilwa, where he was well 
received and where he remained until his death, which occurred sometime
(1) Ibid., pp.70-5,85-4; see H.N. Ghittick, "Kilwa and the Arabic 
Settlement of the East African Coast," JAH. iv, 2, 1965, pp. 
179-90.
(<;) ibid., pp.96, 207; AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Mo^., 
15 August 1778.
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before 1782.(1)
From the incomplete figures now remaining, it seems that 
Morice traded for about 1500 slaves annually in East Africa after 
1775, most of whom came from Kilwa. In 1776 alone, he obtained 
more than 2000 north of Cape Delgado. During the late 1770s, then, 
French traders were taking away about 4500 slaves each year from 
the ports of Mozambique, ibo, Kilwa add Zanzibar. Most, but not 
all, of these slaves were destined for lie de France and Bourbon. 
Slave population figures for both these islands in the eighteenth 
century are extremely haphazard, however, and about all one can 
conclude is that their combined net annual increase was about 
2000 souls. Nevertheless, it is dear that most of the slaves 
obtained by the French in East Africa were destined for sale in 
the French islands, however many of them were actually disembarked 
there.(2)
On the other hand, some were destined for a more distant market: 
America. During the course of the Beven fears' War, France had lost 
her colonies of Benegal and Goree, in West Africa, to the British.
One result of these losses was to force up the price of slaves along 
the Guinea coast for French traders, and this in turn caused them to 
seek new sources for supplying the vast sugar plantations on their
4
(1) FKI, pp.54-5,214; AF, C 49, De Souillac ana Foucault to Minister
of the Navy, Port-Louis, 2 November 1779, enclosing draft contract
with Morice for purchase of 600 slaves by Government, n.d., 
unsigned; SD, p.195. The ship sent to fetch these slaves,
Les Bons Amis, only took on 227 at Kilwa; y8 of these died 
before reaching lie de France. Noel, L'Esclavage. pp.54,229.
(2) Bee Baron d'Unienville, Btatistique de L'lle Maurice et ses
dlpendences.... iii, Paris, 1858, p.588. According to d'Unien­
ville, the slave population of lie de France at the end of 1767 
was 16,065; at the end of 1777 it was 26,400. According to 
Azema, Histoire de l'lle Bourbon, pp. 144-5, that of Bourbon in 
1767 was 15,047 (misprinted as 25,047), and had increased to 
28,457 by 1777. For other, often conflicting, estimates of the 
slave populations of the two islands during this period, see 
anon., "La Population des iles de France et de Bouroon en 1740 
et en 1761-1764," Revue de 1 'Histoire des Colonies Franzaises.
xx, 1927, P»455 (Bourbon: 15,020 in 1761; lie de France: 15,609 
in 1764); Abbe Raynal, A Phil6sophical and Political History of 
the Settlements and Trade of the mropeans in the East and West
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West Indian colonies of Martinique, Guadalupe and Saint-Domingue 
(Haiti). At first, French slavers ventured no farther afield than 
the Congo and Angola, but after the Comoagnie des Indes lost its 
commercial monopoly in 1769 they were able to explore the possibility 
of seeking their slaves along the coast of East Africa. From 1769 
to 1776 trade between the East Indies and France more than doubled 
in volume; ty the end of that period, a new triangular trade with 
its corners at France, the Mascarenes and the East African coast, 
and the Antilles, had been inaugurated. French slavers from Europe 
began trading between Mozambique and lie de France as early as 1771, 
but the enterprising Morice appears to have been the first to have 
sent slaves from East Africa to America: in 1774 he shipped a cargo
of slaves to Cap Franjais, in Saint-Domingue, from the Kerimba 
islands. "By 1776," Morice wrote, "there were three ships making 
this voyage, two for Kerimba... There are other ships on the way 
from Europe for the same operation. I know of two here /lie de 
France/. There are also others of which I do not know." Encouraged 
by requests for Mozambique slaves which were forwarded to him from 
Port au Prince and Cap Frangais by his associates in Lorient, Morice 
remained an active proponent of this new trade and is known to have 
shipped a cargo of 400 slaves to Baint-Domingue from Kilwa in 1777.
For his own part, Morice's learned correspondent, Joseph-Franjois 
Charpentier de Cossigny, attested to well established trading ties 
between slavers from France and the Mozambique coast.(l) Still, 
this traae was limited in comparison to the traditional one to lie 
de France and Bourbon, and the resumption of Anglo-French hostilities 
during the American War for Independence (1778-1785) prevented its 
expansion until after the Treaty of Versailles was signed in the 
latter year.
Having examined the export markets for the French slave trade 
in East-Central Africa, we must see where the brunt of this new
(1) A. Cobban, A History of Modem France, i, 5rd edition, Harmonds-
worth, 1965, pp.75-4,79,92,121-2; L. Dermigny, Cargaisons 
Indiennes - Solier et Cie, 1781-1795. i. Paris. 1&60. no.96-7.
w r  . * * * » «>• »
- 174 -
trade fell. Morice's initiative at Kilwa tapped a valuable new 
source of slaves for the French colonists of the Mascarenes. But 
while slaves from Kilwa were considerably less expensive than those 
from either Ibo or Moyambique in the 1770s, Morice concluded that 
the latter "are preferred to those from Kilwa and are sold for a 
higher price in H e  de France." Furthermore, Cossigny added a note
that "the Makua slaves they bring to lie de France are the most
esteemed of all the Mozambique people. "(1) Undoubtedly, the great 
majority of slaves exported from Ibo were Makua, but it is more 
difficult to determine the tribal origin of those embarked at
Moyambique. Nor does Pereira do Lago's remark that "the Xao
introduce infinite numbers of slaves here, and Macuana has no other 
commerce," help matters. According to one authority, however, of 
every 1000 slaves exported from Moyambique by the French, 150 came 
from the Xao and 570 from the Makua, with the remainder coming from 
Sofala (80), Inhambane (150), and Sena (250). But while Portuguese 
sources confirm the popularity of the Makua, as slaves, with the 
French, they themselves viewed the situation rather differently.
As Lanyous, wrote, the French "bring the best merchandise, which is 
money, and take away the worst commodities, which are Makua slaves. "(2) 
This sentiment, which probably was shared by all the Portuguese of 
Moyambique, was a reflection of the radically worsened state of 
relations between the Makua and the Portuguese, a situation which 
was a direct result of the increased tempo of the French slave 
trade at that port.
According to Pereira do Lago, relations with the Makua had been 
tense since 1772,(5) but according to the anonymous author of the 
valuable Breve e verdadeira noticia da Guerra do Uticullo com o 
Bstado de Mossambique nos annos de 1785 e 1784. there weflg other, more
(1) Ibid., pp.185,189; also 152,158-9,168,195.
(2) AHU, 014 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 15 August 1778; AHU,
CM 15, anon., "0s Franceses extraem...," n.d.; TT, MR, mayo
602, Lanyous, "Memories," Goa, 5 August 1779.
(5) AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 15 August 1778.
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specific factors which had led. to the resumption of open warfare 
between the Makua and the Portuguese in the mid-1770s. (1) In 
1774, during the height of Pereira do Lago’s slave trading with the 
French, Jo&o Francisco Delgado, the Captin-Major of the Mainland, was 
an especially active participant in that same trade. Unsatisfied with 
the profits he was making by trading openly, he is said to have begun 
secretly to seize free Africans who were residents of Voacella, a small 
settlement situated two leagues from Mossunl on the route to Uticu^lo. 
These he also sold to the French. Delgado was soon joined by Mateus 
Coelho de Castro and the two kidnappers applied themselves diligently 
to this profitable business. Within a very short time, nVoacella 
was depopulated, as it is still found today.*1 Murimuno, whose follow­
ers the people of Voacella were, naturally sought satisfaction, but as 
both his solicitations and his threats provoked no response from 
Delgado, he prepared to attack the coast. On 6 January 1776 Murimuno 
swept over Mossuril at the head of more than 8000 "well armed Kaffirs,'*
(2), burning and looting everything they could. More than a hundred 
Portuguese, or their followers, were killed, and many captives, 
including whites, were seized. Both the fortress and the church 
were robbed, and the Makua returned to their settlements with the 
field "full of truncated bodies, and the survivors filled with such 
a fear that they never more will lose it."(5)
(1) Alcantara Guerreiro, MBpisodios ineditos das lutas contra os
macuas no reinado de D.Maria I, segupdo o Codice CXVI, f'ls.
179 a 184 da Biblioteca Pubiica de Bvora, ** Boletim da Sociedade 
de Estudos da Colonia de Mozambique. 52, 1947, pp.79-109. 
Alcantara Guerreiro suggests that the author may have been 
Jeronimo Jose Nogueira de Andrade, who had arrived at 
Mocambique in 1785; see below, p.
(2) As in the previous decades, the Portuguese still sold firearms
secretly to the Makua on the mainland opposite Mogambique,
despite Moricefs belief that the Makua only received these
and gunpowder from French smugglers there. Ibid., p.94;
FKi. p.128.
(5) AlcSntara Guerreiro, "Episodios," pp.95-6; cf. AHU, CM 19, 
Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Mossuril,
9 November 1785.
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Pereira do Lago*s initial efforts to castigate Murimuno failed 
completely, and eight months later the Makua were still terrorizing 
the Portuguese mainland. Food supplies were low at Mozambique 
because the Makua had prohibited all trade with the Portuguese. By 
August 1776, however, he had enlisted the aid of more than twenty 
Makua chieftains from Cambira, "who always were useful due to their 
farming and their good friendship with the Portuguese." These 
Makua had long been anxious to establish their rule over Uticulo 
and thus they willingly took up the-Portuguese cause as a cover for 
their own abmitions. Mocutoamuno, one of the most powerful of the 
Cambira chieftains and a long-standing friend of the Portuguese, 
commanded this force, which was soon driving Murimuno *s people out 
of their villages, farther into the hinterland. (1) Nevertheless, 
two years later Portuguese holdings on the mainland were still 
largely abandoned and their owners were ever fearful of "the continual 
threat of those indomitable Kaffirs," a situation which was unchanged 
at the time of Pereira do Lago's death in 177y.(2) his policy of 
setting rival Makua groups against each other for the benefit of 
Mozambique eventually backfired, however, for in the early 1780s 
Mocutoamuno was numbered among the enemies of the Portuguese, as an 
ally of Murimuno and the other important chieftains of Uticulo.(5)
The unsettled conditions at Mossuril and in Uticulo in the later
1770 s could only have harmed the operation of long distance trading
to Mozambique, as they had in previous years. Not only did the iao 
route to Mojambique take them through Uticulo, but Uticulo lay between 
that route and Cambira, so that It was probably impossible for the lao 
to reach Mozambique by diverting through Cambira.(4) Certainly the
(1) AHU, CM 15 & Cod.1552, fl.256-8, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moz**
16 August 1776; AHU, CM 15, same to Viceroy, Moz., 15 August 1776.
(2) ibid., same to Crown, Moz., ^  August 1778; cf. ibid., Lanzous to
M. de Melo e Castro, Moq., 17 October 1778, where he describes
a Makua raid on Sanculo.
(5) Alcantara Guerreiro, "Episodios," pp.96,105.
(4) bee above, p. .
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Yao must have been unable to come to Mossuril during the chaotic 
year of 1776. That nothing further is known of the Yao until 
1776, however, and then only very little, (1) is partially due to 
the sparseness of documentation for the entire decade; but it also 
seems to be symptomatic of a decline in the volume of trade then 
being done by the Yao to Mozambique, a development which is attested 
to by the events of the succeeding years.
2. The redirection of Yao trade to Kilwa.
Pereira do Lago*s successors in the government of Mojambique 
had no more success than he in dealing with the bellicose Makua of 
Uticulo. Besides, until the return of Saldanha de Albuquerque, in 
1762, these men were more interested in trading for their own profit 
than in restoring some semblance of order to the mainland.(2) At 
the end of 1779 the Portuguese mainland was still in a state of total 
disorder as a result of the continuous raids made by the Makua against 
the Portuguese. Uhile some trade was still carried on, the Makua 
of Uticulo frequently robbed those African traders who passed through 
their territory on the way to the coast. Half a year later Makua 
incursions appear to have been less frequent and serious, but the 
situation on the mainland still remained precarious.(5) On his 
return to Moqambique as Governor-General in 1782, Saldanha de 
Albuquerque found that the general terror of a Makua raid was so 
pronounced that a single shout announcing their approach could send 
all the Portuguese on the mainland fleeing to their boats. In order 
to give himself time to formulate a plan of action, Saldanha de 
Albuquerque conveyed his wishes for peace to the Makua, together with
(1) AHU, CM 15, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moq., 15 August 1778; EHGEP.
p.270, note continued from preceding page; see above, p. HM.
(2) See below, pp. 115-G,
(o) TT, MR, maqo 604, Aboim to Crown, M09., 27 August 1779; AHU, CM 16, 
Fr. Francisco de Santa Teresa to Gov., Moq., 21 December 1779;
ibid., Vicente Caetano de Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e 
Castro, Moj., 18 August 1780; AHU, CM 17, same to same, M09.,
25 September 1781.
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presents for the chiefs, as had been the custom of each government 
since January 1776. As usual, the chiefs agreed, but within two 
months the policy of appeasement had once again failed and the 
Makua resumed their raiding of the Portuguese mainland. After 
consulting with various ranging officials, Saldanha de Albuquerque 
opted for a new war against the Makua of Uticulo.
it was decided to attack Uticulo in a pincer movement emptying 
the regular and auxiliary troops of Mozambique, the combined forces 
of numerous friendly Makua chieftains, those of the Sheikhs of 
Sanculo and Ctiitangonha, and a special force coming overland from 
the Cape Delgado area. These were all to go into action at the 
beginning of October 1783, at the arrival of the Cape Delgado force.
But its commander, Joaquim Jos£ da Costa Portugal, who was also 
Governor of that district, fell seriously ill on the banks of the 
Lurio River and the expedition was detained there into November.
Mutimuno took advantage of this delay and launched a quick, 
effective attack on Matibane, in the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of 
quitangonha. Greatly disheartened by the failure of his grand 
plan to crush the Makua, Saldanha de Albuquerque*s health failed 
and he died on 24 November 1785. As specified by law, (1) the 
colony was then entrusted to a provisional government consisting of 
the senior military, judicial, and clerical officials at Mozambique 
until a new Governor-General was nominated by the Court. At first, 
the new government was divided on whether or not to continue the war, 
which had begun so inauspiciously, but the repeated and increasingly 
bold incursions of the Makua soon determined them to persist in that 
effort.(2)
(1) AHU, Cod. 1472,fl. 14-15, royal alvara. Ajuda, 11 February 1782; cf.
Lobato, Historia do Presidio de Lourenqo Marques.ildsboa. Iy49,p.69.
(2) Alcantara Guerreiro, ttEpid6dios,1 pp.98-lUU; AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de
Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Mossuril, 9 November 1785;
ibid., Maia e Vasconcelos to same, Moq., 12 November 1785; AHU,
CM 21, Prov.Govt. to same, Moq., 7 August 1784. Each of the
first three sources presents a different viewpoint of the war,
as each party had its own torch to bear. For details of the
organization of the force from Ibo, see AHU, CM 20, Costa Portugal
to saldanha de Albuquerque, Ibo, 2/ & 28 September 1785, and A
logoa de Cagavero, 5 October 1785; AHU, CM 21, Joao de Morais
to Prov.Govt., Arlrriba, 22 July 1784.
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On 8 January 1764 the Cape Delgado force, less than 200 men 
strong, supported by the powerful and friendly Makua chief 
Inhamacomo, also known as Comalla, attacked Uticulo. This foray 
produced no permanent results, however, and a fortnight later the 
Portuguese again struck at Uticulo, concentrating on Murimuno*s 
own village of Mutipa, this time with greater success. With the 
tide running their way, for a change, the Portuguese pressed their 
advantage and on 11 February launched an even more successful attack 
against the enemy. This was followed by independent assaults made 
by the Sheikhs of Ouitangonha and Sanculo. By this time the Makua 
had suffered considerable losses and many had fled from Uticulo to 
the interior. Tired of fighting, their chiefs sent five ambassadors 
to Cabaceira Grande with orders to make peace with the Portuguese. (1) 
Naturally, the Portuguese required the fulfillment of certain 
conditions of peace by the Makua. Numbering seven, these included 
a call for the cessation of all hostilities among themselves, as well 
as with the Portuguese, support against foreign threats, and the 
return of runaway slaves.(2) Murimuno, whose domain was nearest to 
the Portuguese and who had suffered the greatest losses, was willing 
to accept peace on these terms, but the other chiefs of Uticulo —  
Mauruqa, Maviamuno, Mocutoamuno, and Mevorirauno —  refused them* 
Murimuno accordingly came to the coast to make his peace with the 
Portuguese, but his arrival was almost immediately followed, on 8 
June, by yet another concerted Makua attack on Mossuril and the 
Cabaceiras, causing considerable damage and taking many prisoners. 
Nine days later, preparations were completed for the departure of a 
major expedition to crush Mauruqa. Portuguese forces were again 
joined by large contingents supplied by the Sheikhs of Quitangonha 
and Sanculo, so that the army numbered some 5000 men. Seeing an
(1) Alcantara Guerreiro, "Episodios," pp.100-102; AHU, CM 21, Maia
e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moq., 18 August 1784; 
see ibid., Francisco de Freitas, Moq., 25 February 1784.
(2) Alcantara Guerreiro, f,Epis6dios,w pp.102-5; see AHU, CM 19,
Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moq., 12 November 
1785; below, fp.DZ.
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ideal opportunity to increase his own authority, Comalla 
independently declared war on Mocutoamuno, from his stronghold 
in Cambira. By 15 July the Portuguese force had returned to the 
coast, largely successful in its appointed task. All the chiefs 
of Uticulo, save only the powerful Mauruqa, had been chastized, 
and sought peace.(1)
On 24 July, Murimuno formally ceded his country and its 
government to the (^ ueen of Portugal, declaring himself to be her 
vassal. For their part, the Portuguese allowed him to continue 
as chief in these lands, under protection, so long as he remained 
faithful and obedient. Formal possession of this newest conquest, 
which included the villages of Mutipa, Nanruxixi, Greja, Namusupe, and 
their districts, was taken for the Portuguese Crown by Rodrigo da 
F'onseca, the Sergeant-Major of the mainland, on 15 September 1784, 
in the presence of Murimuno and his people's elders. Things were 
not quite so neatly concluded with the other Makua chiefs of Uticulo, 
however, whose greater distance from the coast maae their professions 
of peace rather less certain. Although Comalla was trying to 
establish one of his nephews as chief of Uticulo, it was feared 
that if Comalla1 s plan succeeded the Portuguese might one day be
faced with a more powerful enemy than that which they had just
defeated, in the person of Comalla's nephew. Nevertheless, Comalla 
had again shown his continued good faith by refusing to ally himself 
with some of Mauruqa's followers, and thus nothing seems to have been 
done to discourage him from completing his design. Despite these 
fears, the following year was one of peace, and, after nearly a decade
of hostilities, relations between the Portuguese and the Makua were
(1) Alc&ntara Guerreiro, "Episodios,n pp.105-9; AHU, CM 21, Maia e 
Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moq., 18 August 1784;
ibid., same to Marques de Angonja, Moq., 18 August 1784.
While Maia e Vasconcelos claims the hero's role for himself
in defending against the attack of 8 June, the author of the
Noticia severely criticized him for disobeying orders and 
thereby upsetting the original plan of defense.
*> r
- m -
V o « e * ( l*
Hufo »u»w»*
3lo V e U ’*«>
Uia
u »{■<*« 9 ® " k •
NoS»urU 
^ — — C«liAC«Ira
l>*Wac*» ra. Pe^ue**
KCk(0
M a p  & * Mof andl erwriro hs
- 182 -
free of strife.(1)
The effect of these turbulent years in Macuana on the trade 
of the lao to Mozambique was clearly decisive. Although traae 
was stopped completely only during the seasons of 1783 and 1784, 
when fighting between the Portuguese and the Makua was virtually 
continuous, (2) it is strikingly clear that the volume of the lao 
ivory trade to Mozambique had declined radically since its heyday 
at mid-century, when 400 to 800 bares were carried there in each 
trading season, A general, yet telling, indication of the harmful 
effect which the Makua wars had had on this commerce is the 
inclusion of the following article, and the prominence given to it 
by the Portuguese, as one of the conditions for peace with the 
Makua in 1784: "That they /the Makua/ must allow the lao, or any
other Kaffirs who should come to trade with the Portuguese, to pass 
freely through their territory. 5) In its immediate context this 
demand referred to the total severance of trade relations with the 
iao which the then current fighting had produced. But it seems 
also to have been an attempt to recreate those conditions of 
stability which reigned during the 1750s and 1740s, and which were 
so important to the flourishing of the ivory trade. For by the 
early 1780s the lao were bringing no more than 100 to 130 bares of 
ivory to Mossuril, annually, and the sum of all their yearly trading, 
which included slaves, iron, provisions, fowl, ana tobacco, as well
(1) AHU, CM 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy., 6 August 1784,
and enclosure, anon., Moy., 24 July 1784, describing Murimunofs 
vassalage; AHU, Cod. 1885, f‘1.68, port aria. Prov.Govt. to 
Bodrigoda Fonseca, M05., 30 July 1784; ibid., fl.88, Bernardo 
da Silva, "Autto da Posse tomada das Provayoens abaixo declarada, 
e Seus aestrictos por vertuae da Portaria supra,1 18 September 
1784; AHU, CM 21, Joao Vicente de Cardenas e Mira to Senado da 
Camara. Mossuril, 6 October 1784; ibid., reply, Moy., 7 October 
1784; AHU, CM 25, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro,
Moy., 20 August 1788.
(2) AHU, CM 19, same to Fr.Amaro Jose de Sao Tomas and Antonio de Morais
Durao, Moy., 21 July 1784, although Maia e Vasconcelos incorrectly 
attributed their absence to the effect of Saldanha de Albuquerque's
corporation of merchants, which he bitterly opposed; cf. below, 
p. Ill*
C°) G uerreiro, 11 fp-loZ-3.
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as ivory, was calculated at being worth no more than 500,000 
cruzados.(1) In the 1780s the ivory alone was worth from 400,000 
to 800,000 cruzados each year. Thus it is clear that the Xao 
were no longer flocking to Moyambique as they had in previous 
years.(2)
While there con be no doubt that the persistence of unstable 
conditions in Macuana was the principal cause of this decline, at 
least at the Moyambique end, we must not neglect the less obvious 
role played by official Portuguese efforts to limit the commercial 
power of the Banian traders there. Pereira do Lago, despite his 
personal sentiments on the matter, which he had made clear to the 
Crown in a remarkably antipathetical letter of 1772,(5) had, in 
view of the financial interests of Moyambique, and perhaps of his 
own purse, refrained from taking further action against them other 
than continuing to enforce Silva Barba's bando which required the 
Banians to seek the Governor-General1s license for the purpose of 
crossing over to the mainland, or going to the subordinate ports.
One week after his death, however, public sentiment again manifested 
itself much as it had during the administration of David Marques 
Pereira: all the commercial ills of Moyambique were blamed on the
Banians.(4)
As we have seen,(5) their monopoly as suppliers of Indian trade 
cloths made it virtually impossible for any morador to compete with
(1) AHU, CM 21, Maia e Vasconcelos to SSo Tomas and Morals Durao, Moy.,
21 July 1784; see AHU, CM 19, Jose Ferreira Nobre to Saldanha 
de Albuquerque, Inhambane, 11 June 1785; AHU, CM 18, Lima, 
"Kelayam aos descaminhos," article 18.
(2) See AHU, CM 2b, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy.,
20 August 1785, noting the arrival of the lao at Mossuril in 
1786; see below, pp.
(5) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Moy., 12 August
1785, enclosing Pereira do Lago to Crown, Moy., 10 August 1772; 
see above, p.
(4) AHU, CM 17, Senado da C&mara to Prov.Govt., Moy., 10 June 1779,
enclosing requerimento dos moradores to Senado da Camara, n.d., 
both included among documents pertaining to the residincia of fr. 
Jose de Vasconcelos e Almeida, conducted by Jo&o Nogueira da 
Cruz in 1781.
(5) See above, p. UH.
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them in trading with the lao and the Makua. Although there seems 
not to have been a considerable growth in the resident population 
of the Indian community at Moyambique since the 1780s, wher^Lt was 
about £UU individuals, their hoiuings on the mainland do appear 
to have increased, for some two dozen Banian trading houses were 
established there by 1781.(1) Furthermore, whereas in the 1750s 
it was rare for more than one ship to come from Diu and one from 
Dam&o each year to Moyambique, by the late 1770s it was normal for 
five to appear there from Diu alone in a single monsoon. (2) This 
new development was a direct consequence of the termination in 1777 
of the monopoly of the Moyambique trade there by the Company of 
Mazanes, which haa been established in 1686. Freed from this 
monopoly, the energetic Banian traders of H u  thereafter converged 
on Moyambique every year in unprecedented numbers. There must 
therefore have been a proportionately large seasonal increase in the 
Indian population of Moyambique which, coming as it did during the 
height of the lao trading season, the moradores undoubtedly resented. 
That such an increase did occur is confirmed by the fact that Saldanha 
de Albuquerque was greeted by more than 500 Banians on the island at 
his arrival in 1782;(5) as for evidence of the general Portuguese 
antipathy for these seasonal arrivals, not to mention their fellow 
countrymen who were regular inhabitants of Moyambique, there is more 
than ample documentation.
(1) Bee above,pp.lZ0-l ; AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Moy.,
18 August 1781; ibid., residencia of Vasconcelos e Almeida, 1781
see also, AHU, CM 19, "Mappa das Cazas, Palmares, Cha8s, Negros, 
Negras, Gados, Navios, Bateis, e mais Bmbarcayoens, q posstttm 
nesta Villa Cap. de Moyambique os Banianes existentes nella, 
e nas Terras firmes feito em o Mez de Dezembro de 1782...,H 
summarized in leixeira Botelho, Hist^ria. I^p.597. In 1776, 
the total number of moradores. of all ages, in Moyambique," was 
270; in Mossuril, 71; in the Cabaceiras, 79; in 1778, these 
figures were 271, 68, and 72, respectively: AHU, CM 18, anon.,
mapas of population of moradores. 21 May 1776, and 1778.
(2) BUG HP. p.269; AHU, CM 17 & Cod.1545, fl.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos
to Crown, Moy., 18 August 1781; AHU, CM 19, Pereira do Lago to 
Crown, Moy., 10 August 1772; ibid. & AC, i, 1917, pp.251-5, 
275-80, at 255, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Sec.St.. Moc..
12 August 1785.
(5) ibia., p. 255.
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During the brief administration (4 June to 18 December 1779) of 
the provisional government which succeeded Pereira do Lago, no 
response was made to the requerimento of 10 June.(l) ibis was not 
the case after the arrival of the new Governor-General, for as much 
as any of his predecessor^ Fr. JosS de Vasconcelos de Almeida sought 
to utilize his position for hiw own personal profit. Eager to maJke 
a killing, he was only too willing to attack the monopoly of the 
Banian traders. On 27 May 1760, in response to the wishes of the 
Senado da Camara and the moradores. he issued a bando which 
prohibited the trade of the Xao and all the mainland to ”all those 
who are not nationals of this Continent, and Portuguese.” He also 
formed an exclusive company of twelve men, with himself at its head, 
to trade with the lao. The effect of these two measures was to 
squeeze out completely the Banian merchants from trading at Moyambique. (2).
(1) At the request of sixteen local merchants, however, among whom were
included both Banians and Muslims, a plan was formulated by 
Diogo Guerreiro de Aboim, who as Chief Justice was a member of 
that government, to organize a new company of trade for 
Moyambique which would put an end to the disorders which free 
trade had brought to the Conquest. The plan was never 
implemented, nor did it make mention at all of the trade of 
Macuana or of the Xao, which it presumably intended to remain 
free, as it had been throughout the century. AHU, CM 16, two 
attestations that Aboim met with sixteen merchants to discuss 
the organization of trade at Moyambique, one initiated by Aboim, 
the other signed by the merchants, both dated Moy., 6 August 1779; 
TT, ME, mayo 604, Aboim to Crown, Moy., 27 August 1779, enclosing 
his Plano da Companhia. Moy., 24 August 1779; AHU, Cod.1472, 
fl.5-4, Crown to Govl of Moy., Lisboa, 25 February 1781; see 
AHU, CM 18, Aboim, “Memoria rellativa ao decadents Est&do, e 
interesses da Capitania de Mossambique,n Lisboa, 24 Januaiy 1782; 
Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, i, pp.115-16. For another proposal for 
curing the commercial ills of Moyambique, see TT, ME, mayo 602, 
Lanyous, "Memorias sobre Mossambique,” Goa, 5 August 1779.
(2) AHU, CM 16, bando. Vasconcelos de Almeida, Mossuril, 27 May 1780;
TT, ME, mayo 604, resid&ncia of Aboim, 27 November 1780 to 4
January 1781; AHU, CM 16, Lima, ”Relayam des descaminhos,1
articles 15-16; see AHU, Cod.1472, fl.13-14, & Cod.1540, n.l.
448, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, Junqueira, 15 October
1781; AHU, CM 16, Vasconcelos de Almeiaa to M. de Melo e Castro,
Moy., 20 August 1780, in which he falsely asserts that the
company was open to all those who wished to enter it, including
Banians. It is worth noting that one of his associates in this 
company was the unsavoury Joao Francisco Delgado; see above,
p. nr.
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Few details are known about this new Bocieaade de Mu.iao. but 
Vasconcelos de Almeiaa* s measures against the Banians were later 
spoken of as being unusually harsh. Beeing no other way to prosecute 
their case at Moyambique, these retaliated by not ordering any trade 
cloths to come from biu in the winter monsoon of 1780-1781, as a 
result of which the revenue from alfandega duties fell by some 
55,000 cruzados in the latter year.(l) But this was scarcely of 
any concern to Vasconcelos de Almeida, who died on 7 May of that 
year, having amassed a fortune of more than 90,000 cruzados during 
his brief term of office.(2)
Following the precedent when David Marques Pereira became 
+Ke a
Governor-General. Benado da Camara elected the senior military 
officer of the colony, Maia e Vasconcelos, to succeed Vasconcelos de 
Almeida. Although the new Governor-General had been an intimate 
councillor of his predecessor, as well as a member of his exclusive 
society, he did not seek to continue the latter* s monopoly under nis 
own tutelage. But he did press the assault against the Banian 
traders, in an effort to throw open the trade with the Yao and the 
Makua to the entire local Portuguese community.(o) Thus, on 1 June 
1781, Maia e Vasconcelos promulgated yet another bando which 
specifically and absolutely forbade all Banians from going to Mossuril 
to trade with the Yao. According to its terms, they were to be 
limited to selling their cloth to moradores on the capital-island 
itself, and only at the prices which were established in the alfandega.
(1) AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Bec.Bt., Moy., 25 September 1781;
ibid., Senado da Camara to Gov., /moy.7> 7 August 1781; ibid., 
AHU, God.1545, fl.95-6 & Cod.15447 fl72-5, Maia e Vasconcelos to 
Crown, Moy., 18 August 1781.
(2) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.58-9, Crown to Custodio Dias de Bousa, Ajuda,
7 March 1785*, gives the official figure of 57: 155^200 reis. or
92,858 cruzados; Alcantara Guerreiro, "Episodios,9 p.97, EL5,
gives it as over 100,000 cruzados.
(5) Bee AHU, Cod.1472, f 1.40-5, Crown to Dias de Bousa, Ajuda, 21 March
1785. Maia e Vasconcelos began by ordering, unsuccessfully,
that all the Banians living in the Kemraba Islands should be
dispossessed from there and resettled at Moyambique; AHU, Cod.
1545, fl.12, Maia e Vasconcelos to Gov. of Cape Delgado Islands. 
Hoy., 14 may 1781. *
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As a palliative, he made provisions facilitating the collection of 
their debts from the moradores. who always bought on credit, but 
this was not a satisfactory substitution for the right to trade for 
themselves.(1) The ensuing conflict which took place over the 
legality of this bando echoed those which had raged before, but 
centered on the interpretation of the royal free trade proclamations 
of 1755 ana 1757. The Banians rightly argued that these had freed 
the trade of the entire colony to all Portuguese subjects, including 
themselves, while the Senado da Camara claimed, less plausibly, that 
the trade of Mossuril, by virtue of its not being specifically 
mentioned by the Crown, was not open to the Banians. In the end, 
however, the outcome was determined not by legal merits, but by 
economics. Realizing that it was virtually impossible for the 
government to break the monopoly of the Banians in supplying Indian 
trade cloths to Moyambique, and fearful that the alf&ndega would 
suffer another crushing loss of revenue in the coming year, as it 
had in the present one.^ Senado da Camara and Maia e Vasconcelos bowed 
before the economic pressure which the Banians were able to exert if 
they so chose. It is also clear that another form of economic 
pressure, the crossed pa.lip, was influential in convincing the 
Governor-General to reverse his decision. On 7 August both agreed 
to the granting of licenses which would allow individual Banians nto 
go to the mainland of Mossuril to trade for ivory with the Yao, Makua, 
end other Kaffir nations,” notwithstanding the contrary bando of 
1 June 1781, from which the recipients were excepted. The licenses
(1) AHU, Coa.1545, fl.17-8, bando. Maia e Vasconcelos, moy., 1 June 
1781; and f1.52-5, 9 June 1781.
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were immediately granted to seventeen Banians.(1)
Nevertheless, shortly after he made this concession, Mala e 
Vasconcelos dispatched a scathing letter, condemning the Banians 
for a multitude of sms, to the Crown. The only way to remedy the 
situation, he avowed, was to form a monopolistic company in which 
only fourteen, or fifteen, of the principal Banian trading houses 
of Moyambique would be allowed to participate. (2) But nothing was 
done towards this end until the arrival of Saldanha ae Albuquerque, 
who, although he had formerly been a champion of the Banians* rights, 
had now become their most bitterly prejudiced adversary. Furthermore, 
influenced by the harsh reports of Pereira do Lago and Maia e 
Vasconcelos, the Crown, recently assumed by the fanatically devout 
Maria I (1777-1816), was not so inclined to protect enemies of the 
faith, as it had been under the liberal dictatorship of Pombal.
The new Governor-General1s orders not only disapproved of the 
licensing arrangement of his predecessor, but also ordered that he 
was "under no circumstances, to grant the trade of the continent to
(1) AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to dec.St., Moy., 25 September 1781,
enclosing "Requerimento aos Banianes raercadores existentes nesta 
Capital, sobre o Comercio da Terra firrae de Mossuril,” /Moy.7> 
n.d., but probably 28 June 1781, and "Keposta da CamaraJ" Moy.,
14 July 1781; cf. also Cod*l545, fl.52-67, for copies of these 
two, and related, documents; AHU, CM 17, testimonies supporting 
the Banians' case, Gaetano de Quadros and Jos£ Francisco de 
Begreira e Pires, both dated Moy., 21 July 1781, and Inacio de 
Melo Alvim, Moy., 22 July 1781; AHU, Cod.1545, fl.68-80,
"Keposta dos mercadores Banianes," Moy., 5 August 1781; AHU,
CM 17, Senado da Camara to Gov., Moy., 7 August 1781; AHU,
Cod.1471, fl.4u-5, Crown to Bias de Sousa, Ajuda, 21 March 1785; 
AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos, 1787; AHU, Cod.1545, 
fl.87, "Kegisto da Licenya se passou ao Baniane.,.Punja Velgy, p. 
hir comerciar as terras firmes de Mossuril, e aos mais Banianes 
abaixo declarados," Moy., 7 August 1781.
(2) AHU, CM 17 and God.1545, f1.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Hoy.,
18 August 1781; AHU, Cod.1540, n. 465, Conselho Ultramarino to 
Gov. of Moy., Lisboa, 29 January 1782; see above, p. III.
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the Banians and Moors." (1) Not surprisingly, then, in response 
to the wishes of the moradores. he soon issued a bando that all 
Banians must be recalled from the subordinate ports to Moyambique 
and that no Banian could go to the mainland without receiving his 
personal passport, nor could he send his slaves there. Far more 
drastically, he ordered that all those Banians who owned property, 
including slaves, on the mainland, must sell all to Christian 
moradores within a month.(2) This last order was not immediately 
implemented, but the compilation, in December, of a list of all the 
property owned by Banians in Moyambique ana on the mainland, 
indicates that Saldanha de Albuquerque had certainly not abandoned 
the idea. Concurrently, the Senado da Camara was taking other 
steps to break the commercial power of the Banians on the mainland; 
namely, by forcing the dispossessing! t of the native Swahili and 
Makua, whom the Senado da Camara looked upon as agents of the Banians 
in their trading with the lao, from the settlements of Nandoa, 
Mutamulamba, and Savasava.(o)
By springtime, the cumulative effect of these measures had led 
to their logical conclusion: the virtual suspension of trade.(4)
Saldanha de Albuquerque's solution to the problem of invigorating 
ana Lusitanizing the trade of the colony was to propose the formation
(1) See above, pp,l23-*{ ; AHU, C o d . l 4 ? 2 ,  fl.12-13, M. de Melo e
Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 8 March 1782; see 
AC. i, 1917, pp.251-5, 275-80, for the latter'3 most 
vituperative anti-Banian tirade (12 August 1783), which is 
also notable for its distorted review of his predecessors' 
attitudes towards the Banians; Boxer, Race Relations, pp.85-4.
(2) AHU, CM 18 Sc 19, Sc Cod.1555, fl.235, bando. Saldanha de Albuquerque,
Moy., 16 October 1782; AHU, CM 17, same, fragment concerning 
his orders to the Senado da Camara and their surveillance of the 
selling of Banians' patamares. n.d.
(5) AHU, CM 19, "Mappa das Cazas...q' possuem.*.os Banianes," Moy., 
December 1782; AHU, CM 18, Caetano de Quadros to Saldanha de 
Albuquerque, Cabaceira, 24 December 1782; ibid., Senado da 
Camara to Morais Durao, Moy., 15 January 1785; ibid., Morals 
Durao to Quadros, Moy., 18 January 1783.
(4) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy.,
1 August 1785.
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of a new, monopolistic trading company. (1) Discussion of the form 
which this corpoxiation should take lasted from mid-April until early 
June, when it was finally created. At first, Saldanha de Albuquerque, 
the Senado da Camara, and the principal Portuguese merchants of 
Moyambique were strongly inclined towards making it an exclusively 
Portuguese concern, while the last party wanted no part of the trade 
of the subordinate ports, but only that of Mossuril. In the end, 
however, the reasoning of Morais Dur&o, the Chief Justice of the 
colony, persuaded them that unless the principal banian merchants 
of the island were admitted into the company, not only would it be 
doomed to financial failure, but it would certainly be rejected by 
the Crown, as the resident Banians were "Vassals of the Sovereign, 
like the rest." The Portuguese merchants were also induced to 
support the idea of a comprehensive monopoly. In its final form, 
the corporation had a monopoly of all trade in common trade cloths, 
beads, ivory, rhinocerous horn, hippopotamus teeth, and cashew wine, 
although the buying of slaves remained outside its provenance. The 
trade of these items was to be controlled by the corporation 
throughout the entire province, save only the bay of Lourenyo Marques, 
which was controlled by a separate society of traders.(£) Standard 
prices were to be fixea for all cloths and for ivory, which were the 
most important of all articles of trade. The numerous conditions 
for the establishment of the company were subscribed to by eighteen 
moradores and thirteen Banians.(5)
(1) This is somewhat surprising in view of his strong condemnation of
Almeida de Vasconcelos1s company; see AHU, Cod.1540, n. 448,
and Cod.l47£, f'1.15-14, Saldanha de Alouquerque to Crown, 
Junqueira, 15 October 1781.
(£) See Lobato, Louren90 Marques, i, pp.l£4-6, 150, l5£-5.
(5) AHU, CM 19, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy.,
1 August 1785, enclosing copies of (a) Morais Durao to Saldanha 
de Albuquerque, Ho<}., 2Z April 1785; (b) twelve Portuguese
merchants to same, Moy., £9 April 1785; (c) Morais Durao to
same, Moy., £ May 1765; (d) eleven Portuguese traders to same,
Moy., 6 May 17B5; (e) Hcondiyoens com que se fundou a
Corporayato,H Moy., 5 June 1785; (f) alvara. Saldanha de
Albuquerque^ Moy., 7 June 1785. For more details on the 
administration of the corporation, see Lobato, Lourenco 
Marques, i, pp.H7-£0.
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The new corporation was not, however, without its opponents, 
foremost of whom was, surprisingly, Maia e vasconcelos, who was 
doubtless aisgruntied at not being privy to these proceedings*
It was also attacked fcy the merchants of DamSo. Not least of all, 
it failed to fulfill its purpose, as traae and revenue plummeted* 
Besides, as Lobato has so rightly observed, it was customary “to 
undo, before long, all the works of any governor,” so that 
Saldanha de Albuquerque's corporation shortly came to the same end, 
after his death, as had that of Vasconcelos de Almeida. Its 
existence was doomed qy the Crown on 2 March 1785, and the order 
faithfully executed by the provisional governors, Morais i>urao and 
Maia e Vasconcelos, on ZZ August 1785. But while it was ordered 
“that Trade should continue to be carried on with the same freedom 
which formerly was practiced,“ it was equally stipulated “that the 
prohibition of the Banians trading personally on the mainland should 
remain in effect, until Her Majesty, being better informed, should 
determine what seems fitting in this matter.“(1)
Despite the marked decline in the volume of the lao ivoiy trade 
to Mossuril, it is clear that in the early 1780s the feira de Htfjtaos. 
or lao market, where all commercial transactions with the Yao and 
Makua were now negotiated, still handled “the best trade of all 
others that are lauded in this /part of/ Africa,” as the Banians 
themselves attested.(2) The Banians had gained a monopoly of this 
trade both by giving the Yao, and the Makua, a better price for their
(1) AHU, CM 19, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Mo5., 15 
October 1785; AHU, CM 21, same to Sao Tomas and Morais Dur&>,
Moy., 21 July 1784; AHU, CM 19, Manuel da Costa to Crown, moy.,
10 November 1785; AHU, CM 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro,
Moy., 6 August 1784; AHU, CM 22, bando. Morals Durao and Maia 
e vasconcelos, Moy., 22 August 1785; AHu, Cod.1472, fl.25-4 &
Cod. 1557,*.° 620, M. de Melo e Castro to Antonio Manuel de Melo e 
Castro, Samora Correa, 2 March 1785; Lobato, Lourenco Marques, 
i, pp;121-4*.151, 154-5; cf. Teixeira Botelho. Historia. pp. 
516-17, who incorrectly states that the corporation existed for 
four years and similarly implies that Maia e Vasconcelos supported it.
(2) AHU, CM 17 Sc Cod.1545, fl.52-5, “Registo do Kequerimento dos 
Baneanes mercadores existentes nesta Capital, sobre o Comercio da 
Terra firme de Mossuril,” Moy., probably 28 June 1781; see 
Lobato, "Rellayao dos Bstablicimentos Portugueses na Costa 
Oriental de Africa em 1809 per Henrique Salt sequndo “0
Investigaaor Portugues em Inglaterra", Moyambique.57.1944.p p .7-45.
 ^ at 05—8. n .8. ____
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ivory and by utilizing considerably more acumen in their personal, 
as well as commercial, relations with them than did the Portuguese, 
who looked upon the Africans simply as "barbarians,1 and who saw no 
reason to trade intelligently with them. Moyambique being their 
colony, they believed that the Africans should "naturally” come to 
trade with them, at whatever price they chose. The Banians were 
not so naive. According to a requerimento of the moradores. the 
Banians,
through their slaves, make themselves 
known to the various ^MakuaJ chief s 
at the price of large presents, so that 
these chiefs should direct to them not 
only the produce of their own lands, 
but also the Yao, who pass through 
their territory, and resorting to these 
subtleties in this manner, they make 
the chiefs believe that only they 
themselves are masters of the shipments 
of cloths, and that they alone order 
these to come to their country.11)
Whether the last part of this indictment was more truth than subtlety 
is debatable, but it does serve to illustrate the way in which the 
Banians wooed the Makua chiefs.
In another tirade against the trading practices of the Banians, 
the Senado da 6amara complained that whereas the Portuguese had 
formerly bought ivory "with the usual cloths, “ they were no longer 
able to do so, because the Banians had
insinuated themselves into, and corrupted, 
the Yao and Makua, solely to attract their 
trade, by cleverly giving them fashionable 
wide-sleeved tunics, caps, and shoes, with 
new colors, which they especially order 
to come from Diu.,.,/and/ that the negroes, 
seeing these strange~paintea cloths to be 
to their liking every year, hasten to the 
Banians, and not to any Christian trader, 
and wien one accidently does so, he leaves 
disconsolate, and certainly does not return 
again. And the rest is that when it is 
time for the lao to come, the Banians
(1) AHU, CM 17, requerimento dos moradores to Senado da Camara, n.d.,
enclosed in " Senado da Camara to Prov.Govt ., M09., 10 June 1779
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immediately send their patamares 
half way out along the route, only 
in order to induce and forestall 
them from going to the moradores.(1)
Furthermore, the Banians apparently aid not fail to cultivate good 
personal relations with the Africans with whom they dealt 
commercially, for Pereira do Lago observed that "the Kaffirs respect 
them.M The only morador of whom this was said, although there were 
probably several others, was Jo£o de Morais, who was widely respected 
by the Africans of the mainland opposite the Kerimba Islands.(2)
in view of these conditions, and the fact that the Banians gave 
the Xao a better price for their ivory, (5) it seems highly probable 
that any measures which prevented the Banians from trading on the 
mainland with the xao would have discouraged many of them from trading 
with the Portuguese at Mossuril. In addition to the various 
restrictions of this nature which we have already examined,
Vasconcelos de Almeida's regulation affecting the price of ivory can 
only have had a similar effect. Incorporated in his 1780 bando 
against the Banians, this established that one could not purchase 
ivory from the lao and the Makua at a price greater than 40 cruzados 
per arroba, equal to about 52 pounds, which was considerably less 
than the price of 56 cruzados per arroba which had been customary at 
the feira de Mu.iaos since the late 1760s. This depressed maximum 
evaluation remained in effect even after Maia e Vasconcelos agreed 
to allow properly licensed Banians to trade again at Mossuril. It 
was not discarded until after the arrival of Saldanha de Albuquerque,
(1) MU, CM 17 Sc Cod. 1545,fl.62-7, "Keposta da Camara," Mocj., 14 July
1781, P.6.
(2) AHU, CM 19, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Mo<j., 10 August 1772; see
MiG BP. p.279; AHU, CM 17, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, Mo<}.,
25 September 1781, and enclosures.
(5) AHU, Cm 19, Pereira do Lago to Crown, Mo<j., 10 August 1772; AHU, 
CM 17 Sc Cod.1545, f 1.95-6, Maia e Vasconcelos to Crown, M05.,
18 August 1781; AHU, CM 18 & 19, bando. Saldanha de 
Albuquerque, Mo<j., 16 October 1782; ibid., alvara. same, M05., 
7 June 1785.
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and perhaps then not until the establishment of his corporation in 
1765.(1) The Yao and Makua, who were famous for "the excessive 
price for which they reckoned ivory,11 (2) must have been driven 
away from Mossuril by such regulations. Furthermore, the corporation 
of merchants was not known for its generosity, either, but rather 
for "selling the cloths which they carried to the Negroes at very 
high prices, and buying veiy cheaply the goods which they received 
from them; which is precisely the way to ruin at its foundations 
all the Portuguese Business; /ana/to make ourselves odious to the 
Negroes."(5) It seems clear, then, that the various measures taken 
against the Banians by the government of Mozambique constituted an 
important factor in the decline of the Yao ivoiy trade to Mossuril.
Although the overland ivory trade to Moyambique was obviously 
plummeting during this period, the slave trade continued to be 
pursued vigorously and successfully. Only several of the men who 
governed Portuguese East Africa after the death of Pereira do Lago 
took advantage of their power to trade for their own profit in ivoiy; 
all not only followed his lead in slave trading with the French, but 
apparently eclipsed his excesses in that endeavor. Maia e Vasconcelos, 
for one, was known to have collected a gift of 1500 to 5uOU cruzados 
from each French ship which came to trade at Moyambique and to have 
continued the custom of charging the French a 16 cruzado head tax on 
every slave which they exported. According to Saldanha de
(1) AHU, CM 16, bando. Vasconcelos de Almeida, Moy., 27 May 1780; AHU,
CM 12, caaerno of Francisco Antonio Xavier, Moy., 1767; AHU, CM
14, Joao Vito da Silva, "Memoria A respeito da Correspondencia 
de Comercio de Goa, Dio e Damao com Moyambique," including a 
"Pauta das Avaliayoens de muitos generos na Alfandega de 
Moyambique," post-1777; BNL, Cota 252U,iG, f 1.107-8, "Guia 
para o Negocio da India e Africa Oriental, e uzo de todos os 
que o frequentaraS," c.1777; AHU, Cod.1545, fl.87, bando. Maia 
e Vasconcelos, Moy., 7 August 1781; AHU, CM 21, same to Sao 
Tomas and Morais Durao, Moy., 21 July 1784.
(2) AHU, CM 19 "Conaiyoens com que se fundou a Corporayao," Moy., 5
June 1785, article 7. Joao Vito da ^ilva should be identified
with Joao Vito, author of the "Noticias" on the Kerimba Islands; 
see above, p.
(5) AHU, Cod.1472, ±1,47-9, M. de Melo e Castro to A.M. de Melo e Castro.
Ajuda, 5 April 17855 ™  also in Lobato, Lourenyo ^argues, i,
p.lob; see AHU, Cod.1472, fl.45-4, Crown to Dias de bousa, Ajuda,
50 March 1785, for an almost identical passage.
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Albuquerque, this practice was standard procedure, and the greed 
of his predecessors often led them to exact yet another 1500, or 
2000, cruzados from the French captains.(1) When Saldanha de 
Albuquerque arrived there in 1782, he found three French slavers 
anchored in the harbor, each having entered under one of the usual 
false pretexts. Shortly thereafter yet another French vessel was 
run aground on the bar, its captain piously claiming that it had 
sprung a leak. On inspection, a leak was found, but it was 
obviously made for the purpose and could have been plugged easily. 
Saldanha de Albuquerque learned that the captain had indeed caused 
the leak himself, but that this is what the previous governors had 
wanted. Furthermore, he was told by one of the ship's officers, 
this vessel had been sent to Moyambique by the Governor-General of 
lie de France, who needed slaves for the French Asian fleet and who 
expected it to be received in good faith, and there were to others 
still to follow. The privilege of their trading at Moyambique had 
been granted, he continued, by Vasconcelos de Almeida, and Maia e 
Vasconcelos also had agreed to this, while the original arrangement 
even called for the stationing of a French agent on the island. 
Annoyed at the foolishness of the system of false pretext, Saldanha 
de Albuquerque granted the captain a license to trade and ordered 
him to enter openly. When the other two ships arrived, they were 
to do the same. Within two months this first vessel had a cargo of 
400 slaves and on its departure carried a letter from Saldanha de 
Albuquerque to the Governor-General of the French islands, Franyois 
de Souillac.(2)
(1) ibid., 11.40-5, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 21 March 1785; IT,
M±i, mayo 604, Le Fevre de Chantraine to Gov., Moy., 29 July 1779; 
AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos, 1787; AHU, CM 19 & 
AC. i, 1917, pp.56-42, Saldanha de Albuquerque to M. de Melo e 
Castro, Moy., 1 August 1785. Maia e Vasconcelos was imprisoned 
at Lisbon on 22 January 1788 for his various crimes against the 
Crown; F. Santana (ed.), Documentay&o Avulsa Moyambicana do 
Arquivo Historico Ultramarino. i, Lisboa, 1964, p.78.
U) Ag, i, 1917, pp.56-42.
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In this letter Saldanha de Albuquerque proposed to his French 
counterpart that although Portuguese law forbade foreigners to trade 
at Moyambique, except in cases of extreme need, he would encourage 
Portuguese merchants to supply the French islands with as many slaves 
as were needed there. Souillac's response was limited to reporting 
that he had made this decision known to the colony1 s &ipowners and to 
assuring Saldanha de Albuquerque that Portuguese vessels would be 
received as usual at the islands. (1) But Saldanha de Albuquerque 
was deeply impressed with the potential value to the Portuguese Crown 
of the French slave trade. Thus he recommended that it be legalized 
and regulated in such a manner as to turn it to the Crown's profit 
and to the advantage of the Portuguese colony. (2) As we shall later 
see, his ideas found a receptive audience in the Secretary of the 
Navy and Overseas Dominions, Hartinho de Melo e Castro. Nevertheless, 
neither Saldanha de Albuquerque's letter to Souillac, nor his 
righteous denunciation of his predecessor's sins prevented him from 
allowing the French to trade at Moyambique during his term of office.
At the time of his death, the French ship La Rose was in the harbor 
trading for slaves, reportedly in accordance with an agreement he 
had made with Souillac, although this may have been merely an 
erroneous interpretation of the letter previously cited. Furthermore, 
the usual 16 cruzados was paid for every slave embarked on La Rose.(5) 
The provisional government which succeeded Saldanha de Albuquerque 
similarly continued to allow the French to trade at Moyambique in
(1) AHU, CM 18, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Souillac, Moy., 18 November
1782; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.70-1, reply, H e  de France, 20 February 
1785.
(2) AC, i, 1917, pp.56-42.
(5) AHU, CM 19, Maia e Vasconcelos to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy., 12
November 1785; AHU, CM 21, S&o Tomas and Morais Durao to Crown, 
Moy., 26 March 1784, enclosing related reports by Maia e 
Vasconcelos, Moy., 28 January 1784; Morais Durao, Moy., 25 
February 1784; and JoSo da Silva Guedes, Moy., 24 February 1784 
AHU, Cod.1472, fl.43-4, Crown to Dias de Sousa, Ajuda, 50 March 
1785.
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exchange for the usual remunerations. (1)
Unfortunately, there is absolutely no document which gives 
us any clue to the volume of the French slave trade at Moyambique 
after the death of Pereira do Lago. There is, however, one which 
records that of the Portuguese slave trade there from 1781 through 
1785, giving a total of 7790 slaves exported aboard Portuguese 
vessels during that period. The yearly figures ares for 1781,
515; for 1782, 1045; for 1785, 1765; for 1784, 2515; and for 
1785, 2552.(2) While all the vessels on which these slaves were 
shipped may have flown Portuguese colors, it is virtually a 
certainty that many were no more than nominally Portuguese. Some 
may have been of French ownership, but captained by the lone 
Portuguese aboard. Nevertheless, if these figures are at all 
accurate, they not only indicate a considerable expansion of 
Portuguese slave trading at Moyambique during the early 1780s, but 
also suggest that at least as many slaves may have been carried 
away on French vessels. Certainly in 1781, for instance, during 
the corrupt administrations of vasconcelos de Almeida and Maia e 
Vasconcelos, a good many more than 515 slaves were sold at 
Moyambique to French merchants.
In the Kerimba Islands there was far less administrative confusion 
than at the capital, as Costa Portugal headed tne government at Ibo 
from 21 May 1778 to 51 July 1786.(5) As a consequence, the French 
always knew what to expect at Ibo: full co-operation. Although
there seems to have been a period in late 1783 when the French were 
feared to have ceased trading at Ibo, this break in commercial
(1) AHU, CM 22, Manuel Galvao da bilva to Crown, Moy., 28 August 1785;
see AHU, CM 22, requerimento. Pierre le Bonhomme Duhazais, Moy., 
n.d., but after 9 June 1785, when he, as captain of the ship 
Le Marechal de baxe. was granted a passport to go to Moyambique 
by Camille Charles le Cl ere de Freaie and Etienne Claude 
Chevreau, at Port Louis, lie de France.
(2) AHU, CM 55, anon., "Mappa da Importancia das fazendas, marfim, ouro,
escarvos, e patacas...,n (1781 to 1790), Moy., September 1796.
(5) A.HU, Cod.1484, fl.21-3, termo da entrega. Costa Portugal, Ibo, 21 
May 1778, and carta patente.TeVeira do Lago to same, Moy., 2
May 1778;_ ibid., fl.27—8, carta patente. Saldanha de Albuquerque 
fosame, Moy., 28 March 1785} Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, i, pp.
108-11 & ii, pp.11-59, discusses his activities as governor of 
Lourenyo Marques.
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relations was only tempo raiy. Otherwise, the French slave trade
at Ibo continued to operate on about the same scale, and with the 
same procedure, as it had in the 1770s. The only change appears 
to have been that Costa Portugal raised the head tax on each slave 
exported from 12 to 16 cruzados.(1) The Crown's general concern 
over the French contraband in that captaincy led, in 1785, to a 
devassa against the malconduct of Costa Portugal. This investigation 
proved not only his complicity in trading with the French in slaves, 
cloth, arms and gunpowder, not to mention that with the Swahili in 
Ivory and cloth, but also implicated six of his associates, including 
Jo&o Ferreira da Cruz, Joao de Morais, and one Natee Viseramo. But 
the fact that Costa Portugal made a clean breast of his guilt, and 
that his services to the Crown had otherwise been exceptional, 
exempted him from punishment. Similarly, his accomplices apparently 
suffered no penalties.(2) Despite his close escape from the justice 
of the Crown, however, Costa Portugal appears not to have let this 
alter his policy of trading with the Irench. In July 1785, only
three months after his devassa was completed, it was reported that 
there were three French ships trading for slaves in the Kerimba 
Islands. (5)
(1) AHU, CM 20, AntSnio de Paiva Pinto to Gov./Costa PortugalJ, Ibo,
24 November 1783; AC, i,1917, pp.36-42; AHU, CM 21, four 
Portuguese and two Banian traders to Prov.Govt., Moy., 27 
February 1784; ibid., Morais Dur&o to ?Maia e Vasconcelos 
and S&o Tomas, Moy., 8 Marchl784; AHU, CM 22, same to ?Sec.
St., Moy., 8 July 1785; see above, pp.
(2) AHU, CM 22, Crown to Morais Durao, Ajuda, 14 March 1781, and
devassa of Costa Portugal, Moy., March-April 1785, enclosed
in Costa Portugal to Morais DurSo, Ibo, 7 March 1785; see
ibid., same to same, Ibo, 8 March 1784, and reply, Ibo, 18
February 1785; AHU, CM 24, devassa of Maia e Vasconcelos,
Moc., 1787, question 55 and replies, and testimony {//I) of
Costa Portugal, fl.26-8; SD, p.192.
(5) AHU, CM 22, Morais Durao to ?Sec.3t., Moy., 8 July 1785. The
only figures for the slave trade at Ibo during these years
relate to the exportation of 966 slaves and to the duties of
7589 cruzados collected on these and remitted to Moyambique.
This last fact indicates that the slaves were embarked on
Portuguese vessels. AHU, CM 22, certification by Silva Guedes, 
Moy., 25 March 1785.
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By this date, some considerable changes had taken place in the 
operation of the French slave trade at Kilwa. Until his death in 
about 1781, Morice seems to have held a monopoly of this trade there 
as a result of his treaty with Sultan Hasan bin Ibrahim. Thereafter, 
however, a number of French slavers began competing with each other 
for the lion's share of this lucrative new market. Writing late in 
1784, Joseph Crassons de Medeuil gave an account of "the trading 
that has been done in this port for the last three years, without 
counting traders not personally known to me." According to Crassons, 
in the fourteen voyages, including two of his own, a total of 4195 
slaves were embarked by french traders at Kilwa, "and certainly there 
must have been more in three years. "(1) Although the slaves were 
"superb specimens if they are selected with care," Crassons made it 
clear that, whatever the arrangements had been during the period of 
Morice's monopoly, the traders of Kilwa now dictated the terms under 
which the slave trade with the French functioned. He protested that
This selection we cannot make ourselves, 
being at the discretion of the traders, 
who are now aware of our needs and who 
know that it is absolutely essential for 
us to sail at a given season in order to 
round the Cape of Good Hope. In addition 
to competition amongst ourselves the 
expeditions have never been properly 
thought out and always left to chance, and 
so it happens that three or four ships find 
themselves in the same place and crowd 
each other out.
in view of the considerably increased tempo of the French slave 
trade at Kilwa, especially that to the French west Indies, and of the 
obvious competition for cargoes among the French, it is not surprising 
to see that the price of slaves also rose in the early 1780s. Morice
(1) See AHU, CM £0, Antonio de Paiva Pinto to ?Gov., Ibo, £4 November 
1785, in which the writer, "through certain notices," states 
that three French ships were then at Kilwa; AHU, CM £1, Prov. 
Govt, to M. de Melo e Castro, M05., 7 August 1784; reporting
that "in a few months.♦ .more than ten ships," had taken on 
cargoes at Kilwa.
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had agreed to pay the equivalent of 80 cruzados for each slave at 
Kilwe., in addition to an 8 cruzado head tax to the Sultan, Lacking 
the protection which the conditions of Morice*s treaty imposed on 
both the Sultan and the Swahili traders of Kilwa, the French now 
found themselves having to pay about 40 piastres, or 160 cruzados, 
for each slave they purchased there— exactly twice what Morice had 
agreed to pay. According to information which the Governor-General 
of Mozambique received from some Swahili from Kilwa in 1786, the 
local traders of Kilwa were not the only ones to profit from the 
increased demand for slaves and the cessation of Morice*s conditions 
of trade. In a description which complements that of Crassons, he 
wrote that the French trade ”is made immediately with the King of 
Kilwa, who after charging a tax of ten patacas /40 cruzados7 per 
head, sells them the slaves all together, at a price which suits 
him, without their having the freedom to reject them.” It should 
be noted, however, that Crassons states that the capitation tax was 
only 6 piastres /24 cruzados?. Still, the Sultan of Kilwa, who was 
probably the same Hasan bin Ibrahim who had welcomed Morice, had 
increased his share in this trade considerably. Nevertheless, slave 
trading at Kilwa was still cheap in comparison to that at Mozambique, 
•'where," Crassons complained, ”they make us pay fifty or sixty piastres 
^200 or 240 cruzados? each for them. This does not include presents 
and tiresome vexations.”(1)
During the 1770s the prices paid by the French for a slave at 
Kilwa were appreciably less than those demanded at Mozambique. This 
disparity continued into the next decade. The striking fact is that
(1) HD, pp.194, 196-7; AHU, CM 25, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo 
e Castro, M09., 14 August 1786; see above, pp.iC(r7,fl<H. Accordig 
to FKI, p.216, the slaving figures given by Crassons related to 
a period of only twenty-eight months; in view of these, and 
the probable volume of the French slave trade at Mozambique 
during this period, the view that Anglo-french naval hostility 
in the Indian Ocean from 1778 to 1785 ”seriously dislocated 
commercial intercourse between Mauritius and Kast Africa” would 
seem to be untenable; cf. J.M. Gray, ”The French at Kilwa, 
1776-1784,” p.40; J. Prior, Voyage along the Eastern Coast of 
Africa...in the Nisus Frigate, London, 181y, p.67.
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during the course of only ten years, the rising French demand for 
slaves at these market gave rise to a parallel increase in costs.
By the mid-1780s the price of a slave at both Mozambique and Kilwa 
had doubled in comparison with what was paid in the 1770s.
The fear that another European power might successfully 
establish itself to the north of Cape Delgado led, as it had 
previously in the century, to a spate of unfounded rumors at 
Mozambique concerning the establishment of a French factory at Kilwa. 
Certainly Morice had personally set himself upon the island, but 
here again things changed noticeably after his death. Ending 
several years of speculation on this matter, Antonio Manuel de Melo 
e Castro explained to Lisbon "that the French have not yet obtained 
permission from the King of Kilwa to make the establishment for which 
they have been aspiring for a long time." Having completed their 
cargoes, he continued, they at once departed from Kilwa, ^Without 
a single Frenchman remaining there, leaving evacuated a house in which 
they usually stayed on land, which is perhaps what has given place to 
it being said that the French nave an establishment, and factory, 
there."(1)
by the mid-1780s, the commercial revival of Kilwa and the 
difficulty of trading to Mossuril had combined to cause a marked 
shift of the bulk of lao trade to the one from the other. A typical 
interpretation of the cause and probable effects of this important 
change in the direction of lao trade, made by the three members of 
the provisional government of Mozambique in 1784, -stresses the role
(1) AHU, CM 25, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Moz*> 14
August 1786; see above, pp. Hl-fc ; AHU, Cod.1472, f'l.12-15,
M. de Melo e Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque, Ajuda, 8 March 
1782; AHU, CM 19, reply, Moz*, 1 August 1785; AHU, CM 21,
Mai a e Vasconcelos to bao Tomas and Morals Dur&o, Moz*> 21 July 
1784; ibid., Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moz*> r( August
1784, two letters bearing same date; AHU, CM 25, same to same,
Moz*> 20 August 1785. Cf. also, bordalo, Estatistica. iv, p.29; 
J. de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provincias ultramarinas. 
Lisboa, 1885-87, 4 vols., ii, p.85, which is certainly based on
Bordalo here; J.M. Gray, "a  Note on Joseph Franzois de Cossigny 
(1766-1809),“ INR. 61, 1958, pp.246-9; FKI. p.55.
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of the French at Kilwa, and the Omani fear of the possible exercise 
of French naval and military power along that coast. As it was in 
Rego Barreto*s time, four decades earlier, the domination of the 
vital Mombasa coast by another European nation was seen to be at the 
root of this problem.
From it unerringly follows a great 
deterioration of the trade of this 
Captaincy, because all the Xao who 
cariy their slaves, ivoiy, and other 
goods, to here, making our trade 
flourish, will necessarily bear them 
to Kilwa, not only because it is a 
shorter journey, but also, and 
principally, because they receive all 
the Kaffir cloth/ which they come to 
seek here/ at very moderate prices 
from the French; and besides this, 
they receive all the supply of powder, 
and arms, which is denied to them here, 
and these will pass easily to the Makua, 
our ancient enemy; already the 
alf&ndega duties are diminished, and all 
will shortly fall into total ruin...(l)
By the 1780s, the gross profits made ty the Swahili traders of 
Kilwa from the French slave trade probably made it possible for them 
to give the Xao a consistently good price for their ivory. And the 
French do seem to have traded in cloth and velorio there, as well as 
patacas.(2) But the Xao were still primarily ivory traders, and 
slaves were incidental to their business, although of increasing 
importance. Their interests were more closely to be identified with 
the Omani and Bwahili ivory trade at Kilwa, rather than with the 
French slave trade. In this respect, even the Portuguese realized 
that "it is true, that in Kilwa, and on the Island of Zanzibar
(1) AHU, Gi 21, Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, M09., 7 August 1784;
for the Portuguese belief that the lao had a shorter journey to
Kilwa^_than to Mozambique, see above, pp. lot- %  ; below, pp.
(2) Ibid., Maia e Vasconcelos to 5ao Tomas and Morais Dur&o, M05.,
21 July 1784.
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/principally on the latte^? the Arabs of Muscat carry on a 
considerable trade." As for the sources of the French slave 
trade at Kilwa, and presumably of the Arab trade there, too, 
Crassons implied that the slaves there generally did not come from 
the far interior when he wrote that "the slaves caught in the 
neighbourhood are of very good quality."(1) Although it was the 
threat of French domination of the £ast African coast to the north 
of Cape Delgado which most impressed contemporary Portuguese 
observers, it was rather the less spectacular revival of Arab and 
Bwahili trading there whfch had undermined the position of 
Moyambique as the principal coastal outlet for the trade of East- 
Central Africa.
Perhaps, had conditions been more favorable along the route to 
Mozambique, and at Mossuril itself, the revival of Kilwa would not 
have so adversely affected the lao trade to the south. As we have 
seen, this was not the case. While the governing triumvirate was
ascribing the shift of the Xao trade to Kilwa to the influence of
the French, Jo&o Ferreira Nobre was, with considerably more justice, 
blaming it on the renewal of war with the Makua in 1785-1784. The 
Makua so destroyed everything, disrupting both the trade and 
agriculture of the mainland,
that great famines have been experienced, 
all through their hindering the trade 
which they used to have with the
inhabitants of the mainland, as it was
also customary for large groups of the
Xao Kaffirs, traders from the interior of 
the hinterland, to come to these shores 
every year with their merchandise, such 
as ivory, slaves, rice, and other goods 
which their lands yield; these, as soon 
as they had reports of the new campgign, 
from the first who arrived here, turned 
around and took the route to Mombasa, and
(1) Ibid., Prov.Govt. to M. de Melo e Castro, Moz*> 7 August 1784; 
TKI. p.215.
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Mafia, ana went there to trade, and 
up to the present there has been no 
news of them.(l)
With the return of peaceful conditions, many of the lao again 
came to Mossuril in the following year, as Maia e Vasconcelos 
reported with considerable relief.(2) But Mozambique had clearly 
been eclipsed by Kilwa as the favorite coastal entrepot, just as it 
had superseded Kilwa earlier in the century, and for the same basic 
reason: more favorable trading conditions. Specifically, at
Mozambique, the main factors influencing this development were the 
long period of hostilities in Macuana, and the high price, and 
sometimes irregular supply, of trade cloths, which was largely the 
result of Portuguese measures against the Banians. At Kilwa, the 
prime factors were the existence of stable conditions and the low 
price of cloth, which meant that the Xao could receive more cloth 
in exchange for their ivory.
5. The penetration of coastal influence into the interior
One of the most important consequences of the commercial revival 
of Kilwa was the increase of coastal influence on the people of its 
hinterland. Before the second half of the eighteenth century a few 
adventurous souls from the coast undoubtedly travelled inland to trade, 
but these would have been isolated cases. By the 1780s, more 
meaningful contact between the coast and the interior, through the 
medium of Swahili traders and superficially aculturated Yao traders, 
appears already to have begun to take place. Morice made several 
references to bwahili traders travelling inland and crossing the 
continent to the coast of Angola. In view of the well-established 
routes from both Kilwa and Mozambique to the Mwata Kazembe's capital
(1) Ibid., Nobre to ?Bee.St., Moz«, IB August 1784.
(2) Bee above, p. U3,*n.2»
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on the Luapuia hiver, and of the intimate commercial relations 
between there and the Angolan coast, these references, vague and 
rather garbled though they are, cannot be dismissed merely as 
something morice wished he had heard. (1)
While one may certainly dispute the veracity of Morice1s belief 
that organized caravans departed on this transcontinental journey 
every year, there are several independent sources which confirm the 
existence oi trading connections across Lake Malawi, and thence to 
the East African coast, at this time. According to the traditions 
of both the fumbuka-Kamanga peoples and the Ngonde, whose territories 
border, respectively, on the northwest and the extreme northwest of 
Lake Malawi, about 1780/1800 a new trade route was opened across the 
lake to the coast. in consideration of Morice*s evidence, the 
earlier date would seem to be the more likely. Owing to differences 
in their political organization, this development had a more dramatic 
impact on the fumbuka than it did on the Ngonde. Until this period, 
the Tumbuka-Kamanga peoples were a loosely organized congerie of 
communities without any central tribal authority. About 1780, a 
party of ivory traders, "coming as Arabs" from across the lake, 
according to tradition, arrived in their country ana settled there.
Led by one Mlowoka ("he who crossed over"), tney had undoubtedly 
been attracted by reports they had picked up about the quantity of 
ivory there. They were not disappointed, for "the locals were 
found using tusks as seats, bea-props and so forth without any idea 
of trading value." Gradually, and peaceably, we are told,(2)
Mlowoka, as a result of his opening the area to the trade of the 
coast, was accepted as chief by most of the people living in Nkamanga.
(1) See above, pp. 137-MS ; I. Gunnison, "Kazembe and the Portuguese,
1798-1852." JAH. ii, 1, 19S1, pp.61-7b; idem., Luapuia Peoples.
pp.59, n.4., and 151; FKi. pp.48-9,76,102,105-6,112,118-19,
156-7.
(2) But see Garnitto, King Kazembe. i, p.147.
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Power was centralized in his own person and the country controlled 
through the agency of his travelling companions, whom he established 
as district chiefs over the local headmen. A dynasty, whose rulers 
after Mlowoka styled tiiemselves Chikuramayembe and which remained in 
power until the Ngoni invasions of the mid-nineteenth century, was 
established. (1)
it is clear, from the traditional account, that Mlowoka and his 
party were not Arabs, while the absence of any references to their 
being Muslim, or holding markedly different religious beliefs of any 
sort, suggests that they were not true Swahili, but rather up-country 
African traders who had adopted Swahili dress and had superficially 
assimilated certain Swahili mannerisms, such as strapping one's knife 
to the biceps of the left arm. The fact that Mlowoka confirmed the 
authority of indigenous local headmen by ceremoniously presenting them 
with "a large turban of plain blue cloth" also bespeaks a strong 
coastal influence.(2) it is quite possible that Mlowoka and his 
cohorts were Yao. Specific evidence to this effect is scrappy, but 
the Yao dominance of the coastal trade routes and the existence of 
Yao villages along much of the eastern shore of Lake Malawi support 
such a supposition.(5)
To the north oi Nkamanga, the Ngonae people were already organized 
into a kingdom by the early part of the seventeenth century. Ngulube, 
the mythical founder of the Kyungu dynasty of Ngonde is traditionally
(1) Young, Notes, passim, but especially pp.27-56; idem, "The 'lienga'
People in Northern Nyasaland," NJ, v, 1, 1952, pp.55-7; see 
M. Tew, Peoples, pp.51-60; M. Wilson, The Peoples of the Nyasa- 
Tanganyika Corridor. Cape Town, 1958, pp.2-5,58-40. At first, 
the ivory which came from Nkamanga was probably all acquired 
from the hunters of that kingdom, but eventually a certain 
amount must have been received in trade from the Bisa.
(2) Young, "The'Henga1 People", p.55; idem, Notes, pp.57,41-2,45; see
Mitchell, Yao Village, pp.61-78,91-5, for a discussion of the
political organisation of the Macinga Yao of southern Malawi, 
to which the basic outlines of the system instituted in Nkamanga 
by Mlowoka bears strong resemblance.
(5) Young, Notes, pp.57-40; Tew, Peoples, p.55; for Yao villages on 
the lakeshore, see Abdallah, The Yaos. p.5; Gamitto, King 
Kazembe. i, pp.64-5; J. Rebman, Dictionary, p.v; Krapf, 
Vocabulary of Bix bast-African Languages. Tubingen, 1850, p.viii.
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linked to the Nyakyusa, Namwanga, and Kinga chiefs, to the north 
of the Ngonde. Chieftainship here derives from the Nyamwezi-Sukuma 
culture of central Tanganyika. Like Mlowoka, however, Ngulube, who 
clearly represents a period rather than an individual, opened up 
Ngonde to trade with the coast, although tradition indicates that the 
route by which the Ngonde sent their ivory to the coast ran to the
north, "over the hills of the Ndali," rather than to the east, across
the lake. During the reign of the tenth Kyungu, Mawangende, a 
constitutional crisis occurred in the Ngonde state. The Kyungu, who 
had previously remained in religious seclusion, began to increase 
his secular power and to limit that of the hereditary nobles of 
Ngonde. The late Godfrey Wilson has written:
About this time the direction of the
trade in ivory changed. The present
/l954-ly587 Kyungu told us: 'Later,
after the~first Kyungus, Mwangenae and 
his successors used to exchange the 
ivory with the Marabi who came from
across the lake; the men of Mwela rowed
them across. These traders brought 
cloths, red ana white and dark cloths, 
but when the first Kyungu arrived in 
Ngonde there was no trade-route across 
the lake at all.'(l)
It is possibly for this reason that Mwangende's reign has been said
to have been contemporary with the arrival of Mlowoka at Nkamanga.
Here again, Morice1 s invaluable evidence suggests that such a dating 
is quite acceptable. Whether the "Marabi" were true Swahili or 
superficially assimilated African traders from the interior, they did 
not affect Ngonde the way that Mlowoka did Nkamanga. At Ngonde they 
found, instead, a well organized kingdom, familiar with the coastal
(1) G. Wilson, The Constitution of Ngonde. Rhodes-Living stone Papers, 
No.5, Livingstone, 1959, pp.10-19,44; HEA.i.pp.194-7; M. 
Wilson, The Peoples, pp.15-14,46-60; see Tew, Peoples, pp. 
71-87; FKI. p.76, where Morice's evidence confirms that the 
lake was crossed in boats with oarsmen.
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trade goods and aware of the value of ivory at the coast. (1)
By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, then, there 
appear to have been three basic water routes across Lake Malawi; one at 
the extreme north, between Mwela country and Ngonde; one in the middle, 
between the eastern lakeshore and Nkamanga; and one at the extreme 
south, between points such as Ng'ombe and the southwestern lakeshore.(2) 
From Lake Malawi, the southernmost of these routes definitely led 
either to Mossuril or to Kilwa. The direction of the northernmost 
cannot be determined with any precision. It would seem that the 
adventurous "Marabi" traders crossed the lake farther to the north 
than did Mlowoka1 s party, disembarking from the country of the Mwelaf 
These Mwela should probably be identified with the Mwelya, who inhabit 
the extreme northeastern lakeshore, at the foot of the Livingstone 
Mountains. But there is no indication that the new route which the 
"Merabi" traders opened to the coast led them to Kilwa. It may 
just as likely have led them across the Rufiji River to some point 
on tlie coast nearly opposite Zanzibar. In either case, however, 
the opening of this new route is indicative of the commercial revival 
of the entire coast between Cape Delgado and the stretch opposite 
Zanzibar.
While iumbuka-Kamanga tradition, like that of Ngonde, does not 
indicate from whence on the coast came Mlowoka, the Swahili Ancient 
History of Kilwa Kjyinje. despite its many confusing inaccuracies, 
contains information which suggests that Mlowoka probably came from 
the Kilwa coast. According to this chronicle, a man named Mkwinda, 
whose original home was around Lake Malawi, settled at Kilwa after 
living for many years at Machinga. It was he who inaugurated trade 
between the lake and Kilwa. Mkwinda, like Mlowaka, represents a
(1) In this context, "Marabi" probably should be identified with the
Swahili Mwarabu. wa-, meaning Arab, rather than connecting it 
with Maravi. See F. Johnson, A Standard Swahili-English 
Dictionary. Oxford, 1959, reprinted 1965, p.5191
(2) See above, pp.
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period in the history of Kilwa Kivinje. He seems also veiy 
probably to have been, in his representative identity, a Yao, a 
belief which is supported by his lengthy stay at Machinga. (1) The 
beginning of trade between Kilwa Kivinje and the interior, under the 
leadership of Mkwinda, cannot have been earlier than the late 
eighteenth century, for Kilwa Kivinje was only a small village then.(2) 
The description that "at this time trade was very profitable, because 
the people of the hinterland were stupid, not knowing the value of 
things of this coast," obviously indicates that Mkwinda had opened 
up a new area of the interior to coastal trade. In view of the 
extent of trading relations in laoland, among the Maravi, and in 
Ngonde, it seeras not unlikely that the area to which he was trading 
was Nkamanga. This is, of course, only a tentative theory; but 
the added information that a kinsman of Mbwinda named Mroka, a name 
which bears a striking resemblance to Mlowoka, came from the lake 
area to settle at Kilwa Kivinje suggests that the ties between it 
and Nkamanga may have been close. It also iencts credence to the 
belief that Mlowoka and his followers were lao.(b)
The routes from Lake Malawi to Kilwa can only be vaguely 
reconstructed. The main route generally followed the Lugenda River 
to its confluence with the Ruvuma River, and from there the traders 
struck out for Kilwa in a more or less direct line. Traders going 
to Kilwa from south of Lake Malawi probably picked up the Lugenda 
somewhere north of Lake Chiuta and the Mandimba Hills. As we have
(1) -See above, pp. 67-70.
(2) FKI. p.104,202 & 206 (mpps 2 & 4); /J.B.? Lislet Geoffrey, Memoir
and Notice Explanatory of a Chart of Madagascar.... London, 1819, 
p.59, where he is translating "Observations on the Coast of 
Africa by Lieut, the Chevalier Baulnier ae Mondevit, of the 
Royal French Marine;" this was published in the original French 
a year later by M.M.J.B. Kyries and Malte-Brun, Nouvelles Annales 
aes Voyages,vi. Paris, 1820, pp.552-59; see also, Dalrymple,
Plan of Quiloa and Its Environs on the East Coast of Africa from 
the Observations of the Sieur Morice. 9 May 1784; HEa . i, pp. 
152-4.
(b) C. Vel ten, Prosa und Poesie der Suaheli. Berlin, 1907, pp.254-5.
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already seen, the Mozambique route followed the Lugenda for some 
distance and one reached the Ng'ombe area by traversing the Mandimba 
hills* (l) Of the middle route, that which traders coming from 
Nkamanga used, there is no information* It would seem most likely 
that the greater extent of its length lay in Tanzania, perhaps 
passing through the Tunduru area and only crossing the Buvuma in 
its upper reaches into Portuguese East Africa; but this is only a 
suggestion* In this connection, it is well worth remembering, as 
Alison Smith has pointed out, (2) that these routes were not dearly 
defined roads, but simple trails which probably had to be re-opened 
each trading season* While the general course of each route was 
known, yearly changes in the specific path one followed were probably 
as much the rule as the exception*
The commercial revival of Kilwa brought more Yao traders into 
closer contact with Swahili culture* Prom the second hqlf of the 
eighteenth century, certain Swahili mannerisms and tastes were 
slowly carried inland by them and were gradually adapted, or adopted, 
into Yao culture by those individuals who knew the ways of the ooast. (3) 
Yet despite this penetration of coastal influenoe into the interior, 
the impetus to trade still came from the people of that interior, 
rather than from those of the coast* In general, caravans set out 
from the interior, not from the ooast; it was the people of the 
hinterland, in particular the Yao, who handled the bulk of the trade*
On the co&st, however, a series of circumstances had led to the 
reassertion of Omani rule over Kilwa Kisiwani by early 1785* In 
1763 Ahmad ibn Said al-Busaidi, Imam of Oman and founder of the Busaidi
(1) Abdallah, The Yaos* pp* 12-13; Krapf, Travels* Researches, and
Missionary Labours* during an Eighteen Years* Residence in 
Eastern Africa* London* 1860* pp*419-20; see above* pp* 63-7, 
for Gaspar Booarro1 s route to Kilwa in 1616*
(2) A*Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior, 1840-84," HEA
i, p*267l see FKI* p.76,106,118-19, and Abdallah, The Yaos* 
pp* 12-13, for some idea of the organisation of trading parties 
during this period; see also, W.P* Johnson, Nyasa* pp.26-8; 
Bangeley, "The Ayaow, p*19*
(3) See above, pp* 70-(.
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dynasty, died. He was succeded by his son Said ibn Ahmad. A 
younger son, Saif ibn Ahmad, disputed his brother's claim to the 
throne,but, realizing that there was no hope of his gaining more 
support in Oman, he 3et out for East Africa with his followers in 
an attempt to create his own dominion there. Saif sought 
supporters along the coast at first, primarily at Kilwa, where he 
met Crassons, who was then engaged in negotiating a new trading 
agreement with the Bui tan. Crassons obligingly offered Saif 
armaments and money, but they were not accepted. Early in 1784 
Saif landed at Zanzibar, and, being unable to storm the Omani 
garrison there, began a leisurely seige of the fortress. Before 
this had been successfully terminated, a substantial expedition, 
loyal to the Imam, had reached Zanzibar from Muscat. Saif was 
persuaded to relinquish his claim to the throne and was permitted 
to retire to Lamu, where he died shortly afterwards.
After strengthening Omani control of Zanzibar, one ship from 
the relieving squadron, which was commanded by the Imam's son, Ahmad 
ibn Said, and his uncle, Bultan ibn Ahmad, sailed to Mombasa, which 
was reached in late January 1785. Possession of Fort Jesus was 
taken for the Imam without a struggle. Other vessels from the fleet 
were sent to the south with instructions to reassert Omani rule along 
the coast, in particular at Kilwa. There, however, the Arabs met 
with some resistance, for the Buitan of Kilwa cannot have been 
anxious to share the revenues from the again lucrative trade of his 
state with the Imam. The fighting was brief, but violent, with the 
Arabs, led by one Masudi, winning the day. Peace terms were 
meditated by a Frenchman, Monsieur Bausse, whose ship was then 
anchored in the harbor. The Bui tan was allowed to keep his title, 
but sovereignty, as well as between one-half to four-fifths of the 
customs dues, passed to the Imam. Later in the year, Ali ibn Baif, 
the son of the thwarted usurper, was appointed Omani governor of 
Mafia and Kilwa, where he thereafter resided. As Sir John Gray has 
suggested, this was probably the most convenient way for the Imam to 
disarm a potential troublemaker, stationing him at the extreme
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outpost of Omani territory. it also afforded Ali a gracious way 
out of a difficult situation. With an Omani governor to supervise 
its trade and an Omani garrison in the old Portuguese Fort of S&o 
Tiago, Kilwa had indeed lost its independence. It was never 
again to regain it. But the political events of 1785 did not 
inhibit the commercial growth of Kilwa. The reaffirmation of 
Omani involvement in East Africa, with secure bases at Zanzibar 
and Kilwa, created more stable conditions for trading.(1) During 
the next quarter century, the Yao, and other peoples of the 
interior, continued to carry most of their goods to that coast, 
while the persistence of old problems to the south of Cape Delgado, 
and the added burden of a new one there, inhibited their trading 
to Mossuril and Ibo.
(1) Gray, "The Recovery of Kilwa by the Arabs in 1785," TNR. 62, 1964, 
pp.20-4, & sources cited therein; idem, "A French Account of 
Kilwa at the End of the Eighteenth Century," TNR. 65, 1964, 
p.224; FKI. pp.55-4, 56; Strandes, Portuguese Period, p.558, 
being J. Kirkman1 s topographical note on Kilwa. Freeman- 
Grenville has read the date of the weatherworn Arabic 
inscription over the gate of the Portuguese fort at Kilwa, 
recording its restoration by the Omanis, as 1 Muharrara 1200 
(4 November 1785), while Kirkman has interpreted the same 
date to be 1 Muharram 1204 (2 April 1789). J.J. Nogueira 
de Andrade, "Do Estado ell que ficavao os Negocios da Capitania 
de Mossambique nos fins de Noverabro do Anno do 1789 com algumas 
Observa^oens, e reflec^oens sobre a causa da decadencia do 
Commer^io dos Estabelecimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental 
da Affrica,1 1790, in AC. i, 1917, p.125, states (without 
naming him) that Saif ibn Ahmad came to Mozambique before
going to Kilwa and Zanzibar, but there is no mention of this 
visit in the official correspondence from Mozambique. News 
of the reassertion of Omani rule at Kilwa seems not to have 
reached the Portuguese until 1768; AHU, CM 25, Manuel Antonio 
Correira to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 15 February 1788.
- £15 -
CHAPTER V
The Growing influence of the Slave Trade, 1785-1810
1. French domination
The coastal trade of the Yao, both to Kilwa and to Moyambique, 
was based on ivory. The Yao shift from Kilwa to Moyambique in the 
first half of the eighteenth century, as well as the movement of 
their trade back to Kilwa in the second half of that century, was 
made in response to factors affecting the coastal ivory market. 
Throughout this period slaves were incidental to the Yao trade in 
ivory. The increased demand for slaves along the coast of East- 
Central Africa, inspired by the Omani Arabs, as well as by the 
french, was supplied principally by and from African peoples living 
near the coast. At Moyambique, Yao slaves were less favored than 
the Makua, primarily because the combination of the long journey 
from the interior and the debilitating coastal climate caused a 
high mortality rate among them. Nevertheless, Yao traders must 
have been impressed by the increasing demand for slaves, and there 
was undoubtedly a slow growth in the Yao slave trade during the 
eighteenth century.
After 1785 the slave trade in East-Central Africa expanded more 
markedly than ever before. it is from this date that the Yao began 
to become increasingly involved in trading slaves. To be sure, 
ivory still dominated the long distance trade to Kilwa; but even as 
early as 1785 it appears that the Yao of southern Tanzania were 
seriously involved in supplying the Kilwa coast with slaves. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that by the first decade of the 
nineteenth century the Yao who were still trading to Moyambique 
were dealing primarily in slaves, not ivory.(1) These Yao, unlike
(1) See below, pp. 234, i4o-z, SS'4-S, W -  6 .
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those living in Tanzania, however, were clearly long distance 
traders. As such, they were the first of the Yao long distance 
traders to reflect the growing influence of the slave trade in 
East-Central Africa. This response grew much more gradually among 
most Yao, who carried their goods to Kilwa, not to Moyambique. in 
order to understand the varying responses of the Yao trading to 
Kilwa and those trading to Moyambique, we must first examine the 
changing conditions affecting the coastal market. Foremost among 
these is the commanding role played by French slavers.
French domination of the slave trade in East-Central Africa 
reached iiis zenith between 1785 and 1794. During the brief period 
of peace following the conclusion of the American war for 
Independence, up to the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, an 
unprecedented number of French merchantmen called at the ports of 
this coast. While it was a time of outstanding prosperity for lie 
de France and Bourbon, whose traders aid an increasingly large trade 
in slaves from the continent,(1) the greatest activity was the 
noticeably expanded slave trade between French America and these 
ports. The re-establishment of the Oomoagnie des Indes on 14 April 
1785 was bitterly opposed by those who favored the system of free 
trade which had prevailed since 1769, but it did not inhibit the 
remarkable expansion of the trans-Atlantic trade from East-Central 
Africa. Before the termination of its monopoly in 1790, the Comoagnie 
issued 119 licenses for trading along the coast of East Africa during 
the years 1786-1789 alone. Many of these ships, as bermigny has 
suggested and the Governor-General of Moyambique confirmed, intended
(1) P.J. Barnwell & A. Toussaint, A Short History of Mauritius. London, 
1949, p.88. Accoraing to one source, £650 slaves were brought 
to lie de France from the coast of East Africa daring the period 
of November 1786-January 1788. ^Unienville* s figures also 
show that the importation of slaves there reached its peak 
between 1786 and 1794. See Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes. 
i, p.Ill, n.£7; D*Unienville, Statistique. iii, p.588; see 
also AHU, Cod.1565,f1.17-18, A.M. de Melo e Castro to Luis da
Costa Ferreira de Azevedo, Moy., 1£ February 1791, for a 
license permitting the addressee to take 40 slaves to lie de 
France.
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to sell their cargoes of slaves in America.(1)
The french slave trade from East Africa to America made rapid 
progress in spite of the longer voyage which it required than that 
from West Africa and of the fact that the mortality rate was 
consequently higher. By the mid-1780s, wrote one French merchant, 
slaves were difficult to procure on the Guinea coast and the prices 
asked for them exorbitant. Compared to these, slaves from East 
Africa were much less expensive to buy. According to figures given 
by Dermigny, profits of well over 500$ on each slave appear to have 
been normal. It is not surprising that, the fears expressed by 
certain individuals, both French and Portuguese, over the ability 
of this trade to withstand rising prices in East Africa and problems 
at home in dispatching ships to these ports, were groundless.(£) 
unly war, or the fear of war, was able to inhibit its operation.
At Moyambique, the many years of flagrant disregard by 
successive governors of the royal orders prohibiting trading with 
foreigners finally led to a reversal of this longstanding policy.
The reappraisal of official policy towards such trade formed part of 
a larger reorganization of the colonyfs entire commerce. Supervised 
by Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Secretary of the Navy and Overseas 
Dominions, this general reoiganimation of trade was designed to 
terminate the years of administrative chaos which had followed on the
(1) See Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes. i, pp.98-105,155; AHU, CM £5,
A.M. de Melo e Castro to H. de Melo e Castro, Moy., £6 September 
1787; H. Weber, La Compagnie Franyaise des Indes (1604-1875).
Paris, 1904, pp.616-54; see above, pp. 111-3 . Rare examples
of particular vessels which are known to have been bound for 
French America are the French corvette L'Eunhraisie. Captain 
Labat, and the Spanish vessel La Pepita. Captain Nicolas Baudin, 
which was equipped by French merchants from New Orleans and 
embarked £00 slaves at Moyambique: AHU, CM £5, Benjamin Ferr&o,
auto da visits.. Moy., 50 Ucidbvl788; AHU, CM £5, Mateus Inacio 
de Almeida, “Conaiyoens com que se permitte ao Navio La Pepita... 
fazer Escravos em Moyambique,” Moy., 51 July 1787; Dermigny,
Cargaisons Indiennes. i, p.105.
(£) Dermigny, Cargaisons Indiennes. i, p.110,n.£5,98; AC,ii,1918, p.56.
Although no comparative figures for slave mortality are known 
from French sources, one Portuguese document records that there 
was a 50% death rate for slaves being transported from Moyambique 
to Rio de Janeiro, as compared with a £0% rate on the West Africa 
to Brazil passage: AHU, Cm 15, anon., ”0s Franceses extraem...,” n.d.
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death of Pereira do Lago and. which had culminated in Saldanha de 
Albuquerque’s illegal trading company. (1) The executor of these 
reforms was the Secretary’s nephew, previously the Governor of the 
Rivers of Sena, Antonio Manuel de Melo e Castro, who took office 
as Governor-General of Moyambique on 11 March 1786, replacing the 
inept and corrupt provisional government which had succeeded 
Saldanha de Albuquerque. The new Governor-General was ideally 
suited for the task and his six-year administration of the colony 
was the most outstanding since that of his illustrious father, 
Francisco de Melo e Castro.(£)
The new regulations were drawn up on 19 April 1785, but it 
does not appear that they were put in effect until the middle of 
1787, after Antonio Manuel had closely studied the situation. 
Unfortunately, there are no accounts at all of French traders at 
Moyambique during this important period, as a result of which there 
appears to be an abrupt change, rather than any sort of transition, 
from the old methods of illegal trading to the new legalized system, 
in any case, the 1785 orders specifically instructed Melo e Castro 
to admit French traders to the port of Moyambique, as it was clear 
to all that they would continue to arrive there, and this was 
preferable to the extortions to which previous governor-generals had 
subjected them. This decision was the logical sequitur to the royal 
alvara. issued several days previously, which strictly forbade Crown 
officials from private trading in the colony, or from tampering with 
its official economic apparatus.(5J It is notable, however, that 
Melo e Castro was directed by his uncle that this permission should 
appear to be Myour own decision, so that no one can perceive, or
(1) See Lobato, Lourenyo Marques.i. pp.140-6; ii,pp.£91-9; see above, 
pp. I85~ %
(£) See Costa Mendes, Catalogo. pp.51-5; cf. Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, 
i, p«lo9.
(5) AHU, Cod.l47£, fl.55-5, royal alvara. Ajuda, 14 April 1785.
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suspect, either directly or indirectly, that you are doing this on 
the order, or suggestion of this Court.” In this way, general 
Portuguese colonial policy remained publicly unaltered, while at 
Moyambique trade with the French was secretly authorized.
The procedure to be followed by the Governor-General was 
carefully detailed in his instructions. Immediately on the arrival 
of the French ship at Moyambique, a guard was to be placed on board, 
all the indispensable necessities were to be seized, in order to 
prevent the unloading of wares directly on the mainland, and the 
Captain and Super-cargo were to be brought before the Governor-General 
and Chief Justice. The decision to admit a ship was to be the Governor- 
Generalfs prerogative, without limitations, but he was obliged to 
inform the Crown of each permit so granted. Entrance, having been conceded, 
all merchandise, save only firearms and gunpowder, which were the 
monopoly of the Royal Treasury and to which they had to be sold, was to 
be transported to the alfandega for evaluation. Anything caught 
being smuggled from the ship to the mainland would be seized and a 
fine equal to twice its value levied; a second offence was punishable 
by immediate imprisonment. No French traders were allowed to leave 
the island for the mainland, and all export trade outside of slaves 
and provisions was completely forbidden. Each adult slave was to be 
taxed at the rate of 16 cruzados, with minors paying only 12 cruzados 
per head. None of the crew could remain at Moyambique after his 
ship had departed* Within these conditions, which were to be strictly 
observed and for which the Governor-General was entirely responsible, 
the French could trade freely at Moyambique. The Secretary also 
suggested the imposition of a 10c/o or 12$ duty on all French imports. 
Finally, all French trading at subordinate ports, especially at the
Kerimba Islands, was to be ended, if that were possible; Moyambique
alone was to be the center of the French slave trade in Portuguese
East Africa.(l)
Late in June 1787 Melo e Castro launched the new policy, making 
no attempt, however, to camouflage the fact that the Crown had ordered 
the change. His proclamation embodied the 1785 instructions with 
only minimal modifications. The most important of these was that all 
patacas would be deposited in the alfandega. not only for the collection
of the new 2$ duty on specie, but also so that they could be exchanged
for marked patacas. The inclusion of this provision raises the 
possibility that, despite the recent royal order that all patacas, 
marked or unmarked, should be worth 4 cruzados,(2) use of the inflationary 
stamped pataca was still necessary in the colony, which was perennially 
starved for currency. The Governor-General also added that French goods 
which had been deposited in the alfandega were to be re-exported on 
each ship’s return voyage, confirmation that all purchases were to be 
made in specie. He further explained that imprisoned contrabanders 
would be returned to their ship on its departure from Moyambique. 
Emphasizing Portuguese determination to defend the subordinate ports 
against French traders, Melo e Castro conveyed the substance of this 
proclamation to his French counterpart at lie de France a month later.(5) 
The first vessel which is known to have traded under the new 
regulations arrived at Moyambique in mid-July1787# Thereafter, until
(1) Ibid., fl. 65-70, M.de Melo e Castro to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ajuda,
19 April 1785#
(2) Ibid.,fl.51-2, Crown to same, Ajuda, 15 April 1785, registered by same
at Moy., 14 April 1787* ^
(5) AHU, CM 25, A.M. de Melo e Castro, "Condiyoens com que S«jrao admitios 
os Navios Francezes nesta Capital ate a Real Rezoluyao de Sua 
Magestade, " Moy., 20 June 1787? AHU, Cod.1478,fl#38, same to 
Visconde de Souillac, Moy.,25 July 1787* Francois de Souillac was 
Governor-General of the French islands from 1779 to 1787? s©© 
Barnwell and Toussaint, A Short History. Appendix 2, pp.253-4*
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March 1794, the great importance of the French slave trade at that 
port is vividly attested to by the many autos de visita (writs of 
inspection) which one encounters in the Portuguese archives from 
this period#(l) Although the available statistical sources for this 
trade do not inspire great confidence, they too reflect the growth 
of the slave trade at Moyambique during this period# One list gives 
the following figures for the years 1786-1790: (2)
Year In Portuguese Ships In Foreign Ships
1786 2847
1787 3665 4548
1788 5506 5510
1789 2687 6987
179 0 656 _6622___
Total 15,381 slaves 23,742 slaves
The accuracy of these figures is, however, very suspect. The 
suspiciously large Portuguese figures for 1787 and 1788 may well be 
due to the fact that, in order to circumvent the higher capitation 
taxes levied on French exported slaves, local Portuguese traders took 
a large umber of slaves through customs on their own account, only 
to deliver them to French slavers with whom they had previously struck 
a bargain. Other sources record that in 1789 a total of 1886 slaves 
were exported from the capital aboard Portuguese vessels, while 4838 
were shipped under foreign colors. These figures are consonant with 
the alf&ndega duties collected on the slave trade in that year. Sim­
ilarly, it appears that the correct figures for exportation of slaves
(1) See AHU, CM 26, Benjamin Fer&o, auto de visita taken aboard the
French frigate Breton, Captain Guardon, Moy.,16 July 1787* These 
autos are records of the Chief Justice’s inspection of the foreign 
ships which came to trade at Moyambique, in accordance with the 
regulations of 1787* Each auto includes the name (and usually, 
the type), of the ship, the name of its captain, its nationality, 
and a detailed accounting of its cargo. Regrettably, the port 
for which the vessel was destined is only very rarely indicated. 
See also, ^ Dermigny*s Cargaisons Indiennes, i, pp.156-7*
(2) AHU, CM 33, anon., "Mappa da Importancia...," Moy., September 1798.
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in 1790 are some 758 in Portuguese ships and 6387 in foreign ones.(l)
No capitation figures exist for the years 1791-1794, hut one can 
deduce the minimum number of slaves embarked at Moyambique from the 
taxes collected on this trade. According to these, one gets the 
following pictures^2)
Year In Portuguese Shins In Foreign Shins
1791 1376 4147
1792 1214 373O
1793 1000 3273
1224________________________1M_________________1576
Total 4354 slaves 12,726 slaves
During the period 1786-1794, then, according to official figures,
about 14,662 slaves were exported from Moyambique aboard Portuguese
vessels, while some 34,889 were shipped by foreigners.
The effect of this greatly expanded slave trade on the general 
economy of Moyambique was striking. The Governor-General wrote that 
the trade of both the island and the interior was growing at a terrific 
pace. The great influx of specie and trading cloths, the latter from 
Diu and DamSo, was due solely to "the great exportation of slaves, 
the most flourishing branch of trade of this Captaincy.” Gold and 
ivory, which had formerly been the most important exports of the colony, 
were now "faded, and in precipitate decadency.” Melo e Castro related
(1) AHU, CM 25, Jo&o da Silva Guedes, "Resumo do Rendimento da Alfandiga
no anno preterito de 1789," Moy., 11 August 1798; AHU, CM 27, A.M. 
de Melo e Castro to M.de Melo e Castro, Moy., 24 August 1798; AHU,
CM 27, same to same, Moy., 28 August 1791, enclosing alfandega 
figures for previous year, Silva Guedes, Moy., 13 March 1791? ©ee 
Lobato, Lourenyo Marquest ii, p.359*
(2) AHU, CM 33, anon., "Mapa dos Rendimentos Reais da Capitqnia de 1788 a
1793," Moy., August 1794? ibid., anon., "Mapa dos rendimentos de 
1791 a 1795," n.d.5 cf. Lobato, Lourenyo Marques,iit pp.357-8, 388. 
These figures are calculated by dividing the head tax of 16 cruzados 
for adult slaves exported on foreign ships into the total amount of 
duties collected on that trade, and the corresponding tax of 8 cruzado^ 
paid by Portuguese vessels for similar slaves into that total. This 
is the same method employed by the Portuguese, as the 1789-1798 
figures reveal. It yields, however, a minimal figure, as it ignores 
the fact that young slaves were taxed at a lower rate, so that the 
total sum of the revenue collected must have represented a larger 
number of slaves in proportion to the number of minors embarked.
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that whereas gold and ivory had once paid for virtually all the imports 
of Mojambique from India and Portugal, they now barely accounted for 
a third of these. Furthermore, the volume of these imports had also 
increased considerably. There was no doubt in his mind that the 
stimulus to this growth, and the sole bastion supporting the colony1s 
relative prosperity, was the French slave trade.(l) Melo e Castro1s 
observations were corroborated by Jerdnimo Josd Nogueira de Andrade, 
who in 1790 just returned to Lisbon after nearly eight years1 
service in Mozambique. Devoting a lengthy section of his highly in­
formative memoir on the trade of Portuguese East Africa to the French 
trade at Mozambique, Nogueira de Andrade argued strongly against the 
complaints of some moradores that this trade was harmful to the colony.
He also praised Melo e Castro*s regulation and supervision of the 
French trade. Utilizing the same data as the Governor-General, he 
reasoned that the increase in trade from India was due to the increased 
demand for trading cloths with which to acquire slaves for selling to 
the French. Likewise, he pointed out that the increased imports from 
Lisbon to Mozambique were financed by the patacas with which the French 
bought their slaves.(2) In view of these recommendations, it is not 
surprising that Martinho de Melo e Castro instructed his nephew1s suc­
cessor, D. Liogo de Sousa ^Coutinho/, to continue this policy of tacit 
toleration. Souses restatement of this policy at the end of May 1793, 
two and a half months after he had assumed office, only added a pro­
vision forbidding the raising of the French, or any other foreign, flag 
on Portuguese territory to the original decree of 1787*(3)
(1) AHU, CM 26, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M.de Melo e Castro, Moc.,14 August
1789; AHU, CM 27, same to same, Mo^., 24 August 1790 and 20 August
1791.
(2) AC, ii,1918, pp.32-6. Nogueira de Andrade estimated that the Mozambique
coast provided some 4000 to 5000, or more, slaves each year.
(3) AHU, Cod.1472, fl.107-111, M.de Melo e Castro £0 D.Diogo de Sousa,
Queluz, 12 October 1792; AHU, Cod.l36l, fl.16-17, Sousa, "Condisoens 
que os Capitaens dos Navios Francezes, vindos aeste Porto de 
Mossambique com 0 fim de cargarem escravatura devem exactamente 
observar,...,” Mof., 30 May 1793? see ibid., fl*15, same to Francisco 
Antdnio Tavares de Sigueira, Moj., 31 May 1793? ibid., fl.15-16, 
same to Jo&o da Costa Xavier, Mo^., 4 June 1793*
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During this decade, the price paid for a slave at Mozambique
continued to rise* In the 1770s the average price had been about,120
cruzados per head; by about 1784 it had doubled to anywhere between
200 and 240 cruzados each#(l) Within the next five years the average
price for an adult male slave, according to Portuguese sources, seems
to have varied between about 25O cruzados to more than 400 cruzados
each, not including the 16 cruzado capitation tax* A clear distinction
was made between slaves newly arrived from the interior and those who
had acquired desirable skills through having served Portuguese masters
on the coast, with the latter fetching the higher prices*(2) As for
distinctions of sex, age, and stature, Blancard furnishee prices current
at this time for eight classifications of slaves, the highest of which
are somewhat lower than the contemporary Portuguese figures. They are
especially valuable, however, in that they suggest the limitations one
faces in relying on official Portuguese figures for the slave trade,
based, as these appear to be, on the presumption that each slave exported
was an adult* Blancard1s figures reads(3)
Classification
Males, aged 20 and over 
Females, aged 18 and over 
Males, aged 15-20, being 4 I1M to 4*2” tall 
Males, aged 15-20, being 4*6" tall 
Males, aged 8-15, being 3*8" to 3,H U tall 
Females, aged 8-15, being 4*6" tall 
Females, aged 8-15, being 4l5n tall 
Females, aged 8-15, being 3,6ft to 3fH** tall
1) See above, pp*
2) AHU, CM 25, "Declara<jao dos negociantes cristaos e baneanes da praya
dbMozambique,” Moj., 30 June 1789; AHU, CM 26, Manuel do Nascimento 
Nunes to Crown, ”Denuncio do Servi^o de Sua Mag* no Estado de Mos. de 
1790 pQr...,” Hoc*, 10 June 1790; see Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, ii, 
pp.358-9>388, n.l. The denuncio of Nascimento Nunes includes details 
which corroborate the general details of the French slave trade at 
Mozambique during this period. He was apparently a rival of Nogueira 
de Andrade.
(3) Blancard, Manuel du Commerce des Indes et de la Chine, Paris, 1806, 
pp.16-19. Blancard lived in the East from 1770 to about 1790; see 
Gray, TtA French Account of Kilwa,” p.224» Blancard also notes the 
necessity of paying a baptism tax of about 2 cruzados on each slave 
which was exported.
Price in piastres
35 to 45 
30 to 35 
30
35 to 45 
20 to 25 
30 to 35 
25 to 28 
18 to 22
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Although the increased demand for slaves at Mozambique was 
matched by rising prices, French traders continued to frequent that 
port in strength until March 1794# Thereafter, until early in 1796, 
no French vessels entered Mozambique harbor, as a result of the war, 
although friendly relations were maintained between Sousa and the 
French Governor-General, Ma3artic.(l) Besides the fact that the urgency 
of the French demand for slaves gave them little choice but to do a 
large portion of their business with the Portuguese, the innovation of 
the 17B7 regulations for that trade would seem to have been a factor 
in inducing them to return to trade at Moyambique. Under the admini­
strations of both Melo e Castro and Sousa, French traders knew what 
was expected of them/ prices were high and restrictions rigidly but 
honestly applied. The time-consuming business of bribing the Governor- 
General and the uncertainties of being subject to his whims no longer 
existed. Mozambique was now fully geared to supplying slaves and the 
government saw to it that this was done with the maxiiinum of efficiency.
Such was not the case at the Kerimba Islands, where the French 
slave trade declined during this decade. Complaints continued to be 
voiced that French contraband was still rife there, but these appear 
to have been partly based on slightly outdated information and repeated 
as a matter of habit.(2) Two factors influenced the decline of French 
slaving at the islands: stricter enforcement of official Portuguese 
policy prohibiting thiw trade, and the greater concentration of French 
commercial activity to the north of Cape Delgado. Melo e Castro 
continually warned the Governor of the Kerimba Islands during the 
first eighteen months of his administration against allowing the French 
to trade there. He particularly stressed that Portuguese officials
(1) M.V. Jackson, European Powers and South-East Africa. London, 1942, p*45*
(2) See TT, Minist!rio do Reino, mayo 604, Joaquim Jos! Varela, ’’Discrips&o
da Capitania de Monsambique. e Suas povoasoanst e produccoins. pert- 
encentes a Coroa de Portugal,n.d.. but dated internally lo 1738, 
published in EHGEP. pp.281-310, at 284, incorpgrating alterations 
included in later copy^dC A*. ^^which is itself
published as an anonymous memoir in Andrade, Relacoes. pp*375“405,
376; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.80, M.de Melo e Castro to A.M.de Melo e Castro, 
Ajuda, 20 March 1789; AC,i,1917, p.123; AHU, CM 26, Nascimento Nunes 
to Crown, ’’Denuncio.•.,n Moy., 10 June 1790*
were forbidden to trade privately, as ordered by the royal alvar! 
of 14 April 1785*(l) On one occasion, Melo e Castro permitted a 
French ship, A Modestia (La Modestie). captained by a M*Liborne, 
to go to Ibo in order to take on 80 slaves which were owed him by 
one Jo&o Ferreira. The Governor, Agostinho de Melo e Almeida, was 
instructed to give the Frenchman as much aid as he needed in collecting
this debt, so that the latter would have no future pretext for returning
there.(2) While there is no evidence which reveals Melo e Almeida1s 
execution of these restrictive orders, his successor, Manuel Ant6nio 
Correa, seems to have faithfully carried them out on the one occasion
when a French slaver is reported to have arrived at Ibo.(3).
The establishment of a factory and an alfandega at Ibo, in accord­
ance with the general reorganization of the colony’s trade, may well 
have encouraged this new efficiency, as did Melo e Castro’s own 
example.(4) This trend was apparently intensified after Antdnio Jos!
Teixeira Tigre was nominated Governor and Commandant of the islands 
in September 1788.(5) Late in 1790 Tigre reported the shipwreck, in 
September, of a French vessel from Bourbon on Mtundo Island, just 
south of Vamizi Island. Several of the officers and crew perished, 
while the survivors were spared an attack from certain Portuguese 
moradores and their African retainers only by the vigilance of a 
friendly chief and the Commander of Vamizi. A month later, another 
French ship, La Bonne Henriette. Captain Jean Jagault, tried to obtain
(1) AHU, Cod.1478, fl.1-3, A.M.de Melo e Castro to Agostinho de Melo e
Almeida, Moy., 11 September 1786, enclosing same to Costa Portugal, 
Moy., 20 June 1786; AHU, Cod.1484, fl.46, same to Melo e Almeida, Moy.,
23 July 1787; AHU, CM 23, same to same, Moc., 5 August 1787# Melo e
Almeida was named Governor on 1 August 178b; see AHU, Cod.1484,fl*41, 
carta patente of same, Moy*, 1 August 1786.
(2) AHU, CM 23 and Cod.1478, fl.13, A.M. de Melo e Castro to same, Moy.,
18 September 1787*
(3) Ibid., fl.16-17,13 & v., same to Manuel Antdnio Correa, Moy.,15 & 22
April 1788. Correa became interim Governor of the Kerimba Islands 
following Melo e Almeida's appointment as Governor of the Rivers of 
Sena in November 1787? see Andrqde, Relayoes. p.528.
(4) AHU, CM 32 & Cod.1478, fl.7-9,A.M. de Melo e Castro, alvara,21 July 1787;
AHU, CM 23 & Cod.1478,fl.6-7, same, alvara, 23 July 1787, registered at 
Ibo, 11 August 1787; AHU, CM 24, Antdnio da Silva Teixeira to A.M.de 
Melo e Castro, Ibo, 9 October 1787; AHU, Cod.1475, fl«2, same to same
leave to trade at Ibo, but Tigre ordered it to depart within twenty- 
four hours.(l) Even stronger evidence of Tigre!s zeal in administering 
these restrictions is the verification by a later Governor of the Kerimba 
Islands that Tigre had "religiously" guarded against the French trading 
within his jurisdiction.(2) Tigre was succeeded by Correa, again 
acting as interim Governor, in the early 1790s> but there is no reason 
to believe that he welcomed the French any more than he had previously. 
During the height of French slaving activity along the coast of East- 
Central Africa, then, the conscientious execution of official Portuguese 
policy, which had been thoroughly flounted by successive governors of 
the Kerimba Islands for the previous half century, excluded the French 
from trading in what had once been their favorite area of supply.(3) 
Despite this turn of events, the French continued to receive 
slaves from this area as a result of the inability of the Portuguese 
to inhibit the Arab and Swahili pangaio (a type of sailing vessel) 
trade from the islands and mainland to the towns located north of 
Cape Delgado. This coasting trade had always frustrated the Portuguese,
(4) but its importance seems to have grown considerably after 1786,
/.. footnote continued from page 224*
(4)lbo, 9 October 1787; AHU, Cod.l475> fl*2, same to same, Ibo, 9 October 
1787; see Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, ii, pp.294~7»
(5) AHU, Cod.1478, fl.20-1, A.M. de Melo e Castro to Antdnio Jose Teixeira
Tigre, Mossuril, 16 September 1788.
(1) AHU, CM 26, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 8 November 1790;
AHU, CM 27, same to same, Ibo, 13 November 1790, enclosing petition 
of Jean Jagault, and Tigre*s reply to it, both dated Ibo, 22 October 
1790.
(2) AHU, CM 28, Constantino Antdnio Alvares da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 9
October 1795*
(3) News of the declaration of war between France and Portugal was sent to
Ibo from Mozambique in the spring of 1794; see AHU, Cod.1478* fl*49" 
52, Sousa to Correa, Hoc., 18 May 1794* Dspite the decline in French 
slaving at the Kerimba Islands, Blancard includes prices for the 
various types of slaves there. These range from a top price of 35 
to 40 piastres for adult males, to 18 to 20 piastres for the youngest 
and smallest females: Blancard, Manuel. pp.19-21.
(4) See above, p. 15*1*
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when the French began to face opposition to their trading personally 
at Ibo and to devote increasingly more attention to the Kilwa coast.
The extension of Omani hegemony over Kilwa also influenced the growth 
of the pangaio trade. This trade was harried with some success in 1787, 
when the Portuguese seized a number of slaves from Swahili merchants, 
and there were fears at Ibo that a retributive attack was imminent.(l)
But none took place, as the setbacks were only temporary. The great 
extent of Swahili commercial activity by April 1789 is attested to by 
the fact that some 35 boats were registered by the Portuguese as having 
taken port at Ibo in the pursuance of the legal trade in provisions to 
the Portuguese establishments* Most of these were from Pate and the 
surrounding region.(2). The illegal trade in slaves was equally 
flourishing, it seems. The issue came out into the open after Tigre 
forwarded to Melo e Castro a request by some otherwise unidentified 
inhabitants of the islands to be allowed to send slaves to the French 
at Kilwa, after paying the required duties at Ibo. Due to a contrary 
monsoon, they claimed, it had been impossible to send them to Mozambique. 
The Governor-General strongly denounced such an idea as being diametrically 
opposed to the purpose of the Crown*s prohibition of foreign trade in 
the subordinate ports, that is, that such trade was irjjtrious to the 
national trade. In another letter, written a few days later, Melo e 
Castro advised Tigre to expect the arrival at Ibo of the Prince of Pate,
(1) AHU, CM 25, Correa to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 4 March 1788; AHU,
Cod* 1478, fl.16-17, reply, Mo<}., 15 April. 1788.
(2) AHU, CM 26, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 2 April 1789*
enclosing same, ,fRellay&o das Embarcagens de Mouros da Costa& 
q tern a Porta do nesta Ilha de S. Joao do Ibo de passagem p. 
a Capital de Moss. , outras, que ficarao p. algum Portos 
piquenos desta jurisdiyao...,** Ibo, 2 April 17891 Of 40 craft,
17 were reportedly from Pate, bound for Mozambique; 10 from 
around Pate, of which 4 were destined for Mozambique, while 3 
were staying at Ibo, 2 at Arimba, and 1 in Querimba; 5 were from
Zanzibar, bound for Moyambique; 2 from Mombasa and 1 from Kilwa,
with the same destination; an additional 5 from Anjouon Island 
were at ports in the Kerimba Islands*
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who would be returning home after having discussed the problem of
the clandestine trade carried on in the Kerimba Islands by the
Swahili of the northern coast. A third communication, dated 4 April 1789,
from the Governor-General warned his subordinate that the passports
which many Swahili traders bore were worthless, as they were granted
by virtually non-exisbent rulers# It also ordered the proclamation
in the islands of a bando, is his name, "absolutely forbidding the
clandestine trade of the Swahili of the coast of Zanzibar, Pate,
1 a
Mafia, Kilwa, Mombasa, & • • #JT Contrabanders were threatened with 
serious penalties, including heavy fines, imprisonment, and, for a 
third offender, banishment from Portuguese territory. Tigre published 
this bando on 18 April 1789 and soon sent notice of it to the rulers of 
Kilwa, Pate, Zanzibar, and Mombasa.(l)
The bando was soon followed by further instructions from Melo e 
Castro on regulating and taxing the legitimate trade in provisions and 
cattle. All was to no avail. In the following year Tigre reported 
with alarm that the Swahili from Pate "travel through the lands of the 
jurisdiction of this Command, establishing themselves almost as masters 
of them, and fortifying themselves in Quirimize," from whence their 
boats embarked to trade along the coast and to all the islands without 
regard for the Portuguese. Some of the moradores on the mainland, 
notably the ageing, but still important Jo&o de Morais, even protected
them, in return for assistance in their own settlements. In September
a large boatload of slaves from the interior had set out from Quirimize
(l) Ibid., same to same, Ibo, 22 February 1789; ibid. & AHU, Cod.1478, 
f1.27-8, reply, Moy., 3 April 1789; ibid, f1.26-7, same to same,
4 April 1789; ibid., fl.25, & AHU, CM 26, same to same, Moy.
6 April 1789; ibid & AHU, Cod.1500, fl.18, Tigre, bando, Ibo,
18 April 1789; AHU, CM 26, same to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo,
16 July 1789; cf, Teixeira Botelho, Histdria, 4#PP*588-9» who 
misdates this bando to 1788.
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to be sold to the French at Kilwa.(l) The magnitude of this trade 
is unknown, but there is no doubt that it continued to flourish for 
as long as there was a market for slaves at Kilwa and only a minimal 
demand at Ibo.
As^hey had since Morice*s day, French slavers to the north of 
Cape Delgado concentrated their activities at Kilwa. At the same time, 
however, a concerted effort was made by the French to open up trade 
with Mongalo. Morice had noted Mongalo only as a place with a small 
harbor, where one could buy smaller cowries than at the Kerimba 
Islands. It was scarcely better known to Crassons in 1784* who wrote 
of the coast between Cape Delgado and Kilwa that the Swahili and Arabs 
lived there
take from it a prodigious number of 
blacks (in margin: inferior to those 
of Kilwa but which they bring there 
to sell to us), particularly from 
the river Mongallo, a little-known 
river which flows through fertile 
and thickly populated country 
stretching a long way inland.
This stretch of country is 
entirely unknown to us, the approach 
to it is very difficult and weiare- 
ly go there.(2)
(1) Ibid. & AHU, Cod.1478, fl*22, A.M. de Melo e Castro to Tigre, M05.,
26 April 1789; AHU, CM 27, Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo,
8 November 1790. Quirimize, Kirimizi, or Kirinuzi is the name 
of the spit of land and village there situated opposite the 
most easterly point of Matemo Island, about 9 miles south of 
Mucojo and 20 miles north of Kissanga: see Diciondrio Corogr^fico, 
i, p.153; A Handbook of Portuguese Nyasaland. London, 1920, pp. 
159-60; W.B. Worsfold, Portuguese N.yasaland, London, 1899* larger 
of the two maps enclosed in pocket inside rear cover.
(2) fki, pp.90, 103-4 , 108, 120, 124, 175; SE*. PP.192-3.
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But from 1786 to 1789, Mongalo beoame the foous of Frenoh attempts 
from lie de Prance to secure a foothold in East Africa* (l)
In 1784 the Frenoh Minister of the Navy, Marshall de Castries, 
ordered the frigate La Venus* under the command of Count de Rosily, 
to make a special mission of reconnaissance from H e  de France to 
East Africa and the Persian Gulf* The Minister also requested 
Governor-General de Souillac to propose to a local shipowner, who 
would be indemnified by the government in case of failure, that he 
send one or two ships to follow up this mission* Aooordingly, on 1 
July 1785 La Venus* accompanied by the royal corvette La Pr^voyance* 
commanded by Lieutenant le Chevalier Saulnier de Mbndevit, set out 
from Port Louis for the Persian Gulf* At the same time, or shortly 
thereafter, Les Bons Amis* owned by the Mauritian shipowner 
Commarmond, whose offer was accepted in consideration of his previous 
success in mounting lucrative voyages to these plaoes, departed for 
the East African coast* Les Bons Amis seems to have sailed to Mombasa, 
where a certain amount of hostility was encountered from the Arab 
governor* If it visited any other ports, these are not mentioned, but 
later oomments by Commarmond indioate that it did not go to Mongalo*
The vessel returned to H e  de France at the end of the year, carrying 
74 African slaves and yielding its owner a very slight profit* (2)
(1) See Andrade, Rela^oes* p* 375» for an example of general Portuguese
knowledge of Mongalo before the beginning of French enterprise 
there*
(2) AF, Col* C4 96, Le Chevalier d'Entreoasteaux & Motais de Narbonne to
Minister of the Navy, Port Louis, 30 January 1789$ AF, Col* C4 
79, "Raport de M* Le Brasseur au Ministresur l1 expedition de 
la Frigate la Venus et les demandes du S* Comaxmons employ^ 
dans la dite Expedition," n*d«, but post-10 December 1783$
AF, Cod* c4 83, Commarmond to Minister of the Navy, H e  de France, 
20 June 1789$ see also AF, Col* C^ 75* Be Souillac to le Vioomte 
de Loemaria, H e  de France, 20 November 1786, which contains 
references to French complaints against the Governor of Mombasa 
and to subsequent appeals for protection of the Imam of Oman 
in East Africa*
La Venus* too, did not reach Mongalo; (l) but Saulnier de Mondevitvs 
vessel did, and that officer has left us with two extremely valuable 
accounts of that place. (2)
In the journal of his voyage , Saulnier de Mondevit states that 
La Prevoyance left Basra on 29 October 1?85 and reached the island of 
Pemba, to the north of Zanzibar, on 28 December, from Pemba she 
followed the ooast to Kilwa, which Saulnier de Mondevit knew and where 
he hoped to acquire directions, or a pilot, to Mongalo, his destination. 
But at Kilwa he got only vague responses, intimating the impracticability 
of such a proposal, as only very small boats usually went there. It 
seems dear that Saulnier de Mondevit was rebuffed at Kilwa, where 
the local traders, the Sultan, and the Omani governor would have been 
reluctant to see the frenoh open direct commercial relations with a 
town nominally subordinate to Kilwa. La frevovanoe departed from 
Kilwa on 4 January 1786 and soon arrived at what was thought to be 
Mongalo, but which proved to be Lindi. (3) The French were well
(l) See AF, Col. C^ 95* Be Souillac to Minister of the Navy, H e  de 
France, 18 May, 1786; cf. Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders 
pp.84-7#
\2) AF, Col. C^80, Saulnier de Mondevit, "Memoire sur la Baye de Lindy 
et la Riviere de Mbngale. situ£e a la c$te oriefttale de l,Afri- 
que —  Extrait du journal du Ch.er Saulnier de Mondevit, Lieu­
tenant de Vaisseau, commandant la Corvette du Roi, La Prevoy- 
and& armee de 10 cannons & 30 hommes d1 equipage, partie de 
l'Isle de France le ler Juillet 1785* sous les ordres de M. 
le C. de Rosily, Capitaine de Vaisseau commandant la Fre- 
gate de Sa Majeste, La v£nus,” n.d., but dated internally to 
1786; A , Col. C4 84, idem, "M^moire sur la nloessit^ & de les 
Moyens de former un Etablissement fran^ois £ Mongalo sur la 
Cote Orientale dfAffrique,n d.d., but probably composed at 
same time. The following paragraphs are based on these two 
documents, except where otherwise speoified.
(3) The Swahili Ancient History of Lindi reveals that relations between 
the rulers of Lindi and Mongglo (Mgao Mwanya) were very close; 
see SD, p.228.
- 231 -
received at Lindi, which was "under the domination of the King of 
Kilwa," and the people living in the many villages dotting the inner 
bay there offered to trade with them in slaves and ivory. After four 
days La Prevoyance oontinued south from Lindi to Mongalo, which was 
reached after a six hours1 sail. Going ashore, the French met with 
the ruler of Mongalo, but Saulnier de Mondevit fs remark that all the 
looal chiefs were willing to receive him bears out the impression one 
gathers from the Swahili History of Sudi that the Mwenyi Mwanya's rule 
was less than absolute in Mongalo. (l)
According to Saulnier de Mondevit, the French were unkhown to the 
people of Mongalo, who mistook them at first for Portuguese, for whom 
some antipathy was felt. Two local traders, who had been to Mozambique, 
told him in limited Portuguese that such a large vessel had never before 
been seen at Mongalo. They wondered why he had not gone to Kilwa in­
stead, but did not let this prevent them, and their fellows, from raising 
the subjeot of trade. Saulnier de Mondevit explained that they were 
not there to trade personally, although he elsewhere indicates that the 
ship's officers did indeed purchase slaves at Mongalo on this voyage, 
and that his purpose was to negotiate terms for the inauguration of 
direct trade' between them and the French. Two days later (? 9 January 
1766) the authorities of Mongalo sent him a written agreement in which 
were set out the conditions of this trade. These specified (a) that 
the French of H e  de France were to supply them with all the merchan­
dise that they should request, (b) that these be traded for slaves 
and ivory, and (c) described the manner in which a French vessel was 
to identify itself on entering the roadstead. A copy of this agreement 
with the French monarch's seal affixed was requested by the authorities 
of Mongalo, to which Saulnier de Mondevit agreed. It was too promising 
an offer to refuse, for the second article stipulated that male slaves, 
feregardless of age or size, should never oost more than 25 piastres
(l) See above, pJSS; SD» P .230.
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each* The price of women and children was not specified, hut these were 
always less costly* As Saulnier de Mondevit was well aware, from 
his knowledge of the French slave trade at Kilwa, the Kerimba Islands, 
and Mozambique, this was a much lower maximum price than that obtaining 
at any of these other markets* (l)
His argument for the necessity of establishing a French faotory 
at Mongalo was based upon this very premise* Slaves were necessary 
to the Mascarenes and prices had more than doubled at the Portuguese 
strongholds in recent years* The parallel with Morice *s proposal 
for Kilwa is obvious* (2) As did Morice with Kilwa, Saulnier de Mondevit 
praised the many natural advantages of Mongalo, whioh he said had a 
superior supply of fresh water than had Kilwa* (3) Similarly, of 
particular interest are his remarks on the people, general situation, 
and trade of Mongalo* Aooording to what he learned, Mongalo was 
founded by the Swahili, who shared it with the Makonde who embraced 
Islam* Mongalo, as well as the towns below it td Cape Delgado, was 
considered to recognise the authority of the Tigran of Oman, but it 
never rendered him any tribute* His claim to obeisanoe seems to have 
been gooepted by the Swahili as the result of his religious authority 
as Imam; but the Makonde, who originally came from the neighbouring 
plateau, did not recognise his authority, even though they lived in 
Mongalo. (4) Saulnier de Mondevit suggested that French protection
(1) Cf. Dalrymple, Plan of the River Mbngallou on the East Coast of
Africa Lat. 10071 S. Var*u 180AO*W. From a French MS** 51 April 
1789* Dalrymple *s source was almost certainly Saulnier* The 
legend to this map includes the following passages MThe Blaoks 
are very fine & at good prioe* The Moors are the Proprietors 
of the Country and carry on a great trade, as well in Blaoks, 
which they send to Kilwa, as in Ivory, which they sell to the 
Arabs*
(2) See above, pp.WW.
(3) But of* Dalrymple, Plan of the River Mongallou* in which water is
said to be difficult to procure there*
(4) For evidence of the intimacy of Makonde ties with both irfiWM and
Mikindani, whioh flank Mongalo to the north and south on the 
coast, see SD* p*227, and K#Weule, Native Life in East Africa* 
(trs* A* Werner), London, 1909, p*258*
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of Mongalo would scarcely "be contested by the Imam, as he gained no 
tribute from it* On the other hand, he believed that it would be 
welcomed by the Swahili, who lived in fear of the Arabs*
For the most part, the Arabs who frequented Mongalo came from 
Mombasa# All trade to the north, particularly that in Indian goods, 
was controlled by them , while the Swahili were obliged to see Euro- 
pean merchandise at Mozambique# The Mombasa Arabs reputedly tyrannized 
the people of Mongalo in their commercial transactions, obliging them 
to sell their slaves and ivory in exchange for low quality cloth from 
Surat, iron, muskets and powder# Without indicating the unit of measure, 
Saulnier de Mondevit pointed out that the Arabs paid only 7 or 6 piastres 
for the Africans1 ivory, whereas Europeans paid twice or thrice this 
price# nIf the Arabs are contrary, they burn the villages,14 he added#
The Islamioized Makonde were particularly eager to be freed from their 
despotic behavior#
Mongalo*s proximity to Portuguese territory was also advantageous, 
Saulnier de Mondevit claimed, as it would enable the French to tap the 
trade of that interior for themselves# Elaborating on this point, 
he observedt
Mongalo is the part of the ^East/ African 
coast most sunken in the continent; 
consequently, it is nearer to the mount­
ains inhabited by the Makua, the Makonde, 
the Ndonde, and the Tao, all different 
people, oontinually at war, solely to 
make each other prisoners, whom they 
sell# The bands of slaves from this 
part would come out of preference to 
Mongalo if there were a European 
establishment there#
Mongalo is, in fact, most decidedly not 41 sunken in the continent,44
but the edge of the Makonde plateau is very near to the coast at
Mongalo, as it algo is at both Lindi and Mlkindani# The real importance
of Saulnier de Mondevit* s statement is that it shows the Makonde of
Tanzania to have been in occupation of the plateau by at least 1785? (l)
(l) Cf# Lias, Os Maoondes, i, pp# 62-5, 75 and map 2#
that it contains clear references to both the Makua and, especially, 
the Tao being settled in that region by the same date; and that it 
includes the first known reference to the Monde* (l) Furthermore, 
his observation shows that the Tao living close by the Kilwa coast were 
already actively engaged in supplying those market towns with slaves^ 
Saulnier de Mondevit*s encouraging reports on trading prospects 
at Mongalo were immediately followed up by Commarmond, who dispatched 
Les Bons Amis and Le Furet to that place in February 1786* Both were 
ill-fated* Le Furet never reached Mongalo, and after taking port 
at Fondiohd^y in June was sold there; Les Bons Amis was lost on its 
arrival at H e  de France, from Mongalo, in December, although its 
cargo of 400 slaves, wax, and ivory was apparently salvaged. Late 
in May 1787 he sent the brig La Bonite to Mongalo, where it was fol­
lowed by La Legera^ in August, and La Fran^oise* in December* Tet 
ahother ship, appropriately named Le Mongalo was also being readied 
for a voyage to Mongalo at the end of that year* Count de Rosily wrote 
that Commarmond expected to send some 900 slaves from Mongalo to America, 
but these hopes were unfulfilled, partially due to the loss of La 
Frangoise, at Zanzibar, in February 1788* According to Blancard, the 
small French vessels whioh had traded at Mongalo eaoh embarked only 
100 to 150 slaves* Furthermore, the prices of slaves at Mongalo were 
equal to those of Kilwa by 1787, and had, by mid-1789, doubled sinoe 
the time of Saulnier* s first visit in 1785* In view of this situation, 
the faot that the head tax of 3 Piastres each which one paid there, 
not including presents to the ruler and his chi&f subordinates, was less 
than that paid at either Mozambique or Kilwa, made little difference* (2)
(1) According to Dias, the generic name Monde is applied by the Makonde
of the pl^ateau to those who live in the valleys and plains of the 
area, including Makonde, Yao, and Makua. Over the years, however, 
the Makonde-linked Monde evolved certain peculiar cos toms which 
set them apart from their neighbours* See ibid.,dypp.63-86; also 
Tew, Peoples * pp*26-7 ;TDB,ii, Lindi s "Tribal History and Legends, Hp*2 
(191), and "Laws, Manners and Customs", p*9 (199)
(2) AF* Col*04 78,Commarmond to Minister of Havy,Port Louis, 1 November 1787
AF,Col*C4 85, same to same, H e  de France,20 June 1789; AF,Col*C4 72, 
"Raport de M*Le Brasseur*.*," 0*1785-1786; Dermigny, Cargaisons 
Indiennes* i,pp.106,110, n*23; Blancard, Manuel, p*23
Bat as both Commarmond and the administrators of lie de France 
explained to the Minister of the Navy, the mission of these ships was 
not restricted to trade* Aocording to Commarmond, Saulnier had first 
raised the French flag at Mongalo at the end of 1785* Commarmond had 
accepted the task of maintaining the French present there until an 
official establishment could be undertaken by the French Government*
In fact, he explainedy La Bonite was being kept at Mongalo "solely to 
show the French flag there," a sacrifioe whioh had cost Commarmond 
a great deal of money* By late 1787 Commarmond^ men had constructed 
a warehouse on the mainland at Mongalo, "under the protection of a 
small vessel armed with four cannons and with about a twelve man 
crew*" Th e Governor-General and the Intendant of H e  de France reported 
that Commarmond had doubled his staff there so that Saulnier^ obser­
vations could be verified and the rivers which entered the bay could 
be ascended* All three men strongly urged the Minister of the Navy 
to found an official Frenoh establishment at Mongalo, but their request 
must have fallen on deaf ears in Paris, for the Revolutionary Govern­
ment was violently opposed to slavery, (l) Indeed, by the law of 8 
Ventose II (26 February 1794)» the slave trade at H e  de France, and 
presumably also at Bourbon, was temporarily suspended* (2)
After a promising beginning, the French effort to establish a 
foothold at Mongalo soon failed* Commarmond, who apparently exercised 
a monopoly of trade there in return for his services to the State, 
was equally unsuccessful in making Mongalo into an independent rival 
to Kilwa* The particular welcome which the Frenoh had been accorded 
at Mongalo was apparently somewhat worn out by early 1789, althou^ i 
Commarmond seems not to have been aware of this change when he wrote 
in June* According to the Portuguese Commandant of Vamizi Island, a
(1) AF, Col*C^  95, de SouHlac to.Minister of the Navy, He de France,
14 March 1787$ AF, Col* Or 78, Commarmond to same, Port Louis,
1 November 1?87$ AF, Col* 85, same to same, H e  de France,
20 June 1789$ AF, Col* 98, d1 Entrecasteaux and Motais de 
Narbonne to same, Port Louis, 50 January 1789*
(2) K, Noel, L*Esolavage a l1 He de France pendant 1*Occupation franyaise
(1715-1810)* Thkse pour le doctorat de l1 University presentee a la 
Facult^ des Lettres de HTJniversite de Paris, 1955, P»58.
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Frenoh sloop was foroed to quit# Mongalo, either as a result of threats 
from the Sultan of Kilwa, or, as seemed more .likely from news he had 
received from Tungi, from where the sloop had lately departed because 
of a conflict with the ruler of Mongalo over the non-payment of certain 
fees* (l) Not surprisingly, the temporary Frenoh establishment at 
Mongalo nevertheless threw a considerable scare into the Portuguese*
For some unknown reason, however, they did not realize that it was 
looated at Mongalo* In 1787 it was reported from Vamizi that a 
French faotoxy had been erected at Mikindani, a belief to which 
Nogueira de Andrade vigorously Bubsoribed two years later* (2) It 
is most unlikely that this was so, especially as Mikindani passes 
all but unnoticed in contemporary French reoords*
For all the involvement at Mongalo, then, Kilwa remained secure 
as the principal source of slaves for the French north of Cape Delgado*
In fulfilling this role it undoubtedly oontinued to dominate the ivory 
and slave trade of Mongalo, as well* Aocording to the figures given by
Blancard, which date from 1787, the price for an adult male slave at Kilwa
had not risen since 1784, averaging from 35 to 40 Piastres* As at Mozambique 
and the Kerimba Islands, the prices for females and younger males were 
proportionately less* By 1787, however, not only had the head tax on slaves 
been raised slightly from 6 to 6£ piastres* but a considerable outlay had 
to be made in the way of additional presents to various local dignitaries 
for eaoh cargo* For a sale of 300 daves made in that year, a Frenoh trader 
had given the Sultan of Kilwa present of cloth and glass equal to about 100 
piastres; to his two brothers and an unole, similar gifts totalling 60 
piastres; a further 50 piastres eaoh went to the Sultan's 'Minister' and his
SAHU, CM 26, Bruno de Morais to Tigre, Vamizi, 7 February 1789*AHU, CM 24 Correa to A*M* de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 2$ December 1787$AC, i, 1917, P. 124-
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1Secretary1; while 60 piastres were paid to the Omani Governor of Kilwa*
While these presents were not so exorbitant as those onoe demanded by the 
Portuguese offioials to the south, against which Crassons had so strongly 
protested, they were an extra expense* Another new development in the 
operation of the French slave trade at Kilwa, and one of which Crassons no 
doubt approved, was the fact that the French no longer competed among 
themselves for cargoes, but did their trading in orderly fashion, eaoh 
vessel in its turn*(l)*
No precise figures exist for the volume of the Frenoh slave trade at 
Kilwa during this period* Among others, Crassons was still doing business 
along that coast, but the grounding there in 1788 of his ship, Paotole* 
probably terminated his lengthy career as an active slaver in East Africa* 
Crassons was taken on as a passenger at Kilwa by Captain Levanuier of Le Don 
Royal* which had sailed from Le Havre on 4 March 1788* Leaving Kilwa on 16 
September 1788 with a cargo of 500 slaves, Le Don Royal set sail for Saint- 
Domingue, but was subsequently lost off Assumption, a small desert island to 
the north of Madagascar* All the slaves were lost, or destroyed, according 
to Malte-Brun, but Crasson, Levannier, and some of the crew made their way 
to Anjetmn, whence they were transported to Mozambique in a Portuguese ship*
From there, passage to France was readily found* It is doubtful if Crassons 
was able to undertake any further African ventures before his death in 1793* (2)
(1) Blancard, Manuel* pp.21-3, translated in J*M* Gray, "A Frenoh Aocount,"
pp*224-5; see above, pp. According to Captain P. Dal Ions,
in 1788 the head tax on slaves purchased within the dominion of the 
Imam of Oman was fixed at 5 Piastres* It seems doubtful that this 
limit was ever observed at Kilwa* Ballons says that the treaty was 
negotiated by a M.de Roussillon, "the commander of a frigate," under 
the orders of the Frenoh government; is it possible that Ballons, 
writing in 1804, was uncertain of the man's name, and that the French 
agent was the captain of La Venus* de Rosily, who had treated with 
the Imam in 1785? See SaD. p*200*
(2) Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages* Paris, xiii, Wj|Pp*15L-2, relevant
passages translated in J*M* Gray, "The Recovery of Kilwa by the Arabs 
in 1785," p*25; AHU, Cod.1472,f 1.88, M* de Melo e Castro to A«M* de 
Melo e Castro, Ajuda, 5 April 1791* enclosing "Registo da Memoria da 
Informajao que Se pede da parte da Corte de Franja, pelo Seo 
Embaixador o Conde de Chalon," which concerns the death at Mozambique 
of Henri de la Balme, the 17 year old son of Jacques Henri de la Balme 
Secretary to Louis XVI, who had been aboard Le Don Royal*
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More generally, in December 1788, it was reported to Tigre that there 
were seven French ships trading at Kilwa, as well as two at Mongalo, 
but no further particulars are known of these vessels, or their trade* 
Less than a month later, Melo e Castro reported that eleven French 
ships were going business at these ports and at Mikindani, while a 
Captain Le Maitre told Nogueira de Andrade that during the nine months 
in whioh he had lived at Kilwa, five other French ships were taking 
on slaves there* Le Maitre, who was engaged in the American slave 
trade, also led Nogueira de Andrade to believe that the French still 
had a trading convention with the Sultan of Kilwa, and that a stretch 
of shorefront there whioh had been sold to a Frenoh ship's captain 
now belonged to the French Crown, to whom the captain presented it* 
There is no confirming evidence of this, and one must doubt its 
accuracy, in view of official reaction to Morice's original proposal 
and the establishment of Omani hegemony at Kilwa* On the other hand, 
Melo e Castro's belief that the effective oampaign to prevent the 
Frenoh from slave trading in the Kerimba Islands was an important 
factor in driving them to the Swahili ports appears to have been 
well founded*(l)
Very little is known about the French slave trade along the 
Kilwa coast in the early 1790s* Apparently, it continued to flourish 
at the same pace into 17939 after which time the fear of war caused 
a temporary hiatus, just as it did at Mozambique* (2) In the
(1) AHU, CM 25, Tigre to A*M* de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 24 December
1788; AHU, CM 26, A*M* de Melo e Castro to M* de Melo e
Castro, Moq*, 14 January 1789? AJJ, i, 1917f P*125
(2) AHU, CM 31, Alves da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 19 August 1795*
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following year the Sultan of Kilwa is known to have written to the 
Portuguese Governor-General, hut as the correspondence has not been 
found it is unknown if this was in any way related to the French 
trade*(l)*
Although the French resumed slave trading at Mozambique and 
the Kilwa coast after a lapse of only about two years, after 1794 
they no longer occupied the uniquely dominating position in that 
trade which they had in the previous decade* The French slave trade 
in East-Central Africa did not apparently decline, and they oontinued 
to play an important part, but the increasing importance of Brazilian, 
and, to a far lesser extent, American slavers along that coast, 
prevented the continuation of their near monopoly* Of course, one 
must remember that throughout this period the Arabs were also trading 
for slaves at Kilwa and its associated ports* Moreover, despite the 
lfaok of documentation, it would appear that this trade was steadily 
increasing* Were there sources from which one could evaluate the 
volume of this trade, the present impression of French domination 
of the slave trade along the Kilwa coast might well need some revision*
(l) AHU, CM 28, Correa to same, Ibo, 22 February 1794V
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2* Yao responses
During the period of Frenoh dominance of the external slave 
trade of East-Central Africa, the internal trade of that area was 
marked by the continuing trend of the Yao to carry their goods to 
the Kilwa coast, rather than to Mozambique• To be sure, there are 
a few passing references to the Yao at Mozambique, but these suggest 
that their trade was of less importance than in years past.(l) In 
the trading season of 1795, the Governor-General of Mozambique 
wrote that the introduction of better quality trading cloths at 
Zanzibar, as well as of European goods, was "diverting from us the 
concourse of the Yao9 who, in the time of my predecessors, used to 
convey from two hundred to three hundred bares of ivory to Mossuril, 
now, since that of the government of my predecessor /i.e., since 17867, 
and during mine, bring scarcely thirty to forty." (2) Sousa's obser­
vation is particularly valuable in that it comes at the end of a 
decade in which there were no unusual disturbances on the Mozambique 
coast which might have inhibited the Yao from trading there. The 
scarcity of references to the Makua in the documentation remaining 
from this period tactily bears witness to the absence of serious 
conflict between them and the Portuguese*, ©lose which have been 
found support this impression, and although desultory raids were 
made on Mossuril in the middle of 1789, there are no indications that
these in any way affected trading to Mozambique. (3) Similarly, the
(1) Tigre to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Moz*, 28 March 1790, In C. Montez,
*Invent£rio do Fundo do Slculo XVIII," Mozambique,76, 1953, P*134, 
Document 695 BNL, FG Cod. 8105, anon., "Mozambique," n.d., but 
post-1783; cf. EHGEP. pp.295*6, and Andrade, Relajoes,p.389, 
although this reference merely echoes earlier descriptions of 
this trade.
(2) AHU, CM 31, Sousa to M. de Melo e Castro, Moq., 22 August 1795*
cf. Teixeira Botelho, Hjst6ria.iAp.493; Jackson, European Powers, 
p.95; see also, AC.i.1917» p#126.
(3) AHU, CM 22, Manuel GalvSo da Silva to ?same, Moz., n.d. but dated
from other sources to August 1785; AHU, CM 26, A.M. de Melo e 
Castro to same, Moz^L4 January & 19 August 1789#
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Banians appear to have been allowed to carry on their business at 
Mozambique with a minimum of bother. Although the royal orders of 
1785 advised Melo e Castro to continue the prohibition against 
their "trading personally on the mainland," the Governor-General 
appears to have reinstituted the granting of passports to individual 
merchants. Besides, the Banians frequently consigned merchandise to 
Swahili agents who lived on the mainland and introduced it tax free 
at Quitangonha and Cabaceira Pequena.(l) In fact, in view of the 
controversy over the position of Banian traders at Mozambique up to 
1785, one is disappointed to find that there are few references to 
the problem during the following two decades. The picture that 
emerges, then, is that the Yao were directing most of their trade 
to the Kilwa coast for the single reason that they were able to get 
a better price, and better merchandise, for their ivory there.
Matters become less simple after 1795, which marks the beginning 
of a period of considerable confusion along the Mozambique coast.
Peaceful conditions were upset not only on the continent, but also 
in the coastal waters. The debilitating effect of these disturbances 
was most pronounced in the already decadent Portuguese possessions in 
the Cape Delgado area. At the same time, one begins to detect the 
growing importance of the slave trade among the Yao, or at least 
among those trading to Mozambique. This is not a development which 
can easily be traced. On the one hand, the increasing Portuguese 
preoccupation with military affairs is harshly reflected in official 
documentation by a disappointing lack of references to matters of 
internal trade, such as those which abound from about 1750 to 1785*
One must rely far more extensively on the accounts of visitors, or
(l) EHGEP, pp.295-6, and Andrade, Relazoes. pp.388-95 AHU, CM 25,
Tigref to A.M. de Melo e Castro, Ibo, 24 December 1788; AHU,
CM 26, Nascimento Nunes to Crown, "Denuncio...," Moz«, 10 June 1790, 
SP 19; AHU, CM 54, Sheikh of Quitangonha, Xafir Salimo, requerimento, 
/Ro9.7 n.d. but definitely post-1804 and probably c.1810; see above, 
P*W#;se® also Lobato, Lourenzo Marques.ii.pp.298 & 312, for further 
evidence of Melo e Castro's and Sousa's toleration of the Banians.
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the scattered memoirs of individual Portuguese officials. On the 
other, it is from this epoch that onefs ignorance of the internal 
divisions of the Tao "becomes most critical, and that the inclination 
to regard the Tao as an undifferentiated whole becomes progressively 
more unsatisfactory. The nascent tendency of at least some Tao to 
regard slaves, rather than ivory, as their most important stock in 
trade, seems possibly to have modulated the responses which they had
made throughout the eighteenth century to factors affecting the
ivory market at the coast.
As we have seen previously, longer periods of peaceful relations
between the Portuguese and their African neighbours were generally 
characterized by the building up of petty grievances which eventually 
led to the recommencement of hostilities by the latter. These periods 
reflected the temporary triumphs of Portuguese power over the local 
chiefs.(l) This process of deterioration was probably acerbated 
after 1787 by the decision in that year to permit the residents of 
Mozambique legally to trade firearms and gunpowder to the Makua, with 
whom a brisk trade was at once begun by leading Portuguese, whose 
agents negotiated these goods exclusively for slaves.(2) Peace finally 
was broken by the eruption of fighting between the Sheikh of Quitangonha 
and the Portuguese in 1795* A declared state of war existed from 1795 
to 1796* and, after an uneasy truce, from 1799 through 1801. The 
Sheikh, formerly a Portuguese ally, commanded a wide following not only 
on the island of Quitangonha, but also on the mainland of Matibane.
Prom the beginning of the conflict, the Portuguese sought to ally the
fl) See above, pp. JIU/
(2) AHtJ, CM 23* A.M.d* Melo e Castro to M. de Melo e Castro, Mo^., 27 
August 1787 (two letters bearing same date); AHU, CM 26, same to 
same, Mo^., 13 August 1789; for a reference to the forging of 
musket balls by local Maftua smiths, see AHQ, CM 22, Galvao da 
Silva, nNoticia Sobre as duas Minas de ferro, e a mostras de 
pedras que mando,1* Moj., 21 August 1785*
- 243 -
important Makua chiefs to their side* The Portuguese repulsed an 
attack on Mossuril in 1799 and by late August of that year had made 
preparations for a major expedition of their allies, said to number 
more than 14,000 strong, against the Sheikh. For the moment, both 
Mwaviamuno and Mauru<ja had joined the Portuguese against Quitangonha, 
qnd in December Mauru<ja carried out a damaging raid in Matibane.
Despite the grandiose plans of the Portuguese for large expeditions, 
however, most of the warring was carried out by individual chiefs 
acting independently and for their own purposes*(l)
Several years later, the roles were reversed, with the Portuguese 
lined up with the new Sheikh of Quitangonha, who had succeeded on the 
death of his recalcitrant predecessor in 1804, against Murimuno, who 
had submitted to Portuguese rule in 1784#(2) Once again the catalysts 
of the conflict were the robbery of trade goods sent by the Portuguese 
into the interior and the harboring of fugitive slaves* In the latter 
case Murimuno was demanding the not inconsiderable ransom of 20 cruzados 
for each of these slaves. During 1807 the Portuguese carried out 
several strikes against his territory. Irfhile these were successful, 
only limited damage was inflicted on the Makua, who soon retaliated 
with a raid on Mossuril. It was the same sort of conflict which had 
always prevailed between these two foes. A report by the Governor- 
General on the progress of the war is especially illuminating in that 
it reveals the extent to which the Portuguese were involved in the
(1) AHCJ, CM 31, Sousa to Manuel Pereira Baptista, Moj., 8 February 1795?
AHU, CM 28, Alves da Silva to Sousa, Ibo, 9 October 1795; AHU,
CM 35t Francisco Guedes de Carvalho e Meneses da Costa to D. Rodrigo 
de Sousa Coutinho, Moc., 25 August 1799> AHU, CM 36, Lufs Correa 
Monteiro de Matos to ?Gov., Mossuril, 5 December 17995 ibid., same, 
or Josd Antdnio Caldas to ?Gov., Mossuril, 1799 /fragments AHU,
CM 37, Antdnio ilvares de Macedo to Gov., Uticulo, 16 February 1801; 
AHU, CM 38, Meneses da Costa to Sousa Coutinho, M05., 21 September 
1801; ibid., Isidro de Ahnida de Sousa e S6 to same, M09., 23 September 
1801; see Teixeira Botelho, Histdria.ia PP*5QL“3* 529“30*
(2) AHU, CM 44, Isidro de Almeida de Sousa e S& to Visconde de Anadia,
M09., 28 October 1804; see above, pp«f£©£Mfc.
- 244
"court" intrigues bf their Makua neighbors, a policy which was 
dictated by their military weakness on the mainland. The Governor- 
General first was hopeful of placing a disgruntled relative of the 
previous Murimuno into that chieftaincy. When this candidated proved 
fainthearted, the Portuguese looked to a kinsman of the deceased 
Uticulo chief Impahiamuno to be installed as a more pliant Murimuno*
At the writing of his report, the Governor-General was planning to 
convoke "a public congress in conformity with African manners" for 
his nomination.(l)
While it is not known if a rival Murimuno actually was installed 
by the Portuguese, it is clear that the situation in Macuana remained 
very confused and potentially explosive. In 1808 the robberies committed 
by Napitarauno, whose bailiwick was located on the coast just north of 
Quitangonha, as well as certain other Makua disorders around Mossuril, 
annoyed the Portuguese; but the outbreak of serious fighting in Uticulo, 
early in the next year, posed a far more serious problem. (2) As early 
as March 1809 internal warring had driven the reigning Impahiamuno 
from Uticulo to the Portuguese Crown land which served as a buffer 
between the coastal settlements and the interior* Impahiamuno soon 
sought retaliation against Mauruya, his chief rival, but by early May 
the Portuguese were actively seeking to maintain peace with this powerful 
ruler. There had recently been some skirmishes between Mwaviamuno and 
Mocaromuno, and the Portuguese feared that this might lead to a more 
dangerous situation. For the Portuguese, Antdnio Alberto Macedo 
emphasized his desire for peace with Mauruya, courtfcdg him with presents
(1) AHU, Cod.1372, fl*26v.-28, ^Francisco de Paula e Albuquerque de
Amaral CardostJ to same, Moy., 9 October 1807; cf. Salt, Voyage 
to Abyssinia, pp.38-9# who incorrectly attributes the Makua 
sacking of the parish church at Mossuril, which occurred in the 
raid of 1776> to the 1807 attack; see above, pp
(2) BNL, FGjCod. 8470,n. 4» Caldas to Prov.Govt., Moy., 5 November 1808;
AHU, CM 50, Josd Antdnio Caldas to Prov.Govt., Moy., 17 August
1808; see Picion&rio CorogrAfico.ii.p.102.
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and assured him that "you can freely sendyour people to the coast 
to trade." A week after writing to Mauruya, Macedo reported that 
Impahiamuno had turned up at his residence in the middle of the night, 
having again beeim. driven from Itoculo.(l)
The outcome of that year*s fighting is not known, but events 
of the following year indicate that there was no resolution of differences 
between the various Makua chiefs. As always, everyone pursued his own 
interests and alliances of conveience abounded. No single power on the 
mainland was able to enforce its will on the others, so that there was 
a constant jockeying for position which must have considerably upset 
peaceful conditions there. The most active protagonist of 1810 was 
the Sheikh of Quitangonha, who rendered the Portuguese considerable 
service by his actions. In May, after first seeking Portuguese sanction, 
he joined Mauruya in a successful war against a certain Madulamuno, 
whose territory appears to have been located well to the north of 
Uticulo. Following some indeterminate warring among various Makua 
chiefs in the neighborhood of Mossuril in June, which the Portuguese 
discreetly observed without daring to intervene* the Sheikh began in 
August an extensive campaign, at specific Portuguese request, against 
a number of Macuana chiefs. In the following weeks he was not only 
instructed to chastize dissident chiefs near his own territory, such 
as Cherepomuno (or Cherepwemuno) and Moveramuno to the north, but also 
those to the south of Moyambique, like the Sheikh of Mogincual, which 
necessitated an amphibious attack. Unofficial fears of the Sheikh of 
Quitangonha^ ultimate intentions proved completely unfounded, as the 
Makua alone continued to haraas the mainland*(2)
(1) AHU, CM 52, Macedo to Prov.Govt., Moy., 10 April 1809; ibid., same
to Mauruya, Mossuril, 9 May 1809, enclosed in same to Prov.Govt., 
Mossuril, 10 May 1809; ibid., same to same, Mo&ruril, 16 & 17 
May 1809*
(2) AHU, CM 53# Macedo to Antdnio Manuel de Melo Castro e Mendanya, Moy.,
7 May 1810; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.35-6, Mendonya to Conde das Galveas, 
Moy., 8 November 1810; AHU, Cod.1377# fl*38, 45-7# same to Sheikh 
of Quitangonha, Mossuril, 1 August, 29 September, & 7 October 1810; 
ibid., fl*49, same to same, Moy., 3 November 18J.0 (two letters bear­
ing same date); AHU, CM 53# Sheikh of Quitangonha, Zafir Salimo, to 
?Mendonya, Campo de Chagan, 6 October 1810.
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On 16 November a combined force of some 1300 men, armed with 
guns and under the orders of Mwasemuno, Cherepomuno, and Moveramuno, 
attacked Sanculoand Lumbo on the coast. As Portuguese retaliation 
on their withdrawal to the interior was unusually effective, and the 
ever active Sheikh of Quitangonha followed this up with an immediate 
raid involving more than 3500 men, the Portuguese decided to mount 
a final, crushing expedition against these Makua. This Brief campaign 
was notable chiefly for the fact that in it the Portuguese utilized 
field artillery for the first time against the Makua. The general 
effect of these combined efforts was to restore a temporary semblance 
of Portuguese hegemony over parts of the immediate interior, but the 
area was in such a state of general unrest that complete order 
remained unattainable for the moment#(l)
If conditions around Mozambique were precarious at the end of 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, they were desperate at 
the Kerimba Islands and the coast below Cape Delgado. Whatever 
hopes there may have been in the mid-1790s for a revival of this 
important Portuguese frontier with the Muslim north were crushed by 
the series of blows struck at these establishments in the following 
years. In 1794 prospects were bleak enough, with the islands 
"totally uninhabited" except for the poor and miserable denizens, 
almost no troops, provisions scarce, and the fortifications in 
disrepair, according to the local governor.(2) Throughout that same 
year there were numerous petty conflicts with the Makua, who had risen 
in " a great revolution" on the death of Jo&o de Morais, long the only
(1) AHU, CM 54 & Cod.1374, fl.85-:6^ Joao Vicente de Cardenas e Mira,
Campo de Impoenya. 24 November 1810; AHU, Cod.1380, fl.46-8, 
Mendonya to Galveas, Moy., 28 November 1810; AHU, CM 53#
Cardenas A Mira to Mendonya, Mossuril, 12 December 1810.
(2) AHU, CM 29, Correa to Sousa, Ibo, 10 June 1794, enclosed in Sousa
to M. de Melo e Castro, Moy., 20 August 1794*
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bastion of Portuguese authority on the mainland. During the next 
year it became increasingly difficult to prevent French corsairs 
from slaving along that coast, and in 1796, despite official French 
protestations of peace, French vessels attacked both Ibo and Pangani, 
the latter located on the mainland opposite Macaloe, now known as 
Mahato, Island, (l) The end of the century saw a continuation of 
Makua harassment, a severe famine and an epidemic of an unidentified 
fever in 1798, and a move towards the abolition of the alfandega at 
Ibo. Trade was at a standstill, except for the Swahili slave trade 
from around Vamizi to the north.(2)
In 1800 a new threat to the islands appeared from the sea: these 
were the Sakalava and allied raiders from the northwest coast of 
Madagascar. During the next two decades they were the cause of 
extensive devastation along the African coast from Ibo to Mafia, 
where the presence of their fleet of lakas, single sail and single 
outrigger canoes, in the Mozambique Channel was a threat to all 
other shipping in those waters. The original impetus for these 
raids, which were organized for the express purpose of capturing 
slaves, did not come from the Sakalava, but from the piratical 
Betsimisaraka of the northeastern coast of the great island. The 
idea of striking at the Comoro archipelago and eventually at the 
coast of East Africa may well have been partly introduced by French 
slavers and pirates, or by the Antalaotes, a people of mixed Arab, 
Malgache, and African blood, speaking a Swahili dialect, who had a 
long tradition of commercial intercourse with these places. The
(1) Ibid., Correa to Sousa, Ibo, 29 January 17945 ibid., Sousa to
Correa, Moy., 6 November 17945 AHU, CM 31, bando. Alvares da 
Silva, Ibo, 27 August 17955 AHU, CM 38, same to Sousa, Ibo,
18 October 17955 AHU, CM 32, same to same, Ibo, 26 March 1796
& series of letters dated 10-12 October 1796; cf. Teixeira 
Botelho, Historia.fc»pp.551-5t Jackson, European Powers.pp.47-8.
(2) AHU, CM 35 & Cd.1472, fl.149-50, royal alvara, Lisboa, 13 or 14
March 1798; AHU, CM 35, llvares da Silva to Meneses da Costa, 
Ibo, 2 June 1798; ibid., 24 moradores to same, Querimba, 28 
February 1799; ibid., Antonio da Silva Pinto to same, Ibo,
21 November 1799; AHU, CM 36 Meneses da Costa to Silva Pinto, 
Moy., 19 June 1800; ibid., Alvares da Silva to Nicolau Luis 
da Graya, Ibo, 8 March 1799*
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first raids were organized in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century and until 1800 extended no farther than the Comoro Islands*
The Portuguese first learned of them in 1789 fiom a Comorien "prince" 
who sought aid for himself and other local rulers from "the continual 
invasions of the Sakalava pirates*"(l) The expeditions appear to 
have been raised annually or biennially, with the greater ones coming 
at four year intervals* Beginning towards October, Betsimisaraka 
chiefs from Tamatave assembled boatloads, of about three dozen warriors 
each, in proportion to their personal power. These then departed 
together for the north, slowly picking up the boats of other Malgache 
chiefs as they passed along the coast and around the northern end of 
Madagascar to the small island of Nossi-B!, off the extreme northwest 
coast of Madagascar. Here, or sometimes at Karakadzouro, a Sakalava 
port, they were joined by the Sakalava boats which were sent indepen­
dently by various chiefs and not at the order of the Sakalava ruler, 
then Queen Ravahiny. In the years of the great expeditions, as many 
as 400 to 500 outriggers carrying 15,000 to 18,000 men set out from 
the northwest coast against the Comoro Islands and the African coast. 
Expeditions which had originated around Tamatave in October of one 
year did not set out from Nossi-B! until the August monsson of the 
next.(2)
The Sakalava raid of 1800 (the Portuguese almost always identified 
them by this name alone) gave only a tiny glimpse of what was to 
follow in later years. Only three small boats with some sixty men
(l) AHU, CM 26, Principe dos Mulates to "Senhores," n.d., but enclosed 
in folder dated 1789# This ruler was probably a sheikh on 
Mayotte (Maotwe), rather than Mohilla (Moali) Island; see Ooupland, 
East Africa and its Invaders, p.164#
(2)Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar. p*44“6,52,93,100-1,103-8; A.Cevrey, 
Essai sur les Comores. Pondichery, 1870,pp.127-8,131,187,210-13; 
Capmartin & E.Colin, "Essai sur les iles Comores, present! A la 
Socilt! d* Emulation de 1*Ile-de-France," in Malte-Brun, Annales des 
Voyages.iii.1811.pp.129-70; Guillain, Documents sur 1!Histoire. la 
geographic et le commerce de la partie occidentals de Madagascar. 
Paris, 1845, PP*33,199-200; cf. W.H. Smyth, The Life and Services of 
Captain Philip Beaver. London, 1829,P*256; see below, |ppp.ZSQ-1.
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were involved in several hit and run raids in the Vamizi district, 
after their arrival there on 29 November. Yet despite superior 
numbers the local inhabitants panicked in the face of these attacks. 
According to Teixeira Botelho, who misdates these raids to 1801 and 
incorrectly states that Portuguese resistance was responsible for 
driving them off, in the next year the Sakalava returned again and 
carried out a series of desultory strikes against various points along 
the coast. He says that they appeared as far south as Sanculo and 
Mogincual, where they were withstood with the help of the Sheikh of 
Mogincual, whose usual belligerence against the Portuguese was 
undoubtedly overlooked in view of the challenge of a common enemy.(l) 
In 1804 a Portuguese vessel from Mozambique, A Boa Mai, was SttkSd . 
by the Sakalava in the port of Domoni, at Anjovan Island. Reacting 
to this outrage, to a call for help from the Sultan of Domoni, and 
to news that the Sakalava were assembling a 600 boat expedition to 
attack the Portuguese, in January 1805 the Portuguese Governor-General 
dispatched the royal schooner Emboscada to patrol those waters and 
"to vanquish them /the Sakalava/ at sea and on the land." It was well 
over two years later before the Portuguese learned definitely that the 
Sakalava seized and burned the Emboscada. as well as annihilating its 
entire crew.(2)
(1) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 24 February 1801;
Teixeira Botelho, Hist6ria,4b PP«565-6; see also J.J. Lapa &
A.B.C. de Castro Ferrett, Elementos para urn Diccionario Choro- 
graphico da Progincia de Mozambique, Lisboa, 1889, P*2.
(2) AHU, Cod.l372,fl.7v., Sousa e Sa to Anadia, Moy., 9 July 1805; ibid.,
fl.llv.-12, Amaral Cardoso to same, Moy., 6 January 1806; ibid., 
fl*28v., Prov.Govt. to same, Mop., 10 October 1807; cf. Teixeira 
Botelho, Hist6ria,A»PP«566-8, where he suppresses the fact that 
the Portuguese ship and crew were destroyed by the Sakalava, 
falsely explaining that storms forced it to return to port without 
achieving its mission, after several indecisive encounters with 
the enemy. He also omits all details of the more successful 
Sakalava raids against Portuguese territory.
In the meantime, rumors had reached Mozambique that a massive 
attack involving some 20,000 to 25, 000 warriors was being contemplated 
by the Sakalava# While these were discounted by the Governor-General 
as being exaggerated, he reported that a horde of perhaps 10,000 
Sakalava had indeed overrun both Mohilla and Mayotte Islands#(l)
Finally, in September 1808, the long dreaded attack came. According 
to the report of two Banian traders who encountered the Sakalava, 
they struck first at Arimba, south of Ibo, and then moved down the 
coast as far as Shanga cove, where the important settlement of 
Ushanga was located, from where they turned back towards the islands 
again# The Sakalava, whom Guillain states numbered as many as 8000 
men, attacked the main Portuguese settlements on Ibo and Querimba 
Islands, driving all those inhabitants who were not captured, or who 
had not taken refuge in the fort at Ibo, into the interior of the 
mainland# Eventually they set off towards the Vamizi coast, attacked 
Tungi, and penetrated some distance inland# They remained at Tungi 
until 4 January 1809 before quitting the coast to return home. The 
damage they had wreaked during these months was extensive. The capital 
of Ibo was in a miserable state, while virtually all other Portuguese 
settlements were even worse hit# Some eight hundred prisoners, 
including the foreira (female lessee) of Vamizi, were known to have 
been captured by the Sakalava, and a good many more must have been 
taken in areas lying outside the immediate jurisdiction of the 
Portuguese# Nevertheless, the expedition was not completed without a 
considerable loss of life by the Sakalava, many of whom died from small­
pox# Rather appropriately, it seems from Guillain1s account that 
the disease was contracted in 1807 from Mozambique slaves who were 
aboard a French vessel which had been captured near Cap dfAmbre, the 
northernmost point of Madagascar, before the Betsimisaraka and the
(1) AHJ, CM 46 & Cod#1372, fl.ll & v., Amaral Cardoso to Anadia, 
4 January 1806
Sakalava contingents joined forces at Nossi-Bd. But this news cannot 
have been sufficient to still the fears of the people who had 
experienced the raids of 1808* Late in 1810 they heard from both the 
Sultans of Grand Comoro and Anjovan, the latter of whom had sent a 
pangaio "to sound the alarm at every port of this coast from Zanzibar 
to this port of Ibo, that the Sakalava were preparing a great number 
of boats for coming to make war on this coast in the /forth-coming/ 
appropriate monsoon /i.e. of August 1807*” (l)
Throughout most of this decade the Makua, and occasionally the 
Makonde, continued to harass the coastal settlements of the Portuguese. 
Fighting extended along the length of the Kerimba Islands mainland 
and the populace lived in considerable fear of attack from the Africans. 
The chief belligerents were the Makua chiefs Mugabo and Mutuga, who 
should probably be identified as Mutica, a chief who by mid-century, 
if not necessarily at this time, was subordinate to Mugabo* Mutuga*s 
town was then situated near the mouth of the Tari River, just north 
of Pemba Bay, while Mugabo* s stood behind the coast between that bay 
and the Lurio River. According to the Portuguese, Mutuga*s power was 
such that he dominated both the coast and the immediate hinterland 
from the mouth of the Lurio River north to Kissanga, the principal 
Swahili settlement on that part of the coast. The prazo. or Portuguese 
Crown grant estate, of Arimba was in his possession.(2) He was 
especially odious to the Portuguese adminstration because he encouraged 
Swahili traders from north of Cape Delgado to trade in his domain,
(1) AHU, CM 48, Prov.Govt. to Pereira, Moj., 20 September 1808; ibid.
& Cod.l372,fl*32v.-33* same to Anadia, Mo^., 10 November 1808;
AHU, CM 52, Pereira to Prov.Govt., Ibo, 1 April 1809; AHU, CM 54» 
Jerdnimo Fernandes Viana to same, Ibo, 16 & 19 February 1810;
AHU, CM 53» Francisco Antdnio de Sousa Cdsar to Mendonja, Ibo,
28 December 1810; Guillain, Madagascar, pp.200-1; for a description 
of Shanga cove and Ushanga, see DicionArio Corogrdfico.itpp.9-10+ 
Cf. RSEA. ix,pp.5,12-13*
(2) For a rare reference to the prazo system in the Kerimba Islands and
to the donas de Ibo. such as the woman captured by the Sakalava in 
1808, see Boxer, Portuguese Expansion, pp.60-1.
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welcoming them especially at the Tari. The Portuguese feared to 
attack his town there, as it would lead at once to ama$or war with 
Mutuga. From Kissanga to Vamizi district the Makua and Makonde 
limited themselves to small raids, which Governor Pereira admitted 
were usually "caused by our people, who capture and sell any Kaffir 
still free," so that there was no end to these disturbances.
Agriculture was thus limited by the fact that many Africans had fled 
the immediate coast for the interior in order to escape being enslaved.(l) 
Lacking the military power to deal with the Africans as they would 
have liked, the Governor-General could only advise the continuation 
of a policy of conciliation and amity. (2) As did the Sheikh of Mogincual 
and the Portuguese at Mozambique, the Africans and the Portuguese in 
the northern part of the province undoubtedly suspended their 
hostility when both were more seriously threatened by the Sakalava.
It was impossible for any considerable external trade to be 
carried on in these conditions. Owing to Makua and Makonde hostility, 
neither coastal traders, <*ior their patamares. could travel in safety 
through the interior.(5) The danger of encountering the Sakalava, 
in combination with Portuguese antipathy in the Kerimba Islands 
towards French corsairs, prevented a revival of the French slave 
trade at Ibo, although two vessels took on a small number of slaves
(1) AHU, CM 58, Silva Pinto to Sousa e Sd, Ibo, 5 November 1801; AHU,
CM 40, same to Antdnio Francisco Bemandes, Ibo, 24 March 1802; 
AHU, CM 46, Rodrigo Berri to Sousa e Sd, Ibo, 16 February 1805; 
ibid., parecer. Senado da Camara, Ibo, 12 November 1805; AHU, CM 
48, Pereira to Amaral Cardoso, Ibo, 26 February 1807; Diciondrio 
Corogrdficao.i.pp.96-7*113«1^3» see also Worsfold, Portuguese 
Nyassaland. larger pocket map,,for location of the Tari River.
(2) AHU, CM 48, Amaral Cardoso to Pereira, Mo^*, 23 March 1807.
(3; AHU, CM 48, Joao Gonzales Delgado to Antdnio da Costa Portugal,
Mocimboa, 25 November 1806; ibid., Costa Portugal to Pereira, 
Muluri, 12 January 1807#
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there in March and April 1805,(1) The only trade which continued 
regularly to be plied was the slave trade with the Swahili from the 
north. As we have seen, this was actively encouraged by Mutuga.
There is no way to calculate the volume of this trade during the 
first decade of the nineteenth century, but there can be no doubt 
that virtually all sabotage was halted during the Sakalava campaign 
of 1808. Thereafter, one suspects that this trade dwindled whenever 
word reached the African coast that a new expedition was being mounted 
at Madagascar. Nevertheless, when Swahili traders arrived in the 
islands, whether coming from the northern coast, or the Seychelles,
Comoros, or Madagascar, the local moradores gave them full cooperation. 
Despite repeated bandos to the contrary, this trade was almost their 
only way of maintaining themselves above a level of mere subsistence.
In recognition of this fact, and of the miserable state of the moradores 
in the wake of the Sakalava onslaught, at the end of 1810 the local 
Governor at last relented and began to issue licenses for Swahili 
vessels wishing to trade legally for non-Christian slaves in the 
islands.(2)•
In the interior, there was a movement away from carrying goods 
to the coast opposite the Kerimba Islands and towards taking them to 
ports lying north of Cape Delgado. This shift was well under way 
by the very beginning of the new century and was certainly not reversed 
during the remaining years of that decade. Antdnio da Silva Pinto,
(1) AHU, CM 41, Berri to Sous e s£, Ibo, 15 December 1803; AHU, CM 46,
same to same, Ibo, 15 April 1805; AHU, CM 47* same to Amaral 
fiardoso, Ibo, 30 January 1806.
(2) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto to Sousa e S£, Ibo, 25 February & 5 November
180; AHU, CM 46, Berri to same, n.d., but probably 1805; ibid., 
same to same, Ibo, 17 January 1805; AHU, CM 50* Pereira to Amaral 
Cardoso, Ibo, 26 February 1807; AHU, CM 48* same to same, Ibo,
10 March 1807; AHU, CM 54* Sousa Cdsar to Mendonja, Ibo, 28 December 
1810; enclosing requerimento. the moradores of the Kerimba Islands, 
n.d., but post-July 1810.
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Governor of the islands at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
(l) wrote:
All these lands ^"i.e. within Portuguese 
jurisdiction)? are surrounded by the Makua 
Kaffirs, and through theirs run trails 
(estradas de comunica^ao), some which 
go to Mozambique, and others to Zanzibar.
There used to be a considerable trade 
in ivory, rice, maize, and oils which were 
exported every year in great quantities to 
Mozambique. This/trade/ is extinct as a 
result of the Kaffirs of the interior 
going to Zanzibar, for they find there 
greater profit and better clothes than 
ours.(2)
It may be seen, then, that the Yao were not the only people in East- 
Central Africa who were responding to basic changes in the conditions 
of trade at the coast by shifting the direction of their trade from 
the Mozambique to the Kilwa coast.
As suggested at the beginning of this section, however, the 
pattern of Yao trading during this period was not so simple:as that.
While all relevant evidence emphasizes the continuation of this trend, 
there is other documentation which suggests that the Yao slave trade 
to Mozambique was gaining in importance. The most logical explanation 
for this phenomenon is that while most of the Yao were indeed 
channelling their trade, especially that in ivory, to the Kilwa coast, 
those chiefs, or perhaps that section of the Yao nation, who were 
trading to Mozambique were concentrating their efforts on developing 
the slave trade, so that ivory was becoming of secondary importance to 
them. This was a direct reversal of traditional Yao commercial priorities.
(1) AHU, Cod.1485* fl*l6, termo de posse (term of tenure), Silva Pinto,
Ibo, 23 June 1799; ibid., fl.21, termo de posse. Berri,
Ibo, 17 June 1802.
(2) AHU, CM 38, Silva Pinto, "Discripzao das Terras do Cabo Delgado
pertencentes a Coroo," Ibo, 24 November 1801; for a verbatim 
citation of thif report, see AHU, CM 50* Prov. Govt, to Crown, 
Moz#, 22 October 1807*
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A careful examination of the sources reveals the forces which were 
influencing the trade of East-Gentral Africa during this period.
The end of the eighteenth century was a time of experimentation 
for the commercial administration of Portuguese East Africa* Beginning 
in 1787 and ending in 180^ after which date they remained unaltered 
until I846, the alfandega duties in force at Mozambique were repeatedly 
juggled in a futile attempt to get the colony on its feet financially* 
Those of importance to the trade of the Yao were the taxes levied on 
the importation of trading cloths, beads, and the exportation of goods 
to the Rivers of Sena* Before 17871 imports of veldrio. the basic 
trade beads, were i»axed at a rate of 20$ on their value, while all 
re-exports going to the Zambezi paid a 4 duty* Prom 1787 to 1793> 
the tax on veldrio was reduced to 15$ and the re-exportation tax on 
cloths only to 30$. In 1793 both were further lowered to 10$, but 
the measure was soon attacked from several quarters for being detri­
mental to both trade and the Royal Treasury. The re-export tax was 
pushed all the way back up to 40$ by 1800, but in the next year it was 
finally established at the 1787 rate of 30$* At the same time, 
however, the import duty on veldrio was re-set at 20$, while 
merchandise arriving from Diu and Damao, the chief sources of trade 
cloth at Mozambique, was taxed at a 1 0$ rate. It is not clear whether 
goods entering Mozambique on foreign vessels paid 15$ or 20$ of their 
value.(l) From the point of view of the African trader, the high
(l) AHU, CM 32 & Cod.l478,fl.7-9* alvara* A.M. de Melo e Castro, Moz.,21 July 
1787; AHU, CM 29, Sousa to M. de Melo e Castro, Moz*, 28 July 1794; 
AHU, CM 33, Merchants of Moj. to Sousa, Moz*, 17 October 1796; ibi'd., 
decision taken by the Deputies of the Junta da Fazenda Real. Moz«,
8 April 1797; AHU, Cod.1472, fl.155-6, Crown to Meneses da Costa, 
Queluz, 2 April 1799; Annaes do Conselho TJltramarino, parte n&o 
official,v,1864, D P .65-6; Lobato* Lourenco Marques,ii,pp.291-8, 
308-13,397-4025 see also, AHU, CM 33> Joao da Silva Guedes,
"Declarazacj expecificada do modo por que se cobravao os Direitos 
nesta Alf. por entrada e Sahida...," n.d., but perhaps c.1797;
AHU, Cod.1472,fl.176-83, D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho to Sousa e 
S£, Lisboa, 28 February 1801; AHU, Cod.l500,fl*59> Vicente Josd 
da Silva Negrao, "Pautta da gegulaza# dos Direitos da entrada, e 
Sahida da Alfandega de Moss. ," Moz*, 10 August 1803.
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taxes prevailing in the Rivers of Sena continued to inflate the value 
of the merchandise in which the Africans were most interested, so that 
they were consequently offered less cloth and fewer beads for their 
goods there#
In the middle of the eighteenth century, identical circumstances 
had caused trade which would normally have been expected to go to Tete 
to be diverted in preference to Mozambique#(l) In fact, ivory 
exportations were unusually high in 1793 > totalling about 12,885 
arrobas (more than 800 bares# as compared with an average of less than 
600 bares in the years 1759“176l); but they were not quite half this 
in 1801, and rose only to about 7300 arrobas in 1809#(2) Furthermore, 
all the evidence which we possess explicitly emphasizes the decline 
of the Yao ivory trade to Moyambique in this period# There are also 
indications that the ivory trade from the subordinate ports to 
Moyambique was proportionately more important than it had been 
previously# (5) Onefs belief that such was the case is strengthened 
by the dramatic decline in the ivory exports from Moyambique between 
1793 and the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Portuguese 
coastal waters below the capital were constantly threatened by French 
corsairs#
(1) See above, pp.138-^ .
(2) AHU, CM 52, Silva Guedes, "Relayao exacta dos despaches do Marfim..#
que desta Capital se exportou em o anno de 1,793 >,f Moy., 18 £^ jly 
17^6; AHg, C^ 58, idem., "Mapa do marfim.##q# se despachar# 
p# sah# p« a India...,” Moy#, 3 September 1801, enclosed in 
Sousa e Sd to Sousa Coutinho, Moy., 5 November 1801; AHtJ, Cod.1381, 
fl.4, Silva Guedes, ”Mapa de Marfim# •# nesta Monyao de Agosto de 
1809;” see above, p.<08.
(3) See AHU, CM 399 Joaquim Giraldes Rosa, ”Mappa da Carga que tras a
Goleta Maria do Porto de Inhambane para esta Capital dado pello 
Capital...,” /Soy.7, 11 April 1802 (2070 tusks, weighing 64 bares,
11 arrobas); ibid#. Josd SebastiSo Jorge de Brito, ”Mapa do Estado 
atoal do Brique S. ° Ant. Deligente,” ”Hoje d*Agosto /sic/ de 1802,” 
(420 arrobas); AH(J, CM 43, anon., ”Mapa da Carga da Cruveta Felis 
Costa,” n.d. (50 bares); ibid., Antdnio Norberto de Barbosa de 
Yilasboas Truao to Felix Lamberto da Silva Bandeira, Tete, 5 November j 
1804; AHU, CM 50, Prov. Govt, to Crown, Moy., 22 October 1807, 
reporting that, in 1806, a total of 4375 tusks of ivory were sent from 
the Rivers of Sena to Moyambique; Lobato, Lourenyo Marques, ii, 
pp.414-15*
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While the supply of ivory declined at Moyambique, the demand 
did not. There was a sharp rise in both the official evaluation 
of ivory at Moyambique and in the market price paid for it there.
In 1810 the official price for large ivory (Marfim grosso). which 
had been unchanged since 1787, rose from 80 druzados to 100 cruzados.
On the market, by the beginning of the nineteenth century a bar of 
Indian cloth, which formerly brought 10 to 11 arrobas of ivory, 
could buy no more than arrobas. Henry Salt noted in 1809 that the 
merchants of Moyambique demanded from 104 to 128 cruzados for their 
ivory, (l) For those Yao who cored to trade their ivory to Moyambique, 
prices were clearly better than ever. But the fact that most of the 
Yao still preferred to carry their ivory to Kilwa, rather than to 
Moyambique, indicates that the Moyambique prices were not competitive 
with those to the north.(2)
Other factors at Moyambique which previously had played their 
role in influencing the shift of Yao trade to the Kilwa coast were 
warfare in Macuana and commercial persecution of the Banians by the 
Portuguese administration at Moyambique. As we know, there were 
considerable disturbances in Macuana at this time. During the early 
years of the nienteenth century, the Banians continued to be granted 
licenses for trading personally on the mainland and firmly maintained 
their monopoly on the financing of trade in the province. According 
to the inquisitive French visitor at Moyambique, Epidariste Colin, 
not only their persons and property, but also their religion appeared 
to be respected by the Portuguese, although he suggests that they 
came by these liberties at a considerable price.(3)
(1) AHU, CM 53> Joaquim Jos£ de Melo e Costa, "Acrescimo que houve da
antiga Pauta da Alfandega formalizada no anno de 1787» para a 
que se formalizou no prezente de 1810,” Moy., 12 December 1810;
AHIJ, Cod.l472f fl.l76-7> Sousa Coutinho to Sousa e S&, Lisboa,
28 February 1801; Salt, Voyage to ^byssinia. p.82.
(2) But see above, p.£33.
(3) M.J.Gr. Loureiro, Memoriae dos Estabelecimentos Portuguezes a lfEste do
Cabo da Boa Esperanya..♦♦ Lisboa, 1835» p.289;AHD, CM 41# petition 
of Jos6 Mariano Ribeiro, n.d., granted by Gov., Moy., 4 July 1803; 
AHG, CM 42, petition of Tanaclande Gopal, n.d., granted Moy., 20 
August 1803; Colin, "Notice sur Mozambique," in Malte-Brun,
Annales des Voyages, ix, 1809, p.314«
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By late 1805, however, the Banians had lodged formal complaints 
about the extortions of the new Governor-General, Amaral Cardoso.
He alledgedly had threatened them with deportation to Diu and 
actively sought to sequester their wealth. In August 1807 they 
charged that he had squeezed about 125,000 cruzados out of the 
various Banian merchants. On one occasion, the Banians claimed 
that one of their number was falsely charged by the government and 
that Amaral Cardoso stated his willingness to drop the matter for 
a payment of 50,000 cruzados, which he eventually received. After 
Amaral Cardoso*s death at the very end of 1807, the Banians pressed 
their claims for compensation for his extortions. While no further 
references to their case have been found, it is unlikely that they 
received satisfaction from the corrupt provisional government which 
ruled Mozambique until August I8O9. There is also evidence that 
official harassment of the Banians was maintained by Governor-General. 
Mendonya, who succeeded to this administration.(l) It is clear, then, 
that the factors which had earlier been responsible for inhibiting the 
Yao ivory trade to Moyambique were still working, although not 
apparently in such great force, towards that same end.
Unfortunately, our precise knowledge of the details of the 
ivory trade on the Kilwa coast and of the ivory market at Zanzibar is 
no greater for this period than it is for the mid-eighteenth century. 
Nevertheless, we do know that Zanzibar increasingly was consolidating 
its position as the greatest commercial entrepot in East Africa, and 
that Kilwa*s ties to Zanzibar progressively were becoming more intimate.
(2) Following the futile attempt, in 1784-1785, of Saif ibn Ahmad to 
create a personal empire in East Africa, there were no major challenges 
to Omani hegemony over Zanzibar. Peaceful conditions reigned for the
(l) AHU, Cod.1374, f 1.31-62, "Registo do Requerimento e mais Documentos
de Lacamichande Matichande que deio a informer a este Govemo,fln.d., 
but last of the appended documents is dated 29 November 18085 ABU,
CM 45, idem, **Mappa das Bnbarcayoens, que posseum os Banianes, e mais 
Gentios nesta Capital de Mossambique,” Moy., 13 November 1805; AHU,CM 
62, Sir Evan Nepean to Jos£ Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de
/••
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next three decades both there and at Kilwa. Zanzibar yielded the 
Imam of Oman personally no less than 40,000 piastres in annual 
revenue, and perhaps as much as 60.000 piastres. This revenue, 
the equivalent of which could be paid in ivory, was raised largely 
from the collection of a 5ft duty on all imports to Zanzibar. This 
tax had been only jfo in Morice’s day. The total sum of duties 
collected are said to have been no less than 150,000 piastres.
Between sixty and one hundred vessels may have come there from Arabia, 
the Persian Gulf, and western India in the trading season.
Not surprisingly, the French and British visitors from whom we 
have descriptions of Zanzibar at this time stress the importance of 
the slave trade and say very little about the ivory trade. This is 
to be expected, as ivory was of virtually no interest to them. 
Consequently, we are left with the impression that slaves were already 
the most important item of trade at Zanzibar. There are firm grounds 
for challenging the reliability of these indications in the reasons 
given below by Portuguese observers as influencing the movement of 
Yao trade away from Moyambique to Kilwa and Zanzibar. The fact that 
the Imam1s yearly revenue could be paid in ivory also argues for the 
great importance of this product. Lacking substantial figures of any 
sort for the Zanzibar ivory trade, there is little hope for establish­
ing definitively the priority of either item, slaves or ivory, over 
the other in this period. It seems more likely, however, that ivory 
was of greater importance than slaves to the trade of both Kilwa and 
Zanzibar at the end of 1810.
/•• footnote continued from page 258
(1) Albuquerque. Bombay, 11 November 1817, aud enclosures; AHU, Cod.1583,
n. 1013, Crown to Mendonca, Rio de Janeiro, 20 April 1810, 
enclosing same to Senado aa Camara of Moy., Rio de Janeiro, 19 April 
1810; AHU, Cod.1377, fl*22, Francisco Carlos da Costa Lac4 to 
Subachande Seuchande, Moy., 5 February 1810.
(2) For the following two paragraphs, see Gray, History of Zanzibar,
pp#92-108, who quotes the more important sources at length.
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Turning to the relevant Portuguese sources, one sees vividly 
that ivory still dominated the long distance trade of East-Central 
Africa at the turn of the nineteenth century and that it was the 
concentration of most Yao trade on ivory which continued to draw 
them to Kilwa, away from Mozambique* These sources strikingly bear 
out the picture of trading operations which has been reconstructed 
in an earlier chapter, but they also add important details and 
variations to it.(l) In 1798 the great Portuguese explorer, Dr# 
Francisco Josl de Lacerda e Almeida, who journeyed in that year from 
Tete to the court of the Mwata Kazembe, where he died, observed that 
the ivory trade of the Yao to Mozambique "had diminished considerably, 
because those Kaffirs had shifted their trade to Zanzibar and other 
neighboring ports.” This much is clear from the letter of D# Diogo 
de Sousa, written three years earlier#(2) The Yao did not trade 
directly to the Mwata Kazembe*s capital, although it seems likely 
that some of them must have done so occasionally. Generally, the 
Yao are said to have received their ivory directly from the Bisa, 
with whom they were known to have been "trading for a long time”, 
according to the testimony of Manuel Caetano Pereira, who had 
already visited Kazembe and whose father, Gonjalo, had first begun 
dealing with the Bisa in 1793* The Bisa, in turn, received most of 
their ivory by trading with the Mwata Kazembe, who is said to have 
made them tributary after waging several wars against them. Lacerda 
not unnaturally tends to over-empahsize the Mwata*s dominance of 
Bisa, but it is undeniable that their commercial ties with his court 
were of the closest sort. According to the diary kept by P.J. Baptista,
(1) See above, pp. I37-H5.
(2) P.M. de Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia da Africa. Lisboa, 1936* P«
155; see above, p. fcHO.
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one of two mulatto pombeiros (the Angolan equivalent of patamares) 
who reached Kaaembe,s town in 1806 and were detained there into 
1810, the Bisa were "the first travellers who ever traded with 
Kazambe,"(l) The goods with which the Bisa purchased ivory from 
the Mwata Kazembe came to them from the Yao, and Lacerda strongly 
suspected that the Yao were receiving them from the Swahili 
traders of Zanzibar and the Kilwa coast, because, as Manuel Caetano 
Pereira had told him,
the great quantity of ivory, which 
every year leaves the kingdom of 
Kazembe, and those kingdoms or lands 
which he has conquered..., ends in the 
hands of the Yao, their /the Bisafs7 
neighbors, and these do not sell it all 
in Mozambique, for there is a notorious 
difference between the quantity of ivory 
which the Yao formerly brought to 
Mozambique, and that which they presently 
introduce, /especially/ view of the 
increased trade which the people of 
Zanzibar have carried on in that 
commodity since then.(2)
One is surprised by the apparent lack of Maravi involvement 
in this trade. At one point a Bisa chief told the explorer that he 
sold his ivory to the Manguro, who lived along the Shire River, and 
that the Yao received it from the Manguro. Considering the ethno­
logical vagueness of the name "Manguro,” it seems most likely that 
in some cases Mang!anja traders acted as short haul intermediaries 
between the Bisa and Yao. Generally, however, the Maravi appear to 
have been cut out of much of the long distance trade, surrounded 
as they were by two peoples who were each extremely active and deter­
mined traders. It is probably this factor which accounts for the
(1) Burton, The Lands of Cazembe, London, 1873t PP*33»228; see Cunnison,
"Kazembe and the Portuguese," pp.65,70~2.
(2) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia. pp*208,233*385-7; see also, ibid.,p.23?,
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annoying robberies to which traders were subjected when travelling 
through Maravi territory, (l)
Prom Manuel Caetano Pereira, Lacerda also learned that Bisa 
traders occasionally carried their ivory all the way to Quelimane.(2) 
These trips would seem to have been exceptional at this dat^ 
revealing, rather, the adventurous spirits of a few individuals 
than the beginning of a general movement towards trading at 
Quelimane. This town did not become an important coastal terminus 
for the long-distance traders of East-Central Africa until after its 
rise as a self sustaining slaving port, later in the nineteenth 
century. Another new route which is elsewhere suggested as being 
in operation at this time led from the interior to the Kerimba 
Islands. As early as 1790f Nogueira de Andrade, in a confusing 
passage, seems to have had the Yao and Maravi trading there beside 
the Makua and Makonde. A decade later the Governor-General of Mozam­
bique, in reporting the results of the expedition to Kazembe, wrote 
that "the Negroes who usually go from Kazembe*s to Tete, are the same 
who usually come each year to Mozambique and to the islands of Cape 
Delgado." This is nowhere stated in Lacerda*s diary, nor in that 
of Pr. Francisco Joao Pinto, who assumed command of the expedition 
on the former*s death. Presumably, it is merely an inaccurate 
generalization on the part of Meneses da Costa. The use of cowrie 
shells as ornamentation by the Maravi suggests that there possibly was 
some trading between the coast opposite the Kerimba Islands and the 
interior, but this is no proof that a regular route had yet been 
opened to that part of the coast. Besides, the cowries which Lacerda 
saw worn by the Maravi more probably came from the Kilwa coast, where 
Mongalo was known for its fine cowries, or from Mozambique. Further" 
more, we have already seen that trade from the interior of Cape
(1) Ibid., pp.fcQS, 385-6$ but see below, p.4T9#
(2 )  L&cieHa g + flfaeu fa jT ra v fs S to  ^
Delgado was moving away to the Kilwa coast, and there is no evidence 
at all from Ibo that the Yao or Maravi had as yet penetrated to that 
part of the coast# (l) Like the route to Quelimane, that to Kissanga, 
opposite Ibo, did not become important until well into the nineteenth 
century.
A final problem which requires airing is one which is first 
raised in 1784: namely, the Portuguese belief that a reason for the 
Yao trading to Kilwa was that it was a shorter trip for them than 
that to Mozambique# (2) Lacerda suggests that the ivory which once 
had gone to Mozambique, but now went to Zanzibar, did so "not only 
because they evaluate it better there, but also because this ^i#e#
YaoJ country is closer to Zanzibar, than to Mozambique." This seems 
to be specious reasoning# In this matter, Meneses da Costa seems 
nearer to the general truth when he writes, albeit in the same letter 
which we have seen to be inaccurate in respect to trading at the 
Kerimba Islands, that when Kazembe was questioned as to the source 
of his standard trade beads and the destination of his merchandise, 
he replied that the beads "came to him from Mozambique, and from the 
Zanzibar coast to where they also sent their ivory and slaves to be 
sold, since the distances were equal*11 Several years later, Meneses 
da Costa noted to the same effect that "those chiefs and Negroes of 
the interior attribute little importance to distance, be it longer or 
shorter, in sending their caravans and their trade to more distant 
places, when the profits of trade pay them for their extra trouble♦« J*((3) 
Ve need not rely solely on his information, however, as the same 
opinion is expressed by Dr# Ant&iio de Vilasboas Tru'ao, who was no
(1) AC, i, 1917f P*126; AHU, CM 36, Meneses da Costa to Sousa Coutinho,
Mop#, 29 July 1800$ a copy of this letter is in AHCJ, Cod#
1366, fl#94v#, where it is misdated to 29 June 1800; excerpts 
from this copy are published in Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, 
pp.69-71J see also, ibid*, p#200; see below, p#Z7%
(2) See above, p#l£Z.
(3) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia, pp«233» 71? AHU, CM 34» Meneses da
Costa to Crown, Lisboa, 1 February I8O4.
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less concerned with these affairs than his late predecessor as Gov- 
emor of the Rivers of Sena#
In 1806 Vilasboas TruSo wrote a report on the state of the Rivers# 
This report includes a separate section which vividly reveals the 
effect on African trade of the high tariffs imposed on the trade of 
the Rivers by the provincial government#(l) He argued that taxing 
the trade goods desired by the Africans in this way was necessitated
that the Kaffir traders of the interior 
should diminish in equal proportion 
the value of their gold and ivory, in 
order that such duties should not damage 
our trade# Ordinarily it is the buyer 
who pays this increase in price, 
but this is not what happens in 
this part of Africa#
Continuing his attack on these duties, ha explained:
The Kaffirs who sell us gold and 
ivory, after establishing a certain 
price, and being used to it, by prin­
ciple never pay more than that for 
trade goods, and are able to carry 
their ivory on a journey of two months 
longer, in the hope of seeing if they 
get a small rise in price#
Vilasboas TruSo added that the Swahili traders of the Zanzibar 
coast, including Kilwa, exported much of the gold and ivory taken 
by those Africans to that coast# Since Lacerda1s expedition, the 
trade of the Rivers with Kazembe, with the Bisa, and with the Maravi 
region had been interrupted# But these same Africans had not, he 
stressed, given up
(l) See above,pp#75£-G*
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selling their ivory to the Yao Kaffirs,
who have carried it to the ports of
the coast of Zanzibar, as is known 
from certain information; and some of 
these Kaffirs /presumably the Bisa and 
Maravi/ still continue that trade be- 
cause it is more important to them, 
as they have told our traders# (l)
There is no reason to believe that the proximity of Kilwa to 
the Yao was an important factor in influencing the shift of trade 
to there from Mozambique# Certainly, the most northeasterly section
of the Yao— the Mwera— did live closer to Kilwa. Saulnier de Monde-
vitfs description of the Mongalo hinterland appears to be confirmation 
that they were established north of the Ruvuma by the late eighteenth 
centtiry# (2) But the most active Yao traders, judjmg by what is 
known of the Yao from more recent evidence, would appear to have been 
the Macinga and Masaninga, who lived in the heart of Yabland#
There is, however, no way to confirm this impression (from the 
documents# (3)
Although the primary African product of the long-distance 
trade was ivory, one should not neglect the other commodities in­
volved in this trade# Copper bars and wax were traded from Kazembefs 
to the coast of Bast-Central Africa# Iron Roes, founded by the Mara­
vi, but traded to Mozambique by the Yao, also figured in long-distance 
commerce# These hoes, which were known as "Yao hoes” (enxadas de 
mujau) at Mozambique, sold there for 300 reis each# ^hey appear nor 
only to have been locally consumed, but also to have been exported, 
probably to India. (4) It seems likely that Maravi hoes, as well as
(l) Vilasboas TruSo, "Extracto do Plano para urn regimento ou nova con- 
stituizao economica e politica da ©apitania de Rios de Senna##," 
Tete, 20 May 1806, in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p#n#o#, 
i,1857» p#4145cf, Burton# Cazembe , pp»l68,200,226-7#
(2} See above, pp.£33^•
(3) See, e#g# Mitchell, The Yao Village# p#37*
(4) Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino# p#n#o#, i, 1857# P*4H# ftCL, MSS Azul
1^13, GalvSfo da Silva, HDiario das Viagens, feitas pelas terras de 
Manica," Sena, post-14 November 1788, published in EHCrEP# pp#323“32, 
at 328; Lobato, Lourenzo# Marques# ii#p#360.
j
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those fashioned hy the Cisi Yao, were also traded to Kilwa. (l) But 
slaves were easily the most important item of long-distance trade 
after ivory, and the vital role of the slave trade should not be 
minimized#
Not much is known of the French slave trade at Kilwa in the 
late 1790fs a^d 1800s# In 1797 relations were strained between the 
French and the people of Kilwa as a result of an act of piracy by a 
M# Labadie against a boat from that port. Seven years later a British 
cruiser captured a French corsair about those waters; in I8O9 there 
is another brief reference to the French slaving at Kilwa# (2)
Mongalo passes unnoticed at this time, although Mikindani is described in 
1808 as "presently belonging to the King of Kilwa, with a population 
of three thousand Swahili capable of bearing arms#11 (3) In fact, 
after 1795 most French slaving to the north of Cape Delgado was done 
at Zanzibar, which was ever becoming a growing slave market, in addition 
to its tole as the principal ivory market of the Indian Ocean.(4) The 
estimate made by Captain Thomas Smee, in 1811, that the total number 
of slaves exported yearly from Zanzibar was "not less than 6000 to 10,000," 
is probably fairly accurate# Many of these slaves, if not most, un­
doubtedly came from the Kilwa coast# Freeman-Grenville^ suggestion 
that the annual exportation of slaves from Kilwa probably topped 6000,
(1) Abdallah, The Yaos. pp#10-12; see above, pp.67-$*
(2) Cray, "The French at Kilwa in 1797»fl TNR# 58 & 59» 1962, pp# 172-35
Jackson, European Powers, p#6l; R3EA, ix, pp# 1-2 In 1800 an
American ship touched at Ibo on its way to Kilwa* AHU, CM
37, AntSnio da Silva Pinto to Meneses da Costa, Ibo, 10 July 1800#
(3) AHU, CM 48, intdnio Alberto Pereira to Prov.Covt#, Ibo, 16 August 1808;
see also, AHU, Cod#1372,fl#33 & v#, Prov.Govt# to Anadia, M05.,
11 November 1808#
(4) Gray, History of Zanzibar. pp»92-108; AHU, CM 44# Meneses da Costa to
Crown, Lisboa, 6 January 1804; RBBA. ix, p#13*
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therefore seems quite within reason. At the same time, the logic of 
his reckoning, from the information supplied in I8O4 by the French 
slaver Dallons, that the duties of 6000 piastres paid each year by 
the Chiani governor of Kilwa to Muscat were based solely on the slave 
trade, wrongly implies that the ivory trade was not very important 
there,(l)
In any case, we have already seen that Crassons implied that 
most of the slaves brought to Kilwa in his day did not come from the 
far interior, Saulnier de Mondeyit*s remarks on Mongalo suggest the 
same, (2) On the other hand, certainly some slaves were being led 
to the Kilwa coast by the Yaoj although one cannot even venture a 
guess as to the numbers involved in this trade. According to Abdallah, 
most of the slaves which the Yao acquired in trade were Nyasa, Senga, 
Cikunda, and Bisa, "Of these slaves, some they took to the Coast to 
buy trade-goods with them, others they kept at home to hoe the 
gardens, build houses, and do other village work," Indeed, among 
the Yao, political power was based upon the number of followers a 
chief commanded, so that slaves were highly valued by Yao chiefs 
and headmen not only as a source of wealth for trading, but also as 
potential subjects, provided one could afford to maintain them,(3)
Yet, notwithstanding this domestic demand for slaves, our knowledge
of Yao trading to Mozambique at this time clearly indicates that
they were bringing an appreciable number of slaves to that port each year*
fl) Gray, History of Zanzibar, p,104; HEA«i«p,156; SB, p,200,
(2) See above, pp. *o3; *33-4 *
(3) Lacerda e Almeida, Traves sia,pp,71. 208; AHU, CM 34> Meneses da
Costa to Crown, Lisboa, 1 February 1804; Abdallah, The Yaos,p,15; 
see Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp.34^75 Douglas, "Matriliny and 
Pawnship," p*309$ cf, R, Codrington, "The Central Angoniland 
District of the British Central Africa Protectorate," The 
Geographical Journal, xi,1898f p,518.
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There is no doubt that the French slave trade at Mozambique 
declined after the peak years up to 1794; but it certainly continued 
to be plied actively until 1808, when Franco-Portuguese hostilities 
were finally joined in the Indian Ocean# Until then, neither French 
corsairs, nor the series of statutes prohibiting the French islanders 
from slaving, were able to suppress the trade# Neutrality prevailed 
in spite of both difficulties in Europe and local demands made by 
British cruisers for fulfillment of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance* 
Occasional restrictions of trade at Mozambique similarly did not 
seriously threaten the trade.(l) Meanwhile, the slave trade between 
Brazil and Mozambique began to be pursued more actively from the 
1790s* when it was actively encouraged by Governor-General Sousa*(2) 
Statistics are minimal for this period, but in 1803 the official 
figures for exportations of slaves from Mozambique are 2333 on 
Portuguese ships and 2904 on foreign vessels. This is a total of 
5239* From the beginning of I8O5 to October 1806, duties collected 
on the slave trade constituted two-thirds of the total amount of 
revenue taken on exportations at the alfSndega. In I8O5, the large 
majority of these duties were levied on slaves shipped by foreigners, 
undoubtedly French, with one American exception; in 1806, there was an
(1)See Jackson, European Powers, pp*45~63; Noel, L1Esclavage»pp*39* 56-62; 
Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages«ix«1809# p*314; for specific examples 
of French ships trading at Mozambique, see, e.g., AHU, Cod.l370,fl. 
112-3, Sousa e s£ to Anadia, Moc*, 4 October 1803; AHU, CM 43* autos 
de visita issued at Mozambique to the following French vesselss 
L fPirvia (l6 January I8O4), General Isidro (llJune I8O4), Dois Irm&os 
(ll August I8O4), and Lonechal (50 September 1804)*
(2) AHU, Cod.1472,f1.107-111 ,¥&•10, M. de Melo e Castro to Sousa, Queluz,
12 October 1792; Santana, Documentazao«i.pp.83-4; AHU, CM 32, Sousa to 
Luis Pinto de Sousa, Moc., 26 September 1796; AHU, Cod#1370,fl*l6, 
Sousa e S5 to Sousa Coutinho, Moz#, 28 August 1802, reporting shipment 
of 620 slaves aboard the CastelaCo to Rio de Janeiro and the death of 
nearly 500 of them in a storm which drove the ship back to port; AHU, 
CM 45, petition of Josd DCmingues, Captain of the Africans, of Rio de 
Janeiro, to trade to lie de France, granted by Gov., Moz*, 13 February 
1805.
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abrupt reversal, with Portuguese transported slaves accounting for 
four-fifths of the total. Por both years, just over half the taxes 
were yielded by Portuguese slavers*(l)
Following the extension of the war between France and Portugal 
to the Indian Ocean in 1808, the external trade of Mozambique would 
seem to have dropped sharply. According to the alfandega registers, 
between May 1805 and May 1808, 75 ships, 46 of which were Portuguese 
and 29 foreign, had entered Mozambique; from May 1808 to late November 
I8O9, only six more, three of each, had arrived there.(2) French 
corsairs roamed the Mozambique Channel, inflicting considerable losses 
to Portuguese shipping, while early in I8O9 a French vessel blockaded 
the entrance to Mozambique harbor for nearly two months. The Portuguese 
were unable to defend the port by themselves, so that when there were 
no British cruisers there to protect it for them, trade could be 
stopped, or a disturbance caused, by the French.(3) Nevertheless , in 
August 1809, Henry Salt recorded the departure for India of seven 
vessels from Mozambique. These carried about 500 slaves, in addition 
to their more important cargoes of ivoiy and gold. Salt, who was a 
keen observer, also noted that "five ships loaded with slaves went 
this year to the Brazils, each vessel carrying from three to four 
hundred." The same pace of trade between Mozambique and Rio de Janeiro, 
where the Portuguese court had been removed in 1807-1808, apparently 
continued in 1810.(4) In the end, then, there was only a very short 
period during which French corsairs posed a serious threat to the
(1) AHU, CM 44* Silva Guedes, "Mapa do rendimento que houve na Alfandega
no anno proximo passado de 1803..#," Moz** 1804; Jackson, European 
Powers .p.85 «n* 2; E. Dorman, Documents Illustrative of the History 
of the Slave Trade to America. Washington, 1935*iVffp.5&H,Si(tfn.; AHU, 
CM 47* Andrew Ross to 7Gov., Moz*, 11 April 1806.
(2) AHU, CM 51* Silva Guedes, Moz*, 24 November 1809; see also, ibid*,
requerimento. Costa Lacd, n.d*; and same to Judge of the alfandega. 
n.d*; ibid*, testimony of Joaquim de Rosario Monteiro, Rio de 
Janeiro, 9 May 1809*
(3) AHU, Cod.1372, fl.32v*-3, Prov. Govt, to Anadia, Moy., 10 November
1808; RSEA.ix.pp.1-3; Jackson, European Powers. pp*74"9«
(4) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia. pp*34-5,80; RSEA.p.12.
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export trade of Moyambique* Beginning in 1808, it effectively ended 
with the British capture of lie de France and Bourbon in 1810*
There is very little Portuguese information on the source of 
slaves at Moyambique in this decade* In 1807, when the volume of 
trade may have been about 5000 souls in all, 1080 slaves were sent 
to the capital from the Rivers of Sena. Only a little trade was 
carried in Macuana by the patamares of Moyambique merchants.(l)
This was probably a result of the disturbances in Macuana. If this 
is so, as one suspects, then the fact that the trade with the Yao was 
distinguished by their coming to trade with the Portuguese at a 
regular fair on the Portuguese mainland, may explain the apparent 
predominance of Yao slaves at Moyambique in the 1800s. Loureiro 
emphasized the desirability of encouraging all the Africans to trade 
in this fashion.(2) But Portuguese archives containno descriptions 
of Yao trade at Moyambique at this time, yielding only a few passing 
references to it.(3) For details we must rely on the observations 
of Epidariste Colin and Henry Salt.
Colin spent the peak trading months of August and September I8O4 
at Moyambique. Some of his comments on trade there are gross exag*- 
gerations of the truth, such as his estimate that some 15,000 to 
16,000 slaves and 700 to 800 tons of ivory were exported annually from 
Moyambique. He seems also to have been confused in believing that
(1) AHU, CM 50, Prov.Govt. to Crown, Moy., 22 October 1807; see also,
RSSA, ix,pp.4-5*
(2) Loureiro, Memorias, pp.289-90*
(3) AHU, CM 41, petition of Jos! Mariano Ribeiro, n.d*, granted by Gov*,
Moy., 4 July 1803; AHU, CM 42, petition of Tanachande Gopal, n*d., 
granted Moy., 20 August 1803; AHU, CM 50, Jos! Antdnio Caldas to 
Prov. Govt., Mossuril, 18 October 1808; AHU, CM 52, petition of 
Antdnio Martins de Matos, acknowledged Moy., 5 October 1809; AHU, 
Cod.1379,fl.57* notation of license granted to J0S 0 Rebelo de 
Albuquerque, /Moy.7, 27 June 1810.
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patamares penetrated 250 to 500 leagues inland and returned with 
bands of 400 to 500 slaves, each of whom carried one or more tusks 
of ivory# (l) On the other hand, Colin gathered valuable information 
on the types of slaves available at Moyambique, a subject which he 
clearly examined with cares "The blacks whom the traders prefer to 
all the others are the Makua /Sacquois/; they reach Mozambique in 
good health, having made a journey of only 50 leagues, and sometimes 
less. They withstand the rigors of the sea better...than the other 
blacks." The Makua slaves were known as gay and enterprising, but 
cruel. They were more prone to revolting aboard ship than other 
slaves, whom they scorned and with whom they refused to eat. Continuing 
his remarks, Colin wrote:
The Yaos /Monjavos/ are the most 
common type of blacks at Mozambique.
One recognizes them by the stars which 
they make on their bodies and on their 
cheeks, as well as the two or three hor­
izontal bars below their temples. Their 
humor is gentle and melancholic; they are 
much attached to their master, provided 
that they are not maltreated; ;they are 
better made, in general, than the Makua, 
but rather less robust. One must realize 
that when they reach Mozambique, they 
have made a journey of 250 leagues, and 
are prostrated with fatigue; this is 
undoubtedly the reason why so many of 
them die at sea.
Colin1s misguided generalities are easily compensated for by 
these detailed notes. They both confirm what earlier sources indicate, 
and add valuable details to those descriptions of the slave trade at 
Mozambique, while later writers substantiate his detailing of Yao
(l) Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages, ix,1809,pp.504,512.
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and Makua tribal markings#(l) His remarks on the Yao are also 
especially valuable in that they remind us that the Yao enslaved 
each other, a fact which is not admitted by Abdallah. Colin also 
distinguished Maravi slaves at the coast, whom he correctly realized 
"are closely related to (ont beaucoup de rapport avec) the Yao,
above all in respect to (du c6t6 des)customs: however they are not
as well made, and they are shorter." The Makonde were reputed for 
their intelligence, but Colin’s description of their tatoos does not 
tally with any of those given by Professor Jorge Dias.(2)
Salt, who was at Mozambique for just ovetf three weeks in August-
September 1809, describes the Yao in even greater detail than Colin,
and his observations deserve to be quoted at equal length:
In the afternoon /29 August/ we
walked to the house of one of"the 
planters, about a mile distant, in the 
village of Mesuril, for the purpose of 
seeing some native traders from the 
interior, of a nation called Monjou 
/^ao/, who had come down with a cafila 
of slaves, (chiefly female) together 
with gold and elephants1 teeth for sale.
I was informed that they had been up­
wards of two months on their journey, 
having rested at times on their way, but 
that the distance they had travelled
might be got over in about forty-five days. • •
Some of the Monjou said that they had 
been three months from home, others two, 
and another thought it might be accomplished 
in one and a half, allowing for days of 
rest. • • They told me themselves that they 
were acquainted with other traders called 
Eveezi ^Syamwezi/ and Maravi, who had 
travelled far enough inland to see large 
waters, white people (this must be taken 
comparatively) and horses.(3)
(1)Ibid,pp.520-15 for a comparison with Colin's description of Makua facial 
and corporal sacrifications, see H.E. O'Neill, "A Three Months' Journey," 
PP»193-213 Froberville,"Notes sur les.•.amakoua," pp.313-145 f°r Yao 
tatooing, see M.J. Viana,"Da Tatuagem-iNembo> entre os Wa-Yao."Boletim 
Geral da Coldnias. 270,1947»PP*9-29> see above,
(2) Malte-Bum, Annales des Voyages .ix. 1809. PP. 522-3; Dias. Os Macondes.ii.pp.
56-72.
(3) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia.pp.32-3• Salt's doubts that Nyamwezi and
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Though less certainly than Colin, Salt suggests that the Yao, 
or at least those whom he met, were primarily slave traders* His 
notes on the long journey which the Yao made for the interior confirm 
the impression that they did not, generally, trade directly to 
Kazembe*s. On the other hand, both his and Colin*s references to 
the Maravi act as a valuable counterbalance to Lacerda*s impressions 
of the interior trade of East-Central Africa, which slight the role 
of Maravi traders, except for one passing note.(l) That the Yao had 
met Nyamwezi traders, however, suggests that the Yao may have encounter­
ed them at Kazembefs court, where P*J* Baptista seems to have found
them trading at that time* Alternatively, Yao knowledge of the
Nyamwezi may also have resulted from contact with the Yeke, a Nyamwezi 
people who raided into Bisa country in search of slaves and ivory, at 
about this time.(2) It is also possible that their main contact with 
the Nyamwezi was at the coast, through Yao who had travelled beyond 
the Rufiji River and met Nyamwezi traders arriving from central 
Tanzania. This last alternative seems less likely, though, for we 
know that Kilwa was the northern coastal terminus of Yao trade, 
Portuguese references to their trading to Zanzibar and Mombasa 
notwithstanding* Indeed, even Salt realized this fact and wrote, in 
an unpublished note, that "The Monjou - trade up as far as Quiloa - the 
Ambeze or Eveze higher up*”(3)
/.. footnote continued from page 272.
(3) Maravi traders had seen whites are unfounded in view of the strong
commercial ties between Kazembe*s and the Angolan coast* Morice!s 
evidence indicates that some Africans trading to Kilwa had already 
crossed the continent three decades previously. Por trade between 
Kazembe*s and the Angolan coast, see Cunnison,"Kazembe and the 
Portuguese;” see above, pp. 2o4-r.
fl) Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia*p*196.
(2; Burton, Cazembe. p.188; Thomas, Historical Notes, pp.25-6,295 
EEA,i,pp.265-6,278*
(3) BM, Add. MSS 19,419,fl.l4, See Andrade, Relates.p.151. for Xavier's 
intriguing remarks on African traders called Mussucumas (Snkuma?).
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Salt's conjectures as to the location of Yaoland are purely 
speculative; one wonders how he came to place it ”in a north­
easterly direction from Mosambique." Personally, he thought the 
Yao to be unusually ugly and was clearly repulsed by their negroid 
features. The weapons he saw them carrying were simple, but strong, 
bows; long arrows, barbed and poisoned; and tfvery short spears with 
iron shafts#” They had no firearms.(l) On 30 August, Salt returned 
”to the house of the planter where the Monjou traders resided,” 
where he bought a bow and some arrows from one of the Yao.
In the cool of the evening, the 
planter took us to a kind of fair held 
in the neighbourhood for. the purpose of 
bartering with the traders lately arrived.
The articles displayed to tempt these 
simple savages were very trifling, such 
as salt, shells, beads, tobacco, coloured 
handkerchiefs and coarse cloths from 
Surat; a circustance that proves how art­
fully the Portuguese have carried on this 
species of traffic, otherwise they could 
not for so long a period have kept the 
natives in an ignorance thus suitable to 
their purposes. I was informed that in 
the interior, the traders are still able 
to purchase for about the value of two 
dollars, in the above articles, either a 
slave, or an elephant’s tooth from sixty 
to eighty pounds weight# This fair was 
superintended by a guard of the Portuguese 
native troops. • .(2)
(l) Salt, Voyage to Abyssinia# pp.32-3*
(2; Ibid., pp. 3iPir ; cf. RSEA,ix,pp.4-5; Lacerda e Almeida, Travessia.
pp.297-8, for Pinto's listing of prices for ivory, slaves, and 
copper at Kazembe's; Burton, Cazembe. p.229, for prices at 
Kazembefs in 1806-1810.
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Salt was unaware of the decline of Yao trade to Mozambique from 
former years. The seemingly unimportant items which he saw at the 
fair, of which he alone has left a description, were highly valued 
in the interior. The need for salt was a factor which influenced 
the growth of early Yao coastal trade, while Lacerda remarked upon 
its importance, and the use of cowries, among the Maravi. Beads 
and cloth were, of course, staples of long-distance trading. But 
it is unlikely that there was much demand for foreign tobacco by 
the Yao traders, as both the Yao and the Maravi grew their own.
Like salt, tobacco was early an object of trade for the Yao, and 
it remained so through the nineteenth century.(l) Par from being 
ignorant, or simple, traders, the Yao were resourceful, intelligent, 
and selective.
That some Yao preferred to continue trading to Moyambique, 
while most were travelling to Kilwa, is not surprising in view of 
the long contacts the Yao had with the Portuguese town. Trade was 
not moribund there, and the fact that most of the Yao had shifted 
their trade to Kilwa probably ensured those who did go to Moyambique 
of a good reception by the local traders. Perhaps these Yao belonged 
to a section of the nation which had always had closer ties with 
Moyambique, so that there was no strong tradition of trading to Kilwa, 
such as that retained by the Yao best known to Abdallah, who appear 
to have been a majority. A factor of this sort can only be recovered 
from the Yao themselves. With these intangible influences in mind, 
it also seems possible to postulate that, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Yao who were trading to Mocambique were in
(l) Ibid. pJTl 5 Annaes do Conselho Ultramarine, p.n.o., i, 1857» P*411> 
Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa, new edition, New York, 
1961,ii,p.418; UMCA MSS, A1 (iii), envelope 2, Edward Steere to 
R.M. Heanley, London, 21 June 1877\ Abdallah, The Yaos.-p.15; see 
above,p.
-  276 -
the process of becoming slave traders who also traded ivory, 
rather than ivory traders who also traded slaves# As such, the 
various conditions which affected the ivory market in East-Central 
Africa, and which were causing most Yao to trade to Kilwa, would 
not have turned them away from Moyambique, where there was a steady 
demand for slaves, not to mention a great desire, with resultant high 
prices, for ivory. These Yao were not isolated from their fellow 
Yao, with whom they obviously had frequent dealings, but the 
evolution of their trading habits seems to have been setting them 
apart from most Yao. During the next four decades, that is, until 
the great dispersal of the Yao at about mid-century, the Yao trade 
to Moyambique continued to be based increasingly on slaves. The 
transition to this state of affairs was only later achieved along 
the Kilwa route.
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CHAPTER SIX
Epilogue, 1810 - c. 1850
The first half of the nineteenth century in East-Central Africa 
was marked by the continued and rapid growth of the slave trade.
All along the coast the demand for slaves steadily rose; certainly 
at Moyambique ivory became progressively less important. In 1809 
ivory exports to India had declined to about 7500 arrobas; in 1817 
these had sunk to less than 4^00 arrobas. Two years later the 
unpopular Governor-General of Moyambique, Joao da Costa de Brito Sanches, 
observed that "the present commerce of the Colony only consists of 
the principal article of slaves, and some ivory, which is exported 
to the North ^i.e., IndiaJ in two, or three vessels." (l)
The slave trade at Moyambique expanded rapidly after 1810 and 
dominated all other commerce there. Most of the demand came from 
Brazil, but French slavers from Bourbon and Spanish vessels from 
Cuba also frequented Moyambique. The original stimulus for the 
development of the Brazilian slave trade to Moyambique and other ports
(l) See above, p.2$&; AHU, CM 62^ Silva Guedgs, ^Relaya'o do^Marfim e 
mais generos q Se despacharao nesta Alf. p. Sahida p. os Portos 
da Azia, no mes de j^gosto do prezente ano de 1817;rt AHJ, Cod.
1394* 15-17* Joao da Costa de Brito Sanches to Conde dos Arcos,
Moy*, 10 October 1819# According to a later Governor-General, 
whose memoirs on Moyambique do not inspire confidence so far as the 
Yao are concerned, there was a marked renaissance of the Yao ivory 
trade to Moyambique in the late 1820s, during his administration.
S.X. Botelho, Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na 
Africa Oriental. Lisboa, 1835* PP*371-3> Botelho*s description of 
this trade looks suspiciously derivative; cf. EHGEP, pp.264-5* ACL,
Azul MS 1028, B. Francisco Inocdncio de Sousa Coutinho, "Breve, e 
util Idea do Commercio, Navegayao, e Conquistas d*Azia, e I)1Africa...," 
fl.21-5» Sousa Coutinho was Governor-General of Angola from June 
1764 to November 1772; see R. Delgedo, "0 Goverao de Sousa Coutinho 
em Angola," in three parts, Stvdia,6,1960,pp.19-38; 7*1961,pp#49-86;
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of Portuguese East Africa was the establishment of the Portuguese 
Court there in 1808. Following on Britain*s abolition of the slave 
trade to British subjects in 1807, much pressure was brought to bear 
on the Portuguese Crown first to restrict and then to abolish the 
Portuguese slave trade. These measures did not achieve their purpose, 
but by legally limiting, in 1815, the Portuguese slave trade to 
Portuguese possessions in Africa lying south of the equator, they 
encouraged the diversion of much of this traffic from West Africa to 
Portuguese East Africa. The achievement of Brazilian independence, 
in 1822, further frustrated Britain*s attempts to abolish the slave 
trade. Thus, although slaves from Moyambique were less desired in 
Brazil than those from the western coast of Africa, and, at least in 
Maranh&o, they did not apparently flourish there, this trans-Atlantic 
trade was pursued vigorously.(l)
Milburn*s estimate that some 10,000 slaves annually were exported 
from Moyambique at the beginning of the second decade of the nine­
teenth century seems to be rather exaggerated; but by the end of that 
decade this was probably a minimal figure.(2) Generally, some fifteen 
to eighteen Brazilian vessels arrived at Moyambique between July and 
October to trade for slaves in exchange for money. According to D.Fr. 
Bartolomeu dos Mrtires, Prelate of Moyambique from 1819 to his death 
in 1828, in 1819, sixteen Brazilian ships left there with cargoes of 
slaves. Fr. Bartolomeu states that the Brazilians bought 9242 slaves, 
I8O4 of whom died at Moyambique; of the 7920 who were embarked, 2196 
died on the voyage to Brazil, so that only 5234 were landed there. 
Furthermore, some 1200 slaves who were awaiting sale at Moyambique 
died before being bought. In 1819, then, at least 10,442 slaves were
(1) See RSEA,ix,p.l2; PRO, FO 84/122, Robert Hesketh to Lord Palmerston, 
London, 3 August 1831, enclosure 2, "State of the Slave Trade on 
the Northern Coast of Brazil."
(2) W. Milbum, Oriental Commerce. London, 1813,i,P«59> see RSEA,ix,p.l6; 
AHU, CM 61 & 62, Silva Guedes, despachos issued for 12 Brazilian 
merchant vessels, Moy., 9 February 1817 to 26 March 1818.
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known to have been carried to Moyambique for sale to Brazilian 
slavers alone. (X)
Figures complied by British consulate officials in Brazil, in 
particular at Rio de Janeiro, reflect the increasing volume of the 
slave trade with Moyambique during the 1820s, but they are undoubtedly 
incomplete. This suggests that many slaves were disembar’ed without
i ,x-
paying duties at Rio de Janeiro, just as numbers were illegally 
embarked along the coast running north and south from Moyambique. 
Moreover, in 1821, the first year for which these figures exist, only 
2941 slaves were reported by the British as having been embarked at 
Moyambique aboard Brazilian vessels. In the same year, Dos Mdrtires, 
who was by then a member of the Revolutionary Provisional Government 
which replaced Brito Sanches, tells us that export duties were collected 
on 12,272 slaves at Moyambique. (2) It is in this light that the
(1) Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval, Cod.826(M IVI32), D.Fr. Bartolomeu dos 
Mdrtires, Memoria Chorografica da Provincia e a Capitania de 
Moyambique na Costa d!Africa Oriental Conforme o estado em que se 
achava no anno de 1822. f1.29-30. I am most grateful to the 
Marquesa de Cadaval for allowing me to see this important 
manuscriptfkJLto Fr. Francisco Leite de Faria, who is Keeper of the 
Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval and who enabled me to use it in Lisbon. 
Lengthy extracts from the Memoria have been published, with an 
introduction, by V. Rau, "Aspectos dtnico-culturais da ilha de 
Moyambique em 1822," Stvdia,11,1963,PP*123-62, at 148-51* OF# AHJ,
CM 64, Pedro Simi&o, "Mappa das OnbarcayoBns, que entrar&o e 
Sahirao do Porto de Mossambique no ano de 1819,” Moy., 31 December 
1819, with enclosure, which also has sixteen vessels departing for 
Brazil, but to Pard and Maranhao, as well as Rio de Janeiro, Bahia 
and Pernambuco, the three ports given by Dos Mdrtires.
(2) PRO, FO 84/17, Henry Hayne to Marquis of Londonderry, Rio de 
Janeiro, 16 January 1822, enclosing "Slaves imported at Rio de 
Janeiro during the year 1821;" Cadaval Cod.826(M IVI32),fl.35* See 
Costa Hendes, Catalogo.pp.57-60; Teixeira Botelho, Hist6ria,4»PP«625-9*
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following British figures must be read:
Humber of Slaves
Year ______Embanked at Moyambique_____________________ Landed at
1822 4975 Rio de Janeiro, 3584? Mararihao, 137
1823 4204 " 3503? Bahia, 300
1824 5173 h 2702
1825 3753 " 3406
1826 NO FIGURES
1827 2810 " 2496
1828 6655 5996
1829 7789 " 59455 Bahia, 268;
Pernambuco 281
1830 6350 " 5048
Total (9 years) 39,707 35,641 (1)
(l) PRO, F0 84/17# Hayne to Earl of Clanwilliam, Rio de Janeiro, 15 May 
1822, enclosure, & 21 August 1822, enclosure; BEK), P0 84/24# H* 
Chamberlain to George Canning, Rio de Janeiro, 25 January 1823# 
enclosure, & 15 August 1823# enclosure; IRO, PO 84/31# same to 
same, Rio de Janeiro, 5 January 1824# & enclosure, & 31 March 
1824# & enclosure; PRO, PO 84/42# same to same, Rio de Janeiro,
4 January 1825 & enclosure; PRO, PO 84/55# same to same, Rio de 
Janeiro, 4 January 1826, enclosure; PRO, PO 84/71# A# McCarthy to 
John Bidwell, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1827, enclosure; PRO, PO 
84/84, A.J. Heatherly to same, Rio de Janeiro-, 15 January 1828; 
ibid#, McCarthy to same, Rio de Janeiro, 26 April 1828, enclosure,
& 9 August 1828, enclosure; PRO, FO 84/95# same to same, Rio de 
Janeiro, 26 February 1829, & enclosure, & 30 April 1829, enclosure; 
ibid., same to Earl of Aberdeen, Rio de Janeiro, 11 July 1829# & 
enclosure; PRO, PO 84/112, William Pennell to same, Rio de Janeiro,
25 January 1830, enclosure, & 15 July I83O, enclosure; ibid#, Charles 
G# Weiss to same, Bahia, 6 February 1830, enclosure; Ibid., John 
Parkinson to same, Pernambuco, 13 February 1830, & enclosure; PRO,
PO 84/122, Pennell to same, Rio de Janeiro, 8 January 1831# enclosure; 
see also, PRO, PO 84/95, Arthur Aston to same, Rio de Janeiro, 30 
September 1829, enclosure# 3, f,List of National vessels to which 
Passports have been granted for the Slave Trade to Mozambique♦’* 
Secretary of State*s Office, 15 September 1829*
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Indeed, in 1826, the Captain of a British cruiser anchored at 
Moyambique wrote:
Between eight and ten thousand /slaves/ 
are entered at the Custom house annually as 
being exported from the Port of Moyambique 
to the Brazils - however I consider about 
i or more may be added to that number as 
being shipped off to the Brazils in these 
vessels# This additional fourth is smuggled 
on board to cheat the Custom house# (l)
Though less important, a considerable business in slaves continued 
to be carried on by the French at Moyambique# Operating from the 
Seychelles, ships from Bourbon and Mauritius boldly traded there 
despite British efforts to end this particularly localized trade and 
the perennial Portuguese ban on foreign trading in her African dominions# 
Moyambique slaves were also carried on Arab vessels to the Comoros, 
where French traders purchased and then transported them to the Seycelles, 
before introducing them to the Mascarenes# The key to this system was 
the period of "Frenchification” which the slaves had at the Seychelles# 
After acquiring a smattering of French, they were introduced to Bourbon 
and Mauritius under the pretext that they were already the slaves of 
French residents of the islands, not new slaves being introduced there#
In 1826, Captain Acland remarked that WI have been given to understand 
that 35 Cargoes of Slaves have been shipped off in French vessels 
within the last 2 years from the Portuguese settlements# These 
vessels are not large perhaps averaging about 200 Slaves each Cargo.,,(2)
(1) HtO,CO 415/7,A# No#172, pp#12-13# Captain Acland*s Journal#2, Moy#,
9 October 1826; see also, ibid., A*No*172, p#34> Captain Pilkington*s 
Journal, post -12 December 1826; AHU, Cod#1425# fl* # Paulo Josd 
Miguel de Brito to Sheikh of Quitangonha, Moy#,9 & 17 March 1830, 
condemning the contraband slave trade from Quitangonha to Brazilian 
vessels in Moyambique harbor#
(2) RSEA.ix# pp#l6,51; AHU, CM 57# autos de» visitas issued to eleven 
vessels with British passports, from Mauritius and the Seychelles;
AHU, Cod#1386, no.II67# Antdnio de Araujo de Azevedo to Marcos Caetano 
de Abreu e Meneses, Rio de Janeiro, 18 June 1814# ibid#, no.1213#
MarquSs de Aguiar to same, Rio de Janeiro, 31 July 1815; AHU, Cod#
1380, fl.24O-3, Brito Sanches to Conde dos Arcos, Moy#, 27 September 
1819; AHU, Cod#1391, no#1414, Dos Arcos to Brito Sanches, Rio de Janeiro,
11 February 1820; AHU,Cod#1394>fl*69v.,Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos,Moy#,
15 July 1820; PRO,CO 415/7# A.No.172,pp.14-15*
Many of these vessels operated outside Moyambique, at Ibo, Quelimane, 
Inhambane, and Lourenyo Marques, but there is no doubt that some of 
them did their business at the capital, where the District Judge observed 
in 1829 that the French were the most frequent foreign traders# (l)
Indeed, the many years of slave trading from Moyambique to the 
Mascarenes is reflected in the fact that, as early as 1806, more than 
two-fifths of the slave population of Mauritius were considered 
”Mozambiques.” In 1830, this category included Yao, Makua, Makonde,
Maravi, Ngindo, Africans from the Zambezi area, Inhambane, and Nyamwezi, 
so that the appelation was not strictly accurate; nevertheless, it 
attests to the long-standing trading connections between the Mascarenes 
and East Africa# (2)
Even less is known of the slave trade to Cuba, but in 1819 four 
or five Spanish vessels from there entered Moyambique, certainly to 
take on slaves, before continuing on to Zanzibar to complete their 
cargoes (3)» Mention should also be made of the Arab and Swahili 
slave trade to Madagascar, much of which was supplied from the coast
(1) ACL, Azul MS 847# "Estado das Relayfles Commerciaes da Capitania de 
Mossambique ate o dia 21 de Agosto de 1829 dado pelo Juiz de Fora 
de Mossambique Dionisio Ignacio de Lemos ^nto em gua informayao 
de 2 de Novembro de 1829 dirigido ao Gov# e Cap# General da
d# Capitania Paulo Jose Miguel de Brito,” fl#13#
(2) No81, L 1Esclavage# p#33# quoting Milbert, Voyage pittoresque A lfIle 
de France, Paris, 1812, p#233# who states that in 1806 there were 
26,670 ”Mozambiques” in a total slave population of 60,646; d*Unienville, 
Statistique, i, pp*249,276-9, who gives the slave population of 
Mauritius in 1830 as 67,619# in one place, and as 69,476, in another;
cf# Malte-Brun, Annales des Voyages# xiii, p#380.
(3) AHU, CM 64# Simi&o, ”Mappa# • #,” Moy#, 31 December 1819*
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adjacent to Moyambique# The great numbers of Makttci now living in 
northwest Madagascar apparently bear witness to the volume of this 
trade, although this may partially be accounted for by earlier contact.(l)
Considering all this activity, then, the frequently expressed 
estimate that at least 15,000 slaves were exported each year from 
Moyambique during the 1820s and 1830s seems quite reasonable# (2) 
Notwithstanding the abolition of slave trading in Portuguese territory 
in 1836 and a British blockade of Moyambique from 1840, which led to 
the Anglo-Portuguese Slave Trade Treaty in 1842, it does not seem that 
there was more than a minimal decline in the slave trade in the 
vicinity of Moyambique (3)« Furthermore, Bishop Bos Mdrtires* evidence 
that large numbers of slaves brought to Moyambique for exportation died 
before being purchased suggests that perhaps nearly 20,000 slaves 
annually were gathered in the vicinity of Moyambique during this period#
(1) See AHU, Cod# 1379# fl*43#46,50,90-l, being licenses granted to 
eight Swahili and Arab traders to embark slaves at Moyambique, 
the average request being for 50 slaves, 14 March-12 April 1810,
1 February & 16 March 1812; ibid#, fl#66, license granted for 
buying 40 slaves to "Massane Bunu Portador da Rainha Yaine de 
Bom-Bottoque,” 8 January 1811; AHU, CM 60, requerimento. Said bin 
Saif, from Zanzibar, to go to Madagascar, granted, Moy#, 2 April 
1817? ibid#, requerimento. Sidi Hasan, returning from Madagascar, 
to go to Zanzibar, granted, Moy#, 25 September 1817? PRO, Admiralty 
I/69# no*63, Joseph Nourse to John Wilson Croker, H.M.S. Andromache. 
at Sea, in the Moyambique Channel, 15 December 1823? Cadaval Cod#
826 (M IVX32), fl.31-2, also in Rau, ”Aspectos,” pp#152-3? PRO,CO 
415/4, no#6l, ’’Interrogatories adressed to Mr# Copall and Mr#Copall,s 
Answers relative to the State of Madagascar,” nos#200,202, Port 
Louis, 8 October 1827? Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p#87 &
map 12, p#295; see also, J#F. Elton, Travels and Researches among 
the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and Central Africa (ed.H.B# 
Cotterill), London,1079# P*l62#
(2) RSEAt ix, pp#32-3> cf# ibid#, pp#18,50? F#T# Texugo, A Letter on the 
Slave Trade still carried on along the Eastern Coast of Africa##.
London, 1839# passim, but especially p.345 Lopes, Escravatura# p*l69, 
citing Virey, Histoire naturelle de genre humaine. new ed#, Bruxelles, 
1834, ii# p.67. AHU, cod#1444» no#198, /Crown to Gov#7, 27 June 1839# 
CortftrtHs that Texugo was a political exile from Portugal#
(3) See Jackson, European Powers# pp#195-6, 198-201,222? Margu£s da 
Bemposta Subserra, et al, Untitled memorandum on Portuguese East Africa 
addressed to the Crown, Lisboa, 28 April I856, pp.19-20; McLeod.Travels#
i, pp#304-ll#313,316-21,325.
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While there is no doubt at all that most of these slaves exported 
from nineteenth century Moyambique were Makua (l), it is equally clear 
that the Yao were the second greatest suppliers of the Moyambique
slave market. In 1819 Brito Sanches wrote that the reason Brazilian
ships were leaving Moyambique laden with slaves
is due to the abundance which some 
types of cafilas called Yao, who come
from the interior near Tete, the far­
thest of the Rivers of Sena, bring to
the Mainland of Mossuril, so that this
year they brought more than 3500 slaves, 
and not due to those which come from the 
environs of this City. . . (2)
As more than 12,000 slaves were embarked for Brazil in 1819# Brito 
Sanches was clearly mistaken in minimizing the importance of the 
Makua slave trade, but the detailed observations of Dos MArtires 
confirm his remarks on the Yao*
Dos M^rtires, with surprising accuracy, locates Yaoland between 
10° and 14° latitude south of the equator. The Yao themselves he 
describes as ”a great, and numerous Nation. • ., who have always 
maintained a trade with the Portuguese which has been very profitable
to the Colony. These Kaffirs are independent of any other Nation.......M
While the Prelate’s belief that their homes were some three or four 
months inland is inaccurate, it does indicate the extended nature of 
their trading habits, thereby confirming the observations of earlier 
writers*(3) Each year the Yao came to Moyambique, he continues, 
bringing 2000 to 3000 slaves, together with only "some ivory, and a 
small quantity of provisions,” as well as tobacco and iron wares.
Their slaves were bought at a low price, owing to the fact, again 
noted by previous observers, that the change in climate between their 
own country and the coast seriously debilitated them until they made
(1) ACL, Azul MS 847, fl.10; Cadaval Cod.826(M IV132), fl.17-18.
(2) AHU, Cod.1394, fl.16, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moy*, 10 October 1819*
for passing references to the Yao, see ABU, CM 59# requerimento. 
Muhammed Hasan, n.d., with enclosure, Moy., 12 August 1815# AHtJ, Cod* 
1380, fl.235-6, Prov.Govt. to Dos Arcos, Moy., 19 February 1819*
(3) See above, p.272*
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the adjustment. Dos M^rtires also gives a lengthy and fascinating 
description of the organization of Yao slave caravans, which in turn 
sheds much light on the nature of Yao slave trading at that time.
According to his account, all their slaves were Yao. In
passing through enemy territory in Macuana, the caravan was defended
by "a few Kaffirs, their compatriots.” Dos M^rjtires believed that
the slaves did not know that they were to be sold at the coast, /because
the secret of their business is only confided to a few: out of 3000,
less than 30 return to their lands.” That they did not forcibly seize
their freedom he attributes to the fact that they were outcasts in
their own country and that they surely would be killed or enslaved in
foreign lands. In effect, they had no alternative except to submit.
In greater detail he writes*
Now these Yao certainly are not prisoners 
of war, because they are of the same 
nation as their sellers: but all are 
victims of some crime, either real, or 
supposed; and among them there are some 
crimes which, although committed by only 
one individual, the onus falls upon his 
entire family, and most remote relatives? 
thus it is not rare to see the father, 
mother, sons, daughters, nephews, etc., 
being sold in the same fair, (l)
Dos M^rtires is very probably mistaken in his belief that there was
no internecine Yao warfare at this time, but it also seems not
unlikely that the increased demand for slaves may have caused criminal
liability to be more widely applied in Yao customary law than before.
As to the organization of Yao caravans, Froberville, writing a quarter-
century later, noted that Makua captives, although ’’sometimes as numerous
(l) Cadaval Cod. 826 (M TVI32), fl.27, 63, also in Rau, ’’Aspectos,” pp. 
143-4. 158-9*
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as their masters,# • .rarely seek to regain their liberty by force.”(l) 
It is obvious that the notorious forked slave-stick (Kiswahili, 
kongwa; Ciyao, likongwa, ligole. or likoli). was not utilized in the 
slave trade to Mozambique at this time. (2)
After Dos M&rtires, there is very little information on the Yao 
at Mozambique. Owen mentions them briefly in 182% He also 
indirectly substantiates Dos Mrtires* identification of the origin 
of the slaves traded by the Yao to Mossuril by remarking that 11 the 
practice of tatooing is here universal, and, as each tribe has its 
distinguishing marks, a slave-dealer can at first sight tell to which 
particular one his victim belongs.” (3) Botelho*s confusing remark 
that the Yao nation comprised one of the Karanga kingdoms at least 
has the virtue of eliciting this response from a critical reviewer 
in 1837? ”Mujao or M ’iao slaves are numerous at Mozambique, and they 
could have readily satisfied Sr. Botelho, had he made any enquiry of 
them, that they are not Macarangas.” (4) F.T. Texugo, who was at 
Mozambique in 1838, does not mention the Yao by name, but his
(1) Froberville, ’’Notes sur les...amakoua,” p.323. For references to 
conflicts among the Yao, see Rangeley, ”The AmaCinga Ayao,”
NJ> xv,2,1962, p.42; see also, Sanderson, ”The Use of Tail-Switches 
in Magic,” NJ, viii,1,1955# p«40. For Yao crimes, see Abdallah,
The Yaos. pp#4>9# Lamburn, ”Some Notes on the Yao,” pp.81-2.
(2) See F. Johnson, Swahili-English Dictionary. p. 220; Sanderson,
Dictionary of the Yao Language, pp.106.109.110.
(3) W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of Africa... 
London, 1833»i#PP*190-2,276,295-6; see above, p.168; for other 
passing references, see Santana, Documentazao.i.pp.163«300-15
ACL, Azul MS 648; no.9, anon., ’’Possessions Portugaises en Afrique..*,” 
n.d^c.1820.
(4) Botelho, Memoria Estatistica. p.311# but see 389# anon..’’Botelho on 
the Portuguese Colonies.” The Edinburgh Review, or Critical Journal 
lxiv,1837# P*421. For Botelho1s reply, see his Segunda Parte da 
Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental. 
Lisboa, 1837# P*59* For a fascinating earlier instance of identifying 
a people living south of the Zambezi as idujaos - people who are 
clearly not Yao - see BNL, FG, Cod.4179# 5# ”Rellazao q da 0
capital, e Feitor que foi Alexandrino de Oliveira da Feitoria do porto 
de Imhambane...,” n.d., but post-1739*
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description of caravans arriving from the interior undoubtedly refers 
to Yao caravans. Thereafter, until the 1850s, there are no further 
published references to the Yao trading to Mozambique, (l)
Throughout this period it appears that Portuguese hindrance of 
the Indian trading community was a less important factor in 
influencing the Yao trade to Moyambique than it had been during the 
eighteenth century* Although the Indians continued to monopolize 
the finances of the island, the demand for slaves to which the Yao 
were responding lay beyond their control. Furthermore, Indian 
cloths became less important to the operation of Yao trade, as 
European-produced trade cloths progressively captured a larger share 
of the African market. Favored during the second and harried during 
the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, though always defended 
by the Crown, the varying fortune of the Banian and Muslim Indian 
traders at Moyambique seems to have had little decisive effect on 
Yao commerce during these decades. (2)
It is rather more difficult to assess the role played by the 
Makua in influencing the direction of Yao trade during the first
(1) Texugo, Letter, pp.34—55 of* Gamitto, King Kazembe.i.p.65: H10,F0 
63/836, McLeod to Malmesbury, Hyde Park, 30 November 1858; see 
below, p. m .
(2) See, e.g., AHU, CM 60, Aguiar to Conde de Sarzedas, Rio de Janeiro,
25 January 1816; AHU, CM 66, requerimento of twelve Banian traders, 
/Moy./, n.d., but c.1817; AHU, CM 63, Bos Arcos to Josd Francisco 
de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Rio de Janeiro, 4 July 1818;
AHU, CM 64, J0S0 Vicente de Cardenas to Gov., Moy., 27 September 
1819; AHU, Cod.1402, fl.41 & v., Prov. Govt, to Simiao and Antdnio 
Josd Segundo, Moy*, 6 November 1821; AHU, Cod.141% fl*8, Jo&o 
Faustino da Costa to Josd Antdnio Marcelino Pereira, Moy., 26 July 
1827; ibid., fl.105, S.X. Botelho to JoSo Bonifdcio Alves da Silva, 
Moy., 6 May 1829; AHU, MM 11, petition of Lauchande Cancadas, granted, 
Moy., 18 October 1830; AHU, Cod. 1445# no.2117 (or 2108), Antdnio 
Abruclsio Jarvis de Atongonia to Gov. of Moy., Payo do RamalhHo, 12 
September 1835; Botelho, Resumo, pp.11-14; idem, Memoria Estatistica. 
p.3765 Texugo, Letter. pp*38-9#41*
half of the nineteenth century. Following a Portuguese expedition 
against the Uticulo chiefs in 1811, there appears to have been nearly 
a full decade of peaceful relations between the Makua and the 
Portuguese of Moyambique.(l). Trouble arose in 1819 with Mauruya and 
Impahiamuno, in whose lands coastal traders had frequently been robbed. 
Despite a recommendation of peaceful conciliation from the Crown, a 
campaign was waged against the latter in his territory of Mutipa 
towards the end of 1820. Notwithstanding glowing reports of a 
crushing defeat of Iwpahiamuno, the problem persisted for the next 
few years, at least. (2) By 1830, however, relations with the Uticulo 
chiefs were good, but during the next three years there was a great 
deal of commotion around Fera&o Veloso, where the Portuguese were 
attempting to establish a station. The conflict involved the Sheikh 
of Quitangonha and the Uticulo chiefs, and may have spread as far 
north as Simuco. As usual, alliances were tenuous? Mauruya and his 
fellow chiefs were willing to fight against Quitangonha in concert 
with the Portuguese in 1830, but in 1833 they were equally ready to 
invade Mossuril again if the Portuguese did not treat them with due 
respect. In these circumstances, Portuguese interests were clearly 
favored by negotiating with the Sheikh of Quitangonha. (3) In general,
(1) AHU, Cod. 1385, no.1074, Galveas to Mendonya, Rio de Janeiro, 4 June 
1811; AHU, CM 55, same to same, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1811; AHU, CM 54, 
Mendonya to Calveas, Moy., 31 October 1811; AHU, Cod. 1380, fl.110,
Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses to same, 5 February 1813*
(2) AHU, Cod.1394, f1.31-2, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moy.,11 November 
1819; AHU, Cod.1391, no.1437, & CM 67, reply, Rio de Janeiro, 2 August 
1820; ibid, reply, Moy., 10 November 1820; AHU, Cod. 1394, fl.78, & CM 
67, same to same, Moy., 7 December 1820; ibid., same to same, Moy., 8 & 9 
December 1820; Cadaval Cod.826(M 17132), fl.27, also in Rau, "Aspectos," 
pp.142-3; RSEA, ix, p.18; cf. O'Neill, "Journey from Mozambique to Lakes 
Shirwa and Amaramba," p.634*
(3) See Santana, Documentayao, i,p.l69; AHU, MM 11, Paulo Jos! Miguel de 
Brito to Conde de Basto, Moy., 8 August 1830; AHU, Cod.1452 /fl*19v#-20*•/ 
same to?same, Moy., 27 October 1830; AHU, Cod. 1425, fl.11-12, same to 
Mauruya, Moy., 30 October & 14 December 1830; AHU, MM 11, Gabriel Jos!
de Sousa Ferreira to Brito, Mossuril, 22,24,25 & 26 November, 14 & 24 
December 1830; AHU, Cod. 1452 /fl.23v.-247> Brito to Manuel da Silva 
Gonyives, Moy., 8 January 1831; AHU, Cod.1440, Silva Gonyalves to Jos! 
AntSnio Pereira, Moy*, 15 & 19 March 1855? ibid., same to Chief Justice,
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the situation in Macuana was extremely fluid and highly volatile.
Nor did the Portuguese have greater control over events there at 
mid-century, (l) But if these disturbances had an appreciable 
effect on the Yao trade to Moyambique, the available sources do not 
mention this until, once again, the 1850s.
Before examining this mid-century reference, we must briefly 
note the growth of the slave trade at both Ibo and Quelimane. Until 
1820 the continual threat and realization of Sakalava raids, as well 
as attacks from the neighboring Makua, completely paralyzed the 
trade of the Kerimba Islands, except for that carried on by a few 
bold Swahili. By that date, not only had the Portuguese finally 
reorganized themselves at Ibo, but the power of the Sakalava was 
already in the process of being broken. (2) Definite references
/ P a g e W  , note (3) continued/ Moy., 23 April 1833; ibid., portaria. 
Prov. Govt., Moy., 23 April 1833? ibid., Silva Gonyalves to 
Interim Commandant of Mainland, Moy., 3 May 1833? BNL, FG, Cod.
8470, fl#71, Sheikh of Quitangonha to Prov. Govt.*Quintangonha,
1 December 1833; AHU, Cod.1432 /fl.81-2vi/, Silva Gonyalves to 
Antdnio de Vasconcelos e Carvalho, Moy., 3 December 1833; AHU,
Cod. 1440, same to Pereira, Moy., 25 January 1834*
(1) See Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo sdbre a Provfncia de Moyambique,"
Boletim da Sooiedade de Geografia de Lisboa, lv, 7-8, 1937, P*301;
Bordalo, Estatistica. p.50*
(2) There is a rich body of documentation on the Sakalava raids against
the coast of East-Central Africa during this decade in the following
places: AHU, CM 54,55,56,58,59,60,64,66; AHU, Cod.1380,1394,1478; 
BNL, FG, Cod.8470; see also, Cadaval Cod. 826(M IYI32), fl.39-42; 
Bispo de Himeria, "Padroado de Portugal em Africa," Boletim da 
Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa. 14 Serie, 7-8, 1895, PP*699-700; 
Guillain, Madagascar, p.201* For the Makua conflicts, see AHU,Cod. 
1478, f1.233, Caetano Jos! Resende to Mendonya, Ibo, 1 September 
1811; AHU, CM 55, reply, Moy., 1 October 1811; AHU, Cod.1380,fl.79, 
same to Galvezs, Moy., 11 December 1811; AHU, Cod.1385, no.lll6, 
Aguiar to Mendonya, Rio de Janeiro, 20 May 1812; AHU, CM 57, Manuel 
Onofre Pantoja to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo, 23 February 1813; ibid., 
Ant6nio da Costa Portugal to same, Ibo, 23 February 1813; AHU, Cod. 
1377, fl#154, Abreu e Meneses to Pantoja, Moy., 12 August 1814»
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to French slavers at Ibo began to appear in 1824. Three years 
later a notorious French slaver named Charles Letord, who was 
better known as Dorval, stated that there were nearly always slaves 
ready for purchase there. According to him, the export slave trade 
at Ibo was exclusively French, as Brazilian vessels never went there.
A man named Fortun! Bataille, who was a friend of the Governor, was 
the principal supplier to the French slavers at Ibo. In 1829 Botelho 
warned the new Governor of the islands against admitting foreign 
vessels there, indicating that the majority of these "fantastic 
arrivals" were French ships from Bourbon. Nevertheless, this traffic 
continued to flourish and by the 1850s Ibo had acquired a reputation 
as "the great Warehouse for Slaves." (lj
The slave trade at Quelimane was a direct result of the royal 
alvar! of 4 February 1811, which opened the subordinate ports of 
Moyambique to direct trading by Brazilian vessels, without requiring 
them to call at the capital. As early as 1807 such a ship had been 
specifically allowed by the Provisional Government to carry a cargo 
of slaves directly from Quelimane to lie de France, but this was an 
unusual exception. The Govemor-Generals of Moyambique were violently 
opposed to this trade, some because it hurt Moyambique and the Crown's
(l) AHU, Cod.1402, fl*105v., Prov. Govt, to Jos! Antdnio Caldas, Moy.,
14 February 1824; T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery 
to Africa and Arabia.... London, 1835, ii,PP*55,64; Owen, Narrative, 
ii, PP*9-10,14; FRO, CO 415/7, A. No. 172, pp.3-4, Acland1 s Journal 
#1, Ibo, 24 June 1826; FRO,CO 415/9, A.No.238, "Correspondence agd 
Documents furnished to Captains Polkinhome and Acland...29 Sept.
1827 relative to the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa," Document 1, 
Article 6; Santana, Documentayao. i,pp.119,457? AHU, Cod*1413, fl*H0, 
Botelho to Jose Amanti da Lima, Moy., 2 June 1829; AHU, Cod. 1427, 
fl.8, Brito to Bernardes, Moy., 5 October I83O; AHU, Cod.1207, 
f1.91-2, portaria. Joaquim Pereira, Moy., 29 August I84O; HIO, FO 
63/836, McLeod to Malmesbury, Hyde Park, 30 November 1858.
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finances, others more probably because it affected their own pockets, (l) 
Their pleas were not successful, however, and Quelimane soon became 
a thriving slave port. Official figures complied at Quelimane in 1820 
show that in the previous six years 15>055 slaves were exported from 
there to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco. A third of these 
were accounted for in 1819. In 1823 Boteler estimated that this town 
yielded 10,000 slaves annually and considered it to be "now the 
greatest mart for slaves on the east coast.,r Three years later another 
British officer observed that many French slavers from Bourbon also 
traded there. Indeed, Dorval thought that perhaps 12,000 to 15,000 
slaves were taken away from Quelimane by 1827.(2) The statistics 
compiled by the British at Rio de Janeiro for slave importations from 
Quelimane in the years 1821-1825 and 1827-1830 total 34,466 souls.
As we have already noted in respect to the accuracy of these accounts 
for the Mozambique trade, they are undoubtedly incomplete, but useful 
nonetheless. In 1838 Texugo reaffirmed Boteler*s opinion of Quelimane, 
adding that "during the whole year the harbour was never without 
some slavers." This situation remained unaltered during the 1840s.(3)
Quelimane and Ibo provided the Yao alternative outlets to 
Moyambique. This is demonstrated in a curious memoir written by the
(1) ACL, Azul MS 847> f 1.11,165 AHU, CM 49» petition, Joaquim da Rosario 
Monteiro, granted, /Soy./, 28 April 1807; AHU, CM 50, Prov. Govt.
to Crown, Moy., 22 October 1807; AHU, CM 59, & Cod. 1380, fl.152-3, 
Abreu e Meneses to Antdnio de Araujo de Azevedo, Moy., 1 October 1815? 
ibi<L, f 1.189V Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Conde da Barca, Moy.,
23 September'1817•
(2) Jackson, European Powera p.189; RSEA. ix,p.33> Boteler, Narrative, 
i, pp.248-9; Owen, Narrative, i, pp.292-3; ER0, CO 415/7» A. No.
172, pp.34-5» Polkinghome*s Journal; PRO, CO 415/9> A. No.238,
Document 1, article 4; see also, AHU, Cod.1414* no.1837> Josd Antdnio 
de Oliveira Leite de Barros to Botelho, Ajuda, 19 April 1828.
(3) See above, p.£80, n.l, for the relevant British sources; Texugo, 
Letter, p.34; Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, pp.496~8.
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Marquis of Bemposta Subserra. Although there is no evidence that he 
ever visited Moyambique, he obviously was keenly interested in 
developing the trade of the colony and was probably abreast of the 
current economic situation there when he composed his Resumo in 
December 1853* (l) Whatever the exact provenance of his information, 
his remarks throw valuable light on the new direction being taken by 
Yao trade as a result of the growth of the slave trade in East-Central 
Africa. Indeed, his observations are not limited to the Yao* Each 
year, he wrote,
great mangas /i.e., caravans/ of Negroes, 
some Bisa, who come from the lands of 
the Kazembe, others Yao, and of different 
tribes or nations, all of them traders, 
show up on that peninsula /Cabaceira/, 
in order to trade their merchandise*"for 
others which they need? a makeshift fair 
is set up for this purpose, in which 
everyone cheats with the greatest expertise 
and perspicacity. These Negroes do not 
enter our territory without permission, 
nor do they usually commit any acts of 
violence there; when, however, they are 
unable to overcome the difficulties which 
they encounter in the interior on the part 
of other nations, they go to Quelimane or 
to Ibo.(2)
Although he does not mention the slave trade in this passage, it is 
clear that this was the stock in trade of the Bisa, Yao, and other 
Africans who traded to these ports. The routes to Ibo and Quelimane 
seem surely to have been fairly recent developments, built up in 
response to the sudden rise of both towns as important slave markets.
(1) See Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo stfbre a Provincia de Moyambique,” 
pp.269-270 (introductory note by J080 Farmhouse); Grande 
Enciclopldia Portuguesa e Brasileira, xlviii, 1939t p*508.
(2) Bemposta Subserra, "Resumo sftbre a Provincia de Moyambique,” 
p.303; see above, p.PH for the Moyambique route to 
Lake Malawi at this time.
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A few Bisa were trading ivory to Quelimane in the 1790s, but not, 
apparently, on a very large scale. Certainly, by 1861, after the 
great Yao migration into modern Malawi, the Yao were well known at 
Quelimane. (l) As to the route to Ibo, Rebman says that the slave 
who served as his informant in compiling his Kiniassa Dictionary
was an Mniassa, who in consequence of 
international expeditions for slave- 
catching was seized by a tribe called 
Wapogera, who sold him to the Wamaravi, 
and these to the Swahili slave merchants 
who had come from Uibu (a small island 
belonging to Moyambique and on the map 
called Ibo), At Uibu which was reached 
after two months1 travelling at a very 
slow rate (in effective march only half 
the time is wanted), he was at last 
brought by slave-merchants from Mombas.
This was, perhaps, in 1844. (2)
As this example suggests, by the 1840s, at the latest, much of 
the demand for slaves at Ibo was being generated by the exigencies 
of the booming slave market at Zanzibar. The same factor had also 
caused the rise of Tungi as an important slave depot. (3) The growth 
and operation of the slave trade at Zanzibar has been described in 
detail by both Sir John Gray and Reginald Coupland. The most important 
fact to stress in this respect is that the slave trade at Zanzibar 
constantly was increasing throughout these decades. (4) We are, however, 
more interested in the effect this rising demand had on the Kilwa 
coast, and consequently on the Yao. At the same time, one must
(1) See above, p.2^1-3; Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, p.n.o., iii, 1862, 
p.875 see also, Thomas, Historical Notes. p.33*
(2) Rebman, Kiniassa Dictionary, pp.iv-v; for the Wapogera, see Young,
Notes, pp.25-^*
(3) See Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp.177*8.
(4) See ibid., pp. IZ% 1 5 3 - M C o u p l a n d ,  East Africa and its Invaders, 
PP.300-3, 313-14, 498-523.
remember that alongside the slave trade there was a flourishing trade 
in ivory at Zanzibar, where American traders, in particular, augmented 
the longstanding demand of the Indian market* (l) The shift of Yao 
trade back to Kilwa in the later eighteenth century had been a reaction 
to the revival of the demand for ivory there# Unlike the situation at 
Moyambique, ivory continued to play a vital role in the trade of Kilwa 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. It is for this 
reason that most Yao continued to prefer Kilwa to Moyambique during 
the early decades of the century*
In 1811, Smee commented that the various tribes which supplied the 
Zanzibar slave market were "too numerous to describe," but that the 
chief one was the Nyamwezi. Among the others which he identified were 
the Makua, the Yao, and the Ngindo. (2) A year later, when H.M.S.
Nisus visited Kilwa, a temporary decline in the slave trade seems to 
have set in there as a result of the recent British seizure of the 
Mascarenes, and James Prior, the ship*s surgeon, takes particular note 
of the ivory trade there* Prior also makes a passing reference to 
the slave and ivory trade at Lindi and Mongalo. (3) In both 1816 and 
1817 both Kilwa and Mafia were attacked by large Sakalava fleets*
After suffering considerable losses in the first year, a combined
(1) See Gray, History of Zanzibar, pp*£94*6,204; Burton, Lake Regions,
ii, pp*408-12*
(2) Burton, Zanzibar, ii, pp.510-11*
(3) Prior, Voyage,pp.80, 645 cf. Smyth, Philip Beaver, p.279*
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expedition of local Swahili and Omani forces from Zanzibar handed the 
Sakalava a crushing defeat* (l)
Shortly thereafter, the Sultan of Kilwa, Yusuf bin Hasan, died*
In 1819, when the gifted Oriental linguist, FortunS Albrand, visited 
Kilwa, the Sultan*s successor had not yet been chosen* This, 
however, had little effect on the trade of Kilwa, as commercial and 
political power there were firmly in the hands of the Omani* Alluding 
to its medieval splendor, Albrand remarked that it was "now only a 
miserable village (bourgade) to which the slave trade alone gives it 
any importance*" He was nevertheless skeptical of the assurance he 
received at Zanzibar that 13,000 slaves were imported there from Kilwa 
each year* While he does not refer to the ivory trade at Kilwa,
Albrand does remark that "in addition to the traffic in blacks,
Zanzibar also does as extensive a trade in ivory*” (2) During the 
next decade the Arab slave trade at Kilwa was supplemented by a 
renewed spurt of activity by French slavers at the several ports 
below it, where there was less effective Omani hegemony* Of these, 
Mongalo seems to have been more important than either Lindi or Mikindani, 
for in 1826 the Omani governor of Zanzibar told Acland"1that Mongalo
(l) See AHU, Cod. 1374, fl.96-7> Caldas to Abreu e Meneses, Ibo,
3 December 1816; AHU, Cod. 1377, fl#210, Cavalcanti de 
Albuquerque to the Sultan of Kilwa, Moy., 29 March 1817?
AHU, CM 60, Sultan of Tungi to Caldas, Tungi, 24 May 1817; 
ibid., Caldas to Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Ibo, 13 November 
1817; BNL, FG, Cod. 8470, fl. 71» Salimo Bono Sahi Bono Saude 
USaiude Seleman to Gov. of Moy., ? Zanzibar, n.d., but c.
1817-1818; SD, pp. 224, 198-9? TDB, ii5 Mafia, pp. 3-4, 8 
(124-5, 12977 Albrand, "Extrait d*un M^moire sur Zangibar 
et sur Quiloa," Bulletin de la Soci^td de G^ographie* 2 Serie, 
x, 1838, p.82.
(2) Ibid., pp.81, 75; Dictionnaire de Biographie Franyaise* i, Paris, 
1933, pp.1288-9.
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was the principal depot for the Frendi*"(l)
In the 1830s, Kilwa Kisiwani, plagued hy political dissension 
and an increasingly unhealthy climate, was gradually replaced by 
the previously unimportant village of Kivinje, which was popularly 
called Kilwa Kivinje, as the principal collection point for slaves 
on the Kilwa coast* By 1841 Kilwa Kivinje had become a thriving 
market town* Although its fame was justifiably built on the slave 
trade, it was also "the port to which the ivory, gum copal, &c#, are 
brought from the interior and chiefly sent to Zanzibar for sale," 
according to Atkins Hamerton, who served as British Consul at Zanzibar 
from May I84I to his death in July 1857. Writing in 1842, Hamerton1 s 
additional remark that the rebellious Omani Governor of Kilwa 
Kivinje had recently levied a special tax on ivory exported to 
Zanzibar suggests that this trade may well have been even more 
important economically than the slave trade*(2) The slave trade 
there expanded even further, however, in the following years, boosted 
by both the ingenious French "free" labor immigration scheme, which 
was inaugurated in 1843, and the increasing need for hands to work 
the clove plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba* (3) In 1850 Krapf 
described Kilwa Kivinje as "the most important town on the coast 
between Moyambique and Zanzibar," and a great trading centre* Its
(1) See BM, Add. MSS 41,265, vol.v*, f1*3-6, R.T. Farquhar to Imam of 
Muscat (sic)* Port Louis, 10 May 1821; ibid., fl*7-8, same to Marquis 
of Hastings, Port Louis, 11 May 1821; ibid., fl.67-70, "Memorandum 
connected with the final Suppression of the Slave trade on the East 
Coast of Africa," c. December 1821; PRO, CO 415/7, A.No.171, PP^l-5, 
16-19, "Observations by Captain Owen on the Slave Trade in Aug,
1824#..with Dorval*s remarks thereon, 30 May 1827, n articles 1-6; 
ibid., A*No*172, pp«5“8,17—20, 25—9*
(2) SD, pp.224-59 Boteler, Narrative, ii, p*47* Hamerton*s letter is 
Quoted in Gray, "A History of Kilwa: Part II," p*35, and again in 
his "The British Vice-Consulate at Kilwa Kivinje, 1884-1885,” TNR.51, 
1958, p.176.
(3) Gray, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-1884,” in HEA,i,p.227; 
idem, History of Zanzibar, pp.226,239*
-  297 -
population he estimated to he between 12,000 and 15,000 inhabitants.
He reckoned slaves to be the principal item of trade there and he 
was told that some 10,000 to 12,000 slaves, both from central 
Tanzania and from the vicinity of Lake Malawi, passed through Kilwa 
Kivinje each year. At the same time, however, Krapf also observed 
that the town "drives a very considerable trade in ivory, rice, 
copal, tobacco* . ." If slaves were the mainstay of Kilwa Kivinje*s 
trade, they were not to the exclusion of all other products.(l)
Judging from the available sources, it does not appear that the 
Yao trading to Kilwa were inclined to regard slaves as a much more 
important item of trade than ivory until the late 1830s, and perhaps 
not even until after the great Yao migrations which occurred about 
mid-century. The Yao undoubtedly were trading large numbers of 
slaves to the coast, but the general impression is that their main 
business was still in iavory. Certainly some of the Yao whom Smee 
found in the Zanzibar slave market in 1811 were those living in 
southern Tanzania. As we have already seen, these were involved in 
extensive slaving as early as 1785* By 1819, according to Albrand, 
these Yao, as well as the coastal Makonde and Ngindo behind whom they 
dwelled in the interior, were Muslim. Kiswahili, Albrand believed, 
was the common language of all three. (2) The earliest notice of 
Yao long distance traders during this period only appears in the 
following year, when Brito Sanches remarked that both the Yao and 
the Bisa were carrying their slaves and ivory to Zanzibar /i.e., Kilwa/, 
where the Arabs bought both items at a high price. Referring to the 
same problem in 1827, it was reported from Sena that "the various tribes" 
who had previously traded to Moyambique, now carried their ivory each
(1) Krapf, Travels. p*423
(2) See above,rp.2f$+yAlbrand, "Extrait dfun Memoire,” p.80.
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year to be sold at Zanzibar. This was allegedly due to the "injustice 
and mistreatment" which they had suffered at Moyambique during the 
administration of Brito Sanches* predecessor as Governor-General.(l)
A.C.P. Gamitto*s few notes on Yao trade in his invaluable 
account of the 1831-1832 expedition to Mwata Kazembe indicates that 
the same pattern of trade described by Lacerda prevailed more than 
three decades later. The Bisa traded ivory and slaves from Kazembe*s 
and their own country to the Yao, who subsequently carried them to 
the Kilwa coast. Much of this trade was done directly between the 
Bisa and Yao, at the upper Shire River, most probably very near to 
Lake Malawi; there was also a considerable boat traffic across the 
lake. According to information which Krapf acquired from a Swahilized 
Mwera tribesman from Kilwa, who had travelled with a caravan into the 
heart of Yaoland in this general period, the lake traffic seems to 
have been predominantly in ivory. This man*s observations confirm 
Abdallah*s assertion that the lacustrine trade was controlled by the 
Maravi, whose boats ferried back and forth across the lake. They also 
substantiate Gamitto*s information that the Yao occupied the eastern 
shore of Lake Malawi. (2) It should further be noted that, by the 
time of the Portuguese expedition, Swahili traders were well known 
at Kazembe*s court. They must also have been active in Yaoland, 
where their caravans probably operated side by side with those of the 
great Yao chiefs. It seems, however, that Arabs were still only 
just beginning to penetrate East-Central Africa at this time and may 
not have dared enter Yaoland until the following decade.(3)
(1) AHU, Cod.1394, fl.46, Brito Sanches to Dos Arcos, Moy., 12 January 
1820; a££s£ta9p^s3Bsafc. Santana, Documentay8o.i.p. 170.
(2) Gamitto, King Kazembe, i, pp.64-5, ii, PP*87,144,169-71? Krapf,
Travels, pp.419-20; Abdallah, The Yaos, p.15.
(3) See Gamitto, King Kazembe. ii,pp*119-20; Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.15-17? 
Cadaval Cod. 826(M IVI32), fl.26-7, also in Rau, "Aspectos," pp.141-2; 
Albrand, "Sxtrait d*un Memoire," pp.80-1; Cunnison, Luapula Peoples, 
pp.42,155? W.Y. Campbell, Travellers* Records of Portuguese Nyassaland, 
London /?c.l900/, P«19? Barth, "Routes,” pp.285-8.
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In the late 1830s, at a time when slaves had probably become 
as important to the Yao as ivory, the first of several massive 
migrations occurred which were to have a profound effect on the 
subsequent history of the Yao# As is well known, the Ngoni invasions, 
by destroying the fabric of society among people like the Maravi and 
the Tumbuka, greatly augmented the potential supply of slaves in 
the Lake Malawi region# This process began with the crossing of the 
Zambezi in 1835 by the main body of the Ngoni, under Zongendaba, and 
their stay in Nsenga country for the next few years# By about 1840, 
the Ngoni, their numbers now swollen by the incorporation of people 
through whose country they had marched, including the Tumbuka, finally 
settled on the Fipa plateau, to the southeast of Lake Tanganyika# 
Perhaps a year or two after Zongendaba*s Ngoni crossed the Zambezi, 
a smaller Ngoni group, led by Mputa Maseko, also crossed the river# 
Without pausing in Maravia, apparently, these traversed the Shire, 
continued north along the hills lying east of Lake Malawi, and finally 
settled in Songea District of southern Tanzania# Although the Maseko 
Ngoni apparently incorporated a large number of Yao, these may have 
been those living at the extreme northwest of Yaoland, for Abdallah*s 
silence on this point implies that this migration had no great effect 
on the main body of Yao#
In about 1845 Zongendaba died and there was a second dispersal 
from the Fipa plateau. One of the Ngoni sections, led by Zulu Gama 
and Mbonani, moved east into Songea, where they joined forces with 
Mputa*s Ngoni. Eventually, there was a struggle for control between 
these two groups and Mputa Maseko was killed. Led by his successor, 
Chikuse, this Ngoni group retreated along the route they had followed 
to Songea, to the east of Lake Malawi, and finally settled at the 
southwest of the lake, where they became known as the Gomani Ngoni.
m  3^ 0 **
after Chikusefs son, Gomani. The date of the Ngoni reatreat through 
western Yaoland is not known, but here again Abdallah tacitly implies 
that it had little influence on the Yao.(l) On the other hand^ Krapf 
was told "that in the year 1847 about JOOO Wahiau were captured and 
sold to Kilwa" by a Ngoni group, known locally as Maviti, who lived 
at the southwest of Lake Malawi*(2) If some Yao were at this time 
victimized by the Ngoni, the bulk of them apparently were not. It is 
clear, however, that by mid-century East-Central Africa was already 
in an acute state of unrest, and that the previous pattern of trading, 
which itself had been determined by African reaction to the penetration 
of the Portuguese up the Zambezi in the sixteenth cBntury, had been 
seriously interrupted, if not destroyed.
At about this time the Yao were attacked from the east by their 
Lolo neighbors, a name applied to both the Makua and the Lomwe. Each 
of the various traditional accounts of this war which have been collected 
presents this war as a unique event, but it seems far more likely that 
there was a long period of conflict between the Yao and their neighbors 
from across the Lugenda and that it is only the final scattering of the 
Yao which remains uppermost in their memory.(3) Furthermore, it is 
clear that each of these published accounts has been related from a 
localized point of view. According to Abdallah, the Lolo were Makua from 
Meto; Johnson1s information supports this view. But another source 
states that the Lolo were Lomwe, and the traditions recorded by 
Macdonald and Stannus also suggest this identification. Makua traditions 
recorded in the Tanganyika District Books reveal both internal
(1) See HEA, i, pp.208-9} Tew, Peoples. pp.94-55 M. Read, The Ngoni of 
Nyasaland. London, 1956, PP*9-10» P.H. Gulliver, "A History of the 
Songea Ngoni,11 TNR. 41, 1955* pp.20-1; cf. M.S. Alberto, "Os Angones * 
os liltimos povos invasores de Angdnia Portuguesa," Mozambique. 27, 
1941, PP.87-9,95-6.
(2) Krapf, Vocabulary, p.viii; see also, idem, Travels, pp.423-5*
(3) See above, p.K^X.
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struggles among the Meto chiefs and attacks by the Lomwe into Meto.
Indeed, the Yao probably were attacked not only by both the Meto 
Makua and the Lomwe during this period, but also by the Makonde and 
the Ngoni, as is stated by Dias and Stannus, respectively. One 
possibility is that these assaults may have been stimulated by sudden 
disruption to trade which was caused by the Ngoni invasions. The 
slave trade seems clearly to have played a major part in instigating 
these conflicts, while famine also appears to have been an important 
factor* The antagonism between the Yao and their eastern neighbors, 
which was a factor in diverting Yao traders to Kilwa in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, was surely aggravated by both these 
additional elements, especially the first. During the 1850s there 
was probably a continual movement of people throughout this area, with 
large numbers of Makua and Yao crossing the Ruvuma into southern 
Tanzania. The culmination of these attacks on the Yao came in about 
1858 or 1859, when the Macinga Yao were routed from the Mandimba hills.
From here they fell against the Mangoce Yao and, driving them ahead, 
both groups poured into southeri?Malawi.(l)
This crucial period in Yao history is as yet imperfectly under­
stood; the key to it lies in the gathering and analysis of a greater 
body of Yao, as well as Makua,-Lomwe, and perhaps Gomani Ngoni, 
tradition than is presently available. Nevertheless, the mid-nineteenth 
century Yao migrations into both Tanzania and Malawi clearly stand as 
an important milestone not only in Yao history, but also in the history 
of East-Central Africa. Throughout the eighteenth and even in the first
(l) Abdallah, The Yaos, pp.17-19? UMCA, MSS, A1 (iv),/Johnson/, "Up the 
Lujenda," /l880/, Johnson, Nyasa. pp.100-1; anon., A Journey to Lake 
Nyasa. pp#39“40> D. Macdonald, "Yao and Nyanja Tales*" Bantu Studies, 
xii, 1938, p.275; Stannus, "The Wayao of Nyasaland," pp.231-3? Dias,
Os Macondes. i,p.80; TDB, i, Masasis "Tribal History and Legends," 
0.1(149)? TDB.ii. Lindi: "Tribal History and Legends," p#6(l95); ibid., 
Mikindani, "Tribal History and Legends," pp.4-6(211-13)? Livingstone, 
Last Journals, i, p.88; cf. Rangeley, "The Ama Cinga Ayao," pp.40-2; 
idem, "The Ayao," pp.10-11,13; idem, "The Arabs," pp.23-4*
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half of the nineteenth century, the Yao seem to have dealt with 
their neighbors as traders* Even when the slave trade became as 
important as the ivory trade this seems to have been the case. As 
Abdallah state% and as the writings of Livingstone and all the 
Europeans who followed him into the eastern half of East-Central 
Africa reveal, the effect of these migrations was to turn the Yao 
into marauding invaders. For the rest of the century the Yao were 
as much raiders as traders, and slaves dominated their trading as 
never before. Rather than weakening them, this dispersal led to 
the beginning of Yao hegemony throughout large areas of southern 
Tanzania and southern Malawi, while Yaoland itself remained firmly 
in their control. Its effect was to spread, rather than limit, 
their influence, (l) In many respects it marks the beginning of the 
modern period in Yao history§ while the collapse of the earlier 
commercial network, developed by the Maravi and the Yao during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in response to the arrival of 
the Portuguese, and dominated by the Yao during the next century and 
a half, exposed East-Central Africa to increasing disintegration 
and destruction, which in turn led to the establishment of a new 
political order.
(l) Cf. HEA. i, p.286.
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